The Role of accounting in legitimising the culture of the Australian construction industry by Massingham, Rada Kosa
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection 
2017+ University of Wollongong Thesis Collections 
2017 
The Role of accounting in legitimising the culture of the Australian 
construction industry 
Rada Kosa Massingham 
University of Wollongong 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses1 
University of Wollongong 
Copyright Warning 
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University 
does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any 
copyright material contained on this site. 
You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 
1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised, 
without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe 
their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court 
may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material. 
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the 
conversion of material into digital or electronic form. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the University of Wollongong. 
Recommended Citation 
Massingham, Rada Kosa, The Role of accounting in legitimising the culture of the Australian construction 
industry, Doctor of Philosophy thesis, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, University of 
Wollongong, 2017. https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses1/113 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
 
The Role of Accounting in Legitimising the 
Culture of the Australian Construction 
Industry 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the award of the degree 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
from 
UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG 
by 
Rada Kosa Massingham, B.Com (Merit), MBA 
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, 
Faculty of Business 
2017 
   
 
 
   
CERTIFICATION 
I, Rada Kosa Massingham, declare that this thesis, submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the School of Accounting, 
Economics and Finance, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless 
otherwise referenced or acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for 




Rada Kosa Massingham 
  
CERTIFICATION  i 
ABSTRACT 
Purpose: The purpose of this study was to examine the underlying conflict between a 
lawless culture and accounting practices within the context of the Australian Construction 
Industry. This provided an opportunity to examine accounting’s role as a legitimising 
process, within the context of the Critical Accounting perspective of whether accounting 
practice is objective or subjective. In doing so, the aim was to examine the social system 
that accountants work within this industry. The thesis explores the role of accounting 
within this complex industry at a period of time, the 2003 Royal Commission, where its 
lawlessness had become such that society recognised its social contract was breached and 
told the industry that this behavior would no longer be tolerated. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The methodology is a historical narrative embedded case 
study which uses content analysis and critical discourse analysis to find meaning in the 
reports written about the Royal Commission into Building and Construction Industry by 
Commissioner Cole. The research is in the period 2003-2011, with a primary focus of the 
period surrounding the Royal Commission into the industry and its immediate aftermath 
(2003-2005). The thesis has adopted a critical accounting approach based on using ‘new 
history’ narrative to examine the role of accounting from a socio-metric rather than 
econometric lens. Therefore, it has been interested in people, the industry’s stakeholders, 
and understanding their behaviours. The data collection, analysis and reporting uses 
Content Analysis as well as Critical Discourse Analysis. Critical discourse analysis was 
used to examine the societal and political themes emerging from the content analysis 
coding categories. The outcomes of the critical discourse analysis were examined from a 
ABSTRACT  ii 
critical accounting perspective, with a particular emphasis on public interest theory, and 
stakeholder and legitimacy theories.  
Conclusions (or findings): First, this study shows that accountants in the construction 
industry acted subjectively. They did this because accounting practice allows scope for 
what is called creative accounting. Chapter 6 explains the pressure placed on accountants 
by other stakeholders and how accountants responded. Second, the study provides 
regulators with information about the social practice of accounting which might be used to 
improve regulation of the industry. Given much of the industry’s unlawful behaviour 
occurs due to poor or inappropriate financial management, improved accounting practice in 
the industry could help restore public confidence and repair legitimation. This could be 
done by empowering accountants to act as internal regulators. Third, there are practical 
outcomes in terms of opportunity for accounting bodies to take action to improve 
accounting practice within the construction industry, addressing accounting standards, and 
a community of action research. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the complex social systems 
within the construction industry, and how practical solutions to structural and cultural 
reform must embrace a systems thinking approach. Fourth, there are several theoretical 
outcomes. The study contributes to critical accounting theory by advancing our 
understanding of organisational power and politics, and its impact on the role of 
accounting. The findings examined how accounting may serve a useful social purpose and 
how its practice may be continually improved. The analysis concludes with 
recommendations about how accounting practice may be improved to repair legitimisation 
in an industry that appears to ignore public interest.  
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Research contributions: (Theoretical) The study contributes to critical accounting theory 
by expounding how accounting practice was influenced by stakeholder interests within the 
construction industry’s political economy. By examining the reasons why regulation of the 
construction industry was so difficult and suggesting how this may be improved the study 
contributes to public interest theory. In consideration of the importance of the role of 
accounting in legitimising an industry with a long history of unlawfulness, the study 
contributes to the political economy theories of regulation reflecting broader cultural and 
societal values. The study contributes to legitimacy theory by defining the nature of the 
social contract breach between the construction industry and Australian society, and 
strategies to repair legitimacy. By exploring how the constructs of relationships, impact and 
expectations help us understand the social practice of accounting within the context of a 
social contract breach, the study contributes to stakeholder theory from the managerial 
perspective. The contribution lies in the empirical evidence of the socio-political power 
inequities defining the social interaction between industry stakeholders which have 
breached their social contract. Contributions to stakeholder theory include using  social 
network analysis theory’s construct of density to enhance our understanding of the 
relationships concept; using the social network analysis constructs of heterogeneity and 
homogeneity to examine stakeholder behaviour, focusing on harmony and cohesion, 
furthering our understanding of the ethical perspective; using types and causes of power to 
explain political behavior, improving our understanding of the impact concept; and 
identifying four societal expectations to explain the social contract breach, contributing to 
our understanding of the expectation concept.  
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 (Methodological) The study contributes to the debate between traditional accounting 
history and new accounting history in two ways. First, it examines the existence of multiple 
stakeholders within an industry and not just the political or social elites, in this case 
owners/managers within the construction industry. Whereas traditional accounting history 
might have written this thesis from the perspective of those with economic power, that is, 
owners/managers; the new history approach adopted allows for exploration of stakeholders 
with little power, including accountants, and how this has influenced accounting as social 
practice in this industry. Second, it questions the role of facts and truth in accounting 
history. Whereas traditional accounting history has had a pursuit of truth, evidence, and 
objective knowledge; new accounting history questions the need for such a rigorous 
approach. New accounting history has a more subjective perspective about events, allowing 
for multiple truths and even facts, depending upon the lens from which the events are 
written.  
(Substantive) The study makes a substantive contribution by advancing our knowledge of 
accounting practice based on the social network analysis constructs of interaction, 
cohesion, and harmony. This produced four types of accounting social practice: trust, 
regulate, isolated, and hostile. It identifies the unlawful activities and the involvement of 
accountants in these activities. It defines the accounting processes where unlawful 
behaviour existed. The study provides guidelines for improving the social practice of 
accounting. 
Research limitations: The research is limited in several ways. First, there are 
methodological limitations. Critics of historical narrative argue that they provide an 
incomplete story and therefore a weak form of history. This is addressed by embracing the 
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new history accounting method, which explores the historical narrative of the role of 
accounting in the construction industry from a social practice perspective. Second, there are 
theoretical limitations. Critical accounting theory may be seen as a controversial field 
because it aims to develop a more self-reflexive and contextualized perspective on 
accounting. While there are several perspectives on critical accounting, this study focuses 
on  the role of sectional interests, for example stakeholders in accounting practice, 
particularly exploring the role of socio-political power inequities using stakeholder theory.  
Future research: The historical narrative in this thesis is broad, encompassing a complex 
industry, substantial data, activities, social networks, and social practice. Future research 
might involve interviews with individuals involved in the construction industry 
representing the various stakeholders, to gain further knowledge about motivation, 
behaviours, and culture. Future research might also consider how accounting might 
improve its role in this industry by implementing some of the ideas presented in chapter 7.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The building and construction industry in Australia requires significant cultural 
change. Such change is necessary if the rule of law is to be reintroduced to conduct 
and activities within the industry, if individuals’ freedoms are to be maintained, and 
if the industry is to achieve its economic potential. Change is required in the 
attitudes of all sectors of the industry, including governments, clients, head 
(contractors) or subcontractors, industrial organisations and employees. (Cole 
2003, vol. 11, p. 3) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Accounting can play an important role in ensuring industry behaviour meets societal 
expectations by ensuring industry actors operate lawfully and in the public interest. These 
issues are especially important in relation to the Australian construction industry 
(hereinafter referred to as the construction industry). This industry is important to Australia 
due to its economic and social contribution but it has a history of unlawful behaviour. The 
primary objective of this study is to examine the underlying conflict between a lawless 
culture and accounting practices within the construction industry. It provides an opportunity 
to examine the role of accounting as a legitimising process, within the context of critical 
accounting, to appraise whether accounting practice is objective or subjective.   
Construction is one of Australia’s largest industries. An industry analyst report found that 
the industry generates $285 billion of revenue annually (Dunn 2010, p.3), and represents 
6.2% of Australia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Dunn 2010, p.35). The construction 
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industry has a history of behaviour which society has considered unacceptable. In August 
2001, the Australian Prime Minister (PM) announced the Royal Commission into the 
Building and Construction Industry (hereinafter referred to as the Royal Commission 
(RC)). A royal commission is a major government inquiry into a controversial issue of 
public importance. The Royal Commissions Act 1902, section 1A, defines a commission as 
an “inquiry into and report upon any matter specified in the Letters Patent, and which 
relates to or is connected with the peace, order, and good government of the 
Commonwealth, or any public purpose”. Gilligan (2002, p. 22) notes that the pragmatic 
function of a public inquiry, such as a royal commission, is to “investigate an issue for a 
government, collect information, submit a report and make recommendations”. Gilligan 
(2002, p. 23) argues that public inquiries such as royal commissions have a “broader 
political, or ideological, function as a management strategy, in particular that of crisis 
management”.  
On 29 August 2001, the Governor-General issued a commission to The Honourable 
Terence Rhoderic Hudson Cole RFD QC (hereinafter referred to as Commissioner Cole) to 
“conduct inquiries into the unlawful or otherwise inappropriate practice and conduct in the 
building and construction industry” (DEWR 2003, p. 11). The Terms of Reference (TOR) 
asked Commissioner Cole to make recommendations to “improve the state of the industry” 
(DEWR 2003, p. 11). Clearly, the DEWR saw the RC as tasked to identify inappropriate 
conduct, the social contract breach, and to fix it, by repairing legitimacy. 
There are several reasons why governments appoint public inquiries such as royal 
commissions, including: (1) to provide a perceived independent response to a crisis 
situation and (2) to investigate allegations of impropriety (Prasser 2006). Launching a royal 
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commission is a serious matter and a clear message from the government that an industry’s 
behaviour has breached society’s expectations of acceptable conduct. There have been 
numerous Australian Royal Commissions including the coal industry (Davidson 1929), 
wheat flour and bread industries (Gepp 1936); however, the only industry subject to a 
Royal Commission in Australia during the twenty-first century is the construction industry 
(Prasser 2006). This illustrates the significance of an industry royal commission. The 
Commissioner Cole completed his report in 2003, and it is known as the Royal 
Commission Report (RCR). It was an important event in Australia’s history, and a 
substantial intervention by the government as regulator of the construction industry.   
There were two main reasons for the PM to launch the RC. First, the perception that the 
construction industry’s behaviour had become unacceptable. This established that there was 
a social contract breach. The industry had a long history of unlawful and inappropriate 
behaviour. However, society was no longer willing to tolerate this behaviour. The impetus 
for the RC was a report on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) television 
program Four Corners which exposed a culture of corruption within the trade unions 
associated with the construction industry (Neighbour 2001). The industry had an unsavory 
reputation and even had links to organized crime which attracted significant negative media 
and other coverage. While there was a tendency to blame trade unions for illegal and 
unsatisfactory conduct, there were suggestions that management and other industry 
stakeholders were involved, at least to the extent that they did not act to stop unlawful 
behaviour. The Four Corners report highlighted growing alarms about the extent of 
unlawful behaviour within the industry, and forced the government to investigate whether it 
was acting in the public interest.  
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Second, the perception that society would benefit if the construction industry unlawful and 
inappropriate behaviour was addressed. This established that the legitimisation of the 
construction industry was necessary. The RCR argued that all sectors of the Australian 
economy would benefit if the structural and cultural reforms recommended for the 
construction industry were successfully implemented (Cole 2003, vol. 1, pp. 3-4). The 
societal contract between the construction industry and Australian society in the period 
following the RC was that it will achieve its economic potential by successfully 
implementing the recommended reforms.  
The PM’s statement explaining the need for the RC made it clear that it was a criminal 
investigation with the use of the word ‘unlawful’ or otherwise inappropriate conduct. The 
TOR asked the RC to find evidence of this unlawful behaviour and solutions. The statement 
explained that the regulator felt the social contract with the construction industry had been 
breached and wanted the legitimacy gap closed so that the industry could once again be 
considered legitimate.  
The structural and cultural issues highlighted by the RC in 2003 had developed over many 
years. Much of the cultural behaviour was historically caused by the industry’s industrial 
relations structure. The cost of industrial relations breakdown in the construction industry 
was highlighted a decade before the RC (Aiyewalehinmi, Oluwoye, & Lenard 1994). The 
industry’s structural issues were created by power imbalances between industry 
stakeholders; particularly the widespread use of very small businesses, known as sub-
contractors (Toner 2006). The construction industry’s unsatisfactory behaviour was caused 
by industrial relations activity which exploited the structural imbalances within the 
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industry. The RC found that the industry has a proven predisposition to manipulation and 
non-compliance embedded in its culture (Cole 2003).  
This study examines the role of accountants within the construction industry from two 
perspectives: how accounting may have dealt with the business practices that led to the RC 
(up to 2003), and then how accounting may have assisted structural and cultural reform 
(after 2003). Construction firms employ accountants to analyse and report on financial 
information to explain current performance and future prospects (Palepu, Healy, Bernard & 
Peek 2007). In the construction industry, there are large firms, known as head contractors, 
and small firms, known as sub-contractors. Head contractors employ accountants to provide 
management and financial accounting information for internal decision making involving 
management, external reporting involving stakeholders such as owners and investors, and 
regulation involving auditors. However, sub-contractors are different. While there are 
larger sub-contractors who employ accountants, most firms outsource this function to an 
accounting firm which is paid to provide professional services. Sub-contractors typically 
employ five staff or less (Toner 2006). These are very small business which would not be 
able to afford a full-time accountant. Their accountant would be an outsider, who may not 
be aware of the day-to-day operations of the business.  
The unlawful and inappropriate behaviour of the construction industry leads to questions 
about the role of accounting within the businesses of head contractors and sub-contractors. 
While accountants may have had different employment relationships with these firms, they 
are still bound by the professional and ethical standards adopted by the profession. 
Researchers disagree over whether accounting is as an objective rule-based system which 
supports legitimisation processes, or a subjective construction based on satisficing (Deegan 
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2009). Given the unlawful and inappropriate behaviour in other functional areas within the 
construction industry, such as management, project management, procurement, and human 
resources (Cole 2003); it leads to questions regarding the role of accounting. Given 
employees involved in these other activities were involved in unlawful behaviours; 
accountants, in all likelihood, would have also been involved. In recent years, white collar 
crime, for example Enron, including insurance claims, credit cards, money laundering, and 
cyber-crime has been highlighted as an increasing problem for society (Yallapragada, Roe 
& Toma  2012). Accounting has been implicated in these scandals with suggestions that 
accountants and auditors had “unethical standards, unscrupulous and cooperating” 
behaviours (Yallapragada, Roe & Toma 2012). This study does not make accusations 
regarding the behaviour of any of the construction industry’s stakeholders, including trade 
unions or accountants. Instead it examines the role of accounting within this environment 
based on publicly available information and sources, but in doing so, does not infer illegal 
activity regarding any individual or firm.  
This study provides an opportunity to test accounting’s role as a legitimising process in 
terms of whether accounting was able to address the social contract breach. In this way, this 
study examines whether accounting was part of the unlawful behaviour that led to the RC 
in 2003. Accountants are employed by the firm and their livelihood depends upon 
maintaining this employment relationship with the firm. Under these circumstances, this 
study will explore how accountants responded to pressures for inappropriate conduct, 
which seemed to have involved staff in other functional areas, with similar employment 
relationships. This provides an opportunity to engage in the Critical Accounting Theory 
(CAT) debate about whether accounting is an objective or subjective practice. If it is 
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objective, then this study should find that accountants were able to withstand the pressures 
exerted by stakeholders such as owners/managers, and apply accounting practices, such as 
the standards, in all circumstances. If it is subjective, the study should find that accountants 
were unable to withstand these pressures, and applied creative accounting or other practices 
which applied individual judgment.  
The purpose of the thesis, and the underlying research objectives and broad research 
themes, is to examine underlying conflict between an unlawful culture and regulated 
accounting practices within the context of the construction industry. The thesis has a 
sociological perspective in the sense that it focuses on the behaviour of accountants within 
the broader social context of the organisations and the industry they work in. The outcome 
is a social reconstructed reality of accounting within this economic and socially important 
industry, which advances our understanding of the role of accountants, and their 
legitimation of cultural behaviours within the broader objective of protecting the public 
interest.  
 
1.2 The Importance of the Construction Industry 
1.2.1 Importance of the Study 
Studying the conduct of the construction industry is important from at least three 
considerations. The industry is important to Australia’s economy, contributing 6.2% of 
Australia’s GDP. The RC described it as “critical to welfare and prosperity in Australia” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 3). The industry is a major source of employment for Australians in 
industries such as building material suppliers and associated service providers; in particular 
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it provides an important service for society in terms of shelter and infrastructure. Thus 
Australian society desires a strong and competitive construction industry, which behaves 
lawfully. The RC argued that the whole of Australian society would benefit if the 
construction industry addressed its unlawful behaviour. The study helps us understand the 
role accountants can play in meeting this societal expectation.    
Implementation of industry cultural change necessary to satisfy societal expectations is an 
important measure of effective government policy. As chapter 4 will show, the construction 
industry has been heavily regulated for decades. The Australian federal government acted 
as the industry regulator on behalf of Australian society which expected the industry to 
meet its social contract. Many attempts at regulation had little success. Indeed, the 
construction industry unlawful and inappropriate behaviour appeared to worsen in years 
leading up to the RC in 2003. The government made a significant investment in conducting 
a RC and the Australian society would expect a return on that investment in the form of 
successful implementation of the cultural change reforms. The government had run out of 
patience with the industry and its previous attempts at reform and now wanted the industry 
to change its business practices. The Commissioner Cole stated that cultural reform of the 
construction industry would have widespread direct and indirect benefits (Cole 2003). This 
study helps us understand the role accountants might play in industry cultural reform and 
achieving these benefits.  
The construction industry provides a unique context for examining whether accounting is 
an objective rule-based system or a subjective process influenced by stakeholder demands. 
In this way, the study presents an opportunity for examining the role of accounting in a 
business environment moving towards increased focus on good corporate governance, 
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ethical behaviour, and social responsibility (Lusher 2012). Society expects accounting to 
assist in compliance with the social contract between itself and organisations or even 
industries. This study also provides a historical context by tracking changes from 2003 till 
2012, thereby enabling an opportunity to examine whether accounting helped the industry 
towards legitimisation.  
The study makes important contributions in measuring changes in the behaviour of the 
construction industry, the role of accounting, and accounting’s value to society. The study 
is grounded in a critical accounting theoretical perspective, which views accounting as a 
process that occurs within the social construct of organisations. This study contributes to 
our understanding of the social reality of accounting within the research context of this 
economic and socially significant industry.  
 
1.2.2 Australian Construction Industry Societal Reputation 
The construction industry has a long history of propensity towards unlawful or rebellious 
behaviour, and the industry’s history is strongly associated with the birth and growth of the 
trade union movement in Australia. The workers in the construction industry are mainly 
laborers or tradespeople and their employers are wealthy landowners or property 
developers, which has created socio-political inequities which manifested in the working 
class wealth divide. This led to the formation of some of the strongest and most militant 
trade unions in Australia. The unions have a history of conflict with employers, which has 
led to government intervention and ultimately the deregistering of several unions (CFMEU 
Victoria 2010). The construction industry has a reputation of industrial relations conflict 
and practices requiring intervention by the regulator, the Federal Government.   
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The RC contained 23 volumes. Volume 23 is confidential and not open to the public. 
Volume 3 was a particularly important volume as it addressed cultural change, which was 
seen as a major factor in the construction industry’s unlawful behaviour. Commissioner 
Cole makes this comment at the beginning of volume 3: 
The nature and extent of the unlawful and inappropriate conduct disclosed in the 
hearings before me and recorded in this report should not continue uncorrected 
(Cole 2003, vol. 11, p. 3). 
The RC, which described the industry as having a “culture of disregard for the law” (Cole 
2003, vol. 1, p. 13), was scathing in its criticism of the trade unions and union officials 
associated with the industry. Much of the blame for the unlawful culture in the industry was 
placed with the unions. However, there is evidence in the RCR that the other industry 
stakeholders, most especially employers and management, complied with the demands of 
the unions and participated in unlawful behaviour. This behaviour most commonly created 
unfair or unsafe workplace practices. There was also abundant evidence of fraudulent 
activity including misuse of funds, bribery, and corruption. As explained in the RCR, this 
unlawful behaviour was “fostered because of the short term project profitability focus of all 
those in the industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 13). This implicates all industry stakeholders. 
Accountants are involved in the pursuit of profitability because they analyse and report on 
profitability measures and as discussed earlier profit manipulation is an activity of unlawful 
and inappropriate behaviour that would involve accountants.  
The pressures caused by competition encouraged people to break the rules in the pursuit of 
profit.  At this stage, it is important to note that while many of the cultural problems were 
blamed on trade unions, which led to widespread intimidation, harassment, coercion, and 
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fear, the RC infers that management (and others) were to blame for complying with union 
demands. Management contributed to the cultural problems in pursuit of profit for, if they 
did not comply, projects would be delayed and profits lost. If activities involved financial 
management, management may have involved their accountants in complying with the 
demands of trade unions. If money was involved in the interaction between management 
and trade unions, accountants should have been aware and perhaps involved.  
  
1.2.3 Public Interest Theory 
There is significant public interest in the construction industry because it is important 
economically, socially, and politically. Public Interest Theory (PIT) claims regulation is 
introduced to protect the public and that regulators seek to maximize the overall welfare of 
the community. Regulation is a trade-off between the cost of regulation and the social 
benefits of regulation (Scott 2003, p. 448). PIT assumes that the regulator, which is usually 
the government, is a neutral arbiter of the public interest and does not let its self-interest 
impact on the regulatory process. From a financial reporting perspective, investors need 
“protection from fraudulent organisations that may produce misleading information which, 
due to information asymmetries, cannot be known to be fraudulent when used” (Deegan 
2006, p. 41).  
The regulation of accounting or the absence of regulation can have many economic and 
social consequences (Deegan 2006, p. 43). Researchers make the distinction between public 
and private interest theory of regulation. Public interest is often described as investor 
protection regulation because it aims to protect investors from unlawful behaviour. PIT 
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“holds that regulation is supplied in response to the demand of the public for the correction 
of inefficient or inequitable market practices” (Posner 1974, p. 335), which suggest it is in 
the public’s interest for firms to operate their business efficiently and equitably. Private 
interest theory argues that regulation is driven by the needs of powerful lobby groups, and 
while this definitely happens in Australia, for example the powerful mining industry 
successfully over-turned the Resources Super Profits Tax, an unpopular government tax,   
in 2010, this was not the case with the construction industry in 2003. The RCR suggested 
that the government believed that the industry was ‘under-performing’, largely due to 
inefficient work practices caused by unlawful behaviour, and that the resulting lack of 
productivity was hurting the Australian economy. In this respect, the RC was driven by 
genuine public interest by the regulator with a sincere desire to force the industry to comply 
with society’s expectations.  
Political Economy Theory (PET) (Gray, Owens & Adams 1996, p. 47) provides the social, 
political and economic framework for this thesis. Legitimacy Theory (LT) and Stakeholder 
Theory (ST) both derive from the broader theory of PET (Deegan 2009, p. 321). LT will be 
used to define the social contract between the construction industry and the society within 
which it operates. (Deegan 2009, p. 325) The industry value system is incongruent with the 
value system of the larger social system. This incongruence results in a disparity that is a 
threat to the legitimacy (Lindblom 1994, p. 2). ST will be used to identify key stakeholders, 
individual social contracts and industry’s responsibility to stakeholders, both managerially 
and ethically. Gray, Kouhy, and Lavers (1995) explain that there are similarities and 
overlap between LT and ST as both address the issues underlying PET. However, the two 
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are distinguished by using LT to consider the construction industry’s interactions with 
society as a whole, and ST to focus on the interactions between the industry’s stakeholders.  
The basis of an industry’s social contract is explained by PIT. PIT claims regulation is 
introduced to protect the public and that regulators seek to maximize the overall welfare of 
the community. From an accounting perspective, regulators, such as the government, 
primarily aim to protect investors from fraudulent activity, but also aim to protect against 
non-productivity and other poor performance which will have significant direct, such as 
loss of employment, and indirect, such as non-competitiveness of supporting industries,  
impact on the economy.  
LT provides further insight into the social contract between the industry and Australian 
society. “Legitimacy theory asserts that organisations continually seek to ensure that they 
are perceived as operating within the bounds and norms of their respective societies - that 
is, they attempt to ensure that their activities are perceived by outside parties as being 
‘legitimate’” (Deegan 2009, p. 323). Traditionally, accounting theory has been situated 
within the goal of profit maximization as the optimal measure of corporate performance 
(Patten 1991). Under this notion, a firm’s profits were viewed as an all-inclusive measure 
of organisational legitimacy (Ramanathan 1976) because this increased societal wealth. 
This perspective addresses the non-productivity and poor performance aspects of the RCR. 
However, an increase in corporate disasters (for example, Enron) and unethical behaviour 
has led to a shift in focus. Social contracts expect organisations to react and “attend to 
human, environmental, and other social consequences’’ of their activities (Heard & Bolce 
1981, p.247). This perspective addresses the unlawful behaviour aspects of the RCR.  
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The RCR sets out society’s expectations of the industry, and the extent to which it complies 
with the social contract (Deegan 2009, p. 325). In this sense, the RC represents a gap 
analysis, measuring the difference between current practice and desired practice, and was a 
significant trigger for change. This defines the ‘legitimacy gap’ in the industry’s social 
contract (Deegan 2009, p. 329). The legitimacy gap is the difference between how an 
organisation should act and how it is perceived that the organisation has acted (Deegan 
2009, p. 329).  
Seven unlawful behaviours were selected as the focus of the thesis. These behaviours were 
identified from the analysis of the RC findings. They were selected because they were 
dominant themes in the RC and were associated with financial matters and, therefore, might 
involve accountants. The seven unlawful behaviours are: 
1. Tax evasion 
2. Employee entitlements 
3. Phoenix company activity 
4. Security of payments 
5. Profit reporting 
6. Inappropriate payments 
7. Payroll tax 
The process for selecting these behaviours was as follows. Volume 1 of the RCR presents 
Commissioner Cole’s main findings (Cole 2003, vol. 1). There were three key findings 
which were used in the selection of these behaviours: 
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1. On page 5, section 15: Findings regarding conduct and practices in the building and 
construction industry throughout Australia, listed 25 behaviours (Cole 2003, vol. 1, 
p.5).  
2. On pages 6-10, section 19: The types of inappropriate conduct which exist 
throughout the building and construction, listed 87 behaviours (Cole 2003, vol. 1, 
p.6-10). 
3. On page 17, section 36: Recommendations for reform of the construction industry, 
listed 23 behaviours (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p.17). 
While profit reporting was not specifically mentioned in the three sections outlined in table 
1.1, it was mentioned numerous times in the volume 1 report (and elsewhere in the other 
volumes). An example is discussion of the short term project driven profit process (Cole 
2003, vol. 1, p.13), which reveals Commissioner Cole’s concerns with how the construction 
industry’s structural and cultural problems created pressure to manipulate reporting.  Profit 
reporting involved profit manipulation. This was done for several purposes and for different 
audiences. Owners/managers might seek to manipulate profit reporting to falsify the 
company’s financial position to persuade other companies of financial viability when 
tendering for work, or to mislead regulators and evade tax, or even to avoid the threshold 
for payroll tax. The RC provides several detailed case studies which shed light on how 
employers engaged in inappropriate behaviours associated with profit reporting (see section 
6.2.5). Table 1.1 provides details. 
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Table 1 - 1.1 Selection of Seven Unlawful Behaviours 
Table 1.1: Selection of Seven Unlawful Behaviours 
Unlawful Behaviour Section 15 Section 19 Section 36 
Tax evasion (v) avoidance and 
evasion of taxation 
obligations 






(c) underpayment of 
employees’ 
entitlements 








(u) absence of 
adequate security of 
payment for 
subcontractors 
 (n) Security of 
payments 








• Unions insisting on the payment of a travel allowance to 
workers who did not travel in their work  
• Payment by a head contractor of unpaid debts of its 
subcontractor, pursuant to an implicit or explicit union 
demand  
• A practice within the industry that the response to the 
unlawful or inappropriate exercise of power by a union is the 
payment of money or a ‘commercial solution’ rather than 
resort to the law  
• The disguising of payments of money by contractors to a 
union 
(u) Unlawful and 
inappropriate 
payments 
Payroll tax N/a N/a (k) Payroll tax 
obligations – 
compliance 
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“Legitimacy theory proposes a relationship between corporate disclosures and community 
expectations, the view being that management reacts to community concerns and makes 
necessary changes” (Deegan 2009, p. 340). Researchers tend to use media reports as an 
indication of public satisfaction or dissatisfaction with an organisation’s activities (see Ader 
1995, p. 300; Brown & Deegan 1998). Organisations can also use customer surveys to 
gauge satisfaction levels. Neuman (1990) distinguishes between “obtrusive” and “non-
obtrusive” issues, which defines public awareness levels, and enables organisations to 
prioritise issues for action. For example, interest rate increases are highly visible and would 
be an obtrusive issue for banks; while industrial relations practices or accounting 
procedures would be invisible to most and, therefore, classified as non-obtrusive. In this 
study, the RC made societal expectations very explicit for all industry stakeholders. In 
addition, chapter 5 will show that the construction industry had a history of regulation prior 
to the RC. Society, through the regulator the Federal Government, had made its 
dissatisfaction with the industry’s behaviour explicit. Therefore, the industry’s managers 
should have known what society expected of them and that they were in breach of this 
expectation. Managers did not need to carry out their own research, analysis, or guess what 
society expected from them. The RCR clearly specified the nature of the social contract. 
Therefore the societal contract and the nature of the breach was made explicit both before 
the RC, through the various efforts to regulate the industry before 2003, and then by the 
RC.  
Based on the above discussion of the theoretical definitions, the main conceptual 
development will lie in understanding the interaction of stakeholders in complying or not 
complying with the construction industry’s social contract. This discussion will focus on 
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the role of accounting. This examines the reasons that led the various stakeholders, 
including accountants, to accept or reject society’s expectations. 
The social contract and the importance of pursuing legitimacy is explained in three ways: 
Pragmatic: based on audience self-interest, Moral: based on normative approval, and 
Cognitive: based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness (Suchman 1995, p. 1). 
Legitimacy is a relative concept in the sense that it is relative to the social system in which 
the organisation operates at a particular time and place (Deegan 2009, p. 324). Legitimacy 
motives help us understand its relativity. Pragmatism is focused on the stakeholder doing 
what is right for them, morality is the sense of doing the right thing, and cognitive is ‘doing 
things the way we do it around here’. The legitimacy motives of the various stakeholders 
within the construction industry will be distinguished. This will then explain the industry’s 
motives for compliance or non-compliance with the social contract. 
Stakeholders motivated with pragmatism will be more likely to breach the social contract 
than stakeholders motivated by cognitive or morality motives. In terms of ST, there are 
various groups with a vested interest in the construction industry, but they also have 
different expectations of accounting practice, manifested as multiple social contracts. The 
inappropriate behaviour associated with other construction industry activities suggests that 
the industry tended to adopt a managerial rather than ethical perspective on stakeholder 
expectations. Clearly, not all stakeholder groups are equal in the Industry. This may have 
affected accountants employed by the industry due to differences in power within these 
groups creating conflict over accounting practice. This suggests the need for enquiry into 
who amongst these stakeholder groups was in control and what their expectations of 
accounting were. ST allows an opportunity to further examine the tension between 
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accounting as an objective rule based system versus a subjective reality. This raises the 
question of whether accounting is based on a sense of responsibility, doing the right thing, 
or demand, meeting the interests of the most powerful stakeholders. There are three 
stakeholder constructs: relationships, impact, and expectations (Gray, Owens & Adams 
1996, p. 45). Relationships measures the importance of the stakeholder to the organisation, 
impact measures which stakeholders the organisation’s activities will have the greatest 
effect on, and expectations measures stakeholders in terms of their vested interest in the 
organisation. This framework is used to differentiate the political economy of construction 
industry stakeholders. The political economy will be stronger if there are differences 
between stakeholders in these three stakeholder constructs. On the other hand, homogeneity 
within the stakeholders will create a weak political economy. A strong political economy 
will be dysfunctional, manifesting in social contract breach, and create pressures on 
accounting practice. Alternatively, a weak political economy will lead to more compliance 
with the social contract and less pressure on accounting practice. Organisations that treat 
stakeholder groups as more equal are more likely to follow the social contract.  
 
1.3 Accounting and Regulation 
The accounting “profession’s social obligation to serve the public is paralleled by enhanced 
occupational status. In return for this enhanced status, members of the profession agree to 
undertake their work with the public interest in mind” (Carey 1965, p. 376). Accounting 
has high occupational status, largely because it deals with money and has a reputation for 
integrity and objectivity, which is reinforced by the audit process. Accounting and 
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accountants are afforded trust by society with the understanding that they will act in the 
public interest. Members of the Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board 
Limited (APESB) are required to comply with APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants, when acting in the public interest (Section 100.1). Further guidance on the 
application of the fundamental principles contained within Part A and Part C of the code 
are provided to Members in Business in APES GN 40 Ethical Conflicts in the Workplace – 
Considerations for Members in Business.  
The societal contract agreed to by accountants is embodied in the accounting standards. The 
standards represent the set of rules that accountants agree to follow in carrying out their 
work. The public interest is served by accountants doing their work according to the 
accounting standards. In the construction industry, one of the main standards issued by the 
Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB ) is Australian Accounting Standards 
Board (AASB) 111 Construction Contracts, which establishes that “the primary issue in 
accounting for construction contracts is the allocation of contract revenue and contract costs 
to the reporting periods in which construction work is performed”. Distortions in profit may 
result from misstated revenue. It is important that “contract revenue is matched with the 
contract costs incurred in reaching the stage of completion, resulting in the reporting of 
revenue, expenses and profit which can be attributed to the proportion of work completed” 
(AASB 111, para. 25). If this standard is not followed, then inappropriate behaviour such as 
profit manipulation may occur. AASB 111 is to be superseded by AASB 15 Revenue from 
Contracts with Customers as of 1 January 2018.   
A construction firm must determine how and when to recognise contract revenue and 
contract costs. The accounting standard prescribes the accounting treatment of revenue and 
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costs associated with construction contracts. The standard, in essence, requires that contract 
revenue and contract costs be recognised by applying the stage of completion method and 
that specific information be disclosed about construction contracts in the financial reports 
of contractors. The accounting standard requires the entity to disclose: 
a. Amount of contract revenue recognised as revenue in the period; and 
b. The methods used to determine the contract revenue recognised in the period; 
and 
c. The methods used to determine the stage of completion of contracts in progress 
(AASB 111, para. 39). 
According to the accounting standard, the stage of completion of a contract may be 
determined using the following methods: 
1. The proportion of contract costs incurred for work performed to date bear to the 
estimated total contract costs; or 
2. Survey of work performed; or 
3. Completion of physical proportion of the contract work (AASB 111, para. 30). 
Australian accounting standard AASB 111 is highly subjective and allows a high degree of 
choice in the recognition of revenues and expenses with reference to the stage of 
completion method. The broadness of the standard allows the industry to ensure they are 
perceived as operating within the boundaries of generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP).  
Using the critical accounting premise that problems in accounting are potential problems in 
and of society (Cooper & Sherer 1984, p. 222), potential problems in and of society are 
problems in accounting. In doing so, it is acknowledged that accounting is more than 
calculative, in that it is a social practice involved in political struggles (Burchell, Clubb, 
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Hopwood, Hughes & Naphapiet, 1980, p. 13). As outlined above, the RC found the 
construction industry was lawless in its conduct of industrial relations. It exhibited cultural 
norms of non-compliance and regulatory antipathy. This study examines whether the 
practice of accounting was also influenced by these cultural norms. 
Critical accounting researchers attempt to understand those who practice accounting by 
investigating the practice of accounting. This involves explaining the actions of accountants 
in terms of their meanings. Researchers argue that “practitioners do not see accounting as a 
purely technical activity: objective, factual and neutral. Instead, they see it as a social 
activity and draw on many meanings objective, subjective, inter-subjective, positional in 
explaining how they construct practice within specific social contexts” (Jones 1992, p. 
225). It is this which constitutes accounting rationality in practice. From a critical 
accounting perspective, there is a need to understand this rationality in order to explain, and 
change, accounting.  
Accountants often see themselves as engaged in an objective, value-free, technical 
enterprise, representing reality "as is"; when the reality is that “they are subjective 
‘constructors of reality’, presenting and representing the situations in limited and one-sided 
ways” (Morgan 1988, p. 477). Critical accounting theorists argue that accountants “are not 
just technicians practicing a technical craft, they are part of a much broader process of 
reality construction, producing partial and rather one sided views of reality, exactly as an 
artist is obliged to produce a partial view of the reality he or she wishes to represent” 
(Morgan 1988,  p. 477). The following quote argues that accounting is subjective. 
By appreciating and exploring this dimension of the accounting process, 
accountants have a means of developing a new epistemology of accounting that will 
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emphasize the interpretive as opposed to the supposedly ‘objective’ aspects of the 
discipline, perhaps in a way that will help broaden and deepen the accountants' 
contributions to economic and social life (Morgan 1988, p. 477).  
Accountants are social beings who work within a social system involving complex 
behaviours and attitudes. This is particularly apparent in the construction industry which 
demonstrated evidence of non-compliance with government regulation. If management and 
other stakeholders could reject government directives associated with work practices it 
leads to questions about whether they would also reject regulation from accountants and 
their regulation, that is, auditors and the accounting standards. As individuals, accountants 
in the construction industry operated under workplace pressures very different from their 
colleagues in other industries, but with the same needs to maintain employment 
relationships. The reality of accounting practice, in this sense, was different for 
construction industry accountants compared with accountants from most other industries in 
Australia at the time of the RC in 2003.  
Accounting choice theory (Watts & Zimmerman 1986; 1990) considers the implications of 
not only the nature of the firm but also the role accounting plays within the firm for 
accounting choice of GAAP (Watts 1992). Hunt and Hogler (1990) stated that: 
There is a growing awareness that generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) 
have become highly politicized and manipulable. As a result, not only have 
authoritative accounting bodies (e.g. the FASB) lost some of their credibility, but 
the situation also allows managers to construct a portfolio of accounting choices that 
are in their own best interests and not necessarily in the best interests of other 
parties (e.g. shareholders, creditors, employees). Indeed, "'In the acquisition of 
capital and in the managerial labor market (hiring, remuneration and retention) 
(Fama, 1980), it is to managers' advantage to have the discretion either to disclose 
or  to fail to disclose information to investors, in order to put themselves in the best 
possible light" (Gaa, 1986, p. 442). Furthermore, as long as managers' accounting 
choices are in compliance with GAAP, they will be sanctioned by professional 
accountants through the audit attest function (p. 56). 
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This sociological perspective of accounting choice theory suggests that the flexibility 
allowed under GAAP results in a range of factors, such as ownership structure of the firm, 
as having influence on the way accountants legitimise accounting activities.  
This section has explained that the role of accounting has traditionally been to protect the 
public interest, manifested by following accounting standards, which represent the 
accounting profession’s societal contract. CAT challenges the view that accounting is an 
objective rule based practice and accounting choice theory adds weight to the argument that 
the pursuit of standards is a subjective choice made by individual accountants who perhaps 
seek to serve their own interest first and the public interest second. Given the widespread 
unlawfulness in other areas of the construction industry, this presents an excellent 
opportunity to investigate the reality of accounting in an environment where individuals are 
under constant pressure to bend the rules. Given this operating context, this study will 
examine whether accountants allowed themselves to be influenced by those engaging in 
unlawful behaviour or whether they were able to resist these pressures and not become 
involved. Accountants are, after all, only human.  
 
1.4 The Role of Accounting 
The RC found the industry was characterised by widespread disregard for the law, 
recording over one hundred types of unlawful behavior (Cole 2003). While the majority of 
these acts were related to industrial behaviour, such as unfair workplace practices, there 
were behaviours relevant to accounting. More specifically, the RC found tax evasion, 
widespread inappropriate payments, underpayment of employee entitlements, absence of 
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adequate security of payments for sub-contractors, non-compliance with payroll tax and the 
creation of phoenix companies amongst other breaches in regulation. Thus accounting 
practices were involved in the construction industry’s unlawfulness. This indicates that the 
accounting profession operates to support the views of business (Sikka & Wilmott 2005), 
and is a subjective process. 
A major cause for the escalating unlawfulness leading up to RC was that the existing 
regulatory bodies had insufficient power and resources to enforce the law (Cole 2003). As 
chapter 4 will show, regulation up to the time of the RC failed to ensure that the industry 
carried out its work not just in the interests of those most immediately involved, that is the 
owners and employers, but society generally. The RCR claimed that trade union officials, 
in particular, felt above the law in the sense that unlawful behaviour seemed to go 
unpunished. The failure of the Federal government to regulate behaviour in the construction 
industry suggests that other regulatory bodies, such as auditors and the AASB, would have 
also struggled to impose order. If the construction industry ignored the Federal 
Government, they may also have ignored accounting regulators. Therefore, the key themes 
considered in this thesis are: 
1. The way in which the structural and cultural factors that led to the RC in 2003 affect 
accounting practice in the construction industry. 
2. The role of accounting in the construction industry firms’ social contract. 
In considering the first theme, there is a range of key social actors in the construction 
industry: owners, general managers, project managers, accountants, general staff, 
construction workers, subcontractors, suppliers, government, regulators, unions and 
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investors. There are social tensions between accounting regulation and these social actors. 
This theme reconstructs the social reality of accounting within this industry and addresses 
the theoretical issue of whether accounting is objective or subjective. 
In relation to the second theme, the RC confirmed breaches in the “social contract”, that is, 
the expectation that society had about how the industry should conduct its business 
(Deegan 2009, p. 325). This explores the reaction of the wider social system. There were a 
number of government intervention strategies. First, the Building Industry Taskforce (BIT) 
was established as an interim measure on 1 October 2002 in direct response to the core 
findings of the RC, until the establishment of a national agency. The BIT was created due 
to the “continuation of unlawful and inappropriate behaviour in the industry” (Hadgkiss 
2004, p. ii; 2005, p. i) and “the overwhelming requirement for greater powers in order to 
fulfil the Government’s objective of securing the rule of law” (Hadgkiss 2004, p. ii).  
Second, the passing of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 
2005(C’wth) (BCII Act 2005) to establish the Office of Australian Building and 
Construction Commissioner (ABCC) on 1 October 2005. The primary responsibility of the 
ABCC was to ensure workplace laws were upheld in the construction industry to ensure 
building work was carried out fairly, effectively and productively for benefit of all industry 
participants and Australian economy as a whole. Third, the Building and Construction 
Industry Forum (BCIF) was established to ensure compliance with tax laws. This theme 
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1.5 Research Method  
1.5.1  Overview 
The research epistemology is constructivist. The aim is to reconstruct the reality or truth of 
the role of accounting practice in repairing or legitimising the breach of the societal 
contract within the construction industry. The research design is a single descriptive case 
study using historical narrative. The unit of analysis adopts an embedded design, which is 
multiple units of analysis within a single case study because, while the primary focus is on 
the construction industry as a whole, this study examines differences between stakeholders 
in terms of their compliance with the societal contract. Two main sources of evidence are 
used: documents from the construction industry and archival records. The analytical 
technique is explanation building by using Content Analysis (CA) guided by Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA). CA and CDA are appropriate because the main source of 
evidence is text, the RCR, and the best way to examine the research themes is via the 
communication within this text. 
Figure 1.1 presents the overall framework for this study. On the left hand side it identifies 
the theoretical frameworks used to interpret the data. Next is theme 1 which covers the 
period up to and including the RCR in 2003. It examines the nature of the social contract 
breach and accounting’s role. Next is theme 2 which covers the period after the RC. It 
examines the legitimisation process and accounting’s role in helping the industry find 
legitimacy, that is, fill the legitimacy gap. On the right side is the data analysis methods and 
the specific accounting work practices examined by this study. The list of activities is taken 
directly from the findings of the RC. In reconstructing the social reality of accounting in the 
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construction industry, this study examines how each of these activities were undertaken and 
the role accountants played. Given that the RC found these activities to be evidence of 
unlawfulness by the industry, it is then possible to assess accountants’ degree of 
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Figure 1- 1.1: Overall Thesis Framework
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1.5.2 Research Setting 
The subject of this study is the construction industry; more specifically firms engaged in 
residential and non-residential construction. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of this industry. 
The principle research data will be gathered from extensive secondary sources, most 
especially the 23 volumes of the RCR. This study is a reconstruction of reality based on the 
publicly information available. It is a historical recount. It does not promise to discover the 
truth of accounting practice in the construction industry in the period under review. This is 
not a study of forensic accounting. It is an historical narrative examining the role of 
accounting. Given the nature of the focus of this study, there has been no attempt to include 
contributions from those who worked in the industry, other than the evidence they provided 
to the RC. Human nature suggests it would be very unlikely individuals would admit to 
inappropriate conduct and, therefore, non-compliance with the social contract would be 
impossible based on an interview method. Fortunately, the RC was a major public enquiry 
and produced a very significant volume of data, and the industry’s social contract breach 
has meant it has been heavily regulated since the RC. This means that the research strategy 
will focus on ways to extract the most accurate representation of the truth, measured by the 
accuracy of the social construction of the reality of behaviour from the industry’s social 
actors, from these secondary sources.  
The large amount of data which is publicly available provides the detail necessary for such 
a thick description of the social reality of behaviour within the construction industry. There 
are 23 volumes of the RCR, company annual reports, industry regulator reports, and 
industry analyst reports. CA was chosen to examine “words, meanings, pictures, symbols, 
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ideas, themes or any message that can be communicated” (Neuman 2006, p. 322). The data 
available for this study contains hundreds of thousands of pieces of content.  
 
1.5.3 Data Analysis 
Given the significant amount of textual data, for example, in the RCR, it was decided to use 
CA because it is appropriate for analysing the content of text. CA lets a researcher identify 
the messages and meanings in a source of communication, for example, reports (Neuman 
2006, p. 323). CA enables content to be compared and analysed using coding techniques. It 
can also reveal aspects of the text’s content that are non-obvious or difficult to see 
(Neuman 2006, p. 323). The question then is to determine what you are trying to analyse 
and reveal. CA generally tries to measure frequency, direction, and intensity of 
communication (Neuman 2006, p. 325). This can be extended to consider the source (who), 
encoding (why), channel (how), message (what), recipient (to whom), and the decoding 
process (to what effect) (Holsti 1968). To further reconstruct the reality of the construction 
industry, CDA is used to code the meaning in the messages within the RC text. CDA aims 
to uncover the embedded meanings in everyday rhetorical discourses that point to beliefs, 
ideologies, and values of a social community (Brummett 2008). CDA provides additional 
meaning within a text.  
CA and CDA are used explicitly in chapters 3 and 4 to show the nature of the construction 
industry’s breach of the social contract and the regulator’s response. An example is table 
4.2: Critical Discourse Analysis of Selected Themes from the ABC Four Corners Transcript 
(see chapter 4). The coding used to apply CDA to texts (such as in table 4.2) was developed 
from Gee (2011). Gee (2011) recommended using the following codes to reconstruct social 
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reality based on text analysis, in other words, to discover what the social context in the 
documents really means. The codes were: significance, practices (activities), identities, 
relationships, politics, connections, and sign systems and knowledge. The coding in table 
4.2, for example, used Gee’s (2011) definition of these codes to apply to the text of the 
ABC Four Corners Transcript to classify meaning within each theme. For example, under 
the theme Explicit Social Contract Expectations and the topic of industrial relations, the 
CDA coding describes the identity of union leaders as villains and relationships based on 
collusion. 
The study also uses Social Network Analysis (SNA) to examine the nature of the 
construction industry’s political economy.  SNA is a technique used in the social sciences 
to analyse social interaction at work. Given the importance of understanding cultural 
behaviour in this study, SNA provides a framework for analysing how the construction 
industry stakeholders interacted. It also allows us to understand the role of accountants in 
terms of their social interactions with other stakeholders. A recent article identified research 
opportunities opened by SNA’s perspective on accounting and auditing regulation 
(Richardson 2009). Therefore, SNA is used in this study to apply ST to understand the 
pressures placed on accountants by other construction industry stakeholders. 
SNA is used explicitly in chapters 5 and 6. First, SNA is used to classify social behaviours 
into broad themes. Each of the unlawful activities identified by the RC were analysed and 
coded into broad themes. These are listed in table 5.1 in the middle column (see chapter 5). 
The themes are descriptions of the main types of unlawful behaviour found after analysis of 
each of the seven unlawful activities (listed in the first column). Each theme was then 
coded into one of the three theoretical lenses used in chapter 5, that is relationships, impact, 
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or expectations. Coding was done by assessing each theme and the type of social behaviour 
it describes, against the definition of the construct. This method is an example of grounded 
theory, which is ‘a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to 
develop an inductively derived theory about a phenomenon’ (Neuman, 2006, p. 60). The 
codes, therefore, were induced from analysis of the data presented in this chapter. The 
procedure was to look for similarities, that is, themes, across ‘unlike phenomena’ (Neuman, 
2006, p. 60), which in this case was the thesis data which was based on numerous sources, 
for example the RC volumes and other documents, and often different case studies and 
contexts. This grounded theory approach enabled theory to emerge from the data, in this 
case it was themes of unlawful behaviours (middle column) associated with activities (left 
column) and explained by one of the three ST constructs used in this analysis. The table 
illustrates the range of social behaviours associated with each activity. The outcome of this 
analysis was then used to organise the historical narrative in the rest of this chapter. The 
method enables generalizations by making comparisons across social situations. These are 
later linked to accountants’ behaviour in section 5.3. The activities and themes were 
combined into their relevant lens. 
Second, SNA was used to examine three dimensions of ST, (1) relationships, (2) impact, 
and (3) expectations (Gray, Owens & Adams 1996, p. 45). The objective with this 
operationalisation is to test whether these ST constructs may help predict stakeholder 
behaviour in terms of willingness to meet the social contract. The first operationalisation is 
relationships. Relationships may be defined by SNA. SNA allows us to measure interaction 
between stakeholder groups in terms of network quality (depth of contact) and network 
structure (number of contacts and frequency of contact) (for example, Stone 2001). The 
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second operationalisation is impact. Impact may be defined in terms of management’s 
willingness to listen to various stakeholder groups and adjust their behaviour accordingly. It 
measures the power or level of influence of each group. The third operationalisation is 
expectations. Expectations may be defined in terms of the social contract for each 
stakeholder group. It answers questions about what each of the groups listed in figure 2.1 
(see chapter 2) expect of accounting, and how these expectations differ. The central theme 
with ST for this study is that the construction industry’s stakeholder groups will have 
different social contracts with the industry in terms of its accounting. This will be 
manifested in differences compared with the overall social contract, the RC, and between 
the expectations of the various groups.  
To assist this analysis, the seven unlawful activities were examined to identify their 
business processes (see appendix 1). This method is a further example of grounded theory, 
which is ‘a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to develop 
an inductively derived theory about a phenomenon’ (Neuman, 2006, p. 60) (see section 5.1 
in chapter 5 for further explanation). Each process was then analysed in terms of: 
1. Interaction. This is to identify the density of accountants’ social networks in each 
process. High density means frequent interaction with other stakeholders involved in 
the unlawful activity. Low density means infrequent or no interaction. This asks, how 
much were accountants invited to participate in this process? Codes were developed to 
describe the level of density: 
a. Lead: where the accountant interacts with others; 
b. Follow: where the accountant responds to requests for help from others; and 
c. Alone: where the accountant does the activity largely in isolation from others.  
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2. Harmony. This is to identify the heterogeneous (inclusiveness) accountants’ social 
networks in each process. Heterogeneity means accountants’ views were welcomed by 
other stakeholders. Homogeneity means accountants’ views were unwelcome. This 
asks, how much were accountants asked for their opinion in this process? Codes were 
developed to describe the level of heterogeneity as follows: 
a. Respect: where accountants were valued; and 
b. Tolerance: where the accountant was entitled to participate.  
     Codes were developed to describe the level of homogeneity, as follows: 
a. Outsider: where secrets are held from the accountant; and 
b. Enemy: where the accountant is denied any contact with other stakeholders. 
3. Cohesion. This is to identify the democracy of accountants’ social networks in each 
process. High cohesion means shared control with other stakeholders involved in the 
unlawful activity. Low cohesion means no shared control. This is to examine how much 
were accountants’ opinions listened to. Codes were developed to describe the level of 
democracy, as follows: 
a. Expert: where the accountant’s opinion matters more than any others; and 
b. Advisor: where the accountant only offers advice  
      Codes were developed to describe the level of non-democracy, as follows: 
a. Challenged: where the accountants views would be disputed; and 
b. Ignored: where the accountant has no influence at all.  
The codes were induced from the data using a grounded theory method. The procedure was 
to look for similarities across the behaviours to enable generalizations about the social 
behaviours. The code descriptors are based on the macro-level explanation of the micro-
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level events (Neuman, 2006, p. 60) described in the historical narrative which follows. The 
descriptors were guided by SNA theory of interaction, harmony and cohesion (see section 
5.2.3.1). Further explanation is provided below.  
Interaction: density is used to examine the interconnectedness of social networks; 
individuals with high density scores are connected with more than one social network 
(Stone 2001; Anklam 2005). Density is a positive factor in social networks because it 
measures frequency of interaction. The more density, the more opportunity to build and 
maintain relationships, which results in increased communication, trust, and social 
dependency. In contrast, low density indicates separateness, which results in isolation, 
mistrust, and conflict. The analysis identified the network density, that is, the connectivity 
between stakeholder groups. It also highlights differences in density amongst stakeholders, 
that is, which groups were well connected and which were not. 
The interaction codes developed to describe accountants’ social behaviour were lead, 
follow, and alone. They describe levels of interaction with other construction industry 
stakeholders in terms of decreasing density. ‘Lead’ describes accountants playing a pro-
active role where they seek interaction with others and, therefore, assume a principal role in 
the social network associated with that activity; often because they are the employee most 
responsible for performing the activity or the subject matter expert.  ‘Follow’ describes 
accountants playing a reactive role where they respond to requests from others to interact 
and, therefore, assume a subservient role in the social network associated with that activity; 
often because others are decision makers and only involve accountants to provide advice or 
when otherwise necessary. ‘Alone’ describes accountants as being excluded either 
voluntarily or involuntarily from the social network associated with that activity; usually 
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because decision makers do not want accountants to be involved (perhaps hiding 
something) or the accountant prefers to do a part of the activity in isolation from other 
associated work (perhaps because they do not want to know what is happening).  
Harmony: indicates tolerance and respect between stakeholder groups. If inclusive 
(heterogeneous), the social network welcomes different types of members and is tolerant of 
different views, if exclusive (homogenous), it allows membership only to people who are 
similar (Stone, 2001). Heterogeneity is a positive factor in social networks because it 
identifies the subjective nature of diversity in opinions. The more heterogeneity, the more 
tolerance and respect for different stakeholders. This results in ethical behaviour in terms of 
harmony. However, if relationships were characterized by fragmentation and discord, 
generated by inequality, repression, and exclusion, then the industry would demonstrate 
unethical social behaviour. This unethical behaviour will be explained by Managerial 
perspective of ST. 
The harmony codes developed to describe accountants’ social behaviour were respect, 
tolerance, outsider, and enemy. The first two codes were heterogenous themes. This 
illustrates positive social behaviour where accountants were respected or at least tolerated 
by the social networks associated with the activity. This behaviour is about the role of the 
accountant and their right, as subject matter experts, to be involved. They are levels of 
inclusion; with respect being the most positive, and tolerance is still being included but less 
positive. This supports ST’s ethical perspective. On the other hand, the latter two codes 
were homogenous themes. This was negative social behaviour where accountants were seen 
as outsiders or even the enemy. This behaviour is about the accountant being seen as a 
threat or a barrier to conducting a work activity they may not approve of. They are levels of 
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exclusion; with enemy being the most negative, and outsider still negative but less so. This 
supports the Managerial perspective of ST. 
Cohesion: indicate efficient teamwork. This analysis is looking for the extent to which a 
network membership is democratic; if democratic, decisions will be taken horizontally; if 
non-democratic, decisions will be taken vertically (Anklam 2005). Democracy is a positive 
factor in social networks because it helps in controlling the activities. The more shared 
control within the network, the more efficient the group is because it allows divergent 
thought, creativity, and innovation; which ultimately results in ethical behaviour in terms of 
cohesion. 
The cohesion codes developed to describe accountants’ social behaviour were expert, 
advisor, challenged, and ignored. The first two codes were examples of democracy. This 
illustrates positive social behaviour where accountants assumed high socio-political status 
within the social networks associated with the activity. This behaviour is about the power 
of accountants and their capacity to control the behaviour of others within the network. 
They are levels of participation; with expert being the most positive, and advisor is still 
being a major role but with less influence. This supports equality and gives accountants the 
opportunity to have a strong influence on the network’s behaviour. On the other hand, the 
latter two codes were non-democratic themes. This illustrates negative social behaviour 
where accountants assumed low socio-political status within the social networks associated 
with the activity. This behaviour is about the lack of power of accountants and their 
inability to control the behaviour of others within the network. They are levels of non-
participation; with ignored being the most negative, and challenged is still being a weak 
participant but slightly more influential. This encourages inequality and denies accountants 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 38 
the opportunity to influence the network’s behaviour. The coding in table 5.2: Accountants’ 
Behaviour in Construction Industry Social Networks, is an example of the results of this 
coding method.  
 
1.6 Contribution of the Study  
The study makes several contributions. In reconstructing the reality of accounting practice 
in the construction industry the study provides an historical narrative regarding whether 
accounting’s role is objective and rule-based or subjective and open to interpretation. This 
contribution is grounded within critical accounting perspectives. 
The social reconstruction of accounting in this industry also provides an opportunity to 
contribute to the existing body of literature in several areas. It includes SNA theory to 
extend our understanding of ST. SNA is used to examine the industry culture which was 
the cause of the construction industry’s unlawfulness. Organisational culture theory was 
identified by Dent (1991) as a new field of enquiry enabling the construction of a new 
reality of accounting practice. Gaffikin (2008, p. 128) states that “there is little doubt that 
accounting practices, as socially defined activities, are greatly affected by culture”. 
However, he is critical of definitions of culture, particularly Hofstede’s measures of 
national culture (see Gaffikin 2008, pp. 217-218), and he argues that “it is not possible to 
prescribe fixed dimensions as to how culture impacts on those (accounting) practices”. 
Gaffikin (2008) argues that we cannot rely on extant simplistic cultural dimensions and that 
to understand the impact of culture on accounting practice, we need a “much broader 
compass”. Deegan (2003, p. 520) agrees that “determining the validity of decision making 
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across different cultures would be an important area for future accounting research”. While 
this discussion is of national culture rather than industry culture, the same opportunities 
exist given accounting operates within a socially constructed context. Organisational 
culture is the set of shared values and norms that control organisational members’ 
interactions with each other and with customers’ suppliers, customers, and other people 
outside the organisation (Jones 2004, p. 195). Little is known about the way in which 
accounting is implicated in the culture of organisations (Dent 1991). SNA theory provides a 
lens to examine this topic.  
The thesis also addresses the nature of the legitimacy gap, and particularly the difference 
between actual and desired cultural behaviours. The RCR found that the construction 
industry had a deeply embedded organisational culture based on coercion, intimidation, and 
bending the rules, which meant that many industry activities did not follow accepted 
standards; for example fair work practices, workplace relations, occupational health and 
safety, and recruitment. The RC establishes the legitimacy gap in the construction industry; 
in terms of actual and desired behaviour. The study also tracks the response to the RC in 
2003 to look at the legitimisation process in terms of how the legitimacy gap was 
addressed. This connects with the main contribution, the role of accountants, by examining 
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1.7 Chapter Summary  
This chapter has introduced the thesis. Chapter 2 discusses the methodology, literature and 
public interest. Chapter 3 examines the nature of the construction industry, while chapter 4 
describes the history of the regulation of the construction Industry. Chapter 5 assesses the 
relationships between the construction industry’s stakeholders, and chapter 6 looks at the 
impact of power and politics on the relationships between stakeholders and how the 
expectations of society were affected. Chapter 7 provides suggestions for changing the 
construction industry’s unlawful behaviours based on the research findings, and chapter 8 
describes conclusions.  
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This chapter explains the research methodology used to conduct this study and its 
theoretical framework. The research is an historical narrative of the construction industry in 
the period 2003-2011, with a primary focus on the period surrounding the RC into the 
industry and its immediate aftermath (2003-2005). The data collection, analysis, and 
reporting uses CA; as well as CDA. CA is a “technique for compressing many words of 
text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” (Stemler 2001, p. 55). 
The study focuses mainly on the text contained in the Construction Industry RC (Cole 
2003) and the BIT Reports (2004; 2005); along with other publicly available information 
on the industry and its behaviour. CDA is used to examine the societal and political themes 
emerging from the CA coding categories. The outcomes of the CDA will be examined from 
a critical accounting perspective, with a particular emphasis on PIT, and stakeholder and 
LT.  
 
2.2 Research Methodology 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The selection of a research methodology involves a number of steps. The first step is to 
decide whether to adopt a qualitative or quantitative approach. Silverman (1993) makes the 
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important distinction that social sciences research has two schools: one oriented towards the 
quantitative testing of theories, and the other directed at qualitatively developing theories. 
This study aims to contribute to CAT; more specifically the social reconstruction of the role 
of accounting. Therefore, a qualitative approach is justified.  
The second step in the selection of methodology is to decide on the research philosophy or 
epistemology. Some organisational behaviour is so complex that one cannot find objective 
knowledge of reality, one can only represent it, that is, construct it (Girod-Seville & Perret 
2001, p. 17). The complexity is caused by the nature of the social world under study whose 
reality is defined by interpretations of the social actors of their interactions to create a 
shared meaning, which is at the root of the “social construction of reality” (Berger & 
Luckman 1966, p. 17). Following the principles of a qualitative social construction of 
reality, it is accepted that discovering the truth behind the construction industry’s behaviour 
which led to the RC would be very difficult. Although, respondents can be asked in an 
interview to explain why their behaviour was non-compliant or perhaps unlawful, it is 
unlikely a respondent will provide a response or a truthful response. Given the nature of 
this study, therefore, it can only seek to reconstruct the reality of the industry’s behaviour 
via information which may be publicly accessed.  
Fortunately, the RC was a major public enquiry and produced a very significant volume of 
data, and the industry’s breach of the social contract has meant it has been heavily regulated 
since the RC. This means that the research strategy will focus on ways to extract the most 
accurate representation of accounting practice, measured by the accuracy of the social 
construction of the reality of behaviour from the industry’s social actors, from these 
secondary sources. Critical accounting researchers have argued the need for a constructing 
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of accounting reality as a subjective rather than objective process (for example, see Morgan 
1988). Therefore, a constructivist epistemology has been chosen. 
 
2.2.2 Research Design 
The third step in the selection of research methodology is to decide on research strategy. 
The research design is a case study based on historical narrative. Case study research “is an 
in-depth examination of an extensive amount of information about very few units or cases 
for one period or across multiple periods of time” (Neuman 2006, p. 40). Case study 
methodology is used as the research design because it is suitable for studying complex 
social phenomena within a single industry. The study includes characteristics suitable for 
case study enquiry, namely: many variables of interest including whether accounting is 
objective or subjective, the nature of the legitimacy gap, and accounting work practices (see 
figure 1.1 in chapter 1); multiple sources of evidence (multiple government and industry 
reports); and theoretical propositions (themes in this study) to guide the collection and 
analysis of data (Yin 1988). 
 
2.2.3 Research Technique 
The case study was analysed using the broad framework presented by figure 1.1 in chapter 
1. There are two general analytic strategies used to analyse case study data: 
1. Relying on theoretical propositions: theoretical orientation guiding the 
analysis; following theoretical propositions that have formed the design of 
the case study. This helps to focus attention on certain data and to ignore 
other data 
2. Developing a case description: a descriptive framework for organizing the 
case study; analysis organized on the basis of description of the general 
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characteristics and relations of the phenomenon in question (Yin 1994, pp. 
103-105). 
This study adopts the first analytical strategy to provide theoretical direction. The RCR and 
the other documents contain a very significant volume of information. In order to find 
explanatory meaning in this data and for research efficiency purposes, the theoretical 
frameworks outlined in figure 1.1 in chapter 1 act as a lens to focus on the most relevant 
information in the reports. More specifically: PIT establishes the nature of the social 
contract; ST guides examination of the nature of the legitimacy gap; and LT helps identify 
the process of changing behaviour after the RC in 2003.  
Given the case study happened in the past, it lends itself to historical analysis. Historical 
research plays an important role in developing general explanations and can substantiate the 
emergence and evolution of tendencies over time (Neuman 2006, p. 433). However, social 
science researchers can be critical of historical research. There seems to be three main 
criticisms: 
1. Subjectivity. Historians do not present theory-free objective ‘facts’; rather they frame 
data, classify information and shape evidence based on concepts (Neuman 2006, p. 
434). 
2. Cognitive bias. Historians do not use all of the information available to them; rather 
they select evidence which suits their purpose. This means that the reader cannot know 
what information was excluded which might have been relevant (Neuman 2006, p. 
434). Similarly, historians tend to focus on people rather than events, which focuses the 
research on micro-level issues rather than macro-level (Neuman 2006, p. 434). 
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3. Evidence. Historians organize evidence in a sequential manner, that is, a historical 
narrative, to tell a story. “This compounds problems of undefined concepts and the 
selection of evidence” (Neuman 2006, p. 434). 
Narrative is the “pattern and structure of life where events occurred not just in succession 
but with the order of events giving meaning to those which were previous and those 
subsequent” (Funnell 1998, p. 143). In this way, narrative should not just tell a story by 
explaining what happened and what happened next, rather it should provide meaning to 
those events by using analysis to examine the sequential connections. In contrast, critics see 
narrative as more myth than historical fact due to the focus on individuals and the focus on 
‘interesting’ events to the exclusion of the normal. The debate appears to focus on the need 
to reconstruct an objective social reality or truth rather than a subjective version of reality.  
The criticisms of historical narrative in accounting research can be quite controversial. 
Funnell (1998) was one of the most influential proponents of the new accounting history 
method as an alternative to traditional accounting history. The debate appears to centre on 
the messages or meaning which may be gained from interpreting a body of text. 
Deconstructionists argue the need to be sensitive to the text’s content and context, or the 
method of presentation (Funnell 1998). Neuman (2006, p. 435) summarises this debate in 
terms of the characteristics of the narrative form and its strengths and weaknesses. Table 
2.1 presents Neuman’s summary with comments on how these issues are addressed in this 
study. 
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Table 2 - 2.1: Historical Narrative - Critique of Methodology 
 
Table 2.1: Historical Narrative  - Critique of Methodology 
Critique Response 
Characteristics 
1. It tells a story, with a plot, climaxes This gives the study a natural structure but the main focus is on explaining what 
happened, rather than describing what happened 
2. It follows a chronological order and 
sequence of events 
This is used by looking at what happened prior to the RC, the RCR, and the 
response after the release of the reports  
3. It focuses on specific individuals, not 
on structures or abstract ideas 
Here a different approach is adopted, rather the focus is on conceptual structures, 
the breach of social contract.  
4. It is primarily particular and 
descriptive, not analytic and general.  
Here a different approach is also used. The aim is not to tell the story of the 
construction industry, rather the focus is on a very specific analytical lens, that is, 
the role of accounting in legitimising the industry. 
5. It presents its events as unique, 
unpredictable, and contingent. 
The study does have these characteristics. While there have been other industries 
involved in royal commissions, it is uncommon and the level of unlawful behaviour 
in the construction industry was unique.  
Strengths 
1. It is colorful, interesting, and 
entertaining 
The unlawfulness of the construction industry is a fascinating story. For accounting, 
it represents an excellent opportunity to examine the objective versus subjective 
role debate. 
2. It gives a sense of life in a different era While the RC was not long ago, a little more than a decade, the cultural behaviours 
which created the industry-wide unlawfulness evolved over many decades. It 
created a sense of ‘this is the way we do things’ which is fascinating in itself. Why 
was there such widespread acceptance of unlawfulness? And how did accountants 
respond to that culture? It leads us to question whether the level of unlawful and 
inappropriate behaviour would be tolerated today.   
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Table 2.1: Historical Narrative  - Critique of Methodology 
Critique Response 
3. It communicates the way people in the 
past experienced reality and connects 
emotionally with these people 
From an accounting perspective, it creates an empathy with the pressures these 
people must have been placed under by the various stakeholders. It makes us 
question how we would respond to these pressures ourselves. Given the 
employment relationship accountants had with stakeholders who misbehaved, it 
forces us to consider what lengths people will go to in order to protect their job: an 
emotional issue which connects with all of us.  
4. It surrounds individuals and events 
with a mix of social reality 
While the focus is not on individuals, they are grouped as stakeholder groups to 
reconstruct the social reality of their interactions. 
Weaknesses 
1. It hides causal theories or concepts or 
leaves them implicit.  
This is not done. Rather, theoretical concepts are explicitly used to reconstruct the 
social reality of the industry. The historical narrative is framed by the concepts. The 
analysis gives structure to the narrative.  
2. It uses rhetoric to persuade and is 
subject to logical fallacies. 
The use of CA and CDA adds depth to the analysis and the presentation of the 
findings, thereby avoiding logical fallacies. 
3. It tends to ignore the normal for the 
unique or dramatic. 
There is so much information in the documents being investigated by this study that 
it must be selective in what is analysed and reported. The structure provided by the 
conceptual framework and the rigor of the research techniques, that is, CA and 
CDA, ensures the focus is on the material with most relevance to the study.  
4. It rarely builds on previous knowledge 
and does little to create general 
knowledge. 
The theoretical framework (see figure 1.1 in chapter 1) ensures that the study 
remains focused on advancing our knowledge about the role of accounting practice, 
with a particular emphasis on legitimacy. This ensures that the study does not 
degenerate into a story of what happened.  
5. It tends to focus on individuals and 
their ability to shape events.  
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The table shows that the study has adopted in particular three of the five characteristics of 
historical narratives: first, it tells a story, with a plot, climaxes, secondly, it follows a 
chronological order and sequence of events, and thirdly, it presents its events as unique, 
unpredictable, and contingent. In addressing the debate over historical narrative, proponents 
of new accounting argue that the ‘counter-narrative’ is a means to generate meaning and 
convince, thereby advancing the body of knowledge on the topic under investigation 
(Funnell 1998). It does this by connecting the phenomena under investigation, in this case 
accounting practice, with the wider social, economic, and institutional contexts, in this case 
the construction industry’s breach of the social contract. In making these ideas operational, 
translating them into action, Loft’s (1986) position that accounting must be considered as 
an activity which is both social and political in itself is adopted. This means that the ways 
that accountants practice and produce outcomes, for example accounting reports, allows 
them to engage with others, in this case stakeholders. Accountants have an impact on others 
in terms of the ways in which the accounting information is used. Therefore, this discussion 
about counter-narrative may be translated into research technique by examining the 
interactions between accountants and stakeholders from the historical content of the RCR 
and the other documents investigated by this study.  
This study uses the counter-narrative method broadly by applying CAT as the main 
theoretical lens, analysing the documents via this lens, and using CA and CDA to 
reconstruct the social reality of the construction industry’s behaviour.  
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2.2.4 Analytical Techniques 
The study adopts two techniques to analyse the research data gathered: CA and SNA. CA is 
supported by a further technique called CDA. CA is used to make sense of the text data 
analysed for this study. SNA is used to examine the social interactions of the industry 
stakeholders.   
CA is a methodology for gathering and analysing the content of text (Neuman 2006, p. 
322). The methodology allows a researcher uncover the messages and meanings in a source 
of communication, such as a book, article, movie, and perceive content in a different way to 
the ordinary way of reading or watching (Neuman 2006, p. 323). CA has been used for 
more than a century and across many fields (Neuman 2006, p. 322), including in recent 
accounting research (for example, see Dellaportas, Senarath Yapa & Sivanantham 2008; 
Breton 2009; Brandau & Hoffjan 2010; Crofts & Bisman 2010; Vafaei, Taylor & Ahmed 
2011). Structured observation of text, using written rules, is enabled by CA. These rules 
provide the structure to the measurement and coding of the content. By following the CA 
rules, the researcher ensures they are using the method properly. This also gives the reader 
confidence in the validity and reliability of the results. The CA rules are: 
1. Frequency: counting how many times a word or code is mentioned. 
2. Direction: message is positive versus negative, supporting or opposing.  
3. Intensity: the strength or power of a message. 
4. Space: the volume of the message proportionate to the overall text (Neuman 2006, p. 
325).  
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The following table shows fifteen general purpose uses of CA, the element of the 
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Table 3 - 2.2 Uses of Content Analysis  
Table 2.2: Uses of Content Analysis by Purpose, Communication Element, and 
Question 










Why? • Secure political & 
military intelligence  
• Analyse traits of 
individuals  
• Infer cultural aspects & 
change  
• Provide legal & 
evaluative evidence 




Channel How? • Analyse techniques of 
persuasion  
• Analyse style 
Message What? • Describe trends in 
communication content  
• Relate known 
characteristics of sources 





Recipient To Whom? • Relate known 
characteristics of 
audiences to messages 
produced for them  










• Measure readability  
• Analyse the flow of 
information  
• Assess responses to 
communications 
 
(Source: Purpose, communication element, and question from Holsti (1968). Uses primarily 
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According to Krippendorff (2004), six questions must be addressed in every CA: 
1 Texts: Which data are analysed and how is this rearticulated? Texts occur in the 
analyst’s world but their origins in the world of others must be acknowledged.   
2 Research questions: the targets of the analyst’s inferences from available texts. By 
starting content analysis with research questions before making any enquiries, 
efficiency and empirical grounding is enabled.  
3 Context: specifies the world in which texts can be related to the analyst’s research 
questions. The analyst needs to make their context explicit, and it is usually their 
theoretical perspective.  
4 Analytical constructs: operationalize what the analyst knows about the context; 
specifically the explanations of how the texts are connected to possible answers to 
the research questions, and the conditions under which these connections might 
change.   
5 Inferences: these emerge in the analysts coding the texts, the analytical procedures, 
and sometimes after the analysis has been applied. There are deductive inferences: 
logical generalizations, inductive inferences: are generalizations from smaller 
samples to similar kinds of larger populations; and abductive inferences: applying 
from one set of particulars to another. This is the type most relevant to content 
analysis.   
6 Validating evidence: while content analysis can be difficult to replicate, it is helpful 
if a content analysis can be validated in principle. The aim is to give a sense of 
reliability and repeatability within the constraints of abductive inferences (pp. 29-
40). 
The assumption is that words and phrases frequently mentioned are those reflecting 
important concerns in every communication. Quantitative CA begins with word 
frequencies, space measurements, time counts and keyword frequencies. “Content analysis 
is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other 
meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” (Krippendorff  2004, p.18). To extend CA, 
CDA is used to provide additional structure to the analysis of the meaning in the document 
text under investigation in the thesis.  
CDA was first developed by the Lancaster school of linguists of which Norman Fairclough 
was the most prominent figure. Fairclough developed a three-dimensional framework for 
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studying discourse, where the aim is to map three separate forms of analysis onto one 
another. This involved analysis of (spoken or written) language texts, analysis of discourse 
practice (processes of text production, distribution and consumption) and analysis of 
discursive events as instances of sociocultural practice (Fairclough 1995). The analysis is at 
the micro, meso and macro-level of interpretation. At the micro-level, the researcher 
considers the text’s syntax and metaphoric structure.  The meso-level involves studying the 
text’s production and consumption, focusing on how power relations are enacted. At the 
macro-level, the researcher is concerned with inter-textual understanding, trying to 
understand the broad, societal currents that are affecting the text being studied (Fairclough 
1995). In this way, this study is able to code the text in the RCR which is associated with 
cultural dimensions asking who, why, what type questions. This will elevate the analysis 
from descriptive to explanatory case study analysis as the CA framework is used to 
reconstruct the reality of cultural behaviour within the construction industry. The following 
CDA framework adapted from Gee (2011, pp. 121-122) is used to complete the 
reconstructions: 
1. Significance: language may be used to signal that something is more or less 
significant or important. This is used to code node attributes by asking this CDA 
question: how is this language being used to make certain things significant or not? 
2. Practices (activities): language may be used to get things done. This is used to code 
node attributes by asking this CDA question: what practice or activity is this 
language being used to enact? 
3. Identities: language may be used to explain roles, which is particularly important in 
this thesis from a ST perspective. This is used to code node attributes by asking this 
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CDA question: what identity or role is this language trying to get others to 
recognise? 
4. Relationships: language explains the relationship we have, want to have, or are 
trying to have with others. It is another very important concept for the thesis’s 
stakeholder analysis. It introduces the notion of deference and of power differentials 
in relationships. This is used to code node attributes by asking this CDA question: 
what sort of relationship is this language trying to create with others? 
5. Politics: language may be used to assign value judgments about others which 
allocates them status. This is used to code node attributes by asking this CDA 
question: who or what is being assigned values of being normal, right, good, 
correct, proper, appropriate, valuable, the way things ought to be, high status – and 
the inverse of each of these labels.  
6. Connections: language may be used to link things that are not normally connected. 
This is used to code node attributes by asking this CDA question: how does this 
language connect or disconnect things or make something relevant or irrelevant? 
7. Sign systems and knowledge: language may also be abstract and include symbols or 
jargon. This is used to code node attributes by asking this CDA question: does this 
language privilege or disprivilege certain technical or jargon groups? 
 
SNA was introduced by Granovetter (1973) who used it as a tool to link macro and micro 
levels of sociology theory. Granovetter felt that existing network analysis focused mainly 
on interactions within well-defined small groups, that is, micro level analysis. However, 
there was a need to examine interactions ‘between’ groups, that is, macro level analysis, as 
well as ‘within’ groups (micro level). He differentiated this in terms of strong ties and weak 
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ties. One of the criticisms of network analysis has been that it lacks sufficient measurement 
tools (see Granovetter 1973). Granovetter pioneered the notion that SNA, at the macro 
level, can identify political organisation and social cohesion, themes which are particularly 
relevant to this study.  
Where SNA can enhance ST and make an important contribution in this study is in 
providing contextual and systemic understanding of the interaction between the 
construction industry’s stakeholders. Borgatti and Foster (2003, p. 991) explain that SNA 
has evolved to include more predictive power “including direction of causality, levels of 
analysis, explanatory goals, and explanatory mechanisms”. They explain how recent SNA 
studies have focused on network consequences and have classified the literature into “four 
canonical types: structural social capital, social access to resources, contagion, and 
environmental shaping” (Borgatti & Foster 2003 p. 991). Social access to resources 
connects with LT in terms of organisations being granted access to resources in exchange 
for legitimate behaviour. Similarly, environmental shaping connects with LT in terms of 
legitimacy tactics, the actions and interactions of stakeholders to repair legitimacy.  
Therefore, SNA might help the explanatory power of ST analysis by mapping the 
interactions of the construction industry’s stakeholder groups and connecting these 
interactions with their motives; social access to resources, contagion, and environmental 
shaping. However, an obvious problem for this study in using SNA is that it commonly 
uses statistical analysis, largely based on survey data. The study does not have access to 
survey data and, therefore, must infer SNA data based on qualitative interpretation of 
stakeholder relationships using publicly available data. The ways that this study applies a 
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theory usually requiring quantitative data to qualitative data is a further methodological 
contribution.  
SNA allows measures of social quality and social structure. The first SNA construct is 
network structure. It is measured by four factors: network size, having lots of contacts and 
that are well connected; density, access to multiple social networks; heterogeneity, willing 
to accept different people and views into their group; and constraints, group decision 
making is democratic and effective (see Stone 2001; Anklam 2005). The structural 
measures are based on measuring connections. Survey respondents are typically asked 
whom they connect or interact with, that is, nominate their “ties”. In this way, network 
structure measures social relationships in terms of an individual’s connectivity and 
frequency of interaction: how many people do they know and how often do they talk.  
The second construct is network quality. It is measured by six factors:  
• tie importance, know important people and have a strong network position or even 
power as a result;  
• corporate leadership, have a degree of influence within social networks or seen as a 
politician or activist;  
• volunteering, have a degree of popularity within social networks or seen as a 
generous person;  
• mentoring, have leadership status within social networks or seen as a wise person;  
• social dependence: have durability within social networks or seen as a necessary 
person; and  
• reciprocity or willing to give and receive from others (Stone 2001; Anklam 2005).  
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The quality measures are based on measuring the strength of relations. Survey respondents 
are typically asked about the nature of their relationship with others and also about how 
others’ perceive them. In this way, network quality measures social relationships in terms 
of an individual’s social influence and status: do they know the ‘right’ people and are they 
seen as a networker.  
This discussion shows how SNA cannot be used in this study at a micro level because 
individuals cannot be surveyed to measure their social capital in terms of network structure 
or quality at the time of the RC. However, inferences may be made at the macro level 
interaction, the strength of weak ties, using some of the conceptual frameworks outlined 
above. While interactions cannot be analysed in statistical terms, conclusions may be drawn 
about the strength of the relationships between the stakeholder groups, as opposed to 
individuals, using network structure and network quality as guiding ideas. The results will 
be presented in chapter 5. For example, conclusions may be drawn about network structure 
measurements such as (a) heterogeneity: willing to accept different people and views into 
their group; and (b) constraints: group decision making is democratic and effective, from 
the document text using CDA to find meaning and interpretation from the language used. 
This broad way may be used to identify macro level political-social differences between the 
stakeholder groups. As Borgatti and Foster (2003, p. 991) explain, this approach is 
validated by fields which use SNA to analyse document text, such as “literary criticism, in 
which consideration of literary works as self-contained immutable objects has given way to 
seeing texts as embedded in a system of meaning references decoded by myriad interacting 
readers” (for example, see Kristeva 1980). The study will use SNA to draw qualitative 
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conclusions about the social interaction of accountants with other industry stakeholders, 
particularly in terms of their social network structure and network quality.  
Given the large volume of data analysed by this study, CA and CDA are used explicitly in 
chapters 3 and 4 to show the nature of the construction industry’s breach of the social 
contract and the regulator’s response. chapters 5 and 6 then apply SNA to three dimensions 
of ST, (1) relationships, (2) impact, and (3) expectations; and CA and CDA are used more 
implicitly, otherwise the narrative would have become too mechanical and the analytical 
technique would have got in the way of the story being told.  
 
2.3  Theoretical Framework 
2.3.1 Critical Accounting  
The main theoretical lens for this thesis is CAT. This theoretical lens seeks to find the 
reality or truth about how accounting is practised within the context of its organisational 
setting. CAT views accounting as a social practice and its reality is found in the interactions 
between its various stakeholders. Yet as, Hopwood (1983, p. 287) stated “ With accounting 
so intertwined with organisational functioning it is surprising that so little is known of the 
organisational nature of accounting practice”. A framework to examine this social reality is 
provided by CAT (Hines 1988). In the mid-1970s CAT emerged by researchers adopting a 
“critical perspective” about accounting practice. CAT is cross-disciplinary and has been 
influenced by a range of intellectual sources, particularly sociology. Some researchers have 
drawn on labour process theory or on political economy in the Marxist tradition (for 
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example, Cooper & Sherer 1984). Other researchers have been influenced by interpretative 
and interactionist sociology (for example, Tomkins, Groves, Abdel-Khalik, Ajinkya, 
Morgan & Willmott 1983). CAT has two themes that are particularly relevant for this 
study. The first is whether accounting can enact change leading to a better society 
(Laughlin 1999). The second is the debate over whether accounting is objective or 
subjective. Each theme is now examined.  
The importance of social culture for the practice of accounting is widely acknowledged 
(Dillard, Rigsby & Goodman, 2004, p. 507). To change accounting practice requires not 
only social awareness but ultimately social change (Cooper & Sherer 1984, p. 222). CAT 
links understanding and change through the philosophy of praxis, whereby theory informs 
practice and existing practice informs theory (Roslender 2006, p. 264). This is achieved 
with the evaluation of existing practice aimed at changing and shaping accounting 
conceptually, institutionally, practically and politically (Tinker 2005, p. 101). Laughlin’s 
work on critical theory is used to solve real life accounting problems and examines 
accounting systems in organisations (Gaffikin 2006, p. 10). Laughlin (1999, p. 73) argues 
that there are four characteristics of critical accounting. First, critical accounting is always 
contextual and recognises accounting has social, political and economic consequences. 
Second, critical accounting seeks engagement to change or improve practice of the 
accounting profession. Third, CAT is concerned with micro (individuals and organisations) 
and macro (societal and professional) levels. Fourth, critical accounting is inter-disciplinary 
and engages and borrows from other disciplines. This study meets each of these criteria. On 
the inter-disciplinary criteria, the study uses SNA as a research method from the 
sociological discipline.  
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CAT can identify theories for changing the way accounting is practiced in industry and 
ultimately lead to reforms in how business and society operate (Deegan 2009, p. 530). CAT 
aims to identify the prevailing social arrangements within a community, such as an 
industry, within the broader context of the society in which it exists (Roslender 2006, p. 
250). CAT aims to promote self-awareness of both “what is” and “what might be”, and how 
the former might be transformed to install the latter (Roslender 2006, p. 250). It is 
concerned with the promotion of a better society, and understanding the change processes 
necessary to achieve this goal. Therefore, it lends itself to examining the role of accounting 
in legitimising the construction industry.  
CAT examines the social praxis involved in organisational change (Tinker 2005, p. 101). 
Social praxis envisages a broad understanding of both “theory” and “practice”, involving a 
two-way and perhaps circular relationship between the two, whereby theory influences 
practice and vice versa (Deegan 2009, p. 530). One implication of social praxis within the 
context of CAT is that theories need to change in response to changing social conditions. 
Well developed and empirically grounded theories may create impetus for changing the 
way accounting is practiced and ultimately lead to reforms in how business and society 
operate (Deegan 2009, p. 530). In this study, the aim is to understand the social reality of 
the interaction between the various social actors in the construction industry. By 
understanding how these actors or stakeholders behave and why, a theory of the 
antecedents associated with social contract breach at an industry level may be developed. 
This is the main explanatory dimension of this study, explaining why the breach happened.  
In understanding the social interaction between the industry’s groups, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the traditional ‘partisan’ perspective, which views accounting as 
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objective or neutral, and critical accounting, where accounting is seen as a means of 
constructing or legitimising particular social structures (Deegan 2009, p. 531). In order to 
understand the social reality of accounting from a critical theory perspective, PET is used. 
This theory explains that the strategic outcomes of accounting practices favour specific 
interests in society and disadvantage others (Cooper & Sherer 1984, p. 208). The social 
praxis underlying the behaviour leading to the construction industry’s legitimacy gap may 
be explained by the differing interests of the social actors.  
Traditionally, researchers have argued that accounting is objective and that it stands above 
all other organisational activity and acts as a type of guardian of the public interest. 
Accounting practice, therefore, is able to withstand the pressures exerted by the various 
stakeholders, for example owners, management, and maintains its integrity through 
application of accounting standards. On the other hand, critical accounting researchers 
argue that accounting practice is subjective because it is influenced by the social 
interactions within its organisational setting. In this sense, the thesis explores the 
objectivity versus subjectivity debate within CAT. It questions whether accounting acted as 
a watchdog over the construction industry, providing a sense of regulation within an 
otherwise unlawful culture. If it was not a watchdog, it suggests that accountants were 
unable to withstand the pressure of the organisational context and were dragged towards the 
industry’s culture of inappropriate and unlawful conduct, such as bending and even 
breaking the rules.  
Traditional accounting researchers view accounting as “technical”. In Hopwood’s (1985, 
pp. 362 - 372) discussion, “technical” is variously linked with the terms “calculative”, 
“neutral”, “professional”, “uncritical” and the belief in “progress” and “efficiency”. 
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 62 
Accountants in practice are presented as seeing the setting of accounting standards as a 
purely technical activity and claiming objectivity. Conventional academics are seen as 
viewing accounting as a factual and “objective form of knowledge” (Loft 1986, p.137). 
Textbooks are found to portray accounting as “a technical and neutral information service 
for decision making” (Hopper, Storey & Willmott 1987, p. 442). “Thus, a theme which 
runs through critical accounting is that conventional accounting espouses a technical 
perspective which typically stresses objectivity, factuality and neutrality” (Jones 1992, 
p.229).  
Some researchers argue that the idea of objectivity in accounting is largely a myth, and 
propose “an alternative perspective on the nature of the accounting process, building on 
insights regarding the interpretive and metaphorical nature of accounting, and arguing that 
accounting should be approached as a form of “dialogue” through which accountants can 
construct, “read” and probe situations in a variety of ways” (Morgan 1988, p. 477). 
The critical perspective of accounting and the theory of accounting rationality (see Jones 
1992) view is supported by Hopper, Storey and Willmott (1987, p. 438), who sees 
accounting as “fully social practice [that is] both the medium and the outcome of the 
politico-economic context in which accounting is embedded”. The theme is echoed by 
many other critical accounting writers (for example, Cooper & Sherer 1984; Knights 1987; 
Loft 1986). “Thus, critical accountants have created a dichotomous model which offers the 
possibility of examining different perspectives on accounting” (Jones 1992, p. 229). These 
different perspectives have arisen from the social practice of accounting, whereby it was 
stated that: 
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In identifying accounting as “social”, stress is variously placed on: subjectivity; the 
cultural or ideological nature of knowledge; and the political nature of accounting in 
relation to interests. Despite the critical accounting view that accounting is a social 
activity, this perspective is not seen as shaping the meanings that accounting 
practitioners attach to accounting (Jones 1992, p. 229).  
This creates a dichotomy in the interpretation of accounting practice between those who 
study accounting, for example researchers, and those who practice it. The conventional 
view of accounting as objective and rule based is contrasted with the social reality of 
practicing accountants. As Jones describes, “management accountants include subjectivity, 
uncertainty/estimation and purposefulness in their explanations of accounting and, in doing 
so, come closer to the critical perspective than to its image of conventional accounting” 
(Jones 1992, p. 230). Therefore, the conventional perspective cannot provide an adequate 
conceptual framework for this study of accounting in practice. “The conventional 
perspective captures only one aspect of practitioners’ views, or only those views expressed 
in particular contexts at particular moments” (Jones 1992, p. 230). The critical accounting 
perspective adopted by this thesis provides an opportunity to examine all aspects of 
accounting practice in the construction industry at the time of the RC. 
“The work of critical accountants in debunking the myth of conventional accounting has 
presented a strong challenge to the image of accounting as a narrow technical activity” 
(Jones 1992, p. 230). There is a danger that management accountants see their activities as 
objective, factual and neutral, which is a perspective of accounting as objective practice. 
This may be one element of an accountants’ self-image but it does not recognise the 
“subjectivity, estimation/uncertainty and purposefulness which they recognise in 
‘professional judgement’” (Jones 1992, p. 230), which is a perspective of accounting as 
subjective practice.  
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Some critical accounting researchers may be sceptical of the use of ST in this thesis. Some 
researchers believe that the “critical-theory approach is essentially a critique of the 
stakeholder-accountability approach” (see Brown & Fraser 2004, p. 27). This suggests a 
conflict which may make some feel uncomfortable in the analysis which follows. This 
conflict has been debated “during the 1930s, 1950s and 1970s” (Brown & Fraser 2004, p. 
27). Therefore, it is an ongoing difference of research opinion. It appears to be based on 
two issues. First, critical theorists suggest that the stakeholder approach is unrealistic. ST 
proposes accountability and transparency necessary for a democratic society (Brown & 
Fraser 2004, p. 28). For accounting this means full disclosure based on satisfying 
stakeholders’ needs for information. Critical accounting argues that this approach denies 
the “exploitative aspects of the capitalist system, and the inherent social inequities which 
exist” (Brown & Fraser 2004, p. 28). In other words, ST’s idea of including all stakeholders 
is nice in theory but does not reflect reality. Second, critical theorists suggest the 
stakeholder approach is unachievable. ST proposes that stakeholders “have information 
rights which must be acknowledged for decision-making purposes and to protect against 
potential abuses of corporate power” (Brown & Fraser 2004, p. 28). For accounting this 
means that all stakeholders should have equal power and equal access to financial 
information. Critical accounting is “sceptical about the potential for real accountability in 
the absence of radical change in capitalist society” (Brown & Fraser 2004, p. 28). In other 
words, we cannot act as if we live in a pluralist society because those with power and 
financial strength dominate other stakeholders and will deny them information rights.  
These differences are also apparent in the treatment of regulation, which emerges as an 
important theme in this thesis, and is highlighted in chapter 7. ST proposes that “regulation 
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is necessary to ensure balanced reporting for accountability, monitoring and decision-
making purposes” (Brown & Fraser 2004, p. 28). For accounting this means objectivity and 
regulation aims to ensure this. Critical accounting accepts this, to some degree, by 
acknowledging that “legislation is important in securing information rights” (Brown & 
Fraser 2004, p. 28). However, critical accounting is still “wary of opportunities elite groups 
have to emasculate regulatory processes through agenda setting” (Brown & Fraser 2004, p. 
28). This means that regulation must address the socio-power inequities in the business 
world.  
This apparent conflict between critical accounting and ST may be reconciled. The way 
forward is tolerance for different perspectives. Critical accounting researchers themselves 
call for tolerance, and “a more self-reflexive and contextualized perspective on accounting 
which sees the connections between society, history, organisations, accounting theory, and 
accounting practice” (Lodh & Gaffikin 2005, p. 156). Critical accounting has challenged 
the traditional view of accounting from a financial or economic perspective and, in doing 
so, it has required tolerance from researchers who prefer this view.  
Critical accounting encourages different perspectives on accounting research. This thesis 
embraces this thinking in several ways. First, it adopts the new history of accounting and 
“explores the reflexive relationships between accounting and the socio-political system in 
which it is embedded” (Funnell 2005, p. 144). New accounting history tends to have a 
sociological perspective, which explores accounting as social practice using social theory. 
The reflexivity of the thesis lies in its focus on the role of accounting within its social 
practice, which fits in the definition of critical accounting by Lodh and Gaffikin (2005) and 
Funnell (2005).  
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Second, the thesis focuses on the role of accounting in improving society through the social 
contract breach within the construction industry and the role accountants could play in 
repairing this breach and legitimising this industry. This provides a theoretical bridge 
connecting critical accounting and ST. Critical accounting attempts to comprehend the 
“social contexts within which accounting issues exist” (Gaffikin 2005b, p. xvii). This 
approach examines how accounting may serve a “useful social purpose and how its practice 
may be continually improved” (Gaffikin 2008, p. 5). The bridge is PIT, which connects 
critical accounting to LT and ST. The societal contract breach, which is defined by LT, 
identifies the opportunity for accounting to improve society, and ST enables us to 
understand why the legitimacy gap exists and how accountants might help close the gap.   
Third, the thesis may address the concerns of critical accounting researchers who are 
skeptical about the claims of ST. Recent research from critical accounting researchers has 
discussed the important role of stakeholders. Anderson, Gaffikin and Singh (2014, p. 542) 
argues that accounting research needs to recognize the needs of multiple stakeholders and 
“from a reading of the corporate social and environmental literature, it seems that the 
stakeholder concept has been gaining prominence over the last two decades”. Gaffikin and 
Lindawati (2012), for example, argue the need to include the public as important 
stakeholders. They propose a code of ethics applicable not only to public accountants but 
which should be extended to “the business community and probably the public at large as 
potential stakeholders” (Gaffikin & Lindawati 2012, p.14). This supports PIT, and the 
stakeholder perspective, from critical accounting researchers. The following quote suggests 
the widespread acceptance and practice of stakeholder perspective: 
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[these ideas] have been accepted in accounting education and practice. These 
include, for example, the idea of the social responsibility of the accounting 
profession and the stakeholder orientation of accounting reports. These topics are 
now included in most Australian accounting texts. The accounting profession, both 
the Institute and CPA Australia, has also embraced these ideas (Anderson et al. 
2014, p. 546) 
However, Anderson et al. (2014) acknowledge concerns about whether these ideals have 
been realised in practice. They highlight recent corporate scandals, such as Enron, and 
suggest that “the accounting profession has had problems in fulfilling its social 
responsibilities” (Anderson et al. 2014, p. 546). However, this criticism appears to focus 
more on Corporate Social Responsibility accounting rather than ST. The thesis contributes 
to this discussion by developing an operationalisation of ST, more specifically from the 
managerial perspective, by exploring how the constructs of relationships, impact and 
expectations help us understand the social practice of accounting within the context of a 
social contract breach. The application of such an approach might, for example, help better 
understand how scandals such as Enron occurred and how to avoid them in the future, 
therefore, realising in practice the goals of ST and satisfying critical accounting researchers. 
In doing so, this study extends critical accounting by operationalising ST and realising that 
whilst key stakeholders are part of the problem, they are also by necessity, part of any 
possible solution. 
 
2.3.2 Public Interest Theory  
The debate over whether accounting is objective or subjective practice is explored through 
PIT. This theory aims to correct inefficient or ineffective market practices (Posner 1974). In 
terms of accounting practice, the PIT of regulation proposes that regulation be introduced to 
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protect the public (Deegan 2009, p. 42). In most cases, the regulator, usually the 
government, acts on behalf of the public to rectify inefficiencies. However, in some cases 
the regulator is a private sector, as opposed to public sector, agency, as with accounting. 
Whilst technical accounting standards are the responsibility of the AASB, ethical and 
professional accounting standards are the subject of industry self-regulation (Wallace, 
Ironfield & Orr 2000, p. 149). Questions then arise about whether private sector regulators 
act in the interests of the public or their own constituents, in this case, accountants (Deegan 
2009, p. 43).  
The public interest is to ensure that in a capitalist society there is confidence that capital 
markets are efficiently directing or allocating resources to productive assets (Deegan 2009, 
p.74). There are arguments that government regulation is flawed due to  ineffective 
implementation caused by ineffective management or funding or the regulation is 
ultimately controlled by those parties who it was supposed to control (Deegan 2009, p.74). 
However, as highlighted in chapter 4, the Australian Government did not give in to pressure 
exerted by the construction industry and it allocated hundreds of millions of dollars to 
investigate and regulate the industry. The RC alone cost $60 million dollars (Senate 
Standing Committee on Education and Employment 2014, p. 13). Therefore, typical 
criticisms of regulation do not fit in this case. The government genuinely sought to correct 
perceived social inequities in the construction interest with sincere motives to protect public 
interest, and allocated resources appropriately.   
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2.3.3 Legitimacy Theory  
The reasons why the government launched the RC are explored through LT. This theory 
asserts that “organisations continually seek to ensure that they are being perceived as 
operating within the bounds and norms of their respective societies, that is, they attempt to 
ensure that their activities are perceived by outside parties as being ‘legitimate’” (Deegan 
2009, p. 323). LT is part of the broader PET (Gray, Owens & Adams 1996). PET explains 
how capitalism, as a social system, is shaped by economic and political interests (Gaffikin 
2008, p. 82). In a capitalist society, such as Australia, there are many social inequalities 
amongst social classes brought about by their inequitable access to the use of resources. 
Economic forces serve to protect the interests of those with access to resources. Regulation 
is the political forces used to find more balance in the allocation of these resources.  
LT fits within PIT because it explains how organisations obtain access to resources in 
return for acting within the broader public interests. In essence, responsible corporate 
citizenship is rewarded with approval by society and wealth. The measure of legitimacy 
expectations is the social contract. Historically, social contracts were measured by profit. 
Traditionally, accounting theory has been situated within the goal of profit maximization as 
the optimal measure of corporate performance (Patten 1991). Under this notion, a firm’s 
profits were viewed as an all-inclusive measure of organisational legitimacy (Ramanathan 
1976) because this increased societal wealth. However, an increase in corporate disasters 
(for example, Enron) and unethical behaviour has led to a shift in focus. Social contracts 
now expect organisations to react and “attend to human, environmental, and other social 
consequences of  business activities” (Heard & Bolce 1981, pp. 247-248).   
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Legitimacy, therefore, is the measure of societal perceptions of the adequacy of corporate 
behaviour (Suchman 1995). Legitimacy is commonly defined as the perception that the 
actions of an entity are within the norms of their society (Deegan 2002; Nasi, Nasi, Phillips 
& Zyglidopoulos 1997; Suchman 1995). Perception may differ from reality but the status of 
legitimacy is based on being adjudged legitimate (Lindblom 1994). Legitimacy is pursued 
primarily for one of two reasons. Legitimacy is either considered to be an operational 
resource (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; O’Donovan 2002) or a set of constitutive beliefs 
(Zucker 1987). However, unlike many other resources, legitimacy is considered to be a 
resource that an organisation is able to affect or manipulate through various disclosure-
related strategies (Woodward, Edwards & Birken 1996). In line with resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978), organisations dependent on a resource will pursue 
strategies to ensure the continued supply of that resource (Deegan 2009, p. 324).   
Legitimation is the process that leads to legitimacy (Deegan 2005; Lindblom 1994). 
“Researchers have proposed that legitimation tactics might differ depending upon whether 
the entity is trying to gain, maintain, or repair legitimacy” (Deegan 2009, p. 331). Deegan 
(2009) argues that theoretical development in this area remain weak. Given the historical 
context of this study, this represents an area within the literature where a significant 
contribution can be made. In examining the history of the construction industry, this study 
will begin by looking at how the industry tried to maintain legitimacy. It must be assumed 
that the industry had legitimacy status at one point; otherwise society would not have 
allowed it access to necessary resources. Maintaining legitimacy is considered easier than 
gaining or repairing (O’Donovan 2002). There are two strategies for maintaining 
legitimacy: predicting future changes and protecting past accomplishments (Deegan 2009, 
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p. 331). On the first strategy, Suchman (1995, p. 595 ) recommends monitoring the external 
environment to track changes in society expectations through boundary spanning 
employees. On the second strategy, Suchman (1995, p. 595) recommends making 
legitimacy a continual, rather than episodic, process by avoiding good corporate citizenship 
mistakes and building a stockpile of ‘good news stories’.   
This study will examine how the construction industry gained legitimacy in the first place. 
Organisations gain legitimacy by proactively seeking to persuade society that they deserve 
this status, and access to necessary resources (O’Donovan 2002). Gaining legitimacy 
involves similar strategies as when trying to repair legitimacy. The only real difference is 
that gaining is a proactive approach and repairing is a reactive approach. Repairing involves 
responding to a crisis. Lindblom (1994) recommends four strategies to gain or repair 
legitimacy: 
1. Communicate to the public the organisation’s performance and activities 
which align with society’s expectations 
2. Change perception of the public via disclosure of positive or desirable 
activities, without falsifying  
3. Manipulate perception by deflecting attention from problem areas onto 
positive or desirable activities 
4. Change social expectations, perhaps by arguing they are unreasonable. 
In developing theories about the process of legitimisation, two approaches are adopted in 
this present study. It will examine what, if any, legitimisation tactics were employed by the 
industry before and after the RC to maintain, gain or repair legitimacy, and what 
disclosures the industry used to communicate with society. Deegan (2009, p. 332) explains 
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that there has been insufficient empirical research and theoretical development to connect 
specific legitimisation techniques with efforts to gain, maintain, or repair legitimacy. In 
other words, Lindblom’s recommendations are untested and it is not known whether they 
work or how to attain legitimacy. The only action known to work is disclosure. 
To attain legitimacy status, the actual conduct of the organisation is somewhat irrelevant. 
Rather it is what society collectively knows or perceives that shapes legitimacy (Deegan 
2009, p. 324). Information disclosure, therefore, is vital to establishing corporate 
legitimacy. Disclosure is important in influencing society’s perception of the organisation’s 
behaviour. Disclosure must then consider what type of information will influence society’s 
perception. LT emphasizes that the organisation must appear to consider the rights of the 
public at large, not just shareholders or investors (Deegan 2009, p. 325). It examines 
questions about the type of information that needs to be disclosed, and how organisations 
can persuade society that they are behaving legitimately.  
Legitimacy is a theoretical concept in the sense that there is usually no clear statement from 
society about what it expects of an organisation. It is unlikely that an organisation can find 
a copy of their social contract and “negotiate” that with society (Deegan 2009, p. 326). 
However, it is possible to identify general guidelines of behaviour applicable to most 
organisations. Gray, Owens and Adams (1996) distinguish between explicit and implicit 
terms of the social contract. Explicit terms are legal requirements. These may be specified 
by legislation in areas such as industrial relations, environment, and safety. However, 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) point out that society may be unable or unwilling to have all 
desirable behaviours codified within the law. Implicit terms are areas outside the law but 
still deemed desirable by society. For example, Nike’s use of Asian ‘sweatshops’ outraged 
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many people in the community which Nike obviously did not foresee. Implicit terms are the 
area where managers have most discretion and seem to make the most mistakes.  
As a society changes, so do its expectations of organisations. Therefore, organisations need 
to adapt and change in terms of their social contract. The analysis will identify the 
“legitimacy gap” in the industry’s social contract (Deegan 2009, p. 329).  The difference 
between how an organisation should act and how it is perceived that the organisation has 
acted is the legitimacy gap (Deegan 2009, p. 329).  
LT is used in this thesis to examine the social contract between the industry and Australian 
society. The RC issued a 23 volume report on 24 February 2003 (Cole 2003). The RCR 
presented the findings of the Commissioner Cole’s examination of the conduct of the 
industry. It sets out society’s expectations of the industry, and the extent to which it 
complies with the social contract (Deegan 2009, p. 325). In this sense, the RCR represents a 
gap analysis, measuring the difference between current practice and desired practice, and 
was a significant trigger for change. 
Legitimacy gaps are created in two ways. Society’s expectations might change but the 
organisation or industry is still doing what it always did. The classic example is the tobacco 
companies; they carried on doing business as they always had, but suddenly came under 
increasing attack in the 1970s as society became more aware of the health problems 
associated with smoking (Nasi et al. 1997). The second manner in which legitimacy gaps 
are created is when previously unknown information about an organisation becomes 
known. Bowles (1991, p. 398) calls this the “organizational shadow”, which refers to 
information about the organisation unknown to the public. This usually becomes known 
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through the media. This framework is used to explain the historical context of how the 
construction industry lost legitimacy in chapter 4. For example, the Four Corners Report 
was a catalyst for the RC; because while the Government was aware of the industry’s 
unlawful and inappropriate behaviour, the media report pushed it into the forefront of 
public consciousness and the Government had to respond.  
LT proposes a relationship between corporate disclosures and community expectations; the 
view being that management reacts to community concerns and makes necessary changes 
(Deegan 2009, p. 340). Researchers tend to use media reports as an indication of public 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with an organisation’s activities (for example, see Ader 1995, 
p. 300; Brown & Deegan, 1998). Organisations can also use customer surveys to gauge 
satisfaction levels. This enables management to distinguish what is important so that 
organisations can prioritize issues for action.  
Neuman (1990) distinguishes between “obtrusive” and “non-obtrusive” issues which 
defines public awareness levels. For example, interest rate increases are highly visible and 
would be an obtrusive issue for banks; while industrial relations practices or accounting 
procedures would be invisible to most and, therefore, classified as non-obtrusive. 
Construction industry managers needed then to see the signs that their conduct was 
considered unacceptable by society and whether to act or ignore them. 
LT explains that managers will adapt to community expectations if they are to be successful 
(Deegan 2009, p. 335). A number of papers have identified specific types of social 
responsibility disclosures that have appeared in annual reports (Deegan 2009, p. 336). 
These disclosures attempt to explain how management has responded to legitimacy gaps 
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and tried to attain or maintain legitimacy. Questions then emerge about what type of public 
disclosures exist in the construction industry and how to assess their reliability and 
accuracy.  
In summary, LT helps us understand the construction industry’s interaction with the 
broader society. It helps identify the economic forces which created social inequities 
leading to the breach of the social contract, as well as the political forces driving regulation 
and seeking to find balance amongst the industry’s social groups. It provides an 
interpretative framework to measure the social contract, the nature of the breach, that is the 
legitimacy gap, and its historical context, how the industry gained, maintained, and repaired 
its legitimacy.  
 
2.3.4 Stakeholder Theory 
ST and LT are similar, as both are part of the broader theory of PIT. The difference is that 
while LT discusses the expectations of society in general, manifested as the social contract, 
ST examines particular groups within society. These different groups, it is proposed by ST, 
will have different expectations and this is manifested in terms of various social contracts 
‘negotiated’ with different stakeholder groups (Deegan 2009, p. 346). Therefore, ST has a 
very important role in this study, and is the main theory used. ST allows us to examine the 
difference between the government’s expectations of the industry and other groups with a 
vested interest in the industry. In this study, ST uses SNA to help understand the social 
interaction between the construction industry’s stakeholders.  
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Accounting’s role in the industry has implications for how stakeholder expectations are 
considered or managed. Firms’ compliance with the social contract will be influenced by 
their relationships within the industry. ST will enable the examination of the interaction of 
the following groups within the industry, their relative importance and influence over 
accounting, and the tension between responsibility, doing the right thing, and demand, 
meeting the interests of the various stakeholder groups. The following figure summarises 













Figure 2 - 2.1: Australian Construction Industry Stakeholders 
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Figure 2.1: Australian Construction Industry Stakeholders 
 
 
ST has two themes: the Ethical (also referred to as moral or normative) perspective and the 
Managerial perspective. Each theme is now examined.  
The Ethical perspective argues that all stakeholders should be treated equally and that the 
(economic) power of various groups should not allow them to have differential influence 
over the firm (Deegan 2009, p. 347). Decisions should be made based on the best interests 
of all stakeholders and not just the most powerful. The ethical perspective supports the 
position of the RC. The RC’s statement of social expectations of the industry argues that 
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Australians. Therefore, the Government is representing all of society in setting a social 
contract for the industry. From a SNA lens, the ethical perspective represents cohesion and 
harmony within the social network, generated by equality, democracy and participation 
amongst all stakeholders.  
The Managerial perspective, on the other hand, argues that management will be likely to 
respond to the expectations of particular (typically powerful) stakeholders (Gray, Owens & 
Adams 1996, p. 45). A fundamental cause of the problems that led to the RC was that the 
industry’s management were influenced by the demands of different stakeholders, the 
unions in particular. However, the RC also found non-industrial relations issues such as tax 
evasion and unlawful acceptance and reporting of ‘commissions’. This raises the question 
of which stakeholder groups influenced these behaviours and why.   
Three stakeholder constructs have been identified for operationalisation: 
1. Relationships 
2. Impact 
3. Expectations (Gray, Owens & Adams 1996, p. 45)  
The objective with this operationalisation is to test whether these ST constructs may help 
predict stakeholder behaviour in terms of willingness to meet the social contract. The first 
operationalisation is relationships. Relationships may be defined by SNA. SNA allows us 
to measure interaction between stakeholder groups in terms of network quality (depth of 
contact) and network structure (number of contacts and frequency of contact) (for example, 
Stone 2001). The second operationalisation is impact. Impact may be defined in terms of 
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management’s willingness to listen to various stakeholder groups and adjust their behaviour 
accordingly. It measures the power or level of influence of each group. The third 
operationalisation is expectations. Expectations may be defined in terms of the social 
contract for each stakeholder group. It answers questions about what each of the groups 
listed in figure 2.1 above expect of accounting, and how these expectations differ. The 
central theme with ST for this study is that the construction industry’s stakeholder groups 
will have different social contracts with the industry in terms of its accounting. This will be 
manifested in differences compared with the overall social contract, the RC, and between 
the expectations of the various groups.  
In summary, ST identifies the various groups with a vested interest in the industry, but also 
their different expectations of accounting practice, manifested as multiple social contracts. 
The unlawfulness associated with other construction industry activities suggests that the 
industry tended to adopt a managerial rather than ethical perspective on stakeholder 
expectations. Clearly, not all stakeholder groups are equal in the construction industry. 
Questions raised include whether differences in power within these groups create conflict 
over accounting practice; if so, who was in control and what were their expectations of 
accounting within the industry. ST allows an opportunity to further examine the tension 
between accounting as an objective rule based system versus a subjective reality. It allows 
examination about whether accounting in the construction industry was based on a sense of 
responsibility, doing the right thing, or demand, meeting the interests of the most powerful 
stakeholders. SNA theory will be used to enhance ST by examining the macro level 
interactions of the stakeholder groups in some more theoretical detail.  
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2.4 Research Objectives  
The study has two main themes, as outlined in section 1.4 of chapter 1: 
1. How did the structural and cultural factors that led to the RC in 2003 affect accounting 
practice in the construction industry? 
2. What was the role of accounting in the construction industry’s social contract? 
In this section, these themes are expanded to identify specific research objectives, which 
are used to guide the data gathering, analysis, and reporting. This chapter’s theoretical 
framework is laid over the research objectives to show how the theory is used to examine 
the data.  
As stated previously, the main theoretical lens used in this study is CAT. CAT aims to 
identify the prevailing social arrangements within a community, such as an industry, within 
the broader context of the society in which it exists (Roslender 2006, p. 250). In this study, 
CAT examines the interaction between the construction industry and its stakeholders. The 
societal context is that the industry is important to Australia but was not behaving in a way 
that met society’s expectations. The outcome was the RC 2003 to examine why the industry 
was misbehaving and how this might be addressed. CAT also aims to promote self-
awareness of both “what is” and “what might be”, and how the former might be 
transformed to install the latter (Roslender 2006, p. 250). The difference between the 
desired and the actual behaviour of the construction industry is the legitimacy gap.  
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Theme 1 – What Led to the Royal Commission (up to 2003) 
PIT explains why and how society intervenes in business activity. In this study, it is used to 
explain why the regulator, the Federal Government, felt it needed to take action to improve 
behaviour in the construction industry. It is also used to explain the types of regulation used 
by the Government and accounting bodies. In terms of this study, a number of questions 
emerge: 
1. Why was the construction industry sufficiently important for the Australian Federal 
Government to launch a Royal Commission? (chapter 3) 
2. Why did the Federal Government choose to conduct a Royal Commission into the 
construction industry? (chapter 4) 
3. Did regulation of accounting practice in the construction industry act in the interests of 
the public or its constituents? (chapter 7) 
LT explains how organisations seek to be perceived as ‘legitimate’ by their society in return 
for resources necessary for their survival (for example,  see Dowling & Pfeffer 1975; 
O’Donovan 2002). Lindblom (1994) distinguishes between legitimacy and legitimation, 
where the former is a condition or status and the latter a process that leads to being 
adjudged legitimate. This raises a number of questions: 
4. Why does the construction industry need to be perceived as legitimate? What resources 
are conferred as a result? (chapter 3) 
5. What criteria does society set in adjudging legitimate status? How can it be known if 
the industry is legitimate? (chapter 4) 
6. What processes does society expect of the industry to close the legitimacy gap?  
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LT helps us understand why and how organisations can be accepted as appropriate 
corporate citizens in their society. A number of questions emerge: 
7. How did the construction industry perceive its role as corporate citizens? (chapter 4) 
8. How did society perceive the industry’s role as corporate citizens? (chapter 4) 
9. What was the nature of the social contract between the construction industry and 
Australian society?  What did society expect from this industry? (chapter 4) 
ST identifies the various groups with a vested interest in the construction industry, but also 
their different expectations of accounting practice, manifested as multiple social contracts. 
ST is used help explain or predict stakeholder behaviour in terms of willingness to meet the 
social contract. A number of questions emerge: 
10. How did the construction industry’s stakeholders interact with accountants? (chapter 5)  
11. What is the willingness of the construction industry’s management to listen to various 
stakeholder groups and adjust their behaviour accordingly? Who had the power in this 
industry? What power did accountants have? (chapter 6) 
12. What is the social contract the construction industry’s stakeholders had with 
accountants? (chapter 6) 
Theme 2 – Post Royal Commission (after 2003) 
Non-compliance with the social contract can also have a negative impact on the 
organisation or industry’s market reputation or image (Deegan, Rankin & Voght 2000). The 
importance of societal perception is illustrated by a study showing positive correlations 
between media attention for certain social and environmental issues and the volume of 
disclosures on these issues (Deegan, Rankin & Tobin 2002). In other words, organisations 
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see compliance with their social contract important enough to take action. This leads to 
questions about the RC’s findings and how the construction industry reacted: 
13. What measures of legitimacy were imposed by the RC on the construction industry? 
(chapter 4) 
14. Did the construction industry’s non-compliance with the social contract have a negative 
impact on its market reputation/image? If so, how did this negative impact affect the 
industry? (chapter 7) 
The role of accounting practice is then considered within the broader context of the social 
reconstruction of this industry. The specific activities identified by the RC as misbehaviour 
may then be examined in terms of the role of accountants. These activities are listed on the 
right hand side of figure 1.1 in chapter 1, and include profit manipulation, non-compliance 
with payroll tax, and so on. The response of accounting to the RC findings is explored by 
looking at how these activities are typically conducted in the construction industry and 
whether they could have been undertaken with or without accountants, prior to the RC, and 
afterwards. In this way, conclusions about the role of accounting in legitimising the 
construction industry can be drawn. A number of questions emerge: 
15. What role did accountants play in activities identified as unlawful behaviour by the RC? 
(chapter 6) 
16. Did accountants change their role in in activities identified as misbehaviour by the RC 
after 2003? (chapter 7) 
This section identified sixteen research questions aiming to reconstruct the social reality of 
behaviour explaining the legitimacy gap in the construction industry.  
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2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the ‘what’, ‘why’, and ‘how’ of the study. It defined the ‘what’ as 
the construction industry, with a particular emphasis on the industry’s private and public 
stakeholders. The ‘why’ explained that the industry is socially and economically important 
to Australia and its conduct is in the public interest. The ‘how’ outlined the methodology 
and the theoretical framework used to examine accounting’s role in legitimising this 
industry. The methodology is an embedded case study which uses CA and CDA to find 
meaning in the reports written about the construction industry. The social reconstruction of 
the industry and its stakeholders mainly uses ST, with help from LT and PIT, and ideas 
from the discipline of sociology, SNA. The next chapter will explain the phenomena under 
investigation, the ‘what’ in this case study, in more detail, and also its significance, the 
‘why’ in this case study.    
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the nature of the construction industry. The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide context for the remaining chapters. The chapter examines the 
industry’s nature, history, structure, and culture. The chapter will show that the 
construction industry has had a long history in Australia, that it is important to society, 
its structure has created intense competition with small profit margins and a short-term 
profit focus, and the culture that these characteristics have produced has created a 
propensity towards unlawful behaviour.  
The construction industry began in the earliest days of Australia’s settlement by white 
Europeans, that is the 1780s, and has remained important to society ever since. In the 
early days, much of Australia was characterised by vast distances between settlements. 
The industry provides fundamental benefits to society, that is, shelter and infrastructure 
such as roads and bridges. The industry is somewhat unique in Australia in terms of its 
industry structure. It is a highly fragmented industry divided between a small group of 
large companies, known as head contractors, and thousands of very small companies, 
known as sub-contractors. The sub-contractors are often dependent upon head 
contractors for work, creating important socio-power differentials within the industry. 
This is heightened by the wealth and status divide of landowners, entrepreneurs and 
business owners, and property developers, and trades people. Given the traditional 
working class nature of trades people and labourers, many industry employees have felt 
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powerless in terms of their relationship with their employers. This tension has found a 
powerful voice in the trade union movement in Australia, which has always been 
closely associated with the construction industry employees. This association has 
created a rebellious culture within the construction industry which evolved to the point 
in 2003 when the Federal Government launched a Royal Commission to investigate the 
industry’s conduct.  
The main purpose in describing the industry’s history from a sociological perspective is 
to begin analysis of the behaviours leading to the social contract breach. Organisational 
behaviour can be a result of organisational culture which in turn is a result of underlying 
assumptions about the way business is done (Schein 2004, p. 26). The behaviours which 
led the RC to conclude that the industry was unlawful (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 8) did not 
suddenly emerge. These behaviours were embedded in organisational practices, 
systems, norms and values. By looking at the history of the industry from a sociological 
perspective, an understanding is gained as to why these unlawful behaviours became the 
norm. The turning point appears to be a change in political ideological, brought about 
by the emergence of communism and its adoption by union leaders, particularly from 
the 1950s onwards. The prosperity of the 1960s boosted union membership and 
strength. The 1970s saw a fundamental shift in the industry’s socio-political landscape 
with unions taking control and dictating the rules of stakeholder interaction. This 
landscape built upon the political ideologies of left wing union leadership with a natural 
animosity towards the ruling class, manifested by owners and managers, and a militant 
style. This evolved in the 1980s and 1990s into a culture that felt those in power could 
ignore the law and do things their way. It seems a long way from the sense of social 
justice and generosity of spirit that created the friendly societies in the early days of 
Australia’s white settlement.  
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3.2 Nature of the Australian Construction Industry  
3.2.1 Introduction 
Economists define an industry as a group of firms that supplies a particular market 
(Grant 2009, p. 86). The key to defining an industry is its market. The main problem 
with defining an industry in terms of its market is setting boundaries. In the case of the 
construction industry, it offers many products and services and has many different types 
of customers. Researchers overcome this problem by dividing it into supply and demand 
dimensions. On the demand side, an industry is defined as firms that provide the same 
product or service, and its customers are able to switch, or choose between suppliers, on 
the basis of price. On the supply side, an industry is composed of firms that are able to 
use their factors of production, including equipment, technology and labour, in the same 
way (see Grant 2013).  
This approach to defining industry structure focuses on the key dimension of firm 
behaviour within an industry: competition. Competition is particularly important in the 
construction industry because it has created many of the structural problems identified 
by the RC in 2003. The construction industry is characterised by intense competition, 
leading to small profit margins, and a short term focus on profit. In order to understand 
the structural problems, we need to identify who is in competition.  
3.2.2 Industry Sectors 
Previous research uses the term construction generally to describe the activity of the 
creation of physical infrastructure, superstructure and related facilities (Wells 1985). 
Construction is also referred to as all types of activities associated with the erection and 
repair of immobile structures and facilities (Nam & Tatum 1988), in other words, things 
that are built for a purpose to last.  
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It is more helpful that the construction industry is typically defined as having three 
distinct industry sectors: engineering construction, non-residential building, and 
residential building (de Valence 2011). This approach is also adopted by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS), a government body who collects and reports on information 
for the government and broader society. The ABS defines the construction industry in 
terms of the major industry segments, as follows: 
The construction industry consists of those businesses mainly engaged in the 
construction of residential and non-residential buildings (including alterations 
and additions), engineering structures and related trade services classified under 
the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (ANZSIC) 
2006 (ABS 2010, p. 3). 
In terms of competition, competitors can be identified by asking whether the same firms 
operate in each of the three industry sectors. For example, do those firms offering 
engineering construction services also offer residential and non-residential buildings? 
From a demand perspective, would customers seeking to buy a road or a bridge be 
willing to buy a house instead if the price was lower? This would not occur because 
these products offer a different function for the customer. From a supply perspective, 
can an engineering construction firm use its expensive earth moving equipment to build 
a block of units? This is also unlikely to occur. This means that the engineering 
construction sector is different from residential and non-residential building. Therefore, 
from a competition perspective, the construction industry can be split into two distinct 
groups of competitors:  engineering construction and residential and non-residential.  
Consideration needs to be given as to whether firms competing in residential and non-
residential constructing are the same. From a demand perspective, would customers 
seeking to buy a house be willing to buy an office, factory or shop if the price was 
lower? Given that the needs of the customer are very different this is most unlikely. 
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From a supply side perspective, would firms who can build a house also be able to build 
a factory with their existing resources such as equipment and labour? This is more 
likely. This means that firms are able to compete in both the residential and non-
residential sectors. Therefore, this study adopts a definition of residential and non-
residential building as its definition of the construction industry. It does this because 
this study focuses on the types of firms investigated by the RC and, from a competitors’ 
perspective, this was firms operating in the residential and non-residential sectors.  
3.2.3 Industry Segments 
Researchers also define industries in terms of the products and services they offer 
(Grant 2013). The construction industry has two classes product buildings and civil 
works (Chris 1998; Gould & Joyce 2008). 
This approach also supports the decision made by this study to separate the industry into 
engineering construction and residential and non-residential building. In terms of 
market segmentation, researchers have mostly classified the industry in this way. First, 
engineering construction offers road and bridge construction, electrical generation, 
electrical transmission, water and sewerage, processing plants including oil and gas 
pipelines, and miscellaneous including railways, harbours, and recreational facilities (de 
Valence 2011). Residential building includes all dwellings. Non-residential building 
includes offices, hotels, factories, shops and other business premises, as well as 
warehouses, terminals, service stations, and car parks (de Valence 2011). This approach 
to industry segmentation is consistent with industry analysts who also define the 
industry in terms of the type of products and services offered, as shown by this extract: 
The [industry] covers construction of buildings, roads, railroads, aerodromes, 
irrigation projects, harbour or river works, water, gas, sewerage, storm water 
drains, mains, electricity, other transmission lines or towers, pipelines, oil 
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refineries, civil engineering projects and on-site assembly of prefabricated 
buildings. It includes repairs and renovation, mine site preparation, demolitions 
or excavations and the installation of utilities. Construction services are also 
included (Dunn 2010, p. 2). 
This industry analyst report extends the range of products and services typically used by 
researchers by including support services such as maintenance. For the purposes of this 
study, the industry analyst definition is too broad and would include too many firms that 
are not competing directly.  
The only reason to use industry segments to analyse unlawful behaviour instead of 
industry sectors would be if competitors were different. Researchers have found that 
competitors in the construction industry are different across Australia, but for reasons 
not related to the products or services; namely size and geography. Therefore, this study 
will focus at the industry sector level, residential and non-residential construction, with 
an interest in differences in behaviour across firm size and geography.  
3.2.4 Firm Size 
The RCR defines the construction industry in terms of firm size: head contractors (large 
companies) and sub-contractors (small businesses). In general terms, these categories 
may be defined in terms of number of employees. The RCR defines most subcontractors 
as small businesses employing fewer than five employees (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p.13). The 
ABS defines small business as fewer than twenty employees, and five or less employees 
as micro businesses (ABS 2002, p. 1). For the purposes of consistency, the thesis adopts 
the RCR definition of small business, which may be used inter-changeably with the 
ABS term micro business. All others are classified as large companies. In terms of 
competition, firm size does matter in the construction industry. Head contractors 
compete against other head contractors; while small contractors compete against other 
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small contractors. In most cases, big firms do not compete against small firms. There 
are exceptions to this rule. For example, there are very small firms who build houses 
who compete against the big housing construction firms. However, this competition is 
more indirect and customers are still most likely to be comparing small builders against 
other small builders, perhaps based on price or the opportunity to build a one-off design. 
Most large house builders have a set of standard designs that customers can choose 
from and they compete based on these designs. Differences in firm size are very 
important in creating the socio-power inequities which existed within the construction 
industry and this had a strong influence on the relationships between the industry’s 
stakeholders.  
The government’s main concern from the social contract breach identified by the RC 
was the small firms who largely work for the head contractors. These firms employ only 
a few people each but when combined represent a large proportion of the industry 
workforce (36%) (Cole 2003). The Government’s concern about this industry structure 
is the powerlessness of the small businesses to address the industry’s unlawful 
behaviour, as shown in this extract from the RCR:  
The subcontractors in the building and construction industry are typical of small 
business in Australia. Of the 692 800 people who are engaged in the industry, 
248 100, or 36 per cent, are subcontractors or ‘own account workers’. Less than 
25 per cent of the total workforce belongs to a union. These figures are 
indicative of an industry where more than three-quarters of the workforce do not 
wish to be involved with unions, and more than one-third have an attitude of 
independence and self-reliance. However, most subcontractors are small with 94 
per cent employing fewer than five employees. They are frequently 
undercapitalised and depend upon continuous cash flow for their continued 
existence. They are thus immensely vulnerable to disruption to their work flow. 
They have no prospect of resisting union demands or, at present of recovering 
losses suffered from unlawful industrial action by unions (Cole 2003, vol. 1, 
p.13). 
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The extract shows why the Government chose to define the industry in this way. The 
phrase ‘immensely vulnerable’ is particularly useful in describing the power inequities 
within the industry, and how subcontractors had little power. For the purposes of this 
study it is helpful to split the industry sector grouping, residential and non-residential 
building; and then into head contractors and sub-contractors within each sector, because 
they are competing directly with one another. The issue of competition is important 
because it influences industry structural issues, which were highlighted as problems by 
the RC.  
3.2.5 Geography 
The construction industry is not mobile, in the sense that the final product is not readily 
transportable and the final service has to be delivered on site (Toner 2006). As a result, 
firms tend to operate within a geographic area that enables their workers to travel to and 
from site; perhaps one to one and a half hours travel by car or rail. Therefore, most 
small firms service their local area. Large firms can overcome this problem by opening 
branches in other areas and employing local staff. 1: Firm Size Industry Map 
The larger firms operate across all segments and Australian states (geographic 
locations) and include firms such as Lend Lease Corporation Limited, Leighton 
Holdings Limited, and Mirvac Group. However, the construction industry has very low 
mobility barriers, in the sense that there are no regulatory barriers to inter-state trade or 
mobility of equipment or labour, and minimal restraints on the acquisition of industry 
occupational skills (Toner 2006). This means that while a firm may be based in one 
state, such as Victoria, it might compete for business in another state, such as New 
South Wales, if it needed the work. This means it has the opportunity to grow and 
become a national firm.  
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In summary, the study defines the construction industry as firms competing in 
residential and non-residential building, with a particular focus on firm size, and an 
interest in differences by geography, that is, state. The study does not include firms 
offering engineering construction, and does not examine industry segments in the sense 
of product or service classifications.  
 
3.3 History of the Australian Construction Industry  
3.3.1 Sociological Background 
The construction industry began when the tents of the first fleet were set up on arrival at 
Sydney Cove in 1788. The Aboriginal people who lived in Australia before the arrival 
of the English also engaged in construction in the sense of camp sites and other shelter. 
However, the beginnings of today’s construction industry began with white settlement 
in 1788. From the earliest days of the white settlement, construction works began with 
convict labour under the supervision of military authorities (Knight 1997). Sydney Cove 
quickly grew as temporary and then more permanent structures were built and roads and 
bridges were constructed. In the decades following the first fleet arrival, free convicts, 
as well as free and assisted immigrants began to engage in construction work (Knight 
1997). As the number of skilled immigrants grew, their skills were diffused and groups 
of tradespeople emerged. As these groups grew, authorities felt a need to regulate their 
work practices to introduce consistent standards and quality about the way work was 
conducted. Carpenters and joiners were one of the first labour groups to become 
organized in this way (Turner & Sandercock 1983). Various associations surrounding 
the building trades, known as friendly societies, started to emerge in the 1830s (Mitchell 
1996).  
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These friendly societies provide an insight into the culture of construction industry 
employees in the early decades of white settlement in Australia. They began as a benefit 
society in the sense of providing financial and other support for members who were 
sick, out-of-work, and sometimes provided funeral assistance (Hume 1960). This helped 
to create a sense of belonging and support that evolved into the national culture identity 
of ‘mateship’ that Australian is so proud of. Mateship has its roots in Australia from 
convict times; but the goldfields in the 19th century were the cultural incubators of the 
term (Dyrenfurth 2015). Trade unionists, labour party members, and radicals have used 
the term mateship to mean the same thing as unionism, and mateship was seen as the 
equivalent of socialism within the union movement (Dyrenfurth 2015). This sense of 
mateship created a strong identity for workers in the industry and a culture of 
supporting one another when things got tough. It also created a sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
In these early stages of the industry’s development, social networks began to establish 
clear roles and divisions. Hume (1960), for example, argues that the friendly societies 
were indeed trade unions because they excluded employers from their membership and 
recognized differences in worker status. Although the friendly societies began with a 
purpose of providing social welfare, this grew to include a focus on wages and 
conditions of employment. While initially these groups may have existed to help those 
“down on their luck”, they evolved to consider the needs of all members. They became 
unions of trades or trade unions.  
Evidence of the sense of natural justice desired by these early trade unions emerged in 
industrial action which aimed to improve the economic interests of members. The 
carpenters and joiners went on strike at least once in 1840; plumbers also took industrial 
action in the 1840s; and stonemasons fought for and won the eight hour day in 1856 
(Turner & Sandercock 1983).  These actions reveal a culture of socio-power conflict 
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between employers and employees. That workers felt the need to strike to communicate 
their dissatisfaction with their working conditions suggests they felt powerless and 
exploited by employers and that the only way to negotiate changes was to band together 
and take a stand. The sense of mateship had grown into an industrial movement by the 
1850s. This shows that the culture which led to the RC in 2003 had its roots 150 years 
ago in the growing awareness of workers that they needed to act together to force 
employers to listen to their needs.  
There was also a sense of pride in their skills and the quality of their work. The early 
trades unions imposed strict rules of entrance; if a tradesman’s work was not of 
satisfactory standard, they were not admitted as a member of the union (Mitchell 1996). 
This sense of pride and maintaining industry standards was formalized by the creation 
of the construction industry’s peak body, the Master Builders Association (MBA), in 
1873. The MBA is Australia’s oldest industry association (Master Builders 2015). The 
formation of the MBA also “heralded a change in the industry, namely the widespread 
adoption of subcontracting” (Gyles 1992, vol. 7, p. 146).  
The emergence of subcontracting was a watershed moment in the history of the 
construction industry as it changed the way work was organized. Most importantly for 
this study, it changed the employment relationship and had a significant impact on 
socio-political power inequities in the industry’s social networks. The emergence of the 
MBA changed the employment relationship away from single trades. For example a 
customer, such as someone wanting a house built, would seek people with necessary 
skills to complete the project such as a carpenter, plumber and other trades (Gyles 1992, 
vol. 7, p. 146). The master builders tendered for whole projects and then subcontracted 
work out to tradesmen (Knight 1997). This meant that the master builders were project 
managers who had a temporary relationship with the tradespeople they employed. The 
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temporary nature of this relationship created socio-political power inequities in the 
employment relationship. Tradespeople became subcontractors whose dependency on 
the masters builders to give them work meant that they were vulnerable. The master 
builders in essence were head contractors. This industry structure continues to today.  
In 1899, the Government began to take an active role in the regulation of the 
construction industry. The New South Wales Minister for Works used the Public Works 
Department to improve the remuneration and working conditions of lower skilled 
labourers (Sheldon 1989). This resulted in growth in union membership. In the period 
up to 1920, union density continued to grow (Knight 1997), and the government took a 
more active interest in union activities and Federal registration of building unions 
(Gyles 1992, vol. 7, p. 148).  
The construction industry had a cyclical boom-bust nature in the early part of the 20th 
century in response to changes in the economy and in government policy, which created 
fluctuations in spending on all industry sectors. World War One halved industry 
outputs, but the post war recovery increased demand, and the depression in the 1930s 
led to widespread unemployment in the industry (Sheldon 1993). During this period the 
adoption of the new political ideology of communism emerged and created important 
changes in Australian society. These changes would have a significant impact on the 
construction industry.   
By 1945, communists led the major construction unions in Australia (Turner & 
Sandercock 1983). This was most noticeable in the Building Workers’ Industrial Union 
(BWIU), which was formed by workers with communist party associations (Mitchell 
1996). Communist beliefs transformed employee groups into industrial unions rather 
than trade unions (Mitchell 1996) by changing the focus from individual trades such as 
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electricians to industries such as construction. This increased the size of the unions in 
terms of membership and more power. The transformation meant that the socio-political 
power inequities between employers and employees became aggressive and adversarial. 
Unions such as the BWIU sought benefits for their members, just like pre-communist 
unions, but the difference was in how they sought these benefits. Rather than pursuing 
benefits through the process set by government, that is industrial tribunals, the BWIU 
sought to deal directly with employers. Accordingly a new relationship emerged 
between the industry’s stakeholders. The BWIU introduced campaigns of “direct 
action” which saw the first attempts of different unions working together to coerce 
employers to comply with their demands (Knight 1997). This aggressive behaviour led 
the Federal Government to deregister the BWIU, essentially outlawing their behaviour.  
In the 1950s, the construction industry socio-political power inequities changed again as 
two new dynamics emerged. Inter-union rivalry emerged as unions struggled to 
establish more power over other unions (Gyles 1992, vol. 7, p. 146). Employers, 
through the MBA, fought back by trying to get unions such as the BWIU deregistered. 
At the same time, the militant culture created by communist ideology created power 
struggles within the union movement. Whereas until the 1950s the battle had been 
between employers and employees, it now involved employees against employees as 
well. However, the battle was mainly restricted to union leadership and often did not 
involve the average union member. It was the 1950s where the construction industry 
established a reputation for violence and aggression (Frenkel & Coolican 1980), and 
thuggery and corruption (Mitchell 1996). Thus, it had changed considerably from the 
benevolence of the friendly societies 60 years before.  
In the 1960s, the construction industry enjoyed a boom period with almost uninterrupted 
growth. During this period, changing technology, new building materials and techniques 
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changed the way labour was used (Mitchell 1996). Once again, the employment 
relationship in the industry changed. New pre-fabrication techniques meant the use of 
off-site construction, which was then transported to site (Mitchell 1996). This created a 
‘manufacturing’ process for construction where off-site ‘factories’ prepared pre-
fabricated structures for assembly on-site. These off-site production facilities enabled 
more specialisation of labour and more permanency in the employment relationship. 
Booming demand for construction, particularly within the central business districts of 
major cities, meant employers wanted to avoid industrial disputes to ensure they did not 
miss out on opportunities (Mitchell 1996). In this way, the 1960s swung the balance of 
power towards the trade unions and their members. Employees in the construction 
industry experienced their best ever wages and working conditions, increased job 
security, and bargaining power over employers who wished to avoid industrial disputes.  
In the 1970s, the unions started to flex their muscle. The final swing in the socio-
political power inequities amongst construction industry stakeholders was noticeable 
during this time. During this period, the trade unions assumed control of the industry. 
The Builders Labourers Federation (BLF) led the way and attacked employers with 
aggressive tactics. The most visible was disputes over payment for accidents (Mitchell 
1996). The dispute caused massive disruption to the industry with 30,000 union 
members attending meetings across New South Wales alone. Employers felt powerless 
to respond and had no choice but to grant the unions’ demands for accident pay 
(Mitchell 1996). The BLF was not satisfied and wanted the dispute to continue despite 
getting what they sought. However, the dispute is particularly important for this study 
because it showed how the unions had changed the rules of engagement in the 
adversarial relationship between the construction industry’s stakeholders. This dispute 
showed that the unions not only wanted to win, they wanted to define the nature of the 
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game, fight only along the rules they set, and to emerge victorious (Knight 1997). The 
new rules of engagement did not include ‘asking for an umpire’s decision’ (Knight 
1997) which meant the unions did not involve society’s legal system, that is, courts or 
other arbitration. This shows that as early as the 1970s, 30 years before the RC in 2003, 
that the unions had decided they did not need to work within the legal processes 
established by society. They would go around the legal system and do things their way. 
While this may imply a negative impact on the construction industry, particularly for 
employers, industrial unrest did have a positive affect by improving the quality of 
employees’ lives.  
In the 1980s, the construction industry moved towards becoming a truly national 
industry, whereas it had previously been restricted to geographic boundaries set by the 
states of Australia. The movement towards a national industry was generated at two 
levels: employers expanded to open business in other states, and the unions 
amalgamated and created Federal Branches, rather than state-based organisations. Both 
the employers and unions saw the benefits of size. Larger organisations had more 
bargaining power. In the 1990s, the decade leading up to the RC in 2003, the industry’s 
behaviour increasingly attracted the attention of the media, the public, and the 
Government.  
3.3.2 Economic Background 
Like any economy, the construction of residential and non-residential building, as well 
as infrastructure such as roads and bridges is essential. Given that Australia’s history of 
European settlement is little more than 200 years, and the rapid development of the 
towns and cities and associated infrastructure, it is clear that the industry became 
prosperous and influential. Australia has one of the highest rates of home ownership in 
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the world. Therefore, demand for housing construction has always been strong. On the 
other hand, Australia is a big country with vast distances separating the major towns and 
cities, fuelling demand for infrastructure. This strong demand may have created a 
perception within the industry of being an essential service, and one Australia could not 
do without.  
The period prior to 1930 saw steady growth as Australia transformed from a colony to a 
nation. Villages transformed into towns and then into cities. Demand for dwellings grew 
as the population increased. The period between 1930 and 1944 was characterised by 
the depression and World War II, which meant an overall economic downturn and slow 
demand for construction activity. The period between 1945 and 1975 was defined by 
consistent and strong growth throughout the Australian economy. This was also the 
period where the construction industry enjoyed its strongest growth relative to the 
economy overall. The source of much of this post-war investment build up was the 
construction of buildings and the formation of infrastructure. Over this period the 
construction industry rose from 5% of Gross Domestic Product to a peak of 8.3% in the 
mid-1970s (Dunn 2010).  
Since 1975, the construction industry has shown signs of maturity. The industry’s share 
of GDP has fallen gradually, despite sporadic boom periods such as 1988-89 where it 
reached 5.8% of GDP. There have been no major and widely used advances in 
technology, shifts of location or market, and the major long term driving force behind 
demand has been population growth (Dunn 2010, p. 36). Despite this, the construction 
industry’s overall revenues have grown steadily over the past few decades. The 
following table and graph presents a trend analysis since 1986-87 by industry sector. 
The annual data is presented for the year’s preceding the RC, and then compared with 
the most current data (2011-12).  
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Table 4 - 3.1 Construction Industry Revenues 













1986-87 12.6 13.4 26.0 12.5 38.5 
1987-88 13.8 15.4 29.2 11.6 40.8 
1988-89 17.7 16.1 33.8 11.4 45.2 
1989-90 16.9 17.2 34.1 12.7 46.8 
1990-91 14.7 15.4 30.1 12.9 43.0 
1991-92 14.8 12.0 26.8 12.0 38.8 
1992-93 17.3 10.8 28.1 12.4 40.5 
1993-94 18.9 10.4 29.3 13.4 42.7 
1994-95 19.7 11.3 31.0 13.7 44.7 
1995-96 16.3 12.6 28.9 15.0 43.9 
1996-97 16.1 13.8 29.9 15.5 45.4 
1997-98 19.2 13.9 33.1 17.4 50.5 
1998-99 20.8 14.5 35.3 19.2 54.5 
1999-00 24.2 14.2 38.4 19.3 57.7 
2011-2012 59.3 42.3 101.6 135.9 237.5 
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Figure 3.1: Construction Industry Revenues Trend Analysis: AUD$Billions 
 
Figure 3 - 3.1: Construction Industry Revenues Trend Analysis 
The graph shows how much the construction industry has grown over the past 20 years. 
While the increase in revenues is due to CPI changes in this period, for example the cost 
to purchase a house is much more in 2012 than in 1986; it also reflects growth in the 
economy and the population which both drive construction demand. The steep spike in 
2011-2012 is also due to no data being available for the decade before. A search of the 
ABS archives could not locate this data. However, the point is made that in the decade 
prior to the RCR the industry revenues were relatively stable, but began to climb in 
1999-2000 which was when momentum for an investigation into unlawful behaviour 
started to gather.  
3.3.3 Propensity Towards Unlawful Behaviour 
The construction industry did not always behave unlawfully. As section 3.3.2 explained, 
the industry began with a strong sense of social justice, and the friendly societies in the 
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fortunate. The industry’s culture changed in the 1900s as the friendly societies became 
trade unions. The relationship between employers and employees became more 
adversarial. World War II marked the most dramatic change in behaviour of the unions, 
as communism infiltrated the union movement, and people with communist ideology 
assumed leadership (Mitchell 1996). From this period, the unions became increasingly 
militant and aggressive in negotiating demands from employers on behalf of their 
members. Communist ideology bred an inherent animosity towards the wealthy class 
that is employers and their organisations such as the head contractors, and perceptions 
of being exploited. This created a rebellious culture within the industry where the 
unions saw authority as the enemy. This manifested in the 1970s where strong militant 
unions, such as the Builders Labourers Federation, engaged in coercive behaviour. The 
unions assumed control of the industry in the 1970s with a reputation for bullying rather 
than negotiation. It was at this time that rebellion turned into disregard for legal 
processes (Mitchell 1996). Rather than negotiate through arbitration, the unions 
preferred to by-pass the courts and deal directly with employers, and at times 
negotiations were sometimes unlawful (Mitchell 1996), creating a sense of anarchy 
within the industry.  
Within this turmoil, unlawful practices emerged. This emerged in the form of collusive 
tendering, the making of special payments, and the distribution of unsuccessful tender 
fees amongst some employers (Knight 1997, p. 80). The Royal Commission into 
Productivity in the Building Industry in New South Wales 1992 found evidence of this 
unlawful activity inside the Master Builders’ Association from 1974 onwards (Gyles 
1992, vol. 2, p. 25).  The Royal Commissioner, The Honourable Justice Roger Vincent 
Gyles QC, commented that: 
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The evidence abounds with grounds for concluding that the agreements were 
made with dishonest intent (Gyles 1992, vol. 2, p. 161). 
The phrase ‘dishonest intent’ suggests unlawful behaviour and that this was deliberate, 
that is, not accidental. Gyles (1992) added: 
The agreements were made in private and kept private by deliberate lack of 
records, false invoicing and abstention from legal action if repudiation by a 
successful tender occurred (vol. 2, p. 161). 
This suggests that this unlawful behaviour was organised in the sense that processes 
were put in place to cover up unlawful work practices. This infers that this unlawful 
behaviour was not a one-off event and that it was sufficiently regular as to require 
covering up by falsifying documentation. The activity, false invoicing, is particularly 
relevant for this study as invoicing is part of accounting work practices. Accountants 
were probably aware of practices such as false invoicing. Other Government 
investigations found that the construction industry’s work practices were “corrupt” and 
“widespread” (Knight 1997, p. 80).  
Therefore, the construction industry did have a propensity towards unlawful behaviour 
prior to the RC in 2003. The industry has a long history of political activism, mainly via 
its strong trade union movement. Some of the unions have been deregistered by the 
Australian Government, and the unions have a history of rebellious and unlawful 
behaviour. This raises the question of whether the industry’s other stakeholders, the 
owners, management, staff, also had a propensity toward unlawful behaviour. The RCR 
and the BIT Reports (Hadgkiss 2004, 2005) were scathing in their criticism of the 
unions, and somewhat defensive of contractors and sub-contractors who were portrayed 
as the victims of bullying by the unions. However, guilt cannot be completely absolved 
from the other stakeholders. There was an industry-wide culture of unlawfulness created 
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over many decades, and all stakeholders were involved to some degree. For example, a 
union official cannot accept unlawful payments from a contractor unless it was offered, 
irrespective of whether it was demanded by the official. Therefore, for the industry’s 
unlawful behaviour to be effective it had to involve various stakeholder groups.   
3.3.4 The Breach of the Social Contract  
PET explains how capitalism, as a social system, is shaped by economic and political 
interests (Gaffikin 2008, p. 82). In a capitalist society, such as Australia, there are many 
social inequalities amongst social classes brought about by their inequitable access to 
the use of resources. This is particularly evident in the construction industry which has a 
long history of conflict between those with access to resources, that is employers, and 
those without access, the working class. This has been manifest in the actions of the 
trade union movement, with strikes and other industrial action. Economic forces serve 
to protect the interests of those with access to resources. Regulation is the political force 
used to find more balance in the allocation of these resources. The more conflict 
between the industry stakeholders due to perceived inequity in the allocation of 
resources, the more need for regulation to find more equity for all stakeholders.  
LT explains how organisations obtain access to resources in return for acting within the 
broader public interests. In essence, responsible corporate citizenship is rewarded with 
approval by society and wealth. Legitimacy expectations are defined by a social 
contract. Historically, social contracts were measured by profit. Companies that were 
profitable were considered to be meeting their obligations to society, their social 
contracts, because they use society’s resources appropriately. Traditionally, accounting 
theory has been situated within the goal of profit maximization as the optimal measure 
of corporate performance (Patten 1991). This introduces the work practice of profit 
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manipulation as a source of conflict for the Construction Industry in meeting its social 
contract. If profit is a measure of good corporate behaviour, meeting the social contract, 
then manipulation of profit is an illegal activity in response to regulation. Given 
accounting plays a lead role in the reporting of profit, questions must be raised about the 
role of accounting in profit manipulation in the construction industry.  
PIT aims to correct inefficient or ineffective market practices (Posner 1974). In terms of 
accounting practice, the PIT of regulation proposes that regulation be introduced to 
protect the public (Deegan 2009, p. 42). In most cases the regulator, usually the 
government, acts on behalf of the public to rectify inefficiencies. This suggests that the 
regulator of the construction industry, the Australian federal government, perceived 
there were inequities in the industry’s market practices which were having a negative 
impact on the public interests.  
“Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate, within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 574). It is considered essential 
because it means society agrees to allow the organisation or industry access to necessary 
resources for survival. These resources could be any factor of production such as raw 
materials; land; office, retail or manufacturing space; and employees. Legitimacy is a 
status conferred upon by society; in other words it has to be earned.  
The construction industry had legitimacy prior to the RC in 2003. This is known 
because society had conferred access to resources necessary for it to survive for more 
than 100 years. It had earned legitimacy status. This raises the question how the 
industry gained legitimacy in the first place. The answer lies in its desirability. In 
gaining legitimacy, the construction industry performs activities that are desirable. It is 
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clear that the construction industry is important to society. In only the second paragraph 
the RCR explained that the industry “is critical to welfare and prosperity in Australia” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 3). It has very significant economic benefits for society but there 
are more fundamental reasons which explain its desirability. Construction is one of the 
oldest industries known to mankind, perhaps only agriculture is older. People need food 
to eat but also somewhere to live. For thousands of years, the ability to build housing 
has been of fundamentally important value to human communities. As societies became 
more complex, other buildings such as community meeting places such as halls, 
churches, castles, and monasteries became necessary, as well as roads, bridges, and 
other infrastructure. Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs shows that shelter is one of 
our fundamental desires (Maslow 1987). According to Maslow, there are five basic 
needs: 
1. Physiological needs such as food, water 
2. Safety needs such as shelter, security 
3. Belonging, love and being part of a group 
4. Esteem through feeling valued 
5. Self-actualisation, the need to realise potential (Maslow 1987, pp. 2-6). 
 
Central to Maslow’s theory is that the list is hierarchical in the sense that basic 
physiological needs must be met first before progressing  to the safety needs and then 
onto belonging, and the higher level needs. Therefore, the service to society provided by 
the construction industry is at the second level and only preceded by basic physiological 
needs. This explains why its activities are desirable and it can attain legitimacy status in 
any society.  
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The construction industry not only provides shelter, it also contributes to society’s 
overall well-being via improved living standards. The construction industry plays a 
major and vital role in transforming the aspirations and needs of people into reality by 
physically implementing various construction development projects (Ibrahim, Roy, 
Ahmed, & Imtiaz, 2010). Construction projects cover infrastructure, such as roads, 
dams, airports, railways, and irrigation work, and buildings such as schools, houses, 
hospitals, factories (Ibrahim et al. 2010). Thus, the construction industry is essential to 
the growth of a nation and a key sector in the nation’s economy. A country cannot grow 
if there is no development and infrastructure built to spur the economy. The 
contributions of the industry are more than just economic; the products of construction 
mentioned above contribute extensively towards the creation of wealth and the quality 
of life of the population. The following quote illustrates the importance of the 
construction industry to the world’s fastest growing economy, China: 
According to a survey conducted by China Statistics Press in 2000 and 2001, the 
construction industry in China accounts for approximately 7 percent of gross 
domestic product since mid-1990s and the employment in construction also 
accounts for about 7 percent of the total urban permanent employment in China. 
Furthermore, at the end of year 2003, there were totally 48,688 registered firms 
employing 37.8 million people working in the construction industry, creating a 
total output of 2,186.5 billion Yuan which is about 300 billion US $ (Shang et 
al., 2006). These figures clearly indicate the scale and importance of the 
construction industry sector in the economic development in China (Zou, Fang, 
Wang & Loosemore 2007, pp. 163-164). 
Further evidence of the legitimacy of the construction industry is found in its reputation 
of conducting business in a proper or appropriate way. Construction is one of the oldest 
laboratories of the management sciences, particularly in the field of production 
management (Ibrahim et al. 2010). There are several important historical examples of 
the construction industry being used as an exemplar in management studies. In 400 BC, 
studies were carried out in Persia on the use of movement, layout and transport of 
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materials in construction sites (Ibrahim et al. 2010). The construction industry was used 
by Gilberth in his famous motion studies that established some of the principal 
foundations of scientific management (Gilberth 1911).  
Construction is a type of production (Heizer & Render 2005) that has helped in the 
development of management techniques such as total quality management, project 
management, and business process improvement. Bertelsen and Koskela (2004, p. 2) 
have defined construction as “a complex production of a one kind product undertaken 
mainly at the delivery point by cooperation within a multi-skilled ad-hoc team”. This 
definition of construction indicates at least four characteristics: construction is 
production, it produces a one-of-a-kind product, it is complex and undertaken through 
cooperation by a temporary organisation (Ibrahim et al. 2010). Construction often 
involves a wide range of stakeholders and, therefore, complex management processes. 
Society can benefit from learning about how the industry operates and diffuse this 
learning for other industries.  
In return for its desirability and meeting its social contract, the construction industry 
requires a range of resources to operate including materials, equipment, labour, and 
finance. Society can deny access to these resources if the construction industry does not 
meet its social contract. It can do this by embargo of suppliers of purchased items or 
otherwise showing dissatisfaction through commercial means, such as raising prices and 
industrial action to limit or eliminate access to labour.  
In terms of capability, or the ways resources are combined to create value for 
construction organisations, the following key success factors further define what the 
industry may expect from society in order to survive: 
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1. Flexible labour force. The ability to expand and curtail operations rapidly in line 
with market demand enables operators to alter the size of labour forces in good time 
to match the short term cycles, and the ability to hire high quality, productive 
workers, especially in times of low labour availability. 
2. Having contacts within key markets. This enables strategic alliances and 
relationships with building and construction companies. This is critical for the 
services component, which contributes a large component of the gross product of 
the industry. 
3. Development of new products. This is particularly important for infrastructure 
projects such as with the development of ‘smart roads’. Also important will be the 
ability to pre-sell such developments. 
4. Business expertise of operators. Includes excellent project management skills along 
with time, financial, labour and consortium management skills. 
5. Having a good reputation. This is important to meet time, quality and cost 
specifications aid in tendering for new projects and ensures repeat business (Dunn 
2010, p. 20). While reputation must be earned, it is society’s right to convey if the 
construction industry meets its expectations. For example, if a firm completes 
construction projects on time and on budget, customers will accept that it has earned 
a good reputation, and this is important for the firm’s survival and growth.  
 
This list of key success factors further demonstrates the construction industry’s need for 
resources granted by society. The list includes access to human resources and relational 
attributes. It is clear that poor market image caused by breach of social contract would 
have a significant impact on the industry’s capability. The construction industry needs 
to have legitimacy in order to access resources necessary for survival, more specifically: 
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labour, purchased building materials and equipment, and reputational assets such as 
relationships and market image.  
 
3.4  The Australian Public’s Interest in the Construction Industry 
3.4.1 Introduction 
As stated earlier, the construction industry has had significant economic and social 
importance throughout Australia’s history of white settlement. At the time of the RC, 
the importance of the industry had reached a stage where its unlawful behaviour could 
no longer be tolerated by society. The Australian Government’s main interest in the 
construction industry was concern that it was not operating productively. In other 
words, it was not using the resources allocated to it by society in an effective manner. 
The lack of productivity meant that there were market inefficiencies, capital and other 
resources, such as labour, not being used by society in a way that met its best interests. 
There was another serious concern for government. Many of its constituents were being 
directly affected by the industry’s behaviour. As the second BIT Report (Hadgkiss 
2005) stated, many Australians seeking an honest living, both business owners 
(contractors) and workers, suffered social inequities such as financial hardship, job loss, 
violence, and intimidation, as a result of behaviour in the construction industry. It was 
in the public interest that this behaviour stop.  
3.4.2 Economic Importance 
Some key statistics help explain why the construction industry is economically 
important. Economy rank is the industry’s position compared to other Australian 
industries.  
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Industry (2010-2011) 
Table 3.2: Key Statistics on the Australian Construction Industry (2010-2011) 
Statistic Data Economy Rank 
Revenue ($m) 293,783.0 119/706 
Value Added ($m) 78,228.0 97/706 
Employment (people) 1,109,664.0 140/697 
Domestic Demand N/a 33/215 
Revenue per Employee ($’000) 264.75 65/603 
Share of the Economy (%) 6.19 335/621 
(Source: IBIS: Dunn 2010, p. 35)  
Table 5 - 3.2 Key Statistics on the Australian Construction 
The terms in this table are defined as follows:  
Industry revenue: The total sales revenue of the industry, including sales (exclusive of 
excise and sales tax) of goods and services; plus transfers to other firms of the same 
business; plus subsidies on production; plus all other operating income from outside the 
firm (such as commission income, repair and service income, and rent, leasing and 
hiring income); plus capital work done by rental or lease. Receipts from interest 
royalties, dividends and the sale of fixed tangible assets are excluded. 
Industry value added: The market value of goods and services produced by an industry 
minus the cost of goods and services used in the production process, which leaves the 
gross product of the industry (also called its Value Added). 
Employment: The number of working proprietors, partners, permanent, part-time, 
temporary and casual employees, and managerial and executive employees. 
Domestic demand: The use of goods and services within Australia; the sum of imports 
and domestic production minus exports. 
Revenue per employee: industry revenue divided by employee numbers. 
Share of the economy: industry revenues divided by national GDP. (Dunn, 2010) 
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In analyzing this table, it is clear that strong demand is a key factor in determining the 
industry’s importance to Australia. Construction of residential and non-residential 
buildings is an essential service, as is infrastructure. The relatively high revenue per 
employee ranking is an indicator of productivity, but also reflects the comparatively low 
wages paid to industry employees. The industry’s total wages only ranks 335/621 (Dunn 
2010, p. 35).  
Since 2002, construction industry “profit margins (profits as a proportion of sales) have 
generally remained within a band of 4% to 5%, lower than for all other sectors of the 
economy, excluding retail trade and wholesale trade” (AIG 2008). At the time of the 
RC, profit margins trended downward between 2002 and 2006 with the exception of a 
slight pick-up in 2004 (AIG 2008). “Thereafter, profit margins lifted, rising from 3.9% 
to 4.9% in December 2007” (AIG 2008).  
The construction industry remains very important to Australia’s economy. However, its 
performance must be concerning to the Australian Government. In the decade since the 
RC in 2003, profit margins are still very small and in 2011-2012 actually decreased 
further to a very tight 3.3% (ABS 2013, p.10). At face value it seems the reforms of the 
RC have not increased productivity in the industry.   
3.4.3 Cultural Importance 
The RC focused on the construction industry’s indirect impact on Australian society and 
its economy. The industry’s role as an essential service was emphasized: 
Every Australian business, and every Australian citizen, uses the built 
environment (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 3). 
The industry’s impact on the economy was also highlighted: 
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All industries would benefit from an increase in output as a result of the 
reduction in the cost of building and construction (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 3). 
The RCR goes on to quantify the negative impact the industry’s poor performance had 
on Australia’s economy and the positive outcomes that may be expected if the industry 
improved.  
Were productivity growth to match that of the market sector, economic 
modeling shows that the accumulated gain in real gross domestic product 
between 2003 and 2010 would approximate $12 billion. Modelling shows that if 
that occurs, all sectors of the economy benefit:  
• workers benefit from the 12 per cent pay rise in the first three years;  
• the building industry benefits from output growth of 0.6 per cent by 2010;  
• Australia benefits from an accumulated increase in real gross domestic 
product of $11.5 billion by 2010;  
• exports would grow and imports fall; and  
• output of all industries would grow with particular benefits to manufacturing 
and processing industries  (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p.3). 
In taking this view, the RC was developing a business case for the need for reform of 
the Industry. It is clear that the industry is important to Australia and it provides many 
direct and indirect benefits for the country. To unlock these benefits, the RC argued that 
productivity must increase (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p.3). The reforms recommended by the 
RC laid the blame for the industry’s poor performance with its culture, manifested in 
terms of unlawful behaviour. This section has suggested that part of the Industry’s 
cultural problems was that its sense of importance led to perceptions that could operate 
outside the law. The structural reforms recommended by the RC essentially indicated 
that the industry needed to change the way it does business if it was to improve its 
productivity and achieve its economic potential. The industry structure which existed 
prior to the RC was characterised by competition between construction firms (macro-
level) and between industry stakeholders (micro-level). The intensity of competition 
was so high that it caused dysfunctional behaviour. Research has shown that 
competition levels correlate with profit; the higher the competition, the lower the profit 
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(Grant 2013). The analysis which follows will explain the nature of competition in the 
construction industry. The level of competition is the main reason for the industry’s 
under-performance and explains why it has a profit margin of only 3.3% in 2011-2012 
(ABS 2013, p.10).  
 
3.5   The Australian Construction Industry’s Structure 
3.5.1 Competition between Firms 
Industry concentration is an important factor explaining competition levels because it 
influences price competition (Grant 2013). Industries with high concentration, for 
example a single dominant player such as Microsoft, can charge whatever prices they 
like. Those with two or three dominant players, such as an oligopoly, may create price 
restraint, sometimes through “collusion” but otherwise via parallel pricing (Grant 2009, 
p. 78). Under these industry conditions, competitors must match rivals’ pricing in order 
to be competitive. As the number of firms supplying a market increases, coordination of 
prices becomes more difficult and the likelihood that one firm will seek to attract 
customers via price cutting will increase (Grant 2009, p. 78). 
The analysis which follows is based on the data that was available from industry reports 
and the ABS. This data generally covered the period 2010 to 2013. However, it is used 
to illustrate the nature of competition in the construction industry. The following tables 
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Table 3.3: Industry Data 
  





($m) ($m) (People) ($m) 
2001-02 166,564.20 51,746.10 301,733.00 281,687.00 665,024.00 24,385.60 
2002-03 185,231.70 55,532.20 313,157.00 289,509.00 688,607.00 25,859.70 
2003-04 203,334.60 60,780.30 319,937.00 297,299.00 743,730.00 28,607.10 
2004-05 213,023.70 63,689.60 332,691.00 303,048.00 801,058.00 30,620.00 
2005-06 234,235.10 69,285.30 336,896.00 308,405.00 875,556.00 34,850.90 
2006-07 273,509.40 75,201.10 352,188.00 322,404.00 985,000.00 38,608.50 
2007-08 286,370.40 78,343.90 373,026.00 341,306.00 1,031,000.00 41,594.90 
2008-09 278,989.80 75,332.20 388,534.00 355,324.00 1,030,000.00 42,058.70 
2009-10 284,906.30 76,185.60 395,737.00 361,908.00 1,058,840.00 42,198.00 
2010-11 293,783.00 78,228.00 405,022.00 370,404.00 1,109,664.00 43,431.80 
2011-12 306,709.00 80,862.10 417,756.00 380,173.00 1,158,490.00 44,517.60 
2012-13 319,284.00 83,231.30 429,847.00 390,793.00 1,207,725.00 45,741.80 
2013-14 330,682.00 86,018.20 441,963.00 401,412.00 1,250,841.00 47,228.40 
2014-15 343,248.00 88,927.70 454,097.00 412,031.00 1,298,373.00 48,692.50 
Economy 
rank 119/706 97/706 49/617 65/603 140/697 335/621 
(Source: Kelly, 2016a) 
Table 6 - 3.3: Industry Data 
Table 3.4: Annual Change 
  Revenue Industry Value Establishments Enterprises Employment Wages 
    Added         
  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
2001-02 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2002-03 11.2 7.3 3.8 2.8 3.5 6.0 
2003-04 9.8 9.5 2.2 2.7 8.0 10.6 
2004-05 4.8 4.8 4.0 1.9 7.7 7.0 
2005-06 10.2 8.8 1.3 1.8 9.3 13.8 
2006-07 16.8 8.5 4.5 4.5 12.5 10.8 
2007-08 4.7 4.2 5.9 5.9 4.7 7.7 
2008-09 -2.6 -3.8 4.2 4.1 -0.1 1.1 
2009-10 2.1 1.1 1.9 1.9 2.8 0.3 
2010-11 3.1 2.7 2.3 2.3 4.8 2.9 
2011-12 4.4 3.4 3.1 2.6 4.4 2.5 
2012-13 4.1 2.9 2.9 2.8 4.2 2.7 
2013-14 3.6 3.3 2.8 2.7 3.6 3.3 
2014-15 3.8 3.4 2.7 2.6 3.8 3.1 
Economy 
rank 119/706 97/706 49/617 65/603 140/697 335/621 
(Source: Kelly, 2016a) 
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Table 7 - 3.4: Annual Change 









per Estab. Average wage 
Share of the 
Economy (%) 
  (%)   (%)   ($)   
2001-02       31.07 250.46 14.64 2.22 36,668.75 5.37 
2002-03       29.98 268.99 13.96 2.22 37,553.64 5.58 
2003-04       29.89 273.48 14.07 2.35 38,464.36 5.87 
2004-05       29.91 265.93 14.37 2.41 38,224.45 5.98 
2005-06       29.58 267.53 14.88 2.62 39,804.31 6.31 
2006-07       27.49 277.67 14.12 2.81 39,196.45 6.61 
2007-08       27.36 277.76 14.52 2.76 40,344.23 6.63 
2008-09       27.26 270.86 15.08 2.65 40,833.69 6.29 
2009-10       26.74 269.07 14.81 2.68 39,853.05 6.25 
2010-11 26.63 264.75 14.78 2.74 39,139.60 6.19 
2011-12         26.36 264.75 14.51 2.77 38,427.26 6.14 
2012-13         26.07 264.37 14.33 2.81 37,874.35 6.11 
2013-14         26.01 264.37 14.28 2.83 37,757.32 6.11 
2014-15         25.91 264.37 14.19 2.86 37,502.71 6.07 
Economy 
rank 119/706 65/603 140/697 22/220 186/215 335/621 
(Source: Kelly, 2016a) 
Table 8 - 3.5: Key Ratios 
 
The tables show that the construction industry has steadily grown since the period 
around the RC in 2003 (see table 3.3).  In terms of competition, the growth in number of 
firms was steady with an exception in 2006-2009 where there was above average 
increase. The growth in revenues was strongest in the year before the RC, and a few 
years afterwards in 2005-2007, but weaker in other years suggesting more competition 
for work (see table 3.4). The average revenue per employee and the average wages have 
hardly changed since 2003, further illustrating the stable nature of competition since the 
time of the RC. In general terms, the tables suggest stability in the nature of 
competition, which means it is reasonable to assume the detailed analysis of the 
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industry which follows may be indicative of the nature of competition at the time of the 
RC.  
The construction industry is a very fragmented industry, in the sense that it has many 
competitors and the industry is not concentrated. Industry concentration measures the 
extent to which the top four players dominate an industry (Grant 2002, p. 78). In 2009-
10, the construction industry had a low level of concentration with the major players 
accounting for less than 10.0% of total revenue (Dunn 2010, p. 19). The industry is 
Australia’s second most fragmented after agriculture (Dunn 2010, p.19). This reflects, 
in part, the very diverse nature of the industry which is characterised by significant 
variations in the type of activity undertaken, the size of players, the level of capital 
intensity (Dunn 2010, p.19), high proportion of non-employers, that is, sole operators. 
As a fragmented industry the large number of firms makes price an important 
competitive strategy and leads to high intensity of competition.  
The first industry sector examined is residential construction. This sector represents 
AUD$59.3 billion in revenues and it has 25,686 firms employing 101,000 people (ABS 
2013). The residential construction sector may be further classified into two segments: 
housing construction and multi-unit apartment and townhouse construction. The 
housing construction segment is defined by intense competition. It has low 
concentration of ownership, causing a fragmented structure, and is characterised by its 
many small-scale firms which operate in narrow regional markets. Only around 3.0% of 
firms employ more than 20 persons, and only 46 firms (0.1%) employ more than 200 
people (ABS 2013). These statistics provide important insight into industry structure 
and competition in the housing segment. There are many very small firms (30,429) who 
employ 19 staff or less (ABS 2013). It suggests intense competition where customers 
can trade off builders on price. This means that it is difficult to differentiate and the only 
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way to be successful is to tender the lowest price. Intense price competition means firms 
with successful cost leadership will survive (Grant 2013). Cost leadership in the housing 
segment occurs by lowering costs in the areas of building materials and labour. The 
small firms are competing on price and operating on very small profit margins.  
In 2017, the housing industry generated $42.5 billion in revenue, profit of $3.5 billion, 
wages of $3.9 billion, 41,750 businesses, historical growth (2012-2017) of 1.4%, and 
projected growth (2017-2012) of 1.7% (Kelly 2017a, p. 2).The statistics hide the fact 
that the bigger firms have a relatively high market share. The major players are multi-
establishment operations with a presence across several states and many regional 
markets (Kelly 2017a, p. 1). While the four largest homebuilders account for less than 
10% of annual industry revenue, the top 100 builders in Australia account for around 
41% of the national housing market (Housing Industry Association 2015). Nevertheless, 
the housing segment is very fragmented. 
The main basis for competition in the housing construction segment is product 
differentiation, based on proven quality, efficiency and timeliness. Price differentiation 
becomes an important basis for competition when the potential builders satisfy these 
other prerequisites (Kelly 2017a, p. 6). While price is important, the most important 
factor is market reputation in terms of quality and track record in areas of efficiency and 
timeliness. Being an established, large firm probably has advantages here over smaller 
firms. In terms of geography, the most states with the most building activity are, in 
order: Victoria, Queensland, and New South Wales, however, the industry is 
increasingly globalising with the entry of overseas firms (Kelly 2017a, p. 6). Overall, 
the housing construction industry segment’s level of competition is rated high and likely 
to increase further.  
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The other residential segment is multi-unit apartment and townhouse construction. In 
2016, this industry generated $19.3 billion in revenue, profit of $1.6 billion, wages of 
$1.8 billion, 14,780 businesses, historical growth (2012-2017) of 6.1%, and projected 
growth (2017-2012) of 2.3% (Kelly 2016a, p. 2). The segment has a low concentration 
of ownership despite the existence of several very large scale players. The four largest 
players in this segment are currently estimated to account for 21.6% of total industry 
revenue (Kelly 2016a, p. 7). This segment is very interesting because the major players 
in the non-residential sector also compete in this sub-segment. Therefore, the multi-unit 
apartment and townhouse construction segment represents a move into the residential 
sector for firms traditionally in the non-residential sector. Contrary to the traditional 
housing construction segment, this segment has a relatively high proportion of activity 
undertaken by medium to large scale operators, such as Leighton, Multiplex and 
Bilfinger Berger, which principally operate in the non-residential building and 
engineering construction sectors. Other leading players such as BGC and Mirvac have 
substantial operations in the traditional housing industry.  
Contracts to this industry are awarded based on a combination of factors, of which price 
is seldom the principal consideration. Firms are invited to tender for projects based on 
factors such as: proven reputation for quality; timeliness; financial security; and 
efficiency (Kelly 2016a, p. 6). Price differentiation becomes an important basis for 
competition after the abovementioned prerequisites have been met. Small-scale 
operators rely heavily on word of mouth referrals to obtain contracts and network with 
property developers, financial institutions and real estate agents within their regional 
market (Kelly 2016a, p. 6). These relationships are usually based on reputation to 
complete projects within budget and on time. 
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Large scale contractors in this industry are increasingly taking an equity interest in 
property development consortia (Kelly 2016a, p. 6). This equity stake effectively blocks 
competition from other builders and ensures the flow of work for the equity participant. 
This trend towards equity involvement by the builder is apparent across all scales of 
construction but most evident in landmark projects such as Docklands developments in 
Melbourne and Delfin Lend Lease’s Greystanes quarry site in Sydney. The promotion 
of sales through the construction of speculative developments tends to be limited to the 
medium to large scale builders. The labour intensive nature of this segment limits the 
benefits achieved from economies of scale in the construction process. However there 
are some areas where economies can be achieved, particularly in marketing and 
materials purchasing (Kelly 2016a, p. 6). Scale economies are also evident in the 
purchase of inputs materials as large-scale companies typically standardise the material 
requirements across a wide range of designs and receive substantial discounts by bulk 
purchasing a particular line of bricks or tiles etc. Smaller scale operators receive trade 
discounts from material suppliers but are generally unable to buy inputs at the same 
price as the larger companies (Kelly 2016a, p. 6). 
The multi-unit apartment and townhouse market segment is characterised by a high 
degree of internal and external competition. The industry includes many small and 
medium scale players competing for a share of regional markets, and several larger 
scale players capable of competing across the national market. The smaller scale players 
are generally excluded from competing at the top end of the market, whereas the larger 
players can compete for all scale of construction (Kelly 2016a, p. 6). The demarcation 
between property developer and prime contractor is blurred for many large scale inner 
city developments in the multi-unit apartment and townhouse market. Mirvac for 
example was both developer and prime contractor on several of Australia’s largest 
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projects in the late 1990s, including the Olympic Village at Homebush, with smaller 
building firms subcontracting to complete discrete segments of these projects (Kelly 
2016a, p. 6). There is a high degree of overlap between the multi-unit dwelling market 
and the housing and non-residential building market and firms in this industry are 
increasingly confronted with competition from firms principally operating in these other 
building markets (Kelly 2016a, p. 6). When the other building markets are confronted 
by cyclical declines in demand, firms typically cross into the multi-unit dwelling market 
to chase contracts. The larger commercial builders are able to bring knowledge, 
reputation and financial relationships to compete in this market (Kelly 2016a, p. 6). 
The second industry sector examined is non-residential construction. This represents 
AUD$42.3 billion in revenues and it has 5,612 firms employing 59,000 people (ABS 
2013). The non-residential construction sector may be further classified into two 
segments: Commercial and Industrial Building Construction and Institutional Building 
Construction.  
The first industry segment in the non-residential sector is the commercial and industrial 
building construction. In 2016, this industry generated $34.7 billion in revenue, profit of 
$1.8 billion, wages of $4.2 billion, 9,890 businesses, historical growth (2012-2017) of 
2.1%, and projected growth (2017-2012) of 1.3% (Kelly 2016b, p. 2). The four largest 
contractors generate less than 10% of annual industry revenue (Kelly 2016b, p. 7). 
Relatively few companies are capable of competing for the large scale “landmark” 
projects, such as sporting stadiums and multi-story office complexes. Therefore despite 
the low concentration of ownership, the few large firms exercise some degree of 
influence over market trends. Over the past decade there has been a trend towards 
greater concentration of ownership among the major players. Leighton Holdings 
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acquired the John Holland Group which in turn acquired Transfield Construction. 
Bilfinger and Berger, the parents of Baulderstone Hornibrook acquired Abigroup 
Limited, and Downer EDI Limited acquired Stork ICM.  
Competition is principally based on proven quality, efficiency and timeliness rather than 
pricing (Kelly 2016b, p. 6). In practice, the smaller the project the more important price 
competition becomes as the basis for differentiation (Kelly 2016b, p. 6). Large-scale 
projects are usually put to tender, either a public tender advertised in the newspaper or 
to closed tender (selected contractors invited to tender) (Kelly 2016b, p. 6). The 
selection of contractors for a closed tender is based on reputation and close relationships 
with developers, financiers and other related parties (Kelly 2016b, p. 6).  
The second segment in the non-residential sector is institutional building construction. 
In 2016, this industry generated $11.6 billion in revenue, profit of $0.8 billion, wages of 
$1.4 billion, 3,275 businesses, historical growth (2012-2017) of -3.0%, and projected 
growth (2017-2012) of 3.7% (Kelly 2016c, p. 2). The industry has a low concentration 
of ownership, with the four largest contractors accounting for around 20% of annual 
industry revenue (Kelly 2016c, p. 7). The industry is understood to have a higher 
concentration of activity than most of the construction industry as few firms are capable 
of competing for the large scale “landmark” projects from Federal court buildings to 
hospital complexes.  
The market for institutional building construction is characterised by intensely 
competitive conditions, particularly between the many small to medium scale 
contractors which compete for a share of activity in relatively narrow regional markets 
(Kelly 2016c, p. 6). Industry competition is based on differentiation between builders on 
the basis of proven quality, efficiency and timeliness rather than solely on pricing 
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(Kelly 2016c, p. 6). Large-scale projects are usually put to tender, either a public tender 
advertised in the newspaper or through the government gazettes, or to closed tender 
where the client invites selected contractors to tender for a project (Kelly 2016c, p. 6). 
The selection of contractors for a closed tender is based on reputation (past 
performance) and close relationships with developers and public sector procurement 
officers (Kelly 2016c, p. 6)  
Several builders have established reputations for the construction of specialist buildings 
such as hospitals such as Thiess Contractors and Baulderstone Hornibrook, and these 
firms effectively establish a basis upon which to attract further contracts from other 
regional authorities (Kelly 2016c, p. 6).  
While in broad terms, the institutional construction market has similar competitive 
dynamics as the other segments, it can see from the above that the nature of competition 
is different to other construction segments. Tendering is the preferred buying process 
and reputation (track record) and relationships are key success factors for winning 
contracts (Kelly 2016c, p. 6). Being in business for many years is a real advantage in 
this market. In terms of geography, the states with the most building activity are: New 
South Wales, Queensland, and Victoria are all about the same size in terms of markets, 
followed by Western Australia (Kelly 2016c, p. 6).  
The third industry sector is heavy and civil engineering construction. This represents 
AUD$37.8 billion in revenues and it has 7,300 businesses and wages of $10.8 billion 
(Kelly 2017b, p. 2). The fourth industry sector is concreting services. It is included to 
illustrate the type of construction services supporting the major industry segments. This 
represents AUD$7.7 billion in revenues and it has 11,650 businesses and wages of $1.7 
billion (Kelly 2016d, p2). These sectors are excluded from this study as the aim is to 
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focus on the residential and non-residential sectors because these firms were most 
involved in the RC.  
3.5.2 The Impact of Competition on Industry Structure  
The analysis has shown how competition was intense in all construction industry 
segments. There are two broad conclusions that may be drawn in terms of the impact of 
competition on industry structure. First, while the whole construction industry suffers 
from intense competition, there are differences in the levels of competition amongst the 
segments. These differences influence the structural issues that led to the RC. Segments 
with less intensity of competition, measured by higher profitability, may have 
experienced less pressure to “bend the rules” in terms of their financial management and 
reporting, therefore being more compliant with the industry’s social contract. 
The second broad conclusion that may be drawn is that there were important differences 
between large and small firms across all segments. Large firms, head contractors, tend 
to compete against other large firms. Smaller firms, subcontractors, tend to compete 
against other small firms. Firm size has a direct impact on changes in the construction 
industry’s structure. The following table presents a trend analysis of number of firms by 
employment to illustrate changes in firm size over the past 25 years. The gross product 
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Table 9 - 3.6: Firm Size Distribution of Employment and Gross Product Trend Analysis 
Table 3.6: Firm Size Distribution of Employment and Gross Product Trend 
Analysis 
 Firm-Size Employment 
 1-19 staff >20 staff Total 
1988-89 
Employment x Firm Size ‘000 265.0 130.0 395.0 
Employment x Firm Size percentage no. of total 
firms 
67.1 32.9 100 
No. of firms 95,803 2,255 98,059 
Gross product per person employed $’000 31.8 54.9 39.7 
1996-97 
Employment x Firm Size ‘000 417.9 66.0 484.1 
Employment x Firm Size percentage no. of total 
firms 
86.4 13.6 100 
No. of firms 193,100 1,200 194,300 
Gross product per person employed $’000 29.9 60.0 33.4 
2011-12 
Employment x Firm Size ‘000 590 360 950.0 
Employment x Firm Size percentage no. of total 
firms 
62.1 37.9 100 
No. of firms 204,949 4,834 209,783 
Gross product per person employed $’000 n/a n/a 98.6 
 (Source: Toner 2006 for the 1988-89 and 1996-97 figures, which were calculated from 
ABS statistics. The 2011-2012 data was gathered from ABS 2012.) 
 
The data sources define small firms in this way (for example, less than twenty staff). 
The RCR defines small firms as less than five employees (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p.13). The 
ABS defines these as micro firms. The thesis adopts the RCR definition (as explained 
earlier section 3.2.4), however, this current analysis reports the data from these 
alternative sources and the definitions that they provide. 
Table 3.6 highlights several important points about firm size for industry structure 
analysis. First, in terms of total employment, the industry has more than doubled since 
1988-89, increasing from 395,000 to 950,000. Second, in terms of employment by firm 
size, there was a big shift towards smaller firms between 1988-89 and 1996-97, which 
then swung back towards larger firms in 2011-12. In 1988-89, small firms employed 
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67.1% of the industry’s staff; in 1996-97, this had increased to 86.4%. This shows how 
there was an explosion in very small firms as tradespeople realised it was easy to set up 
as small business owners and subcontract to larger firms. However, in 2011-12 the 
balance had swung back the other way and large firms now represent a higher 
proportion of the industry’s employment than in 1988-89. Third, in terms of number of 
firms, there was an explosion in the period 1988-89 and 1996-97, where the number of 
firms more than doubled. However, the number of large firms almost halved in this 
period, so the growth was driven by new small firms. In 2011-12, the total number of 
firms had only increased by 8.0% since 1996-97. However, the number of large firms 
had increased by about 400%.  Fourthly, in terms of gross product per person employed, 
the figures decreased by 15.8% in the period 1988-89 and 1996-97, however, it had 
increased significantly, by 195%, by 2011-12. This indicates that the construction 
industry’s productivity had increased significantly in the period since the RC. 
This trend analysis highlights that the construction industry moved towards more small 
firms (subcontractors) and fewer large firms (head contractors) in the decade leading up 
to the RC but has since swung back towards more head contractors in the decade after 
the RC. These changes in industry structure had an impact on the nature of competition 
and the way business was conducted. Firstly, it seems the structural reforms of the RC 
have been successful, in the sense that the socio-political power inequities created by 
the high proportion of subcontractors has been reduced in the decade following the RC. 
While there is still many small firms, there has been a swing towards larger firms in 
terms of number of these firms and their proportion of the industry’s employment. 
Large firms now represent a higher distribution than 1988-89 figures.  
The existence of considerable risk for firms in the construction industry is one of the 
factors leading to extensive subcontracting. The level of risk for each firm has 
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increased, especially on larger projects due to the shift from cost-plus to fixed price 
contracts (Toner 2006). Fixed price contracts were introduced in the later 1980s and 
became the norm in the early 1990s (Toner 2006). Previously cost-plus contracts placed 
most of the risk of cost overruns and time delays on the developer or owner of a 
building project (Toner 2006). A portion of the risk faced by the head contractor is 
passed down the contractual chain to each subcontractor with fixed price contracts 
(Toner 2006). That is, subcontractors also face penalties for delays and are paid a fixed 
price for their services (Productivity Commission 1999, p. 14). It is arguable that 
heightened risk facing each firm involved in larger construction projects has created an 
incentive towards greater subcontracting (Toner 2006). 
There was a trend towards outsourcing in the 1990s which influenced the boom in small 
construction firms. There are five inter-related management rationales for introducing 
outsourcing. Hall and Bretherton (1999) believe these relate to:  
risk reduction as described above; meeting peak demand for output by 
outsourcing production; buying-in specialised technology, equipment or skills; 
cost reduction by focussing on the competitive strengths of the firm and buying 
in non-core products and services; and, introducing market discipline within the 
organisation out-sourcing activity and amongst external suppliers of services or 
goods by encouraging increased competition (p. 20).  
The outsourcing argument receives considerable support from the fact that the bulk of 
increase in employment and number of firms has occurred in the construction trade 
services segment of the construction industry (Construction Training Australia 2007). 
This segment provides specialised services such as excavation, plumbing, carpentry, 
bricklaying, electrical, concreting and painting, purchased by firms engaged in 
Residential, Non-Residential and Engineering Construction (Construction Training 
Australia 2007). Further support for the view that larger firms are seeking to cut costs is 
provided by data showing differential movements in output per worker between large 
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and small firms. Between 1988-89 and 1996-97 nominal gross product per person in 
establishments with employment of more than 20 persons increased by 9.2 per cent. It is 
probable that larger firms are subcontracting an increasing share of the on-site 
construction work to construction trade services and specialising and retaining more 
value-added work such as project bidding; design; financial management; project 
management and engineering (Toner 2006). 
 
3.6   The Australian Construction Industry’s Stakeholders 
There are multiple stakeholders who have an interest in the activities and performance 
of the construction industry. These stakeholders interact and their social behaviour 
when interacting was a critical factor in the social contract breach that led to the RC. 
There are two types of stakeholders: private stakeholders and public stakeholders.  
ST considers the various groups that exist in society, and how the expectations of each 
group may have more (or less) impact on corporate strategies (Deegan 2009, pp. 346-
347). The main private stakeholders in the construction industry are: 
1. Owners/Shareholders 
2. Staff including: 
a. Management 
b. Engineers 
c. Project Managers 
d. Accountants 
e. Human Resources 
f. Other employees 
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This list is based on interpretation of industry participants derived from the thesis’s 
analysis of the RCR. The following table (table 3.7) presents an introduction to the role, 
expectations, and impact of each of these groups in the construction industry’s social 
contract. The comments represent underlying assumptions about each stakeholder, 
which are connected to the research themes (see section 2.4 in chapter 2), and will be 
examined in later chapters. These assumptions are based on the thesis’s interpretation of 
the stakeholders’ attitudes and behaviours (see chapters 5 and 6).  
Table 10 - 3.7: Private Stakeholder Overview and Underlying Assumptions 
 
Table 3.7: Private Stakeholder Overview and Underlying Assumptions 
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Table 3.7: Private Stakeholder Overview and Underlying Assumptions 
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The main public stakeholders in the construction industry are: 
1. Regulators/Government 
2. Unions 
3. Accounting bodies 
4. Auditors 
5. Customers 
6. Public generally 
This list is based on interpretation of industry participants derived from the thesis’s 
analysis of the RCR. The following table (table 3.8) presents an introduction to the role, 
expectations, and impact of each of these groups in the construction industry’s social 
contract. The comments represent underlying assumptions about each stakeholder, 
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which are connected to the research themes (see section 2.4 in chapter 2), and will be 
examined in later chapters.  These assumptions are based on the thesis’s interpretation 
of the stakeholders’ attitudes and behaviours (see chapters 5 and 6). 
 
Table 11 - 3.8: Public Stakeholder Overview and Underlying Assumptions 
Table 3.8: Public Stakeholder Overview and Underlying Assumptions 
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Table 3.8: Public Stakeholder Overview and Underlying Assumptions 
Stakeholder Role Expectation Impact Research 
Objective 
(chapter 2) 




























Each stakeholder is expected to have different roles, expectations, and impact in terms 
of the construction industry’s compliance with the social contract. The stakeholder 
groups interact by placing pressure on other groups and in how they respond to these 
pressures.  
 
3.7  Conclusions 
This chapter defined the construction industry, discussed its history, explained the 
Australian public’s interest in the industry, defined the industry’s structure, and 
described the industry’s stakeholders. In doing so, it established a platform for the 
remainder of the thesis by setting boundaries around the study and identifying what it is 
that is being studied. Given this thesis is a historical narrative of the Australian 
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construction, it is important to know what happened before the period of focus, 2001 to 
2003, to understand some of the factors which led to the social contract breach. The 
industry was defined as firms competing in residential and non-residential building, 
with a particular focus on firm size, and an interest in differences by geography (state). 
The study does not include firms offering engineering construction, and does not 
examine industry segments in the sense of product or service classifications. The 
behaviours which led the RC to conclude that the industry was unlawful did not 
suddenly emerge. These behaviours were embedded in organisational practices, 
systems, norms and values. Examining the history of the industry from a sociological 
perspective, leads to understanding why these unlawful behaviours became the norm. 
The turning point appears to be a change in political ideology, brought about by the 
emergence of communism and its adoption by union leaders, particularly from the 
1950s onwards. The prosperity of the 1960s boosted union membership and strength.  
The 1970s saw a fundamental shift in the industry’s socio-political landscape with 
unions taking control and dictating the rules of stakeholder interaction. This evolved in 
the 1980s and 1990s into a culture that communicated the belief that those in power 
could ignore the law and do things their way. The construction industry has significant 
economic and social importance. The second paragraph in the RCR explained that the 
industry “is critical to welfare and prosperity in Australia” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 3). 
Furthermore, the industry has widespread indirect impact on other sectors of the 
economy. However, it is not just economically important. In terms of LT, it provides 
services that make it highly desirable to society. The industry structure which existed 
prior to the RC was characterised by competition between construction firms (macro-
level) and between industry stakeholders (micro-level). These stakeholders were 
dominated by owners/managers and the trade unions. However, there were a range of 
CHAPTER 3: THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 135 
internal and external stakeholders involved in the construction industry’s unlawful 
behaviour. The intensity of competition was so high that it caused dysfunctional 
behaviour. Research has shown that competition levels correlate with profit; the higher 
the competition, the lower the profit (for example, see Grant 2013). The analysis which 
follows will explain the nature of competition in the construction industry. The level of 
competition is the main reason for the industry’s under-performance. 
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CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF 
REGULATION 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the history of the regulation of the construction industry. The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine society’s expectations of this industry, its social 
contract, and its behaviour compared with expectations, using the findings of the RC 
and associated documents. The chapter includes a discussion of what happened after the 
RC in terms of legislative change and other regulation, including the activities and 
reports of a new body, Fair Work Building & Construction (FWBC). The chapter 
explains the need for regulation of this industry, how this was done, and the industry 
response.  
 
4.2 Industry Regulation Prior to the Royal Commission 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The construction industry had a long history of legitimacy, as discussed in chapter 3. 
The industry was important to Australia and provided valuable services and, as a result, 
society conferred access to resources such as labour, materials and capital to 
construction firms. It was in the public interest that the construction industry used these 
resources wisely. The cost of housing, for example, is very important to society, and 
efficient use of resources helps keep housing prices low.  
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LT examines how society becomes aware of social contract breaches in terms of 
organisational shadow (Bowles 1991) and intolerable inequities (Deegan 2009). 
Organisational shadow suggests that inappropriate behaviour is hidden from society, 
and that society suddenly becomes aware that the industry’s behaviour was undesirable, 
and having a negative impact on society. This occurs through a whistle blower, media 
investigation, or a sudden critical event that becomes public. Intolerable inequities 
describe behaviour that society is aware of and has either been ignoring or has been 
trying to moderate. This takes place when society loses patience because the 
behaviour’s impact was having a more serious effect on society. This study concludes 
that the social contract breach by the construction industry occurred due to the 
Intolerable Inequities Scenario (IIS).  
4.2.2 How Society Lost Patience with the Construction Industry 
The IIS suggests that the construction industry’s tendency towards unlawful behaviour 
has always been known to the regulator, the government, but that the situation suddenly 
became intolerable and forced action with increased regulation. In this scenario, the 
regulator is somewhat tolerant about the social contract breach. They are aware of the 
market inefficiencies and inequitable distribution of resources within the industry, but 
they allow it to continue (Deegan 2013). The regulator might do this because they feel 
the social contract breach is relatively minor or perhaps because the reasons for giving 
the industry legitimacy initially, desirability in this case, outweigh the negative impact 
of the social contract breach.  
Given Australia’s cultural traditions, it is not surprising that trade unionism found a 
strong foothold in the construction industry. The workers in the construction industry 
were mainly labourers or tradespeople who worked for wealthy land owners or property 
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developers. The political unrest and sense of social democracy emerging in England in 
the mid to late 19th century found strong support amongst the working class in Australia. 
In the 1930s the spread of communism found a voice in the trade union leaders of the 
time. In this way, the history of the trade union movement in Australia is the proud 
legacy of the working class movement in Australia (CFMEU Victoria 2010). However, 
it also illustrates the propensity towards unlawful or rebellious behaviour, as described 
in chapter 3.  
The history of regulation of the construction industry is largely a history of government 
regulation of its behaviour with a particular focus on the trade union movement. After a 
false start in 1850, the first union for Victorian stonemasons was established as the 
Independent Society of Operative Stonemasons of Victoria (ATUA 2002). The 
Victorian Stonemasons will be remembered for laying down their tools at Melbourne 
University to mark the win of the eight-hour day. Although legislation was already 
being incrementally instituted, the Stonemasons lead the celebrations. On the 21 April 
1856, stonemasons working at the university marched through the streets of Melbourne, 
gathering fellow tradesmen on the way to the Victorian Parliament. ‘The gain of the 
eight-hour day was an astounding international precedent, which working men around 
the world might aspire’ (Museums Victoria 2016, para. 2), and promoted these 
stonemasons as national and international pioneers of workers’ rights. 
The BLF and its antecedent bodies was a politically active union, and what has been 
described as “the most effective industrial fighting machine in Australia” (Ross 2004, p. 
140), the BLF made significant gains in wages and working hours for its membership, 
as well as instituting many progressive policies such as “green bans, the permanency 
scheme, workers' control, encouraging women to work in the industry and limited 
tenure of office” (Ross 2004, p. 168). 
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Several trade unions have been outlawed, that is de-registered, by the Australian 
Government. The  key  example  is the  BLF  which  formed  in  1972,  was  
deregistered  in  1974  under  the Whitlam   Labor  government   and  permanently   
deregistered   in  I 986  following   legislative changes  instituted  by the Hawke Labor  
government  (Singleton   1997,  p. 298). The sense  of social  justice,  mateship  and 
solidarity  within  the  Australian  trade  union  movement  can  be illustrated  by the 
formation of the Painters and Decorators Union in Melbourne in 1886. This union 
sought to ensure sick or unemployed members were cared for, the provision of funerals 
in the event of a workplace fatality and protection from encroachment by unskilled 
craftsmen (Spierings, 1994, p. 2).  This  union  was  a legacy  of the  founding  of  the  
union  movement through   the  friendly  societies  of   1790-1820   that  focused  on  
benevolence   and  sense  of community. 
A strong theme in the evolution of the trade union movement in Australia in the 20th 
century was the birth of One Big Union (CFMEU WA 2011, p. 7). This idea came about 
as officials recognised the value of having one, strong industrial union to secure a better 
bargaining position for workers on construction sites. However, amalgamation of the 
various unions associated with the construction industry proved difficult: 
Bricklayers, Builders' Labourers, Carpenters and Plasterers agreed to form a 
single union in 1922. But it was not until 1942 that bricklayers and carpenters 
effectively amalgamated to form the Building Workers Industrial Union, which 
became a federal organisation in 1943. Over the following decades, work 
continued on the formation of one union for the industry with the gradual 
amalgamation of some of the other building craft unions with the BWIU. For 
example, the Victorian Tile layers amalgamated in 1964 and Stonemasons in 
1965. In WA, the Bricklayers amalgamated with the BWIU in 1968. SA 
bricklayers decided to form a Branch of the BWIU in 1968. Qld stonemasons 
and BWIU amalgamated with the bricklayers in 1973. Nationally, the BWIU, 
the Plasterers Federation and the Operative Painters and Decorators Union also 
began working on amalgamation from 1966 (CFMEU WA 2011, p. 8). 
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The emergence of strong industrial unions in the metal industry was viewed as a threat 
by the Conservative Government of the early 1970s. Consequently, new legislation was 
enacted preventing any reasonably sized unions from amalgamating. Subsequently, 
large unions could only amalgamate with small organisations (CFMEU WA 2011, p. 7). 
However, there were numerous unions spread across construction, forestry, mining and 
energy industries.  In the early 1990s, “One Big Union”, the Construction, Forestry, 
Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) Construction and General Division, emerged for 
the construction industry with a federal structure and representation in every State and 
Territory (CFMEU WA 2011, p. 7). Those numerous unions amalgamated along 
industry lines to form each of the divisions of the CFMEU. Each division of the 
CFMEU operates autonomously, with its own membership, executive, resources, 
industry policies and campaigns (CFMEU WA 2011, p. 7). 
This historical narrative of the construction industry’s trade union movement provides 
two key findings in relation to the IIS. First, the regulator, the government, has always 
been aware of the rebellious and at times unlawful behaviour of the trade unions. This is 
shown by the many battles between the trade union and other stakeholders for more 
than a century. Second, it shows that the regulator has not always been tolerant of the 
industry and has intervened when it has lost patience, as illustrated by the serious action 
of de-registering some trade unions by making their activities illegal. There was a 
growing awareness of the need for society to impose order on the construction industry 
in the 1990s, as demonstrated by several state royal commissions (for example, Gyles 
1992). However, it was not until 2001 that the Federal Government showed it had lost 
patience and it announced the most public symbol of dissatisfaction with the industry, a 
national Royal Commission.  
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The Dark Shadows Scenario (DSS) scenario suggests that instead of the regulator being 
aware of problems and deciding not to act, the construction industry’s inappropriate 
behaviour was hidden from society and it suddenly emerged as having such a negative 
impact on society that it must be stopped. This scenario suggests the regulator was 
either unaware of the unsatisfactory behaviour within the industry or that society 
expectations had changed and what was previously acceptable or tolerated behaviour 
was no longer so. This raises questions of whether new information emerged which 
made the regulator see the behaviour as more serious than previously perceived or 
whether society’s expectations changed just prior to the RC (2003). The main evidence 
for this scenario is the range of public enquiries into the conduct of the Construction 
Industry beginning in the 1990s and a major television investigation which culminated 
in 2001. It suggests that both new information and changes in society’s expectations 
occurred around the same time.  
LT recognises that society’s expectations can change over time. Whereas an industry or 
organisation might be allocated legitimate status at one time, there is no guarantee that 
this status is forever. Indeed it is the responsibility of the entity to monitor and respond 
to changing society demands. The most common example is environmental impact. 
Deegan (2009, p. 327) cites an example from BHP Billiton on 27 July 2006 where the 
CEO explained that legitimacy in terms of public opinion was as essential to business 
survival as any traditional skill such as finance or marketing. 
In chapter 3, it was noted how the construction industry gained legitimacy primarily 
because it was desirable, that is it provided service, accommodation, infrastructure and a 
standard of living that society valued. However, actions that are proper or appropriate 
were not always considered positively. The main focus of society’s attention was on the 
rebellious nature of the industry’s trade unions. Discipline was meted to the industry by 
CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF REGULATION 142 
the government in deregistering unions. For many years there seems to have been an 
uneasy truce between the industry and society, punctuated by conflict between the 
government and the unions. However, things changed. There came a point when 
society’s perception of the desirability of the services provided by the industry became 
outweighed by its dissatisfaction with its actions.  
The RC described the construction industry as having a “culture of disregard for the 
law” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p.13). This unlawful behaviour was “fostered because of the 
short term project profitability focus of all those in the industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, 
p.13). Therefore, everyone was blamed and competition was the cause.  
 
4.3 Factors Leading to the Royal Commission 
A media investigation, broadcast on the respected public affairs television program Four 
Corners, brought the disorderly behaviour of the construction industry which had 
continued for decades into the public’s lounge rooms as they watched television. 
Perhaps the most distasteful finding was the extent of in-fighting between union leaders. 
Whereas the public could tolerate, to some degree, the militant actions of union leaders 
fighting for workers’ rights, they were less tolerant of union leaders fighting between 
themselves for power, along with suggestions of inappropriate financial gains 
(Neighbour 2001). The Federal Government was embarrassed and the Four Corners 
investigation forced the regulator to act.  
The Australian Federal Government was aware of unsatisfactory industrial relations 
activity within the construction industry decades before the RC commenced in 2001. 
The government tried various methods to bring order to the industry including: 
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discipline ,deregistering of construction industry unions in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
legislation, the Workplace Relations Act 1974 and the Trade Practices Act 1974 aimed 
to provide the legal tools to deliver industry reform. However, these methods failed to 
deliver satisfactory results. In 1997, the Government introduced the National Building 
Industry Code of Practice. The Code and the Guidelines were an attempt to regulate the 
conduct of industrial relations, through the medium of contract rather than legislation, 
on construction projects funded by government. The aim was to bring order to the 
industry by setting behavioural guidelines that industry must adhere to if it wished to 
win Government contracts. The Code of Practice: 
Establishes minimum standards businesses must meet to be eligible for 
Australian Government building and construction work. The National Code and 
the Implementation Guidelines for the National Code of Practice for the 
Construction Industry (Guidelines) set out the responsibilities of all parties on 
construction projects funded by the Australian Government.  The Guidelines 
outline the process for complying with the National Code. The Guidelines were 
developed to assist the Australian Government and interested parties to interpret 
and implement the National Code. 
The National Code and Guidelines aim to: 
• establish higher standards of workplace relations behaviour  
• provide greater flexibility and productivity.  
They ensure the building and construction industry:  
• is client focussed  
• has relationships built on trust  
• observes ethical principles in tendering  
• is committed to continuous improvements and development of best 
practice. 
Parties wishing to ensure compliance with the National Code should use the 
Guidelines as their first point of reference. The Guidelines are a practical guide 
to following the National Code. 
Compliance with the National Code and Guidelines is a condition of tender for 
government projects   (FWBC 2012c, para. 1). 
The Implementation Guidelines summarise the current social contract, that is, what is 
expected by society from the construction industry in order to gain access to necessary 
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resources, especially revenues from government contracts. The Guidelines require client 
focus, trust, ethical behaviour, and improvement. This was a clever way of imposing 
appropriate behaviour because it offered financial gain in return for following the 
industry’s social contract. If construction firms wanted to win government contracts 
they had to comply with the National Code. However, it was not completely successful. 
There was much work available in the private sector if firms did not wish to follow the 
National Code. 
By the late 1990s neither legislation nor commercial pressure, most especially the 
National Building Industry Code of Practice, were sufficient to bring order to the 
construction industry. In April 2001 the then Minister for Workplace Relations, Tony 
Abbott, asked the Employment Advocate (EA), Jonathan Hamberger, to provide a 
report regarding “practices in the building industry” (Westmore 2001, para. 1). In a 
statement released with the announcement of the RC, Minister Abbott cited the report 
by the EA, dated May 2001, which referred to “allegations about strike pay being 
extorted from employers, coercion in agreement making, de facto compulsory unionism 
enforced by some union organisers, payment of bribes and secret commissions, and 
allegations of the misuse of industry super funds” (Westmore 2001, para. 5). The report 
combined with a separate investigation by television journalists to highlight the 
construction industry’s breach of the social contract.  
In analysing the report by the EA, (Westmore 2001) identified several important themes 
for investigation by the RC. First, employers failing to deliver on their obligations to 
their employees. According to Westmore (2001, para. 11), “one of the reasons why 
union militants have been able to get away with standover tactics is that some maverick 
employers operated within the industry, and in the downturn in the housing industry 
after the introduction of the GST, thousands of building workers lost their entitlements 
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when the firms which employed them went bankrupt”. This was a political mess for the 
Federal Government because these workers were not receiving their legal entitlements 
and, as representatives of society, they expected the Government to act on their behalf. 
A second theme was union bullying tactics. The report by the EA documented a range 
of “appalling allegations”, in particular, coercion and intimidation by union delegates, 
which characterised the industry in several states (Westmore 2001, para. 12). The main 
type of bullying was to deny employers access to critical resources, such as employees, 
and threatening strike action unless they used union members and adhered to union 
demands for employment conditions. Unions also demanded employers used sub-
contractors of their choice. Essentially the unions blackmailed employers to meet their 
demands. This unlawful behaviour was the result of the growing power and aggression 
by some unions beginning in the 1970s. As chapter 3 showed, the unions assumed 
control of the industry in the 1970s and the report by the EA simply highlighted 
behaviour that was embedded within the industry’s culture.  
The third theme for investigation by the RC was inertia by law enforcement agencies. 
The report by the EA criticised other law enforcement agencies (including the police) 
for failing to act on problems in the construction industry, including criminal activity, 
alleging that complaints “will simply not be actioned with any priority, or at all” 
(Hamberger 2001, p. 2). It seems that there were two causes of inaction: lack of 
authority and lack of evidence, due to fear by witnesses. The EA reported that 66 per 
cent of all complaints received by the Office of the EA by 2000 concerned the building 
and construction industry and in 2001 the figure had risen to 76 per cent (Hamberger 
2001, p. 1). However, it lacked “the power to investigate these allegations, and potential 
witnesses were unwilling to come forward, due to fears of reprisals” (Westmore 2001, 
para. 17). This provides evidence for the socio-political power inequities within the 
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industry at the time. Clearly many people were not happy with these inequities but felt 
intimidated and unempowered to act. The inability of the authorities to enforce 
appropriate behaviour added to the feelings of powerlessness. 
The issues raised in the report by the EA lay blame on both sides. It seems that 
employers failed to properly look after employees and workers feared for job security 
and salary payment. The industry was characterised by smaller operators who collapsed 
in difficult times leaving their employees without a job and money owing to them. The 
unions reacted to this by advocating to protect the interests of their members. However, 
the bullying of employers by unions seemed to cross the line of fair work practice.  
The report by the EA indicated that almost all of the complaints received by its Office 
were from the large commercial sector of the industry, rather than the cottage (home 
builder) sector (Westmore 2001, para. 13). This means that there was an important 
ambiguity in the socio-political context of the construction industry stakeholders 
leading to the RC. While the behaviour of smaller companies seemed to incite the 
unions to aggressively defend the rights of their members, the unions focused their 
political action, that is bullying, on the larger companies. The larger companies, in turn, 
complained to the authorities, such as the Office of the EA, but received no help. The 
authorities failed to resolve complaints made by the larger companies because they did 
not have the power to enforce the law. The situation seems to have settled on an uneasy 
truce where the employers tended to submit to the political force created by the unions 
in return for access to necessary resources; employees to do the work.  
Accounting practice comes under scrutiny because some of the activity resulting from 
this political pressure involved money, such as unlawful strike pay and bribes. 
Accountants working in the construction industry would have been aware of this 
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unlawful treatment of company finances. While the report by the EA highlighted there 
was misuse of occupational health and safety procedures within the construction 
industry, the major points involved financial mismanagement. The report alleged 
misuse of various industry funds, including trust funds established to preserve employee 
entitlements such as leave pay and superannuation: “There have been allegations that 
senior union appointed trustees have sought to influence the investment decisions of at 
least one of these trusts for political and/or industrial purposes” (Hamberger 2001, p. 6). 
According to Westmore (2001, para. 17), “a range of other allegations, including secret 
commissions and criminal activity within particular unions, were also reported”. The 
report by the EA highlighted for the Government that the construction industry was 
misbehaving in a way that could no longer be tolerated. The industrial relations conflict 
which had been the focus of regulators since the 1970s had evolved into activities which 
may be described as illegal. The misuse of funds, bribery and corruption were illegal 
activities and escalated the unlawful behaviour to a level where the Government had to 
act.  
 
4.4 Media Exposure 
Matters came to a head when the unions turned on themselves and bitter in-fighting 
became public. This was exposed by a media investigation into the construction 
industry which appeared on national television on the well respected public affairs 
program, Four Corners, on the ABC.  
On 21 May 2001, the ABC television program, Four Corners, aired a story titled 
“Divided We Fall”. The story was about the battle for power between construction 
industry unions. During the interview, one of the participants, Mr John Sutton 
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(Divisional Secretary CFMEU Construction Division), made allegations of organised 
criminal activity within the union. These allegations were cited by government 
ministers as justifying the calling of a royal commission. Using the technique of CA, the 
transcript is examined to identify the four characteristics of text content: frequency, 
direction, intensity, and space (Neuman 2006, p. 325). The transcript of the interview 
contains 6,564 words. Table 4.1 summarises the coding into key themes found in the 
transcript using the four CA characteristics: 
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Table 4.1: ABC Report - Content Analysis Code Frame 
Code Frequency Direction Intensity Space* 
Corruption 36 Negative – accepting bribes Strong 15% 
Enemies/fighting 20 Negative – between unions Strong 8% 
Power struggle 18 Negative – between unions Very strong 7% 
Threatening/intimidation 11 Negative – against politicians Strong 5% 
Leadership 9 Negative - management Weak 4% 
Illegal activity/Crime 8 Negative – against other 
unionists 
Strong 4% 
Lies 7 Negative Strong 3% 
Strike action 7 Negative – against employers Strong 3% 
Hatred 5 Negative – between unions Very 
strong/emotive 
2% 
Ideology 5 Negative – anti-employer Strong 2% 
Mismanaged funds 4 Negative - unaccountability Strong 2% 
Government 3 Negative - inaction Weak 1% 
Violence 3 Negative – on contractors Strong 1% 
Employees not paid 2 Negative – against employers Weak 1% 
Public image 2 Negative - embarrassed Strong 1% 
Greed 1 Negative Strong 0.4% 
History/background/memories 1 Negative - baggage Strong 0.4% 
Inaction 1 Negative - delay Weak 0.4% 
Other paragraphs  101 N/a N/a 41% 




Table 12 - 4.1: ABC Report - Content Analysis Code Frame 
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Table 4.1 uses CA (Neuman 2006, p. 325) to examine the interview transcript. The 
purpose is to identify whether the themes within this thesis associated with unlawful 
behaviour exist within this transcript. The RCR argues that the construction industry 
suffered from a long-standing culture which encouraged unlawful behaviour. It was also 
argued that this was caused by the culture within the unions. The table’s analysis uses a 
separate historical document, this transcript, to verify the claims about union culture. 
Frequency identifies how often coded themes were mentioned in the transcript. The 
codes were derived from characteristics of unlawful behaviour which emerged from this 
thesis, for example, corruption. The frequency column lists the number of paragraphs in 
the transcript which mentioned corruption. Direction is the message within the content 
in the transcript associated with the code and the target group, for example, hatred was 
about other unions. This is a very interesting finding because it illustrates the 
competitive and confrontational nature of culture within the unions. Some union 
officials felt their adversaries were anyone who stood in the way of achieving their 
goals, including other union officials. Intensity is the strength of feeling in the content 
associated with the code, which was mainly very strong. Finally, space is the percentage 
of paragraphs with that code (that is, frequency) divided by the total number of 
paragraphs (n=244). The spatial analysis provides context for the relationship between 
how many times the code is mentioned and the total size of the document. The higher 
the space percentage, the more the coded theme emerges in the document. Corruption is 
mentioned in 15% of paragraphs, followed by enemies/fighting (8%), and power 
struggles (7%). This suggests fierce political in-fighting and a combative culture. The 
reason there are some single frequency paragraphs listed in the table is to highlight 
relevant codes. For example, greed was only mentioned in one paragraph, which is 
somewhat surprising given the self-interest in the industry. 
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The transcript is an important historical document, particularly in the context of this 
study, because it provides a rich snapshot of the dynamics of the trade union movement 
just prior to the RC. It highlighted the type of behaviour that society decided was a 
breach of the social contract. Adding to the importance of the transcript is that it 
documents the comments and actions of the trade union officials themselves. The in-
fighting validates the social contract breach because it explains the nature of the 
inappropriate behaviour from an insiders’ perspective. Table 4.1 shows that the 
dominant themes in the transcript are 
1. Corruption 
2. Political power struggles between union leaders including allegations against 
enemies such as poor leadership, lying, hatred, greed, criminal activity, 
mismanaged funds, violence, and threatening or intimidating contractors and 
politicians 
In the whole transcript only two references were found explaining why the trade unions 
were aggrieved with society, that employees were not being paid. Furthermore, only 
two references were made to the unions’ public image. The leadership of the unions at 
that time were clearly only interested in their personal power struggles and either 
unaware or did not care about society’s perceptions of them. Indeed, the then secretary 
of the NSW CFMEU union Mr Andrew Ferguson said on several occasions during the 
ABC interview that he made ‘no apologies’ for the unions’ actions, including 
demanding payments from contractors in a variety of situations such as to pay for the 
union’s annual employees’ picnic and as punishment for the death of a labourer in a site 
accident.  
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To investigate the transcript in more detail, CDA is used to examine some of the main 
themes. The following table examines some of the themes using the CDA framework 
from Gee (2011). 
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  Table 4.2: Critical Discourse Analysis of Selected Themes from the ABC Four Corners Transcript 
Theme Significance Practices Identities Relationships Politics Connections Sign 
Systems 
Corruption 
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Table 13 - 4.2: CDA of Selected Themes from the ABC Four Corners Transcript
Power Struggle 
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The CDA of these quotes from the Four Corners program is examined further.  
Quote 1: MARTIN KINGHAM: I just say that's an outrageous distortion of the 
truth. The only proven corruption, um, that is currently in evidence in the 
construction industry at the moment is in the New South Wales branch and in 
John Sutton's home base. 
This quote alleges that the NSW Branch is corrupt and that its leader, Mr John Sutton, is 
responsible. The CDA highlights the significance of the comment, the identity assigned 
to Sutton, the adversarial relationship between the NSW Branch of the union, and lays 
blame on Sutton.  
Quote 2: JOHN SUTTON: I think building workers sitting in their sheds, in 
Perth or in Melbourne or in Sydney or wherever, when they hear that the union 
leader who's meant to be - particularly if it's a Multiplex site - the union leader 
that's meant to be looking after their interests on that site is actually in a business 
arrangement, ah, with the owner of that site or that building company, I think the 
average building worker would reckon it would stink. 
This quote is a response from Mr Sutton where he alleges inappropriate behaviour 
against other union branches and introduces another stakeholder – the union members 
or workers – and how they would not support the allegedly corrupt behaviour of their 
leaders. The inference is that while the union leaders might benefit from corruption, the 
members do not, and are therefore innocent by-standers in this social contract breach. 
While they are involved in undesirable activity, that is strike action, this is under the 
direction of the union leaders who are painted as the villains in this transcript.  
Quote 3: KEVIN REYNOLDS: Ah, and this mob here, they're along the same 
line too. They're asking the same questions. I've got a f---ing boat bigger than 
the Queen Mary that's been supplied to me by *****. I've got f---ing units all 
over this town. I've got an ice-cream parlour somewhere. I think about the only 
thing I don't f---ing own is that Parliament House across the road there. Right? 
But what they all can't come up with is any facts on this s---. You know, they 
can't come up with any facts. 'Cause I'll tell you why they can't come up with 
any facts. There ain't no f---ing facts. I ain't got any beach house, I haven't got a 
boat, I haven't got anything. I've got a f---ing pub with $1.8 mortgage and they 
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ask me about that and everyone knows about the pub. And I'm a bit disappointed 
you don't know a bit more about it, 'cause you should be all down there drinking 
at the f---ing joint. 
This quote is a response to allegations of corruption against one of the union leaders, Mr 
Reynolds. It illustrates the strength of emotion and aggressive language used by these 
men. While his anger is understandable, given the seriousness of the allegation, that is 
corruption, it is a ferocious response. The union leaders appear to be uncompromising 
individuals. It suggests how difficult it may have been for contractors and politicians to 
deal with them. Indeed, introduced later in the transcript is  Mr Tom Domican, who was 
allegedly a ‘stand-over man’, who was employed by contractors to deal with “industrial 
relations matters”, that is trade union officials. This created a culture where accounting 
staff working for contractors would have found it difficult to deal with the pressure 
exerted by these men.  
Quote 4: SALLY NEIGHBOUR: The allegations pitted Ferguson against his 
deputy, Craig Bates, the assistant secretary in NSW. Bates was close to the 
sacked delegates and the signing of enterprise agreements was his job. He'd also 
recently bought two inner-city investment properties in Sydney, worth more than 
$700,000. ANDREW FERGUSON: I had privately started to do some 
investigations. I did property searches. I asked Bates for an explanation about 
properties that he recently purchased. His explanation was that it was none of 
our business. We notified the police of what allegations that we had received 
and the police are investigating those allegations. 
This quote is another allegation of inappropriate financial benefits received by union 
leaders. However, it is particularly interesting because in this case, a union leader took 
responsibility to investigate and involve police in order to follow the rules of society. It 
suggests a number of important activities which would be considered appropriate by 
society that is moving the unions towards the social contract rather than away from it, 
namely, acceptance that there is a problem, the gathering of evidence, and involving the 
appropriate authorities.  
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Quote 5: KEVIN REYNOLDS: John Sutton has got to go! Now a lot of youse 
would be saying, "John who? "Who the f---'s this John Sutton?" Well, I tell you 
why you'd be saying that, 'cause the national leader of your union, I can't 
remember in the last six years him ever being in Perth. I can't remember him 
ever visiting a site in Perth. I can't remember him ever shaking hands with any 
building workers in Perth. I mean, he's got this attitude that the sun rises and sets 
in Pitt Street in Sydney, and that's where he should be. He doesn't... 
This quote is indicative of comments involving the enemy theme. Many of the problems 
within the trade union movement which emerged in the transcript, such as allegations of 
corruption and other illegal activity, were made by men who seemed to be personal 
enemies. In this quote Mr Reynolds is attacking his enemy Mr Sutton. The level of 
animosity between the union leaders appears to be linked to ideology, that is measured 
by degree of ‘left-winged or communist belief’, as well as history, relationships, and 
power struggles.  
Quote 6: SALLY NEIGHBOUR: One who wanted to get rid of him was former 
union organiser, Terry McParland, who challenged Reynolds for the job of state 
secretary. McParland has been a vocal critic since Reynolds sacked him from the 
union. TERRY MCPARLAND: I'm not happy with the way the union's being 
run. And, ah, I'm not happy with the man who's been the secretary for 25 years. 
Ah, I believe he's a dictator. He runs the union for himself and no-one else has 
got a say. 
In summary, the following conclusions about the causal relationships in the themes 
found in the ABC Four Corners transcript using CA and CDA techniques.  
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Figure 4 - 4.1: Nature of Australian Construction Industry Social Contract Breach 
The analysis identifies a range of antecedents for the political forces, manifested by the 
power struggle and allegations between union leaders, followed by the outcomes of 
employees not being paid and poor public image.  
The second scenario, the DSS, more accurately explains what happened. The analysis of 
the government enquiries shows that the regulator was dissatisfied with the behaviour of 
the construction industry for at least a decade before the RC. Therefore, the social 
contract breach was not something that was hidden and suddenly emerged. The catalyst 
was probably the Four Corners media investigation, which gave wide public exposure to 
the behaviour of the trade union officials within the industry. While the information 
provided by the media investigation was not new, it highlighted for many people the 
seriousness of the cultural problems within the industry. The CDA of the Four Corners 
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transcript shows a blatant disregard for others’ opinions, that is society, and suggests 
some of the union officials saw themselves as a law unto themselves. The lack of 
respect for society’s opinion showed a disregard for the social contract. It suggested 
some union officials did not care what society expected. The self-interest of some 
individuals was further highlighted by the union in-fighting. The pursuit of power was 
not limited to conflict between stakeholders, it occurred within the unions themselves. 
The publicity surrounding this media report suggested to the government that they must 
act and that society would no longer tolerate the industry’s behaviour.  
In terms of LT, the construction industry’s behaviour was considered no longer proper 
or appropriate. While its services were still desirable, the benefits provided were 
outweighed by the costs of the inappropriate behaviour. Society, through Minister 
Abbott and the Australian Federal Government, indicated it was unhappy with the 
construction industry’s behaviour and launched the RC to investigate the size and true 
nature of the social contract breach.  
 
4.5 The Royal Commission 
4.5.1 Regulator’s Explanation of the Need for the Royal Commission 
The Australian PM announced the RC in August 2001 by stating that Commissioner 
Cole was appointed to investigate certain matters in relation to the building and 
construction industry. Those matters were defined in the Letters Patent as follows: 
(a) the nature, extent and effect of any unlawful or otherwise inappropriate 
industrial or workplace practice or conduct, including, but not limited to:  
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(i) any practice or conduct relating to the Workplace Relations Act 1996, 
occupational health and safety laws, or other laws relating to workplace 
relations; and 
(ii) fraud, corruption, collusion or anti-competitive behaviour, coercion, 
violence, or inappropriate payments, receipts or benefits; and 
(iii) dictating, limiting or interfering with decisions whether or not to employ 
or engage persons, or relating to the terms on which they be employed or 
engaged; 
(b) the nature, extent and effect of any unlawful or otherwise inappropriate 
practice or conduct relating to: 
(i) failure to disclose or properly account for financial transactions 
undertaken by employee or employer organisations or their 
representatives or associates; or 
(ii) inappropriate management, use or operation of industry funds for 
training, long service leave, redundancy or superannuation; 
(c) taking into account your findings in relation to the matters referred to in the 
preceding paragraphs and other relevant matters, any measures, including 
legislative and administrative changes, to improve practices or conduct in the 
building and construction industry or to deter unlawful or inappropriate 
practices or conduct in relation to that industry. (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p.3). 
The PM’s statement makes it clear that this is akin to a criminal investigation with the 
use of the word ‘unlawful’ or otherwise inappropriate conduct. The TOR ask the RC to 
find evidence of this unlawful behaviour and offer solutions. The document explains 
that the regulator feels the social contract with the construction industry has been 
breached and wants the legitimacy gap closed so that the industry can once again be 
considered legitimate. CDA is now used to analyse the PM’s statement aiming to find 
deeper insight into the regulator’s motives and add to our understanding of the 
legitimacy gap.  The following table (table 4.3) uses the CDA framework adapted from 
Gee (2011), as discussed in section 2.2.4 of chapter 2, to complete the reconstruction: 
1. Significance: how is this language being used to make certain things significant 
or not? 
2. Practices (activities): what practice or activity is this language being used to 
enact? 
3. Identities: what identity or role is this language trying to get others to recognise? 
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4. Relationships: what sort of relationship is this language trying to create with 
others? 
5. Politics: who or what is being assigned values of being normal, right, good, 
correct, proper, appropriate, valuable, the way things ought to be, high status – 
and the inverse of each of these labels.  
6. Connections: how does this language connect or disconnect things or make 
something relevant or irrelevant? 
7. Sign systems and knowledge: does this language privilege or dis-privilege 
certain technical or jargon groups? 
This CDA framework analyses the language used in the PM’s statement to reconstruct 
the social reality of the regulator’s perception of the nature of the social contract breach 
is summarised in in table 4.3.  
 
Table 14 - 4.3: CDA of Selected Themes from the Prime Minister's Statement 
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Table 4.3: Critical Discourse Analysis of Selected Themes from the Prime Minister’s Statement (2001) 
Theme Significance Practices Identities Relationships Politics Connections Sign Systems 
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The CDA shows that the PM’s Statement was conservative in its use of language (see 
significance) but critical of the range of activities involved in the social contract breach. 
It clearly identifies the unions as being at fault but also includes, implicitly, 
management and sub-contractors. The connections reveal illegality, inequity, and lack 
of accountability as the important themes in this document. The government wants to 
communicate to the industry that it will not tolerate this behaviour any further (see 
deter) and that it wants to introduce fairness and accountability to the industry, 
particularly in terms of industrial relations and funds management and disclosure. 
Accounting is implicated in terms of the latter point.  
In terms of the individual CDA themes, the following conclusions may be drawn. First, 
the analysis distinguishes between explicit and implicit social contract expectations. 
Explicit expectations are legal requirements, for example legislation or activity required 
by law (Deegan 2009). Table 4.3 shows what the regulator expected of the construction 
industry in terms of the law, and why these expectations were not being met. The main 
issues were industrial relations and employment practices, where the language used by 
the PM’s statement suggests connections of illegality and inequity. It identifies union 
leaders being villains and workers and employers as victims. Implicit expectations are 
areas outside the law but still deemed desirable by society (Deegan 2009). The main 
issue here was financial disclosure, where the language used by the PM’s statement 
suggests connections of unaccountability. It uses strong words to describe the 
significance of this behaviour, failure, and to allocate identities as management doing 
deals. It does not identify accountants specifically. However, financial disclosure is an 
activity that involves accountants, so they are implicated.  
CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF REGULATION  164 
Second, the analysis distinguishes between pragmatic and moral motives. The table 
shows the regulator’s perception about why the construction industry misbehaved. 
Pragmatic motives are derived from self-interest, for example, profit (Deegan 2009). 
The main issue here was corruption. Moral motives involve responsibility, desire to do 
the right thing, for example, good corporate citizenship (Deegan 2009), the principle 
concern being appropriate use of funds. In both cases, the language used by the PM’s 
statement suggests connections of illegality. The identities were all those with self-
interest, and while union leaders were implicated, the language is cautious, using the 
word ‘inappropriate’. Deegan (2009) identifies a third motive, cognition, which is 
shared mental models, for example peer group pressure, norms, or just the way things 
are done in the industry. This involves the cultural problems later identified by the RCR 
in 2003, however, at this stage the PM’s statement does not specifically use language 
regarding cognition, possibly because the cultural behaviours were unknown at that 
time.  
Third, the analysis explains the legitimacy gap, in terms of expectation change; how 
society expectations have changed over time, current requirements which were different 
from the past; and organisational shadow, when previously unknown information about 
an industry or organisation becomes known (Deegan 2009). The table shows that the 
language in PM’s statement identified expectation change as the main factor. As a result 
of the regulator perceiving the construction industry was not meeting its social contract, 
both explicitly and implicitly, and the nature of the industry’s pragmatic and moral 
motives, the government required changes to the way the industry was being regulated. 
The connections were about prevention and the regulator wanted identity as taking 
charge. However, the sign symbols showed that the regulator’s history of powerlessness 
showed it was dis-privileged in terms of the socio-economic power inequities amongst 
CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF REGULATION  165 
construction industry stakeholders. While the PM’s statement suggests the regulator 
wanted a relationship with the industry where it was a watchdog with a policing role, 
the social reconstruction of the reality of the industry at the time was that the regulator 
was often ignored.  
4.5.2 How the Royal Commission Gathered Evidence 
The RC was initiated and funded by the Federal Government.. Despite this, the 
Commissioner Cole argued strongly that the RC was independent and objective:  
This Royal Commission was conducted entirely independently of the 
Commonwealth Government. I did not receive, nor would I have accepted, any 
instruction from the Government. At all times this Commission maintained its 
independence from the Government and, indeed, from all other institutions and 
persons (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 15). 
This statement is intended to distance the RC from the Government. Using the CDA 
framework, the language used explains the significance of the statement with the word 
‘entirely’. Commissioner Cole wants there to be no doubt about its independence. 
Similarly, in terms of activities, the phrase ‘at all times’ aims to make it clearly 
understood that the investigation never wavered from its path of independence. The 
phrase ‘I did not receive, nor would I have accepted’, establishes Commissioner Coles’s 
claim to be a man of integrity. Finally, the phrase ‘from all other institutions and 
persons’ defines the RC’s relationships with the construction industry and its 
stakeholders, as an independent and separate authority. Commissioner Cole then goes 
on to explain how the Government played no role in the conduct of the RC, for example 
in determining the witnesses or material placed before the RC (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 15). 
However, there are two anomalies in this account: first, Commissioner Cole states he 
never received instruction from the Government, yet there was a TOR; and second, 
Commissioner Cole argues that the Government did not interfere in the conduct of the 
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investigation, yet RC staff were called before the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Committee on four occasions to answer questions about its conduct (Cole 2003, vol. 2, 
p. 15), and the RC provided the Attorney-General with information relating to 96 
Questions on Notice from the Committee (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 15). It seems that while 
Commissioner Cole went to great lengths to argue his independence from the 
Government, and therefore the integrity of his findings, the Government did keep a 
close eye on the conduct of the investigation.  
The RC used a “multi-pronged approach” (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 17) in its investigations 
and procedures prior to conducting hearings. The aim was to ensure as many people as 
possible with an interest in the construction industry were made aware that there was an 
opportunity to give feedback on the industry’s behaviour, as explained by this extract: 
…in October 2001, an invitation was extended to all governments, 
organisations, companies, unions and persons with an interest in the subject 
matter of the Commission to provide submissions addressing relevant matters. In 
addition, at about the same time the Commission sent requests for information to 
almost 6500 organisations throughout Australia, and established a 1800 
telephone number that could be used to give information to the Commission. 
The advertisements placed in the national and state press before the preliminary 
hearing also invited interested persons to provide submissions to the 
Commission addressing any matters falling within the Terms of Reference. 
Similarly, towards the conclusion of hearings, the Commission again advertised 
in the national and state press seeking final submissions in relation to the 
Commission’s investigations (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 17). 
The Government also provided submissions, as did various industry groups, such as the 
MBA. Interestingly, “only two major construction companies put in submissions, and 
the CFMEU, and the Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred 
Industries Union (AMWU) were the only unions to do so” (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 17). 
This suggests that the industry’s main stakeholders, and those most under investigation, 
did not want to cooperate with the RC, or at least did not want to volunteer information. 
Commissioner Cole expressed disappointment in the number of submissions received 
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which “reflected the general lack of co-operation experienced by the Commission in the 
conduct of its investigations” (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 18). This attitude was not limited to 
the head contractors and unions, Commissioner Cole was disappointed that the voice of 
society, state governments, seemed disinterested, as illustrated by this extract: 
…only sparse submissions were received from the governments of Tasmania, 
Western Australia, Northern Territory and New South Wales. No general 
submissions were received at all from the Governments of Victoria, South 
Australia or the Australian Capital Territory (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 18). 
This apparent lack of cooperation at the early stages of the investigation continued as it 
moved to preliminary hearings. In October 2001, Commissioner Cole wrote to almost 
150 major participants in the building and construction industry with an invitation to 
consult with him confidentially, and only 29 organisations or individuals (19%) 
accepted the invitation (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 18). Less than 20% of the key industry 
stakeholders were willing to meet with Commissioner Cole tasked by society to 
investigate the industry’s behaviour. This suggests that the industry did not want to 
cooperate with the RC, that it did not want to offer information to Commissioner Cole, 
and perhaps that it had something to hide. Evidence to support this claim is found in 
Commissioner Cole’s following statement: 
It must be said, in light of disclosures which have emerged at public hearings, 
that many of those consulted were less than frank with the Commission (Cole 
2003, vol. 2, p. 18). 
While the phrase ‘less than frank’ falls short of accusing industry stakeholders of lying 
to Commissioner Cole, it suggests that even the small proportion who were willing to 
meet with Commissioner Cole were reluctant to tell the truth about the industry’s 
behaviour. The cultural issues embedded in the industry were evident in its relationship 
with the government, in this case Commissioner Cole. Even when the Federal 
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Government announced a nation-wide investigation into the industry, stakeholders 
refused to follow society’s expectations and cooperate. This was an industry which felt 
it could operate outside society’s expectations.  
Commissioner Cole had more success with the release of Discussion Papers. There were 
18 Discussion Papers released over the course of the RC, covering a wide range of 
topics, designed to stimulate interest amongst industry stakeholders. After the release of 
each Discussion Paper, Commissioner Cole wrote to parties he felt may be interested 
inviting a response. A total of 140 responses were received in total (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 
18). Commissioner Cole was happy with the quality of this information and he felt they 
“contributed significantly to my Final Report” (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 18). However, 140 
responses equates to less than 8 responses per Discussion Paper, and when it is 
considered that there were almost 100,000 firms operating in the industry employing 
almost 700,000 people, two issues emerge: first, only a small proportion of the industry 
was engaging in the RC’s findings and second, the majority of the industry was not 
represented in the RC’s findings.  
Faced with barriers to his investigation, Commissioner Cole pursued three legal avenues 
in the hope of obtaining information from those unwilling to provide it. First, he 
obtained cooperation from the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) “for the purpose of 
conducting its inquiries” (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 20). However, there were legal 
restrictions under the Income Tax Act, and an individual’s information could not be 
disclosed to Commissioner Cole, meaning the information gathered was not of “much 
assistance” (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 20). Second, Commissioner Cole received 
information, on one occasion, gathered from listening devices provided by another 
Government agency (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 20). Third, Commissioner Cole obtained a 
total of six search warrants but these “were not a major source of information obtained” 
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for the RC (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 20). Commissioner Cole then enacted his authority 
delegated by the Government in its TOR for the RC to coerce industry stakeholders to 
provide information, as illustrated by this extract: 
Finally, the Commission used its coercive powers to obtain information relevant 
to its Terms of Reference. Those coercive powers took a number of forms. The 
two most important powers were the power to issue notices to produce (which is 
discussed below) and the power to summons persons to attend and give 
evidence. Extensive use was made of both of those powers (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 
20). 
Witnesses were summonsed to give oral evidence at hearings (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 20), 
in other words, industry stakeholders were legally forced to give information. The 
hearings were designed to gather information regarding industry behaviour that was 
apparently well known within the industry but not to the general public. The hearings 
aimed to gather evidence and “make public practices and attitudes in the building and 
construction industry that the Commission’s investigations identified” (Cole 2003, vol. 
2, p. 21). The hearings were designed to illustrate to the public the extent of the 
construction industry’s social contract breach.  
The hearings were defined in terms of scope and process. The scope was that the RC 
could not investigate all cases of inappropriate behaviour that came to its attention. The 
decision regarding which cases to investigate was made by the Counsel Assisting the 
RC, who “called evidence of practices or conduct that they regarded as representative, 
or that were illustrative of particular problems” (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 2). Therefore, 
Commissioner Cole’s legal advisors decided to investigate the matters which were most 
serious or widespread. The process involved RC investigators pursuing “leads” which 
represented cases of inappropriate behaviour, persons who could provide information 
relevant to the lead were identified and contacted, and interviews were conducted and in 
most cases recorded (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 22). On most occasions witnesses cooperated 
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and written statements proved an effective way to gather necessary information. On 
some occasions witnesses were uncooperative and legal summons were invoked; most 
of these cases involved union officials or members (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 23). 
The final step in the RC’s information gathering process was to produce ‘Overview 
Evidence’, which was an opportunity for employers or employees within the industry to 
provide a perspective on their “position” and to explain the industry structural issues 
(Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 24). Commissioner Cole refers later in volume 2 to the way 
evidence was evaluated, particularly when there was conflicting evidence, that is, 
opposing views, as illustrated by this extract: 
Where the evidence of witnesses conflicted, my general approach was as 
follows. I considered whether there was any documentary evidence, or evidence 
from independent witnesses, that lent support to either version of events. Where 
there was such evidence, the version of events that was consistent with the 
documentary or independent evidence was generally preferred, even if that 
version was not completely corroborated by the documentary or independent 
evidence (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 47).  
In terms of the findings, Commissioner Cole makes two important points. First, the 
findings were uncontested in the sense that they were unchallenged by industry 
stakeholders. Second, while the findings were highly critical of the industry’s 
behaviour, it stopped short of publicly announcing criminal conduct. Instead, the 
Commissioner compiled specific instances of alleged criminal activity into a final 
volume which was not made public and was, instead, referred to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions for further investigation, as illustrated by this extract: 
Consequently, I have not made findings to the effect that named individuals, 
organisations or companies have committed criminal offences. Instead, my 
views in relation to matters that might have constituted breaches of the criminal 
law have been set out in a separate volume, which I have recommended should 
not be made public. In that volume, I have set out the matters that I recommend 
be referred to appropriate law enforcement agencies for consideration and, if 
CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF REGULATION  171 
appropriate, further investigation with a view to determining whether criminal 
charges should be laid (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 59). 
Commissioner Cole also addresses the important issue of blame and who is accountable 
for the industry’s unlawful behaviour. His comments here are particularly relevant for 
this study and in particular the examination of the role of accountants employed by the 
industry. At face value, inappropriate conduct is unacceptable, and all firms and 
individuals who participated in activity considered unsatisfactory by society, that is the 
RC, and are accountable for this behaviour. However, many participants in the RC tried 
to justify their behaviour in terms of them having no choice about whether to participate 
in the activity. The following extract illustrates how Commissioner Cole is reasonably 
tolerant of this view: 
One major reason for avoiding making findings of ‘inappropriate’ conduct, even 
if an individual, organisation or company had departed from an apparently 
objective standard of appropriate behaviour, was that such departures were often 
explained by those involved as a reasonable response, taking into account 
deficiencies in the law and law enforcement mechanisms within the building and 
construction industry, to threats of unlawful action by others (Cole 2003, vol. 2, 
p. 61). 
Commissioner Cole tends to excuse firms and individuals from participating in 
inappropriate behaviour if they did not initiate it and if they were responding to pressure 
exerted by others in the interests of doing their job. He stated that it was common for 
people to state “they thought that that conduct was the best way that they could 
discharge their obligation to act in the best interests of their shareholders or members, 
which they may have felt obliged to do whether or not it was objectively appropriate” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 61). 
Commissioner Cole stops short of absolving people who felt they were victims from all 
blame, but he does acknowledge that the industry structure created conflicting interests 
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which created considerable pressure on individuals to cooperate with  inappropriate 
behaviour based on their knowledge of past conduct (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 62). In other 
words, people knew there would be consequences if they did not comply, and they 
based this perception on hard evidence; they had seen what could go wrong if people 
did not cooperate. Perhaps most importantly for this study and the role of accountants, 
Commissioner Cole is somewhat sympathetic towards the pressure individuals were 
under to act in the best interests of their stakeholders. For managers, their jobs required 
them to protect the interests of owners by ensuring the firm was profitable. It was 
common knowledge amongst the industry that firms with a history of industrial disputes 
found it more difficult, if not impossible, to win future work. Managers may have found 
it impossible to refuse to engage in improper practices, such as “sizeable payments that 
have been made for the apparent purpose of securing industrial peace” (Cole 2003, vol. 
2, p. 61), because if they failed to do so they may have felt they were negligent in doing 
their job. A similar argument may be applied to accountants.  
4.5.3 The Royal Commission Findings 
The RC tabled its final report in March 2003. The content of the RCR and its findings 
are used in several ways in this study. The main focus is in chapter 4 of the report where 
the culture of the construction industry is analysed in terms of its work practices. In 
chapter 5, the focus is on regulation and why the regulator felt the industry had breached 
its social contract. The analysis which follows, therefore, analyses the main findings 
only, to place the construction industry’s legitimacy gap within the overall context of 
the history of regulation of the industry.  
“The RC found that the construction industry was characterised by a widespread 
disregard for the law, cataloguing over 100 types of unlawful and inappropriate 
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conduct” (FWBC 2012b, para. 3). The following analysis examines selected text from 
volume 1 of the RCR. The text was selected because it was considered to summarise 
information most relevant to this study. More specifically, the information reveals the 
nature of the social contract breach, and provides evidence of the regulator’s perception 
of the legitimacy gap. In the summary of findings and recommendations at the start of 
volume 1 of the RCR, paragraph 11 states: 
Culturally, first, there needs to be a recognition by all participants that the rule 
of law applies within the industry. The rule of law requires that parties honour 
and implement agreements they have made. It requires that they abide by 
industrial, civil and criminal laws. At present, they do not. The structural 
reforms will assist this necessary cultural change (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 4). 
Using the CDA framework for analysis, the language is somewhat cautious. It does not 
use words such as criminal or unlawful and does not specifically lay blame. The phrase 
‘recognition by all’ suggests strong significance, and indicates that some construct 
industry stakeholders do not recognise the law. In terms of identity, it simply refers to 
‘parties’, which identifies no one in particular. However, it does imply that the 
behaviour is not limited to particular stakeholders. In terms of connections, the 
recommendation links two important issues. First, the societal expectation is that 
stakeholders abide by the law. Second, the main social contract breach is that 
construction industry stakeholders do not abide by the law. The legitimacy gap, 
therefore, is the degree of unlawfulness, that is, the extent to which the industry does 
not abide by the law. Paragraph 16 makes it very clear that the construction industry has 
breached its social contract: 
These findings demonstrate an industry which departs from the standards of 
commercial and industrial conduct exhibited in the rest of the Australian 
economy. They mark the industry as singular. They indicate an urgent need for 
structural and cultural reform (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 6). 
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In this statement, Commissioner Cole uses the phrase ‘departs from the standards’ to 
state that the industry does not behave the way the rest of Australian industry behaves. 
The use of the word standards indicates an expectation, a level of behaviour, that is, a 
social contract. While Commissioner Cole was cautious in his earlier statements about 
industry culture, he makes the departure from society’s standards explicit in paragraph 
17: 
At the heart of the findings is lawlessness. It is exhibited in many ways. There 
are breaches of the criminal law (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 6). 
Commissioner Cole makes two qualifications to soften the allegation of lawlessness. 
First, he indicates that much of the breaches of criminal law relate to the “provisions of 
the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (C’wth)” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 6). Therefore, 
industrial relations practices are the main cause of lawlessness. Second, he suggests the 
consequences of these breaches of criminal law were most likely to be “sanction is a 
penalty rather than possible imprisonment” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 6). While this latter 
point suggests that the size of the social contract breach is relatively minor, in the sense 
of the consequences of breaking the law, Commissioner Cole is starting here society’s 
view and not his own. Elsewhere throughout the reports, Commissioner Cole expresses 
his frustration at the limits of power of authorities in dealing with the industry’s 
unlawful behaviour. For example, in volume 2 he discusses his anger at witnesses who 
openly refused to cooperate with the RC’s investigation, even under summons, because 
they knew the consequences were only a small fine. In evaluating the size of the social 
contract breach in terms of consequences for breaches, Commissioner Cole is stating 
that society allocates a relatively minor penalty. However, it is clear that he disagrees 
with society on this point and believes much stronger punishment should be allocated 
towards those parties who do not obey the law.  
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The analysis turns now to look at volume 11 of the RCR which is titled Reform – 
Achieving Cultural Change. First, Commissioner Cole defines the scope of the problem: 
“there is widespread disrespect for, disregard of and breach of the law in the building 
and construction industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 11, p.13). Second, he explains that “the 
criminal, industrial and civil law is breached with impunity” (Cole 2003, vol. 11, p.13). 
Adopting the content discourse analysis framework, the language used here is scathing. 
The phrase ‘widespread disrespect for, disregard of and breach’ suggests this is very 
significant unlawful behaviour, and in terms of politics the word ‘impunity’ suggests no 
fear of consequences by industry stakeholders.  
Commissioner Cole then goes to the root cause of the problem and lays the blame for 
unlawful behaviour with industrial relations. He argues that this situation has emerged 
because industry stakeholders believe that industrial relations sits outside the law: 
The culture in the industry is that the criminal law does not apply because 
industrial circumstances are involved. The attitude is that the applicability of 
industrial law is optional because there is no body whose function it is to enforce 
it, or which has the will, capacity and resources to do so. Orders of industrial 
tribunals, and even courts, are disregarded if such orders are contrary to the 
views or interests of a participant (Cole 2003, vol. 11, p.13). 
Adopting the content discourse analysis framework, the use of the word ‘criminal’ 
suggests strong significance. The word ‘optional’ is a sign system privileging those with 
power, and suggesting stakeholder groups could choose whether to abide by the law or 
not. In terms of politics, there is frustration with the role of authorities and their inability 
to enforce the law.  
Commissioner Cole identifies the socio-political power inequities which had created the 
industry’s culture. He states that “the result is that industrial power, not right or 
entitlement, determines outcomes” (Cole 2003, vol. 11, p.13). This statement goes to 
CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF REGULATION  176 
the basis of the structural problems inherent in the industry’s stakeholder relationships. 
Those with power were the winners. Power was obtained by industrial action. The 
inequities in the stakeholder relationships were driven by intense competition which 
created small profit margins. As a result “short term commercial expediency prevails” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 11, p.13), which meant that employers, both head contractors and 
subcontractors, had to submit to those with the power to decrease their profitability, that 
is the unions. The unions held power in the industry because they could enact industrial 
action, and firms with a history of industrial disputes were less likely to win work 
because it meant delays and low productivity. To win work and be profitable, employers 
had to avoid industrial action, which meant complying with union demands. The 
inequity in the industry’s socio-political relationships is further explained by the 
following: 
If unlawful action causes loss to others, that loss is not recovered. That is 
because of the difficulty, cost and time involved in bringing proceedings for 
recovery, the uncertainty of outcome, the view that continued relationships with 
unions are important, and the knowledge that if recovery action is taken the 
likelihood is that further industrial action will be taken causing yet further loss. 
Litigation for loss recovery is regarded as a bargaining chip to be used in future 
resolution of industrial disputes, rather than as a serious attempt to hold those 
causing loss responsible for it (Cole 2003, vol. 11, p. 13). 
This extract explains the powerlessness of employers. They felt there would be high 
cost and little benefit to be gained from seeking legal action against unions for loss 
caused by industrial action. The cost involved was explained by Commissioner Cole as 
follows: “head contractors and subcontractors are subject to severe cost penalties for 
delayed completion’’ (Cole 2003, vol. 11, p.13). The real cost to employers due to 
industrial unrest and stoppages was “immediate loss from standing charges and 
overheads, and prospective loss from liquidated damages” (Cole 2003, vol. 11, p.13). 
Using the CDA framework, the language used here indicates a very significant problem 
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for employers. The phrases ‘severe cost penalties’ and ‘immediate loss’ would make 
managers in any industry very anxious; and it adds evidence for Commissioner Cole’s 
identification of employers as victims. The social reconstruction of stakeholder 
relationships in the construction industry at the time of the RC suggests that owners and 
managers of contractors must have been under considerable pressure. Commissioner 
Cole is tolerant of their engagement in the industry’s unlawful behaviour because he 
suggests it is natural that owners and managers would want to minimise or prevent 
activities that cause ‘severe cost penalties’ and ‘immediate loss’, otherwise they would 
ne negligent in their roles. This is a particularly important finding for this study because 
it is reasonable to assume the same behaviour from accountants employed by the 
industry.  
Commissioner Cole explains that the unions had nothing to lose and everything to win 
from the outcomes of industrial action. He states “in contrast, unions suffer no loss from 
unlawful industrial action. They know they will not be held accountable for unlawful 
industrial action by the criminal, industrial or civil law” (Cole 2003, vol. 11, p.13). The 
outcome, according to Commissioner Cole was ‘inevitable’; employers conceded to the 
unions, the “rule of law is diminished”, and “productivity is diminished” (Cole 2003, 
vol. 11, p. 13). The consequences of this social contract breach were that the Australian 
economy as well as contractors, subcontractors and employees were disadvantaged. 
4.5.4 The Royal Commission Recommendations 
LT is used to interpret the RC’s main recommendations for cultural change in the 
construction industry. LT examines three aspects of the recommendations: social 
contract, breach, and legitimacy gap. Social Contract explains the ‘what’, in terms of 
what society expected from this industry. Breach explains the ‘how’, in terms of the 
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behaviour that the regulator found unsatisfactory. Legitimacy gap explains the ‘why’, in 
terms of the reasons for the gap occurring. Society’s expectations of the construction 
industry may be understood from two perspectives: 
1. Explicit: legal requirements, for example, legislation or activity required by 
law 
2. Implicit: areas outside the law but still deemed desirable by society 
Society’s legal requirement of the construction industry is what is explicitly stated by 
law, that is legislation or other legal document, and endorsed by Government as the 
representative of the society in which the industry operates. This assists our 
understanding regarding what society expected of the industry, that is, what was the 
social contract. The following quote presents the RC’s opening findings presented in 
volume 11 Reform - Achieving Cultural Change: 
1. The building and construction industry in Australia requires significant 
cultural change. Such change is necessary if the rule of law is to be 
reintroduced to conduct and activities within the industry, if individuals’ 
freedoms are to be maintained, and if the industry is to achieve its economic 
potential. Change is required in the attitudes of all sectors of the industry, 
including governments, clients, head or subcontractors, industrial 
organisations and employees. 
 
2. In summary, I recommend that cultural change be achieved by: 
• The Commonwealth Parliament enacting a statute of special application 
to the industry. 
• Creating a new statutory norm which clearly delineates between 
unlawful and lawful industrial conduct. 
• Creating a Commission with responsibility for investigating unlawful 
conduct occurring in the industry. 
• Rendering those causing loss from unlawful industrial action liable for 
such loss and prosecuting such conduct. 
• Establishing a just, quick and cheap method of assessing and recovering 
loss caused by unlawful industrial action. 
• Imposing a statutory obligation to report actual or threatened industrial 
action to the Commission. 
• Providing that only fit and proper persons may hold office in, or exercise 
official functions on behalf of, industrial organisations. 
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• The nature and extent of the unlawful and inappropriate conduct 
disclosed in the hearings before me and recorded in this report should not 
continue uncorrected. (Cole 2003, vol. 11, p. 3). 
Using the CDA framework, the language used is assertive and prescriptive. The 
significance of the recommendations is highlighted by the phrase ‘requires significant 
cultural change’. The desired activity is the ‘rule of law’. The politics are individual 
‘freedoms’. The sign system is that the recommendations will privilege ‘all sectors’ of 
the industry. The legal expectation, therefore, is that industry stakeholders need to 
change their cultural behaviours to abide by the law and give all individuals their 
freedom to act in accordance with the law without unfair workplace pressure. In order to 
achieve cultural change, the recommendations include establishing an authority to 
police the industry’s behaviour, with sufficient power to punish unlawful behaviour, and 
that the consequences of unlawful behaviour should be clearly communicated to all 
stakeholders. Commissioner Cole’s frustration is evident throughout the RCR; with 
industry participants but also with the lack of capacity for authorities to deal with 
unlawful behaviour.  
Implicit requirements in the social contract are those that are desirable but not 
enforceable by law. A cynical perspective might argue that the industry’s social contract 
prior to the RC was entirely implicit because it did not seem enforceable by law. 
However, the regulator had established a legal framework, as far back as 30 years 
before the RC, with the Workplace Relations Act 1974 and the Trade Practices Act 
1974, which aimed to provide the legal tools to deliver industry reform. Therefore 
explicit requirements did exist. Implicit requirements are more related to moral motives, 
for example a sense of doing the right thing. Commissioner Cole’s recommendations 
include the implicit requirement of attitudinal change. Attitudes are difficult to monitor 
and perhaps impossible to police. However, attitudinal change was essential if cultural 
CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF REGULATION  180 
change was to be successful. Table 4.4 uses content discourse analysis to examine the 
above quote for explicit and implicit requirements.  
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Table 4.4: Critical Discourse Analysis of Selected Themes from the Royal Commission Reports (2003) on Social Contract Expectation 
Theme Significance Activities Identities Relationships Politics Connections Sign Systems 
Explicit Social Contract Expectations 
Statute explaining 
difference between lawful 
and unlawful 
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Table 15 - 4.4: CDA of Selected Themes on Social Contract Expectation
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In summary, the RC outlines the social contract in explicit terms by requiring industry 
stakeholders to follow appropriate legislation as law (statute), being aware of the 
consequences of illegal behaviour (law enforcement), and only dealing with union 
officials with proper accreditation and behaviours. Implicit expectations involved 
cultural change essentially related to fair work practice and employee empowerment 
and freedom. These themes would carry on throughout the next decade of regulation of 
the industry.  
LT also involves examining the legitimisation process, which is how industries or firms 
try to attain legitimacy status. The importance of pursuing legitimacy is explained in 
three ways: pragmatic, based on audience self-interest, moral, based on normative 
approval, and cognitive, based on comprehensibility and taken-for-grantedness 
(Suchman 1995, p. 1). Legitimacy is a relative concept in the sense that it is relative to 
the social system in which the organisation operates at a particular time and place 
(Deegan 2009, p. 324). Legitimacy motives help with understanding its relativity. 
Pragmatism is focused on the stakeholder doing what is right for them, morality is the 
sense of doing the right thing, and cognitive is ‘doing things the way we do it around 
here’. The legitimacy motives of the various stakeholders within the construction 
industry will be distinguished. This will then explain the industry’s motives for 
compliance or non-compliance with the social contract. Stakeholders motivated with 
pragmatism will be more likely to breach the social contract than stakeholders 
motivated by cognitive or morality motives (Deegan 2009, p. 324). 
The following table uses CDA to examine the RCR (2003) for pragmatic, moral, and 
cognitive behaviours within the construction Industry. This assists in understanding the 
nature of the social contract breach, that is, ‘how’ the industry misbehaved. First, the 
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columns along the top of the table uses the CDA categories adopted for this study. 
Second, the rows along the left hand side of the table are the key themes emerging from 
LT’s pragmatic, moral, and cognitive constructs (see Suchman 1995). The themes were 
coded by the author of this study in order to classify different motives and behaviours 
within each of the LT constructs. The method was adapted from Gee (2011) and was 
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Table 4.5: Critical Discourse Analysis of Selected Themes from the Royal Commission Reports (2003) on Motivations and Behaviours 
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Table 4.5: Critical Discourse Analysis of Selected Themes from the Royal Commission Reports (2003) on Motivations and Behaviours 
Theme Significance Activities Identities Relationships Politics Connections Sign Systems 
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Table 4.5: Critical Discourse Analysis of Selected Themes from the Royal Commission Reports (2003) on Motivations and Behaviours 
Theme Significance Activities Identities Relationships Politics Connections Sign Systems 
Industrial relations: 
dispute resolution 
Rule of law 
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Table 16 - 4.5: CDA of Selected Themes on Motivations and Behaviours 
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The CDA indicates that there are a range of themes explaining the motives of industry 
stakeholders in breaching the social contract. The main theme is pragmatism or self-
interest. There is a culture of bullying and coercion as well as poor financial 
management. The sign systems privilege rule breakers, and contractors as victims. The 
analysis highlights socio-political power inequities; illustrated by connections   The role 
of accounting in relation to non-financial work practices is discussed in this chapter. 
The role of accounting in relation to the financial areas is discussed in this chapter 6. 
The moral themes are about doing the right thing and include empowerment of staff, 
need for law enforcement, as well as industrial relations and relationships. However, the 
results show that workers are often disprivileged and vulnerable to 
employers/owners/management (that is, contractors) avoiding responsibilities. The 
cognitive themes are shared cultural norms across the industry and include the need for 
fair work practices related to freedom of individuals.  
Table 4.5 explains the construction industry’s legitimacy gap in terms of ‘how’ it 
happened and ‘why’ it happened. In terms of the ‘how’, the behaviour that the regulator 
found unsatisfactory is explained by the horizontal themes on the left hand side of the 
table. In terms of the ‘why’, the reasons for the legitimacy gap occurring are explained 
by the LT constructs, pragmatic, moral, and cognitive, with evidence provided by the 
CDA classifications on the top of the table.  
The RC lays the blame for the social contract breach mainly with the unions and for the 
reasons of self-interest and lack of fear of consequences. However, blame may be 
shared amongst all stakeholders. The ultimate cause of the industry’s behaviour is 
competition and profit. Industry structure meant intense competition, tight profit 
margins, and a short term focus. Customers were demanding and wanted projects to 
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finish on time and on budget. The unions were aware of these pressures and used them 
to their advantage. They set themselves up as the industry regulator, interested in the 
long term, due to their concerns for employment of their members. The sustainability of 
the industry was the unions’ goal because it meant safe and secure long term 
employment for members. They used tight profit margins and contractors’ need to meet 
time schedules demanded by customers to negotiate a powerful industry position. They 
knew that industrial action would lead to delays, projects over-schedule, and unhappy 
customers. They used this to coerce contractors to cooperate with their self-interests in 
return for no industrial action. It was essentially industrial blackmail. This assists our 
understanding regarding the nature of the social contract breach, that is, why and how 
the industry misbehaved.  
In summary, this section used LT to examine three aspects of the RC’s 
recommendations on cultural reform for the construction industry: social contract, 
breach, and legitimacy gap. The social contract explains what society expected of the 
industry. The analysis shows that explicit expectations required industry stakeholders to 
follow appropriate legislation as law (statute), being aware of the consequences of 
illegal behaviour (law enforcement), while implicit expectations involved cultural 
change essentially related to fair work practice and employee empowerment and 
freedom. The breach explains why society felt the industry was not fulfilling its 
contract, that is, why it was misbehaving. The analysis shows that there was bullying, 
inadequate financial management, disempowerment, conflicting relationships, unfair 
workplace practices, industrial disputation, and unsatisfactory law enforcement. The 
legitimacy gap explains how this situation has occurred and how the industry behaviour 
came to differ from society’s expectations. The analysis shows that there was a culture 
of industrial pressure which led to organised financial mismanagement; failed moral 
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responsibility to do the right thing by society and the owners of the resources conferred 
by society; and a shared cognitive denial of freedom of individuals to act without fear of 
consequences.  
 
4.6 Industry Regulation After the Royal Commission 
4.6.1 Introduction 
Commissioner Cole submitted his final reports and they were tabled before Federal 
Parliament in March 2003. Commissioner Cole had recommended significant structural 
and cultural reform if the construction industry was to repair its legitimacy gap. A study 
of this reform is, therefore, an empirical investigation of the legitimisation process, 
helping with understanding how an industry regains legitimacy once it has been lost.  
Following the RCR, reforms were announced by the DEWR (2003), Australian 
Productivity Commission (APC) Report (2004), the BIT Reports (2004, 2005), the BCII 
Act 2005, the Office of the ABCC (2005), The Wilcox Report (2009), and the current 
regulatory environment. The history of regulation presented by these activities, largely 
reconstructs the government’s efforts to implement the recommendations of the RC. In 
this sense, it is somewhat of a one-sided history in that it represents society’s attempts 
to legitimise the industry. However, also gained is perspective about the industry’s 
response to regulation in this period. The nature of the activities undertaken by the 
government to implement the recommendations of the RC and their evolution reveals 
much about how much the industry helped itself regain legitimacy, that is, the 
legitimisation process.  
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4.6.2 The Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2003) 
The DEWR was the Government Department tasked with implementing the 
recommendations of the RC. In 2003, the Department issued a statement regarding the 
outcomes of the RC. This statement is analysed using the CDA framework in order to 
identify the regulator’s focus immediately after the RC was completed. While the 
statement is repetitive, in the sense that it covers some of the same material presented 
above in the section on the RC findings, it is an important historical document because 
it explains what mattered most to the regulator at that time. The DEWR statement is the 
regulator’s attempt to filter the 23 volumes of the RCR and distil this into a social 
reconstruction of the industry’s social contract. It tells what the regulator, on behalf of 
society, expected from the construction industry just after the RC.  
The DEWR statement summarised the RC findings as “lawlessness” (DEWR 2003, p. 
5). DEWR highlights Commissioner Cole findings regarding the “widespread disregard 
for criminal, civil, and industrial laws mark(ing) the industry as singular”, as support for 
taking action to “fix” the industry (DEWR 2003, p. 9). DEWR is highlighting for the 
public that the social contract has been breached and that this can no longer be tolerated.  
DEWR then explained why it was now time to fix this problem. The DEWR statement 
explained how previous attempts to regulate the industry had failed. It accepted 
Commissioner Cole’s findings that “the current workplace relations laws were 
ineffective for the building industry and that the existing regulatory bodies have 
insufficient structures to enforce the law and standards of behaviour applicable to other 
industries” (DEWR 2003, p. 16). This statement shows that the regulator accepts some 
responsibility for the construction industry’s social contract breach because existing 
legal frameworks were unable to enforce the contract onto industry stakeholders. It also 
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indicates the regulator’s acceptance that an important part of the solution legislation 
change to increase the power of regulatory authorities.  
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 use CA and CDA frameworks to summarise this analysis of the 
DEWR statement. It explains the Government’s interpretation of the RC findings and 
represents an endorsement.  
 
Table 17 - 4.6: Code Frame for Analysis of Social Contract 
Table 4.6: Code Frame for Analysis of Social Contract: 
Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2003) 
Social Contract 
Expectations 




Misuse of funds 
Expectation change  
Law must be enforceable 
Implicit:  
Law enforcement difficult 
Moral:  
Industrial agreements flouted 
OH&S ignored 
Organisational shadow 
Arrogance for society 
 Cognitive:  
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Table 4.7: Content Discourse Analysis of Selected Themes from Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2003) 
Theme Significance Activities Identities Relationships Politics Connections Sign Systems 
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Table 4.7: Content Discourse Analysis of Selected Themes from Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2003) 
Theme Significance Activities Identities Relationships Politics Connections Sign Systems 
Legitimacy Gap 





















Table 18 - 4.7: CDA of Selected Themes from DEWR (2003) 
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The CDA shows that the DEWR Statement was highly critical of the construction 
industry. This was shown by the language used to measure the significance of the 
problem, that is, unlawful, widespread, and deep-seated. It also comments on a wider 
range of activities compared with the PM’s Statement, particularly occupational health 
and safety and taxation. It is scathing in its attack on the culture which made industry 
stakeholders feel they were above the law and could act as they wished. It also reveals 
frustration with the regulation of the industry, particularly the inability to enforce the 
law. There is the suggestion that the perpetrators realised that their behaviour would not, 
or perhaps could not, be punished and that this exacerbated the problem. Therefore, this 
statement includes the regulators of the industry stakeholders in being responsible for 
allowing the lawlessness to carry on. This raises questions about the role of accounting 
in the industry’s behaviour and accounting bodies, including auditors and the regulators 
of accounting standards.  
4.6.3 The Australian Productivity Commission Review (2004) 
As established in chapter 3, the construction industry is very important to Australia. 
Commissioner Cole explained that the industry’s performance had a significant direct 
and indirect impact on many sectors of the economy. PIT explains how society confers 
resources on industries and firms in return for them meeting society’s expectation to use 
those resources wisely. Commissioner Cole found structural issues that caused 
inefficiencies within the industry and poor performance. After the RC was completed in 
2003, the Government directed the Productivity Commission to investigate further why 
the industry was performing poorly and not meeting its social contract.  
The APC is the “Australian Government's independent research and advisory body on a 
range of economic, social and environmental issues affecting the welfare of 
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Australians” (Productivity Commission 2016, p. ii). The role of the APC is “to help 
governments make better policies in the long term interest of the Australian 
community” (Productivity Commission 2016, p. ii). The Productivity Commission 
completed a study of the construction industry in 2004. The Report focused mainly on 
the Construction Industry’s actual work practices, that is, what companies do to build 
houses, factories, offices, and infrastructure. The focus, therefore, was on how the 
construction industry utilised the resources allocated to it by society and its efficiency. 
The Report’s recommendations were about construction quality, safety standards, use of 
materials, employee training and skills. In this way, the focus was more “micro” 
because it focused on what companies do. The RC, and subsequent efforts at regulation, 
focused more on “macro” issues in the sense of interactions between companies.  
The Productivity Commission recognised that the Construction Industry regulatory 
system was flawed. However, the Report looked at it from a different angle compared to 
the “macro” reviews. The Productivity Commission explained the regulatory system as 
follows: 
The building sector is subject to a diverse range of regulations by all levels of 
government. Reform of building regulation essentially has been directed at 
improving this regulatory system, with a particular focus on achieving a national 
framework. Assessing this reform requires an examination of the ABCC’s 
performance in relation to its mission statement, objectives and work program 
(Productivity Commission 2004, p.25) 
This shows that the Productivity Commission focused on the regulation of building 
construction itself, that is, whether buildings are safe and sound, rather than the 
activities of industry stakeholders. It suggests a legacy view, that is, the way the 
industry had always been regulated, with a focus on the product itself rather than the 
companies. The APC report found that regulation was fragmented in the sense that 
responsibility for governance of building construction itself was carried out by various 
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levels of Government, that is, Federal, State and Local, and there were inconsistencies 
across state boundaries.  
Regulation, historically, was focused around the Building Code of Australia, which 
centred on planning and building standards. The following extract provides information 
on the code: 
“The Building Code encourages productivity and lawful workplace relations on 
building sites. It sets out the Australian Government’s expected standards for 
building contractors or building industry participants involved in 
Commonwealth funded construction projects. The Building Code codifies the 
obligations previously contained in the National Code of Practice for the 
Construction Industry. It came into effect on 1 February 2013” (Department of 
Treasury and Finance 2015, p. 18).  
The Building Code aims to establish higher standards of workplace relations behaviour; 
and improve flexibility and productivity. However, prior to the current regulator’s focus 
on workplace relations, the building code was about quality control. The regulatory 
process, therefore, has historically focused mainly on building inspectors checking on 
the quality of work and on local government planners ensuring that the building met 
local community expectations. Regulation was classified into these activities: 
1. Design Phase: approvals, permits, insurance, contracts. 
2. Construction Phase: inspections, accreditation of materials & processes 
3. Completion & Use Phase: occupancy certificate, essential services, maintenance 
checks, Dispute resolution 
The main theme here is building performance and conformance with society and 
consumer expectations. The way the industry conducted its business seemed to be 
largely ignored as long as its product, the buildings and infrastructure, was satisfactory.   
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4.6.4 Building Industry Taskforce (2002-2005) 
On the 1 October 2002, the BIT was established as an interim body to secure the law in 
the construction industry before the establishment of the national agency envisaged by 
Commissioner Cole (FWBC 2012b). It was an important step in the Government’s new 
reform agenda. The DEWR emphasised the importance of reform:  
The Australian Government supports the key recommendations of the Royal 
Commission. Reform of the building sector is a priority matter for the 
Government. The Government is committed to ensuring that the rule of law 
applies in the building industry as it does everywhere else. With the constructive 
cooperation of industry participants and all levels of government, a fairer, safer 
and more decent industry will emerge. The Government recognises that it needs 
to show leadership and address the specific issues in the building and 
construction industry (DEWR 2003, p. 8).  
DEWR explained that the BIT was created as ‘an initial priority’ was to establish a 
“dedicated body with the power to investigate and enforce the workplace relations law 
on building sites” (DEWR 2003, p. 27). This was the Interim BIT. By 2003, the 
Government felt the Interim BIT was “having a positive influence on the industry's 
behaviour. The industry is realising that people who undertake intimidating and 
standover tactics will be prosecuted” (DEWR 2003, p. 36). The Interim Taskforce 
became a permanent taskforce in March 2004 and operated until the Office of the 
ABCC was established in  October 2005 (FWBC 2012b). The BIT released two reports 
on its activities and the environment in which it operated: 
• Upholding the Law - One year on: Findings of the Interim Building Industry 
Taskforce   
• Upholding the Law: Findings of the Building Industry Taskforce  
Both of these BIT Reports are analysed to assess the construction industry’s response to 
the RC activities and reports, that is whether the industry began to try to comply with 
society expectations and to bridge the legitimacy gap. The Government was pleased 
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with the initial progress of the BIT. The DEWR praised the initial work of the taskforce 
(DEWR 2003, p. 11). 
The first BIT Report, One Year One, provides evidence of the construction industry’s 
initial response to the Federal Government‘s decision to conduct a RC into its activities. 
The Report was released on 25 March 2004. The RC told the industry that it has 
breached its social contract and that it is no longer ascribed legitimate status by society 
and access to resources which is granted as a result of legitimacy.  
The construction industry should have responded to the RC in a positive fashion, that is, 
seek to first acknowledge society’s concerns and second to address them, in a bid to 
regain legitimacy. However, the first BIT report indicates that the construction industry 
did not respond in this way. The covering letter to the Minister for Employment and 
Workplace Relations by the BIT Director, Nigel C Hadgkiss, includes this comment: 
herewith is a report which provides an overview of the environment in which the 
Taskforce operates, highlighting in particular the continuation of unlawful and 
inappropriate behaviour in the industry. The document also addresses the 
overwhelming requirement for greater powers in order to fulfil the 
Government’s objective of securing the rule of law (Hadgkiss 2004, p. ii). 
Hadgkiss is highlighting his frustration as the industry appears to have carried on with 
the behaviour which led to the RC and the lack of authority to force the industry to 
cooperate. This is clear evidence that the regulator’s decision to conduct a RC and 
Commissioner Cole’s findings did not succeed in changing the industry’s unlawful 
behaviour. Commissioner Cole clearly stated that there was a social contract breach. 
This was endorsed by the Government through the statement from the DEWR. Society 
had expressed its dissatisfaction with the industry in its strongest possible terms. Yet the 
first BIT Report found that the industry had not been shocked into action. It seemed to 
ignore the RC and to carry on its unlawful behaviour regardless.  
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In defining the nature of the unlawful and inappropriate behaviour, that is the social 
contract breach, Hadgkiss lists the following: 
• Nature of complaints received by the Taskforce 
• Introduction not restoration of the rule of law 
• Contempt for the law  
• Organised crime and corruption in the industry  
• Violence, thuggery and intimidation 
• Donations or outright extortion 
• An industry like no other  
• Misuse of occupational health and safety 
• Fear of retribution (Hadgkiss 2004, pp. 3-13). 
This list of unlawful and inappropriate behaviour is consistent with the themes 
identified using CDA of the RC findings. However, the BIT report uses even stronger 
language, such as ‘outright extortion, contempt, and fear’ to highlight the significance 
of the problem. The phrase ‘organised crime and corruption’ is particularly disturbing. 
Mr Hadgkiss has taken criticism of the industry to another level. There is nothing 
cautious about these comments. Mr Hadgkiss must have felt he had strong evidence to 
support his claims. It seems the industry was getting worse, rather than better, after the 
RC.  
The first paragraph of the Executive Summary explains how the construction industry 
continued to breach its social contract and why this angered the Government: 
Behaviours that are unacceptable by general community standards are the norm 
in the industry. Too many Australians attempting to earn an honest living have 
become victims of the industry’s blatant disregard for the law (Hadgkiss 2004, 
p. iv). 
There is considerable powerful language in this statement which is highlighted by the 
CDA framework. The most important content are the words ‘unacceptable’, which 
clearly states the significance of the problem; ‘too many’, which is a connection phrase 
to amplify the problem; ‘honest living’, which is a political attribute given to workers 
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for good behaviour in contrast with union leaders; ‘victims’, the identity given to 
workers; and ‘blatant disregard for the law’, is the activity causing the social contract 
breach.  
Mr Hadgkiss makes the accusation that the construction industry has always been 
lawless: 
The challenge...is not to simply restore the rule of law to the industry, it is to 
introduce the rule of law for the first time (Hadgkiss 2004, p. iv). 
This is a very important comment because it suggests that the construction industry 
should have never been given legitimacy status because its behaviour was never proper 
or appropriate. This means that society’s tolerance for the industry was based on the 
desirability of its services and not its activities or the way it conducted business. This is 
an important finding for this study in the social reconstruction of the role of accounting, 
because accountants employed by the industry may have become aware that the industry 
was different to other industries and the practice of accounting may also have to be 
different due to the suggestion that it had never operated lawfully.  
The unique nature of the industry made it extremely difficult for the Government to 
resolve the social contract breach, as shown by this extract: 
Approaches for reform which may be appropriate for other industries would 
simply fail in the building and construction industry because of the poor state of 
workplace relations and the pervading culture of lawlessness. Most concerning 
to the Taskforce are reports received about threats and intimidation being used 
as a means of advancing industrial agendas. Such coercion is indicative of how 
countless industrial disputes are currently resolved in the industry (Hadgkiss 
2004, p. iv). 
The BIT found that the main problems associated with the social contract breach were 
corruption and criminal activity. On corruption the report stated: “union officials extort 
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money and services in return for industrial peace on building sites” (Hadgkiss 2004: p 
iv). On criminal activity the report stated “The Taskforce is particularly alarmed about 
elements of organised crime operating within the industry” (Hadgkiss 2004: p iv). It is 
clear that the BIT report felt the culture of unlawfulness in the construction industry was 
due to the unions: 
The union are a police force of their own but they make up the rules as they go 
along (Hadgkiss 2004, p. 3). 
While it is easy to lay the blame for the construction industry’s behaviour solely with 
the trade union leaders, the other industry stakeholders were also involved. As 
illustrated by the following quote from the BIT report, the contractors participated in the 
corrupt activity, even if it was as unwilling bullying victims: 
It is like a school yard. You’ve got your bullies (unions), the wimps (head 
contractors) and the blokes who just want to have a kick of the footy 
(subcontractors) (Hadgkiss 2004, p. 1). 
From this it can inferred that management was involved because they interacted with 
the unions over industrial relations matters. The BIT report provides some clues about 
whether accountants were involved. First, in a section on the role of women in the 
industry, it states that: 
The Taskforce has found that the work engaged in by women tends to be of an 
administrative, clerical and accounting nature, with women rarely holding senior 
or middle management positions. Very few women are employed as labourers or 
in trades, or in professional fields such as architecture or engineering (Hadgkiss 
2004, p.16). 
While this paints an unflattering picture of the role of accountants in the construction 
industry, that is, as lower level staff not deserving professional status, it does infer that 
accountants would probably not have been involved in direct dealings with union 
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leaders or even contractor management. They might then have been distanced from the 
actual unlawful behaviour or at least not in a position where they could directly 
influence the behaviour. This is inferred because of the phrase “rarely holding senior or 
middle management position” (Hadgkiss 2004, p.16). Of course not all accountants 
employed by the industry were women, but the status allocated to accountants, lower 
level, is an important clue in terms of their relationship with other stakeholders, and 
their level of involvement in the industry’s unlawful behaviour. This is examined 
further in chapters 5 and 6.  
However, there are signs that some accounting staff may have been exposed or involved 
in some unlawful behaviour. The following quote from the BIT report illustrates the 
importance of money in the industry: 
All decisions come down to money (Hadgkiss 2004, p. 20). 
If money was involved in the unlawful behaviour, then accountants had to be involved 
in some way. If money was exchanged between contractors and union leaders, 
accountants should have known about it.  
The BIT report argued that unions extorted money from contractors, which is illegal 
activity. Accountants may have been unaware funds were being manipulated in this 
way. The following extract from the BIT report shows how this manipulation was done. 
In the latter part of 2003, a subcontractor was required by a union official to 
purchase t-shirts, bearing a union logo, at a cost of thousands of dollars per item. 
The subcontractor provided payment in return for access to the site where he 
could continue his work. This type of activity is common on sites throughout 
Australia. In one city, the clothing company awarded these clothing contracts is 
owned by the wife of a union organiser. In a matter investigated by the 
Taskforce in February 2004, a subcontractor was charged $1,000 by a union 
official for each of the seven days he worked on a site. The official demanded 
this payment because the subcontractor did not have a union endorsed Enterprise 
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Bargaining Agreement (EBA). The subcontractor was issued with receipts that 
indicated the payment was for t-shirts (Hadgkiss 2004, p. 9). 
The extract provides evidence of inappropriate use of funds and financial 
mismanagement. In reconstructing the social reality of what happened here, would 
accountants have been involved in this activity, if not, should they have been, and if so, 
what was their role? Possibly the payment may have been processed as a lump sum 
under the expense item t-shirts. However, what happened and how accountants 
employed by the firms involved behaved is not exactly known. A very good accountant 
would have investigated and questioned the number of t-shirts purchased for the funds. 
Despite an expectation of some cognizance of the dubious nature of the transaction, it is 
difficult to know, when illegal funds are laundered in this way, the extent of the 
accountant’s involvement. However cash is a different matter.  
As seen from the allegations of corruption in the ABC Four Corners transcript, union 
leaders appeared to expect “donations” to the unions made by contractors as normal part 
of doing business. Indeed, Andrew Ferguson made several comments defending this 
practice. In response to a question from Neighbour “so you forced them to pay?”, he 
explained that contractors “were forced to pay to meet their moral obligations”, and 
added that “we don’t apologise” (Neighbour 2001). However, the BIT report argues that 
this practice was extortion, that is, it was forced upon people illegally, rather than a 
voluntary act of kindness on the part of the donor, as illustrated by this extract from the 
Report: 
The Taskforce believes donations received by unions are not only required from 
employers but also from union members. Since the tabling of the Final Report of 
the Royal Commission, head contractors, subcontractors and employees alike 
have been required to make weekly donations to union ‘fighting funds’ which 
have been established to help pay for the costs of defending court actions. As 
many of the donations received by union officials are cash and not receipted, the 
Taskforce is at a loss as to where the money ends up. The Taskforce lacks the 
requisite powers to follow the money trail. Moreover, when these kinds of 
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matters are referred to the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), the Taskforce is 
unable to receive any feedback on the dissemination of the information because 
it is not a statutory law enforcement agency recognised under the Income Tax 
Assessment Act or the Taxation Administration Act. Consequently there is no 
capacity for the ATO to share information with the Taskforce (Hadgkiss 2004, 
p. 10). 
The extract shows that when cash was involved, it was very difficult to follow the 
“money trail”. This raises the important question of whether accountants were involved 
in this money trail and what role accounting practice could have played to bring 
lawfulness to this activity.  
The second BIT report was released on 15 September 2005, two years after the RCR 
was tabled, and it highlights that the construction industry had done little to repair its 
legitimacy status. While the cover of the report has newspaper headlines of union 
officials being bashed and union offices being shot at, suggesting contractors were 
fighting back, the industry remained in turmoil as illustrated by this statement from 
Hadgkiss’s covering letter to the Minister: 
Contempt for the law and hostility towards the Taskforce remains the culture, 
and continues to have consequences for those who would like to see reform. 
This document highlights the continuation of unlawful and inappropriate 
behaviour in the industry (Hadgkiss 2005, p. 4). 
The second BIT report shows that the Taskforce has tried to enforce law within the 
construction industry had “placed 29 matters before the courts”; and “16 of those court 
actions have been completed following cases investigated and prepared by the 
Taskforce” (Hadgkiss 2005, p. i). At face value, this might suggest significant 
improvement in industry behaviour and progress towards legitimisation. The RC found 
more than 400 cases of unlawful behaviour. The second BIT report, two years after the 
completion of the RC, found 29 cases. Twentynine is much less than 400, and so 
suggests considerable improvement. However, the second BIT report concluded that 
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two years after the RCR was tabled, “the industry remains plagued by a culture of civil 
disobedience, coercion, intimidation, threatening behaviour, and contempt for the law” 
(Hadgkiss 2005, p. i). This means Mr Hadgkiss found the same behaviour as 
Commissioner Cole in 2003, and the first BIT Report in 2004. The RC had far wider 
ranging powers and scope than the BIT and, as a result, it is also reasonable to conclude 
that the 29 cases may represent comparable levels of unlawful behaviour. It is also 
reasonable to conclude that society should not tolerate even one case of unlawful and 
behaviour from the industry. Therefore, the 29 cases found by the second BIT report 
provides strong evidence that the industry had not repaired its legitimacy and there was 
still a significant legitimacy gap two years after the RC.  
The reasons for this continued unlawfulness, despite the RCR and the activities of the 
BIT, were a culture of fear and retribution, as illustrated by this extract from the Report: 
A cause for this ongoing culture of lawlessness is that the Taskforce has been at 
a loss to pursue complaints because a fair proportion of callers are reluctant to 
take them to the investigation level. Taskforce investigators maintain that callers 
often report instances of unlawful activity but do not want to assist any further in 
the investigation. Such decisions to acquiesce are invariably motivated by the 
commercial reality that if they do not succumb to this industrial pressure, they 
will lose their business and livelihood. As a result, it has become increasingly 
apparent to the Taskforce that industrial problems are very rarely resolved 
permanently, but rather go into remission (Hadgkiss 2005, p. i). 
This culture of intimidation suggests that accountants too might have operated in fear 
for their jobs and, perhaps, have chosen to ignore unlawful behaviours rather than risk 
their livelihood. The sense of consequence for those who did not participate in the 
culture of unlawfulness is further illustrated by this quote: 
You have to cheat to compete, Taskforce caller (Hadgkiss 2005, p. 2).  
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The fact that this caller was willing to call the BIT and offer this comment suggests a 
sense of moral intolerance for the activity, but acceptance that it was necessary in order 
to survive in the industry. In explaining that the unlawful behaviour continues, the 
following quote highlights how contractors felt they had no choice but to participate 
despite the RC: 
employers are talking (to the unions) because they know the union can make 
their life a misery anyhow - and will still be able to post-Cole (reform), though it 
will be harder (Hadgkiss 2005, p. 2). 
The comment shows how the RC had limited impact, in the two years after its tabling in 
parliament. While it made the unlawfulness more difficult, this carried on regardless. 
The industry’s unlawful behaviour involved all participants, however, it is clear that the 
main problem was the union leaders. The BIT report showed that 72% of complaints 
received by the Taskforce were against trade union officials (Hadgkiss 2005, p. 4). The 
following quote further illustrates that the industry continued its unlawfulness despite 
the RC: 
We’re working in an industry that has no laws, Taskforce caller (Hadgkiss 2005, 
p. 7). 
While Hadgkiss appears very frustrated by his inability to enact change, the BIT played 
an important role in the initial period of reform following the RC in 2003. The reform 
program included: 
• propose a building Act to govern workplace relations in the industry; 
• create an enforcement body – headed by the ABCC; 
• improve occupational health and safety – a Federal Safety Commissioner; 
• increase penalties and allow those affected by unlawful industrial action to 
recover damages; 
• use Australian Government purchasing power to bring about reform and 
adherence to a new Australian Government Building Code; 
• assist employees to protect entitlements they are due; 
• encourage training, traineeships and apprenticeships; 
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• combat tax evasion and fraudulent phoenix company activities (DEWR 2003, p. 
58). 
This reform package was designed to “introduce a robust enforcement regime to 
combat the industry’s lawlessness, significantly improve current patterns of conduct 
and establish the rule of law in the building industry” (DEWR 2003, p. 58). 
 
CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF REGULATION  208 
Table 4.8: Content Discourse Analysis of Selected Themes from Building Industry Taskforce Reports (2004, 2005) 
Theme Significance Activities Identities Relationships Politics Connections Sign 
Systems 
Explicit Social Contract Expectations 
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Table 4.8: Content Discourse Analysis of Selected Themes from Building Industry Taskforce Reports (2004, 2005) 
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Table 4.8: Content Discourse Analysis of Selected Themes from Building Industry Taskforce Reports (2004, 2005) 
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In summary, the CDA of the BIT Reports reveals that the legitimacy gap remained in 
the years immediately following the RC (2003) because the regulator did not have 
sufficient power to enforce the law. The figures in the second BIT Report (Hadgkiss 
2005) are particularly damning. The taskforce visited over 1,000 sites, issued around 
230 notices to produce evidence to individuals (23% of visits), employers and unions 
and taken 6 matters to court (0.06%) (Hadgkiss 2005, p. 1). Less than 1% of site visits 
by the BIT led to a court appearance (Hadgkiss 2005, p. 1).  
The language used by the BIT reports is more critical of the industry compared with the 
previous regulatory reports analysed so far in this study. The BIT feels that lawlessness 
has actually increased since the RC. Therefore, two years after the RCR was tabled in 
parliament, 2005, it was not having the desired effect. The social contract breach was 
actually getting worse. The BIT blames the unions and some union officials for 
engaging in illegal activities with suggestions of links to organised crime and extortion. 
The phrase ‘civil disobedience’ is a polite way of describing this behaviour. The BIT is 
scathing in its perception of the immaturity of this workplace behaviour, using the 
theme of bullying and phrases such as schoolyard tactics to condemn the industry.  
It is important for this study to note that money seems to be more explicitly mentioned 
by the BIT. The BIT seems to have uncovered financial mismanagement. The fact that 
‘money drives every decision’ suggests the power of profitability but also that 
corruption and bribery were rife. The final recommendation in the second BIT Report 
was the need to “combat tax evasion and fraudulent phoenix company activities” 
(Hadgkiss 2005, p. 23). Accountants would have been involved in these types of 
activities. Managers, union officials, and sub-contractors would probably not have the 
CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF REGULATION   212 
skills or knowledge to engage in this type of illegal activity without help from 
accountants.  
 
4.7 Enacting Reform 
4.7.1 Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act 2005  
The BCII Act 2005 was the Government’s legislative response to the RC. This 
legislation established the ABCC as an independent statutory authority. The aim was to 
provide the Government with sufficient power to enforce law upon the construction 
industry and an entity (ABCC) to enact these powers. In this sense, the Act and the 
formation of the ABCC was a positive step to address one of the major frustrations of 
the BIT, its lack of authority to enforce law. The DEWR report in 2003 explained the 
reform process of the Act and the formation of the ABCC as follows: 
The Australian Government will be implementing the key recommendations of 
the Royal Commission through the Building and Construction Industry 
Improvement Bill (building law). The proposed building law will: 
• set up an autonomous independent body - headed by the Australian 
Building and Construction Commissioner to secure compliance with the 
new law; 
• put in place a Federal Safety Commissioner to help improve the 
occupational health and safety (OHS) performance of the industry; 
• give workers a genuine choice when it comes to bargaining; 
• strengthen the rules about freedom of association to better deal with 
closed shops and discrimination; 
• make sure that officials of employer organisations and unions are held 
accountable for their actions; 
• provide sanctions for unlawful industrial action; and  
• put in place a tough regime which deals with law breakers and 
substantially increases penalties (DEWR 2003, pp. 106-108). 
The Act was a positive step forward in creating a legislative framework to be used to 
enforce law in the Construction Industry. This addresses a critical barrier to making the 
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industry comply with its social contract, that is, the regulator’s inability to enforce the 
law.  The announcement of the Office of the ABCC created an authority with more 
powers than its predecessor, the BIT, and the purpose of enforcing the legislation.  
The list of aims above also further highlights the problems identified by the RCR and 
the BIT reports. The key social contract expectations are fairness, freedom, and choice, 
with consequences for unlawful behaviour illustrated by the words ‘accountable’, 
‘sanctions’, and ‘tough regime’. It is clear that the regulator no longer wants to be seen 
as a ‘toothless tiger’ and that those involved in unlawful behaviour should fear it. 
However, the process of holding unlawful individuals accountable for their actions was 
not clear.  
4.7.2 Office of the Australian Building and Construction Commissioner (2005) 
The Office of the ABCC (2005–2012) was an independent, statutory authority, whose 
role was to monitor and promote appropriate standards of conduct throughout the 
building and construction industry (FWBC 2012a). The ABCC provided education, 
investigated workplace complaints and enforced compliance with national workplace 
laws in the construction industry. The ABCC did this primarily by: 
(a) monitoring and promoting appropriate standards of conduct by building industry 
participants, 
(b) investigating suspected contraventions, by building industry participants, 
(c) instituting, or intervening in, proceedings in accordance with this Act;  
(d) providing assistance and advice to building industry participants regarding their 
rights and obligations under this Act and the Workplace Relations Act; (BCII 
Act 2005, s. 10). 
The ABCC commenced operations on 1 October 2005. As outlined in the BCII Act 
2005, section 3 (1), the principle role of the ABCC was to “ensure that building work is 
carried out fairly, efficiently and productively for the benefit of all building industry 
participants and for the benefit of the Australian economy as a whole”.  
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The difference between the ABCC and its predecessor organisation, the BIT, is that new 
legislation was provided, that is, the BCII Act 2005, which gave it more law 
enforcement power. The nature of the powers given to the ABCC illustrated the nature 
of the legitimacy gap during its seven year life. For example, the ABCC could 
commence civil penalty proceedings against individuals and organisations who engaged 
in “unlawful industrial action” (BCII Act 2005, s.38). This term and its unlawful nature, 
is explained as follows: 
• employees performing work in a manner that is different to how it is 
normally performed 
• employees adopting a practise that restricts, limits or delays the performance 
of work 
• a ban, limitation or restriction by employees on performing or accepting 
work 
• a failure or refusal by employees to attend work or perform any work 
• the lockout of employees from their employment by their employer (FWBC 
2012f). 
The ABCC was able to bring against building and construction industry participants 
who engaged in unlawful industrial action civil penalty proceedings resulting in a fine 
(BCII Act 2005, s. 38). This reveals that the primary focus of the ABCC was to address 
illegal industrial relations. Society’s expectations were that the Construction Industry 
would engage in satisfactory and legal industrial relations by not doing the types of 
things outlined in the above quote, for example, restrictions on performance of work.  
However, the ABCC recognised that unlawful industrial relations were caused by issues 
associated with industry culture, that is, the way we do things around here. Utilising the 
insight gathered from previous reports by the regulator (see above), the first issue to be 
addressed was coercion. Coercion in the building and construction industry was 
considered unlawful. Coercion of persons includes:  
(a) take or threaten to take any action; or  
(b) refrain or threaten to refrain from taking any action;  
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with intent to coerce another person, or with intent to apply undue pressure to another 
person, to agree, or not to agree:  
(c) to make, vary or terminate, or extend the nominal expiry date of, a building 
agreement under Division 2 or 3 of Part VIB of the Workplace Relations Act; (BCII Act 
2005, s. 44). 
In addressing unlawful behaviour such as coercion, the ABCC did more than try to 
prosecute. The first issue it addressed was wages and entitlements. It tried to empower 
workers by helping them understand their rights. The ABCC provided free information 
and advice on pay, conditions, and workplace rights and obligations to building and 
construction industry participants (FWBC 2012d). The ABCC investigated complaints 
relating to sham contracting, underpayments of wages and entitlements for workers in 
the building and construction industry (FWBC 2012d). 
An example of unlawful work practices was sham contracting. A sham contract is where 
an employer deliberately misrepresents employment as an independent contracting 
arrangement, instead of engaging the worker as an employee (Fair Work Act 2009, s. 
357). In some cases, this may result in the worker missing out on some entitlements or 
being pressured to become an independent contractor or being misled about the effect of 
changing their working arrangements (Office of ABCC 2011a, p.56). The ABCC acted 
as an advisor and advocate for workers who were unsure of their rights and vulnerable 
to unfair work practices such as sham contracting.  
As the ABCC developed over time, it showed that it was prepared to tackle the issues 
underlying the construction industry’s social contract breach. On 19 November 2010, 
ABCC, Leigh Johns, announced that the ABCC would conduct an inquiry into sham 
contracting in the building and construction industry (FWBC 2012d). On 22 December 
2010, Commissioner Cole released a discussion paper and called for written public 
submissions to the inquiry (FWBC 2012d). A total of 21 submissions were received 
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from industry associations, subcontractors, the resources sector, academics and others 
(Office of ABCC 2011b, p. 5). In March and April 2011 the ABCC held a series of 
Roundtable events in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Canberra and Perth, to provide a 
forum for all industry participants to discuss the nature and extent of sham contracting 
(Office of ABCC 2011b, p. 73). On 29 November 2011, the ABCC released the Sham 
Contracting Inquiry Report 2011, which outlined ten recommendations aimed at 
eliminating sham contracting within the construction industry (Office of ABCC 2011b, 
pp. 93-107). This enquiry illustrates that the ABCC was willing to pursue unlawful 
behaviour on an industry-wide basis.  
The ABCC also continued with its pledge to provide fairness to Wages and 
Entitlements. In March 2011 the ABCC assumed full responsibility for investigating 
complaints relating to wages and entitlements in the construction industry (FWBC 
2012a). Prior to this a memorandum of understanding existed between the ABCC and 
the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) for such complaints to be handled by the FWO. The 
ABCC announced he would terminate this practice when he commenced his 
appointment on 11 October 2010 (FWBC 2012a). 
The second issue it addressed was right of entry. One of the ways unlawful industrial 
relations was manifested was denying people access to work sites. In this way, unions 
could control the workplace and signal to all stakeholders that they were in charge of 
whether work could be conducted on any given day and by whom. This gave them 
extraordinary power over employers and employees. The ABCC addressed right of 
entry by overseeing laws regarding how and when a person could enter a building or 
construction worksite (Fair Work Act 2009). Union officials must hold a valid federal 
permit and provide at least 24 hours written notice to enter a building or construction 
worksite. The written notice period may not apply, if the reason for entry relates to an 
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occupational health and safety issue. (FWBC 2012f). This provided employers with 
power to deny union officials access to the workplace unless they had good cause and 
provided sufficient notice to allow employers to prepare.  
The third issue the ABCC addressed was law enforcement. The prosecution strike-rate 
of the BIT was less than 1%; of 1,000 visits to construction sites, only six people were 
taken to court (BIT Report, 2004, p. 2). In order to be effective in this role, the ABCC 
was provided strong powers to investigate alleged misconduct and breaches of the law. 
Section 52 of the BCII Act 2005 provided the ABCC with the power to compel a person 
who had evidence relating to an investigation to answer questions, or provide 
information or produce documents. A person that fails to comply with a section 52 
notice faced imprisonment for six months , or instead of, or in addition to imprisonment, 
the court may now impose 2000 penalty points for a natural person fine for breaches, 
and five times that for a body corporate convicted of an offence. This was provided for 
under subsection 4B(2) of the Crimes Act 1914. 
The fourth issue it addressed was contracting, including tendering and procurement. A 
fundamental structural problem within the Construction Industry was the allocation of 
work contracts. Australia is a democratic capitalist society, which means that the 
Government and society tend to leave business to market forces. In other words, society 
trusts that business will use resources it allocates efficiently by choosing the best 
supplier of goods and services. In the case of the Construction Industry, market forces 
manifested in terms of contracts. The industry awards contracts at multiple levels. A 
prime contractor, that is a large construction company, may win a contract to build a 
housing estate, a hospital, school, bridge and so on. In performing this work, the prime 
contractor may seek the services of other companies, known as sub-contractors. The 
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process of awarding contracts to prime contractors and sub-contractors has been abused 
in the past and unlawful behaviour has resulted.  
The ABCC addressed the problem of contracting with the National Code for the 
Australian building and construction industry. The National Code was established in 
1997. However, the ABCC recognised its power to bridge the industry’s legitimacy gap 
and encourage compliance with the social contract. The Australian Government spends 
billions of dollars annually on construction projects to build schools, universities, 
hospitals, roads, and bridges. This represents a significant market opportunity for all 
construction companies. In order to be eligible for Australian Government funded 
construction work, businesses must be compliant with the National Code (FWBC 
2012c). “The National Code and these Guidelines encourage co-operation, ethical 
behaviour, continuous improvement and best practice by clients and service providers in 
the construction industry” (Australian Procurement and Construction Council 1999, p. 
5). In this way, the ABCC could encourage the cultural behaviour desired by society, 
that is the social contract, by providing a financial incentive to comply. Only by taking 
action to bridge the legitimacy gap could construction companies gain access to 
lucrative government contracts.  
In summary, the ABCC made significant progress in addressing some of the underlying 
cultural work practice problems within the Construction Industry. It differed from 
earlier regulation because it was supported by specific legislation, the BCII Act, and a 
strategy aimed at empowering victims and isolating the bullies. By providing employers 
with an incentive to comply with the National Building Code accreditation to win 
government contracts, and empowering employees with wages and entitlements support 
and  industrial relations laws to break down bullying, and support to police the industry, 
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the ABCC made significant progress towards bridging the legitimacy gap in the 
construction industry.  
4.7.3 Fair Work Building and Construction (2010) 
Justice Murray Wilcox’s report, ‘Transition to Fair Work Australia for the Building and 
Construction Industry’ (2009), made recommendations on the structure and powers of 
an organisation to replace the ABCC. This report was part of a range of measures 
designed to update the regulation of the  construction industry, within the context of a 
broader changes to industrial relations policy and legislation.  
The Fair Work Act 2009 (C’wth) (FW Act 2009) replaced, from 1 July 2009, the 
Workplace Relations Act 1996. The FW Act 2009 is the cornerstone legislation for 
workplace relations laws in Australia (FWBC 2012b) and includes rules regarding:  
• terms and conditions of employment  
• rights and responsibilities of employees and employers  
• compliance and enforcement rules (FW Act 2009,  ss. 5-7)  
The FW Act 2009 consolidates the government agencies that currently administer the 
workplace relations system into two new regulatory bodies: Fair Work Australia (FWA) 
and the FWO (FW Act 2009, s. 595 and s. 682). 
The Australian Government introduced the BCII Amendment (Transition to Fair Work) 
Bill 2009 to parliament. The purpose of the bill was to establish the Office of the Fair 
Work Building Industry Inspectorate, which replaced the ABCC. The ABCC continued 
to operate until the BCII Act 2005  was amended. The ABCC was abolished on 31 May 
2012, and was replaced on 1 June with the Fair Work Building and Construction 
(FWBC) as the building industry regulator (FWBC 2012b).  
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4.8 Current Regulation  
The current state of regulation of the construction industry is examined from two 
perspectives. First, analysis of comments made by industrial relations lawyers about the 
formation of the FWBC Agency, and the legislative and policy changes and second, the 
agency’s web-site which explains its activities and services. In combination, this 
provides a summary of the current efforts to regulate the construction industry and the 
size and nature of the current legitimacy gap.   
The key changes in the BCII Amendment (Transition to Fair Work) Bill 2011 were: 
• The Bill abolishes the Office of the Australian Building and Construction 
Commissioner and establishes a new statutory agency, the Fair Work Building 
Industry Inspectorate.  The Inspectorate will be a stand alone statutory agency. 
• While the Bill retains the use of coercive powers by the Director of Inspectorate, 
it also imposes a number of safeguards. 
• The use of coercive powers by the Director of the Inspectorate will be sunsetted 
in three years, not five years as previously proposed.  A decision as to whether 
the powers will be extended will be made at that time. 
• The role of “Independent Assessor” has been introduced with power to make 
determinations that the coercive powers be “switched off” in respect of 
particular projects on which “building work” commences after the 
commencement of the Bill. 
• The provisions of the Fair Work Act will apply unchanged to workers in the 
building industry.  Provisions within the Building and Construction Industry 
Improvement Act which dealt with industry-specific laws (such as unlawful 
industrial action, discrimination, coercion and unfair contracts) will be repealed.   
• The Bill removes existing higher penalties for building industry participants for 
breaches of industrial law and broader circumstances under which industrial 
action attracts penalties. 
• In order to ensure that all building industry participants are not subject to 
multiple proceedings, the Inspectorate will be prevented from prosecuting 
building workers when the parties have settled or discontinued matters (Young 
2012, para. 3). 
CDA of this evaluation of the legislative changes identifies that the explicit social 
contract expectations are that the construction industry comply with industry-specific 
laws, which are related to unlawful industrial action, discrimination, coercion and unfair 
contracts. The comments also refer to the ‘coercive powers’ and penalties, which are 
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evidence of expectation change in the legitimacy gap, whereby society expects stronger 
law enforcement of the industry.  
Young (2012, para. 4) concludes that “much like the BCII, the Bill affects the rights and 
obligations of ‘building industry participants’”.  This includes: building employers, 
building employees, building contractors and building associations (Young 2012, para. 
4). The definition of “building work” as existed under the BCII Act  is largely retained 
with one important difference. “The Bill now expressly excludes from the definition of 
‘building work’ off-site pre-fabrication made to order components” (Young 2012, para. 
5).  This is intended to exclude manufacturing that takes place in off-site facilities 
separate from a building project (Young 2012, para. 5). This evaluation shows who is 
required to comply with the social contract being enforced by the legislation and the 
new inspectorate.  
The FWBC Agency is headed by a Director, appointed by the Minister.  The functions 
of the Director include, amongst other things: 
• providing education, assistance and advice to building industry participants; 
• monitoring compliance with designated building laws and the Building Code by 
building industry participants; 
• investigating any act or practice by a building industry participant that may be 
contrary to a designated building law, a safety net contractual entitlement or the 
Building Code; and 
• commencing proceedings in a court, or to make applications to Fair Work 
Australia, to enforce designated building laws and safety net contractual 
entitlements as they relate to building industry participants (Young 2012, para. 
6). 
This appears to be a more limited scope of activities compared with previous regulatory 
bodies, such as the ABCC. While the important themes of employee empowerment, 
compliance, investigation, and law enforcement are retained, it seems that the new 
regulatory body has more of a watchdog role rather than a change role. The regulatory 
agency role looks as if it is being wound down. However, law enforcement powers 
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remain. Inspectors, who are appointed by the Director of the Inspectorate, have the same 
powers as inspectors appointed under the FW Act 2009, to enter premises, inspect work, 
interview any person and require a person who has the custody, or access to a document 
to produce that document (Young 2012, para. 7). Young (2012) provide this summary 
advice for Construction Industry stakeholders: 
Whilst the Bill introduces considerable changes to the BCII Act and in particular 
the range of matters considered unlawful as well as the nature of penalties that 
might be imposed, it would be unwise for any employer or union to become 
complacent.  
Rather, there is a high likelihood that the Inspectorate will continue to actively 
monitor compliance with designated building laws, investigate any act or 
practice that may be contrary to a designated building law or a safety net 
contractual entitlement or ultimately commence proceedings in a court, or to 
make an application to Fair Work Australia. 
Further, even though the use of the coercive powers has been curtailed, the 
Director retains considerable powers to obtain information, documents and 
answers to questions.  We expect these powers to obtain information through 
means other than the exercise of the coercive powers will be utilised and for the 
presence of the Inspectorate on building sites to continue (paras.16-18). 
The comments reveal that while the industry’s regulatory body appears to have been 
scaled down, it still has sufficient authority and TOR to have consequences for industry 
stakeholders who wish to risk breaching the social contract.   
The FW Act 2009 seems to have made a significant difference to the industrial relations 
problems within the Construction Industry. Enterprise agreements made under the FW 
Act 2009 after 1 May 2012 must include a genuine dispute resolution process that 
provides for an independent third party, such as Fair Work Australia (FWA), to mediate 
a dispute (Young 2012, para. 15). An independent third party, such as FWA, must have 
the capacity to settle the dispute via a binding decision, if the dispute cannot be resolved 
(Young 2012, para. 15).  
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The current regulatory environment for the construction industry suggests a much 
tighter control of the social contract provided by legislation, policy, and regulatory 
agency activity. The Fair Work Building & Construction web-site has the following 
“pop-ups” to highlight the type of information it most wants to communicate to users of 
its site: 
1. Learn more about your rights and responsibilities (empowerment) 
2. How can FWBC help you? (support) 
3. Find out how to win government work (compliance benefits) 
4. Are you being paid correctly? (industrial relations and empowerment) 
5. Stay-up-to-date (information diffusion) (FWBC 2012f, para. 2) 
The menu under the web-site’s tab “Your Legal Rights and Responsibilities” contains 
these areas: 
• Industrial Action 
• Occupational Health and Safety 
• Right of Entry for Permit Holders 
• Union membership – your right to free choice 
• Unlawful pressure and coercion prohibited (FWBC 2012e, para. 1) 
4.9 The Industry Response to Regulation   
Chapter 3 examined how the Construction industry gained legitimacy in the first place 
through its desirability. Organisations gain legitimacy by proactively seeking to 
persuade society that they deserve this status, and access to necessary resources 
(O’Donovan 2002). Gaining legitimacy involves similar strategies as when trying to 
repair legitimacy. The only real difference is that gaining is a proactive approach and 
repairing is a reactive approach. Repairing involves responding to a crisis. Lindblom 
(1994) recommends four strategies to gain or repair legitimacy (see section 2.3.3). 
In developing understanding about the process of legitimisation in the construction 
industry, two approaches are adopted. First, it will examine what, if any, legitimisation 
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tactics were employed by the industry before and after the RC to maintain, gain or 
repair legitimacy. Second, it will examine the industry’s disclosures in order to identify 
the way it communicated its legitimisation tactics. Deegan (2009, p. 332) explains that 
there has been insufficient empirical research and theoretical development to connect 
specific legitimisation techniques with efforts to gain, maintain, or repair legitimacy. 
Lindblom’s recommendations are untested and it is not known whether they work or 
how to attain legitimacy. Disclosure is the only action known to work. 
4.9.1 Industry Efforts to Repair Legitimacy 
Evidence that the construction industry did not wish to repair its public image and seek 
to regain legitimacy status is provided in the previous sections. The evidence comes in 
two forms: the continued unlawful behaviour found by the BIT and the creation of 
various regulatory measures (for example, legislation) and authorities since the RC. 
There were clear signs that the union leaders actively sought to maintain unlawful 
behaviour. Indeed, rather than seek to regain legitimacy status, union leaders openly 
defied the Government and sought to challenge the laws imposed on them. The second 
BIT report cites the case of Craig Johnston, the former Victorian State Secretary of the 
AMWU, who was sentenced in 2004 following incidents in 2001 associated with an 
industrial dispute. The BIT report states “From his Victorian prison cell, Johnston 
subsequently sent a message to unionists to “continue to break these laws” urging them 
that “if the law is wrong, break it and break it again and force the Government to repeal 
it” (Hadgkiss 2005, p. 8). Further examples of civil disobedience were found on a 
website devoted to the Defend Craig Johnston movement, where Craig Johnston is 
quoted as saying: “The only way that the Workplace Relations Act will be brought 
down is if there is a full-on onslaught of civil disobedience and breaking the law with 
political and industrial action” (Hadgkiss 2005, p. 8). This illustrates how the union 
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movement did not do any of the four tactics suggested by Laughlin (1999) to repair 
legitimacy. They employed a new tactic, challenge social expectations by breaking the 
contract so often that society must agree that the expectations cannot be enforced.  
There is considerable evidence in the second BIT report that some contractors tried to 
repair legitimacy by standing up to the unions. The contractors employed the 
communication tactic - explain how you are doing what society expects – by reporting 
efforts to confront the unions to the BIT. These actions were then communicated to the 
broader public by the BIT report. However, these actions did not work. The BIT report 
lists several tragic stories of contractors facing bankruptcy or substantial financial loss 
as a result of trying to stand up to the unions. Most accepted the unlawful behaviour as 
necessary if they were to survive, after trying to behave according to society 
expectations and it failed.  
 
4.10 Chapter Summary  
This chapter provided an historical narrative of regulation of the construction industry. 
It provides evidence of the nature of the legitimacy gap by establishing the social 
contract, that is, society’s expectations of the industry, and the social contract breach, 
that is, the behaviour considered unsatisfactory by the regulator. The narrative shows 
how the regulator introduced several regulatory bodies and further reviews of the 
industry in the period since 2003. In the period immediately after the RC, the industry 
appeared to ignore the regulator’s claim that there was a legitimacy gap and continued 
with its behaviour. However, there are signs that the industry is now moving towards 
compliance with the social contract.  
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The legal evaluation of the legislative and policy changes provided by Young (2012) 
and the FWBC web-site suggests that the construction industry has made significant 
progress towards breaching the legitimacy gap. While the existence of the FWBC 
Inspectorate and the legislation suggests that a legitimacy gap still exists or at least that 
deterrence is necessary to ensure the breach does not reappear, the regulatory 
environment appears to be gaining control of the industry.  
Given the volume of data examined in this chapter including some historical context of 
industry regulation, the ABC Four Corners transcript, RC  outcomes, DEWR Report, 
APC report, BIT Report, ABCC and FWBC, and brief reference to recent regulation; 
the chapter summary will discuss the findings against the relevant research questions 
posed in chapter two.  
Theme 1 – What Led to the Royal Commission (up to 2003) 
PIT explains why and how society intervenes in business activity. In this study, it is 
used to explain why the regulator, the Federal Government, felt it needed to take action 
to improve behaviour in the construction industry. It is also used to explain the types of 
regulation used by the Government and accounting bodies. A number of questions were 
posed in chapter 2 which may be answered by chapter 4. The first was question 2: Why 
did the Federal Government choose to conduct a RC into the construction industry?  
In discussing the history of the regulation of the construction industry, there are two 
broad themes: economic and political forces. The economic forces were driven by 
uneven power within the construction industry’s stakeholders. This created social 
inequities between stakeholders. The political forces were driven by Government’s 
desire to restore equity and balance between stakeholders. Therefore, the first step in the 
CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF REGULATION   227 
interpretive framework in this chapter is to code the document text in terms of whether 
the text refers to economic or political forces. The themes are: 
1. Economic: activities creating social inequities between stakeholders. 
2. Political: government frustration with perceived inequities between stakeholders. 
An investigation by the EA in 2001, which was prior to the RC in 2003, criticised law 
enforcement agencies for failing to act on problems in the construction industry 
(Hamberger 2001). The chapter described evidence of the socio-political power 
inequities within the industry at the time. Clearly many people were unhappy with these 
inequities but felt intimidated and unempowered to act, and the inability of the 
authorities to enforce appropriate behaviour added to the feelings of powerlessness.  
The RCR was critical of the construction industry trade unions for creating a culture of 
intimidation. The ABC Four Corners (Neighbour 2001) investigation into trade unions 
highlighted the type of behaviour that society decided was a breach of the social 
contract. The chapter’s analysis reveals dominant themes of corruption and political 
power struggles between union leaders. There were allegations against enemies such as 
poor leadership, lying, hatred, greed, criminal activity, mismanaged funds, violence, and 
threatening or intimidating contractors and politicians.  
 The Federal Government’s decision to conduct a RC into the construction industry may 
be explained as a DSS. The social contract breach was not something that was hidden 
and suddenly emerged. The catalyst was probably the Four Corners media investigation, 
which highlighted for many people the seriousness of the cultural problems.  
The analysis of the PM’s statement in 2001 announcing the RC reveals illegality, 
inequity, and lack of accountability as important themes. The government 
communicated to the industry that it would not tolerate this behaviour any further and 
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that it wanted to introduce fairness and accountability to the industry, particularly in 
terms of industrial relations and funds management and disclosure. Accounting is 
implicated in terms of the latter point. 
The second question addressed by chapter 4 is question 5: What criteria does society set 
in adjudging legitimate status? How can it be known if the industry is legitimate?  
LT explains how organisations seek to be perceived as ‘legitimate’ by their society in 
return for resources necessary for their survival (for example, see Dowling & Pfeffer 
1975; O’Donovan 2002). The chapter’s findings answer this question in two ways. First, 
it establishes undesirable behavior. In doing so, it outlines the type of behavior society 
will no longer tolerate. The PM’s statement (2001) announcing the RC revealed 
connections of illegality and inequity. It identifies union leaders being villains and 
workers and employers as victims. The main issue in terms of implicit expectations was 
financial disclosure, where the language used by the PM’s statement suggests 
connections of unaccountability. It uses strong words to describe the significance of this 
behaviour, failure, and allocate identities as management doing negotiations. It does not 
identify accountants specifically. However, financial disclosure is an activity that 
involves accountants, so they are implicated.  
The analysis distinguishes between pragmatic and moral motives for misbehaviour. 
Pragmatic motives are derived from self-interest, for example, profit (Deegan 2009). 
The main issue here was corruption. Moral motives involve responsibility, desire to do 
the right thing, for example, good corporate citizenship (Deegan 2009), the principle 
concern being appropriate use of funds. The identities surrounded self-interest, and 
while union leaders were implicated, the language is cautious, using the word 
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‘inappropriate’. Deegan (2009) identifies a third motive, cognition, which is shared 
mental models, which involves the cultural problems identified by the RCR in 2003.  
The third question addressed by chapter 4 is question 7: How did the construction 
industry perceive its role as corporate citizens? The chapter findings revealed that the 
construction industry was aware that its behavior was considered unsatisfactory by 
society but there was a sense of apathy about this reputation. The ABC Four Corners 
investigation in 2001 showed that union leaders would not apologize for their behavior, 
suggesting they had no intention of wanting to repair the legitimisation gap. Further, 
when the RC announced its findings, they were uncontested in the sense that they were 
unchallenged by industry stakeholders. The construction industry recognised that it was 
perceived as poor corporate citizens, who had breached their social contract, with a 
sense of apathy, helplessness, and acceptance.  
While the RC was highly critical of the unions, Commissioner Cole was sympathetic 
towards other stakeholders suggesting they were often victims of intimidation. People 
knew there would be consequences if they did not cooperate with unlawful behaviour. 
Perhaps most importantly for this study and the role of accountants, Commissioner Cole 
was sympathetic towards the pressure individuals were under to act in the best interests 
of their stakeholders. For managers, their jobs required them to protect the interests of 
owners by ensuring the firm was profitable. The analysis suggested managers may have 
found it impossible to refuse to engage in improper practices. Accountants may have 
found themselves in the same situation.   
The fourth question addressed by chapter 4 is question 8: How did society perceive the 
industry’s role as corporate citizens? The chapter found that construction industry 
stakeholders do not abide by the law. The legitimacy gap, therefore, is the degree of 
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unlawfulness, that is, the extent to which the industry does not abide by the law. 
Commissioner Cole laid the blame for unlawful behaviour with industrial relations. He 
argued that this situation had emerged because industry stakeholders believed that 
industrial relations sits outside the law. Commissioner Cole identified the socio-political 
power inequities which had created the industry’s culture. The basis of the structural 
problems inherent in the industry’s stakeholder relationships were that those with power 
were the winners. Power was obtained by industrial action. The inequities in the 
stakeholder relationships were driven by intense competition which created small profit 
margins. As a result a short term focus prevailed which meant that employers, both head 
contractors and subcontractors, had to submit to those with the power to decrease their 
profitability, that is the unions. 
The fifth question addressed by chapter 4 is Question 9: What was the nature of the 
social contract between the construction industry and Australian society?  What did 
society expect from this industry? Commissioner Cole uses the phrase ‘departs from the 
standards’ to state that the industry does not behave the way the rest of Australian 
industry behaves. The use of the word standards indicates an expectation, a level of 
behaviour, that is, a social contract. The legitimacy gap explains the ‘why’, in terms of 
the reasons for the gap occurring. Society’s expectations of the construction industry 
may be understood from two perspectives: 
1. Explicit: legal requirements, for example, legislation or activity required by 
law 
2. Implicit: areas outside the law but still deemed desirable by society 
The legal expectation was that industry stakeholders need to change their cultural 
behaviours to abide by the law and give all individuals their freedom to act in 
accordance with the law without unfair workplace pressure. The implicit requirements 
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in the social contract are those that are desirable but not enforceable by law. Implicit 
requirements are more related to moral motives, for example a sense of doing the right 
thing. Commissioner Cole’s recommendations include the implicit requirement of 
attitudinal change. Attitudes are difficult to monitor and perhaps impossible to police. 
However, attitudinal change was essential if cultural change was to be successful. The 
following table uses content 
In summary, the RC outlines the social contract in explicit terms by requiring industry 
stakeholders to follow appropriate legislation as law (statute), being aware of the 
consequences of illegal behaviour (law enforcement), and only dealing with union 
officials with proper accreditation and behaviours. Implicit expectations involved 
cultural change essentially related to fair work practice and employee empowerment 
and freedom. These themes would carry on throughout the next decade of regulation of 
the industry.  
Theme 2 – Post Royal Commission (after 2003) 
Non-compliance with the social contract can also have a negative impact on the 
organisation or industry’s market reputation or image (Deegan et al. 2000). The sixth 
question addressed by chapter 4 is question 13: What measures of legitimacy were 
imposed by the RC on the construction industry? The chapter showed that explicit 
expectations required industry stakeholders to follow appropriate legislation as law 
(statute), being aware of the consequences of illegal behaviour (law enforcement), while 
implicit expectations involved cultural change essentially related to fair work practice 
and employee empowerment and freedom. The measures of legitimacy were also 
defined by the social contract breach because Commissioner Cole specified the 
inappropriate behaviour society expected the construction industry to change: bullying, 
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inadequate financial management, disempowerment, conflicting relationships, unfair 
workplace practices, industrial disputation, and unsatisfactory law enforcement. 
 
CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF REGULATION   233 
CHAPTER 5: ACCOUNTING AS 
SOCIAL PRACTICE - 
RELATIONSHIPS 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to reconstruct the social reality of how accountants work 
within the construction industry from a ST perspective. The aim is to examine the social 
system that accountants work within this industry. Three ST constructs are used as the 
lens for this examination: relationships, impact, and expectations (Gray, Owens & 
Adams 1996, p. 45). This chapter will examine the first construct, relationship, and 
chapter 6 will look at the two remaining constructs, impact and expectations.  
These constructs help us explore the social systems within the construction industry. 
From an ethical perspective, it is argued that all stakeholders should be treated equally 
and that the (economic) power of various groups should not allow them to have 
differential influence over the firm (Deegan 2009), whereas, the managerial perspective 
argues that management will be likely to respond to the expectations of particular 
(typically powerful) stakeholders (Gray, Owens & Adams 1996). The analysis will 
examine whether social practice in the construction industry was ethical or managerial. 
The outcome of this analysis is the social contracts which are ‘negotiated’ with different 
stakeholder groups (Deegan 2009). 
In this chapter, the relationships constructs will be used to discuss the key themes which 
emerged from analysis of the behaviours within the construction industry. More 
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specifically, behaviours associated with the activities mentioned by the RC which may 
have involved accounting practice: (1) tax evasion, (2) underpayment of employee 
entitlements, (3) non-compliance with payroll tax, (4) creation of phoenix companies, 
(5) making of and receipt of inappropriate payments, (6) absence of adequate security of 
payments for sub-contractors, and (7) profit manipulation. These activities involved a 
range of social behaviours. These are analysed using the relationships construct.  
The role of accounting exists within a complex social system. The aim is to examine the 
social interactions between accountants and other industry stakeholders when 
accountants were potentially involved in the seven unlawful activities. It is important to 
note that this thesis does not seek to explicate exactly what happened in the construction 
industry at the time of the RC. The aim is to examine the role of accounting; not the role 
or performance of individual accountants. Therefore, this section explores how 
accountants might have interacted with others based on the evidence available from the 
RCR.  
The three ST constructs, relationships, impact and expectations (Gray, Owens & Adams 
1996, p. 45), will be applied as follows. First, SNA will be used to examine the use of 
power within the social networks within the construction industry. This is relationships. 
Second, whether the people making decisions about tax evasion were willing to listen to 
accountants and adjust their behaviour accordingly. This is impact. Third, what did 
these people expect of accountants when their company was doing tax evasion. This is 
expectations. This chapter will examine the first area, relationships.  
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Table 20 - 5.1: Themes by Unlawful Activity 
Table 5.1: Themes by Unlawful Activity 
Activity Theme Construct 
Taxation 1. Cash payments  Relationships 
2. Fake labour hire  Expectations 
3. Unions threatening to expose employers Impact 
4. Pyramid Subcontracting Expectations 
5. Use of illegal workers Impact 
6. Fraudulent claims for Goods and Services Tax 
(GST) Input Tax Credits 
Relationships 
7. Large companies Expectations 
Employee 
Entitlements 
1. Reduce costs Relationships 
2. Treating employees as sub-contractors Expectations 
3. Failing to pay employees benefits such as 
superannuation  
Impact 
4. Insolvency to avoid payment Expectations 
Payroll Tax 1. Using employees as sub-contractors Expectations 
2. Grouping of companies Expectations 
3. Non-registration Expectations 
4. Lodgment of returns Expectations 
5. Incorrectly completing returns Expectations 
Phoenix 
Companies 
1. Avoiding payroll tax Expectations 
2. Acting as company directors while bankrupt Expectations 
3. Establishing groups of companies to avoid liabilities Expectations 
Inappropriate 
Payments 
1. Buying industrial peace Impact 
2. Including inappropriate payments in industrial 
agreements 
Impact 
 3. Delaying payments to employees, for example wage 
increases or other entitlements 
Impact 
4. Unions demanding payment during industrial action Impact 
5. Unions exerting pressure to ensure employee 




1. Misleading financial viability Relationships 
2. Lack of capability to assess financial health Relationships 
3. Contracting system Relationships 
4. Lack of regulation Relationships 
5. Legitimate business failure Expectations 
Profit 
Manipulation 
1. Self-interest at the expense of others Impact 
2. Unwillingness or inability to change behaviours Relationships 
3. Management of costs Expectations 
4. Buying work Relationships 
 
The themes are used to theorize about the nature of the unlawful activity (see grounded 
theory explanation in section 5.1). 
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They are used to further illustrate the nature of the unlawful behaviours and allow 
generalizations about what companies do when they engage in unlawful behaviour 
associated with for example, employee entitlements, for example, such as treating 
employees as sub-contractors. Further research, perhaps in other industries, or in 
construction in other countries, could look at whether this also occurs. It allows 
measurement constructs to emerge. For example, listing employee entitlements as 
unlawful behaviour does not equate to a concept that is easily measured by other 
studies. Nor does the detail of the historical narrative in this thesis because the context 
is specific, which would make it challenging to compare case situations with others. The 
themes provide a middle ground, by enabling measurable constructs to be used in 
further research. For example, it is possible to measure whether other organisations or 
industries treat employees as sub-contractors, and then infer whether employee 




The relationships between the construction industry’s stakeholders are analysed using 
SNA theory. SNA is a technique for understanding the nature of connections between 
people, to visualize them, and to analyse them for tactical and strategic change (Anklam 
2002). Borgatti and Foster (2003) proposed two dimensions of SNA research which are 
helpful in this analysis of construction industry relationships: explanatory mechanisms, 
which refers to how network ties are seen to function; and explanatory goals which 
refers to network outcomes. Explanatory mechanisms include patterns of 
interconnection. This will be used to identify the nature of interaction between 
stakeholder groups in terms of network quality (depth of contact) and network structure 
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(number of contacts and frequency of contact) (for example, Stone 2001). Explanatory 
goals include homogeneity in actor attitudes, beliefs and practices, as a function of 
social ties (Borgatti & Foster 2003). This framework is used to further enhance our 
understanding on the use of power within stakeholders’ relationships in the construction 
industry because it helps identify changes in behaviour as a result of those interactions.   
5.2.2 Social Interaction 
5.2.2.1 Introduction 
An examination of which stakeholder groups interacted, how often, and for what 
purpose is conducted. The SNA theory construct, density, is used to examine the 
interconnectedness of social networks; individuals with high density scores are 
connected with more than one social network (Stone 2001; Anklam 2005). Density is a 
positive factor in social networks because it measures frequency of interaction. The 
more density, the more opportunity to build and maintain relationships, which results in 
increased communication, trust, and social dependency. In contrast, low density 
indicates separateness, which results in isolation, mistrust, and conflict. This analysis is 
to identify the overall network density, that is, the connectivity between all stakeholder 
groups. It will also highlight differences in density amongst stakeholders, that is, which 
groups were well connected and which were not. 
In terms of the social networks within the construction industry, there are two main 
social systems: internal stakeholders and external stakeholders. In examining the 
relationships between these stakeholders, the involvement of accounting practice will be 
explored when considering the interaction associated with the seven unlawful activities 
identified by the RC.  
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5.2.2.2 Overall Social Network Density 
Overall, the construction industry’s social network had moderate density. The industry 
was dominated by its complex contracting system which involved layers of businesses 
from head contractors (large companies) to contractors (medium sized companies), to 
sub-contractors (small companies). This required high levels of interaction between 
owners/managers of these companies when tendering for projects and then in 
completing the project, if successful. The other dominant player was the trade unions. 
The unions were at the centre of industrial relations problems within the industry and 
would frequently interact with owners/managers. Interaction between other stakeholders 
was much less frequent, which is why the industry’s overall density is described as only 
moderate. The interaction between stakeholder groups is now examined to identify the 
density of each group. Internal stakeholders are examined first, followed by external 
stakeholders.  
5.2.2.3 Owners/Managers Network Density 
Owners/managers interacted regularly with all other industry stakeholders. This 
interaction varied in frequency and volume, that is, how many times these individuals 
interacted with other stakeholder groups and the size of their networks. However, 
owners/managers had a high density within the construction industry’s social networks 
overall. In many respects, this level of interaction was a positive factor in the industry’s 
social networks. As outlined above high density should generate more opportunity to 
build and maintain relationships; resulting in increased communication, trust, and social 
dependency. This was the case with owners/managers and most other stakeholders in 
the construction industry. However, it was not the case in the interaction between 
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owners/managers and unions, where the characteristics of low density emerged, that is, 
mistrust and conflict.  
In their interactions with other stakeholders, owners/managers played several roles. 
With staff, the role was negotiator. With small profit margins, owners/managers were 
often under pressure to cut costs. This emerged in discussions with staff about employee 
entitlements. The industry sought procedural justice in terms of employee entitlements, 
particularly in terms of legitimate performance (that is, bonus). Owners/managers 
sought to “gain a competitive advantage by being innovative in the way they 
remunerated their employees” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 208). This would have improved 
employee recruitment and retention if owners/managers could have paid more for 
higher performing employees. However, pressure from unions meant that employers 
could not overpay employees as a reward for superior performance.  
The RC found evidence of non-uniformity in the pattern agreements, which where  a 
type of enterprise bargaining agreement (EBA), “from the non-residential building, road 
and bridge construction, and earthmoving sectors of the construction industry” (Cole 
2003, vol. 5, p. 267). The pattern agreements were particularly interesting because they 
were non-union agreements that were intended to reflect what employers were willing 
to give employees in terms of fair distributive justice for employee entitlements, 
particularly focusing on aligning employee expectations with feasible employee 
entitlements. Analysis of these pattern agreements provided positive and negative 
reports on employers’ adoption of regulatory requirements. On the positive side, all 
three sectors “had identical provisions relating to leave entitlements, termination and 
retrenchment procedures, & OHS policies” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 267). The RC felt that 
this may have been a legacy from the award or awareness of the need to follow statutory 
requirements (such as in the case of Equal Employment Opportunity [EEO] provisions). 
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This finding suggests that employers were at least aware that they needed uniformity in 
terms of employee entitlements. However, they found ways to work outside this pattern 
agreement. On the negative side, the pattern bargaining differed across these three 
industry sectors in “the term of the agreement and the wage increases provided” (Cole 
2003, vol. 5, p. 267). 
With regulators, the role of owner/managers was avoidance. The RC identified 
widespread unlawful behaviour by the industry. For many owner/managers, the thinking 
was that everyone else was doing it and the aim was not to get caught. An example was 
phoenix company activity, which mainly involved directors of companies, that is the 
owners or managers, who sought to avoid paying tax and other liabilities. The practice 
appeared widespread and may be described as normal industry behaviour. While the RC 
was critical of individuals who engaged in this activity, Commissioner Cole focused 
mainly on the failure of the regulatory system to police this activity. He inferred that 
individuals who engaged in phoenix activity were opportunistic and were only taking 
advantage of weaknesses in the regulatory system.  
The RC almost apologised for employers in terms of them engaging in inappropriate 
behaviour associated with profit reporting. The inference was that contractors were 
under so much pressure that they had no choice but to manipulate profits. An employer 
group, the MBA, submitted to the RC that contractors who wanted to behave 
appropriately knew that this behaviour would not be recognised by customers. The 
MBA stated that its public “position on taxation compliance is based on fair and 
economically-based competition” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 68). The MBA defended its 
members by stating that “in an industry where profit margins are traditionally tight, the 
practice of tax evasion places legitimate businesses at a significant competitive 
disadvantage when bidding for work against those which do not comply” (Cole 2003, 
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vol. 9, p. 68). The MBA placed the blame firmly with customers by arguing that it is 
“unfortunate that some clients choose to turn a blind eye when accepting quotations for 
work to the fact that they can only be so significantly under-priced compared to others 
because of tax noncompliance practices” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 68). In other words, 
customers should be aware that companies tendering at very low prices would have 
been engaging in inappropriate behaviour, and therefore, they should have not accept 
tenders from these unscrupulous companies. However, the reality is that customers will 
often choose the lowest priced tenderer, as it serves their self-interest to save money 
themselves. 
With other construction companies, the role of owner/managers was competitor. The 
complex nature of the contractor system in the construction industry meant that 
companies could be both competitors and allies. On occasions, companies would work 
together to win a construction project and then complete the project. This would happen 
because head contractors often outsourced work to other contractors (medium sized 
companies) or sub-contractors (small companies). However, most construction 
companies saw other companies as competitors. Due to the small profit margins in the 
industry, competition was fierce. The outcomes emerged in activities such as employee 
entitlements.  
Owners/managers of construction companies focused on distributive justice in terms of 
employee entitlements but from a different perspective compared with other internal 
and external stakeholders. Owners/managers sought uniformity in employee 
entitlements across the industry. Their objective was equity but only if their 
organisation could benefit. They wanted to reward employees for their loyalty with 
equitable employee entitlements. However, the level of reciprocity was determined by 
industry competition. The RC found that the “cost of an increase in employee 
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entitlements could be automatically passed up the contractual chain”, if construction 
companies “know that their competitors must bear similar costs” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 
208). In other words, employers would be happy to pay employees their full employee 
entitlements because they could simply pass this cost onto their customers by increasing 
the price of construction projects. However, the small profit margins in the construction 
industry meant that companies risked losing projects and going out of business if they 
raised prices. Therefore, companies under pressure would try to avoid expenses like 
employee entitlements rather than risk losing work. Unless all companies agreed to pay 
full employee entitlements and raise their prices, some companies would compete on 
price by avoiding employee entitlements.   
The complex relationships between construction companies allowed unlawful 
behaviours to occur. Construction companies engaged in payroll tax noncompliance to 
various degrees. The degree to which companies engaged in this activity was largely 
influenced by their size. Smaller companies were more likely to try to avoid the 
threshold figure.  
Tax avoidance and tax evasion was estimated to cost the Australian Government 
revenue of about $3 billion a year as long ago as 1985 (Potas 1993, p. 1). There is an 
important distinction between tax avoidance and tax evasion. Tax avoidance is legal, in 
the sense that any company or individual may seek legitimate methods to reduce their 
tax liability. However, tax evasion is against the law, and involves the “illegal non-
payment of taxes either by under-declaring income or over-declaring deductions or 
exemptions” (Potas 1993, p. 2).  
Tax evasion is generally known as “white collar crime”, because “it is an offence 
committed by people of high social status, the owners and managers, in the course of 
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their occupation” (Potas 1993, p.1). Yet it is not restricted to rich people and can be 
undertaken by “anyone who has an income and has an obligation to pay tax” (Potas 
1993, p. 1). Tax evasion and fraud was apparently quite widespread across many sectors 
of Australian industry in the years leading up to the RC. The ATO conducted an audit of 
Australia’s top 100 companies in the period 1988-1993, and while only half of these 
audits were completed, tax adjustments of more than $1 billion were required (Potas 
1993, p. 1).  
Firms and individuals “engage in fraudulent behaviour in direct proportion to the 
potential gain” (Potas 1993, p. 2). Most people would “naturally prefer to not pay more 
tax than they are obligated to pay, and there are always some people who will try to 
cheat the system” (Potas 1993, p. 2). Some areas where tax evasion has been practiced 
include: “trust shipping (involving the exploitation of the revenue/capital dichotomy), 
investing in loss companies, profit shifting, income splitting, gift schemes, exploitation 
of trusts and superannuation schemes” (Potas 1993, p. 2). In terms of this study, 
questions emerge in terms of whether construction firms would engage in these tax 
evasion activities and, if so, what role would accountants have in these activities. 
The following case studies illustrate how noncompliance occurred. The first case was an 
example of a mid-sized company which primarily engaged in grouping. The second 
case was an example of a smaller company which suffered at the hands of larger 
companies.  
The following extract provides a case study on Emerson Industries from the RCR. It is 
used to analyse in more detail the nature of payroll tax evasion in the construction 
industry.  
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In a submission from David Hicks on 18 November 2002, through his solicitor 
Mr Mark Douglass, Hicks indicated that if the company searches he had 
undertaken on 23 January 2001 had disclosed the correct information about the 
status of each company, then he would have conducted further enquiries into the 
Emerson Group, including making a determination on the capacity of Harkin to 
be a company director’. 
Emerson Industries was awarded the Multiplex NSW contract on 19 February 
2001, because it had offered the most competitive price. It commenced work on 
site that month. At that point the payroll tax debt owed by ACN 071 413 191 Pty 
Ltd to the NSW Office of State Revenue (OSR) remained unpaid. Between 
January and March 2001 Harkin provided Multiplex NSW with a number of 
receipts and other documents. An examination of these documents shows, 
however, that they did not all relate to Emerson Industries. Some of these 
documents related to ACN 065 040 173 Pty Ltd and others related, or appeared 
to relate, to ACN 088 440 304 Pty Ltd (formerly Emerson Services). Set out 
below is a list of the material provided and the company to which it related: 
• ATO – Australian Post Office Taxation Receipts for 1 March and 2 March 
2001 (company unspecified). 
• NSW OSR – ACN 065 040 173 Pty Ltd – payroll tax account for January 
2001 was issued to ACN 065 040 173 Pty Ltd but the cheque in payment 
was drawn on the account of Emerson Industries. 
• Enterprise Bargaining Agreement between ‘Emerson Services Pty Ltd & 
Employees and The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, 
Construction & General Division, NSW Branch, 1999-2002’, dated 14 April 
2000 in relation to ACN 088 440 304 Pty Ltd. 
• Coverforce Top-up Accident Scheme paid by Emerson Services (ACN 088 
440 304 Pty Ltd) on behalf of employees in relation to accident cover and 
top-up insurance. 
• Construction & Building Unions Superannuation Fund (Cbus) paid by 
Emerson Services (ACN 088 440 304 Pty Ltd) on behalf of employees (Cole 
2003, vol. 8, p. 175). 
In September 2001 the CFMEU gave Harkin a statement of moneys that had 
been paid to the ACN 065 040 173 Pty Ltd employees. On this statement, tax 
was deducted from the gross payments and there was a note at the bottom of the 
statement stating that Harkin and his wife were liable for the tax payment. 
Harkin presented this statement to the liquidator of ACN 065 040 173 Pty Ltd 
(formerly Emerson Services). On 24 September 2001 the Supreme Court of New 
South Wales ordered the winding-up of ACN 065 040 173 Pty Ltd, and 
appointed Mr Anthony Milton Sims, chartered accountant and partner, Sims 
Lockwood, as liquidator. The statement of the director, Liberina Harkin, 
disclosed unsecured creditors of $2.5 million, including $1.69 million to the 
ATO, $266 093 to the NSW OSR for payroll tax, $382 935 in workers 
compensation premiums, more than $108 000 in unpaid superannuation 
contributions and $46 448 in unpaid redundancy contributions (Cole 2003, vol. 
8, p. 185). 
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The extract provides several findings. First, the phrase “status of each company” 
suggests a problem with grouping. In other words, the Emerson Group may have been 
trying to evade payroll tax thresholds by splitting its business activities into different 
companies. The testimony of Mr Hicks that if he had known the extent of grouping by 
Emerson then he would not have awarded them the construction contract is particularly 
interesting. It suggests how difficult it was for customers, in this case the head 
contractor Multiplex NSW, to untangle the complex contracting arrangements in the 
construction industry, and the lengths some unscrupulous individuals went to in order to 
avoid paying tax. Second, the list of documents provided by Mr Harkin to Multiplex 
NSW showed that the head contractor was trying to do the right thing and to examine its 
contractor’s (that is, Emerson Group) lawfulness. This suggests that the bigger 
construction companies tried to follow lawful behaviour, whereas the mid-sized 
companies, like Emerson Group, and smaller companies were more likely to engage in 
noncompliance.  
A third finding, the point about “moneys that had been paid to the ACN 065 040 173 
Pty Ltd employees” and that Mr Harkin and his wife were “liable for the tax payment”, 
reveals how payroll tax evasion occurred by grouping activities. It seems that Mr 
Harkin was deducting tax from the gross payments of employees in at least one of his 
group of companies, and withholding these funds with the intention of later paying them 
to the taxation authorities. However, as the latter data indicates, when Mr Harkin’s 
company failed and went into liquidation he owed a large amount to the authorities, 
including $266 093 to the NSW OSR for payroll tax. This implies that Mr Harking 
withheld funds from employees for purposes other than to pay tax.  
This case raises interesting issues about the role of the regulator in payroll tax evasion. 
In this case, the construction project was funded by the New South Wales State 
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Government. It was the refurbishment of the Campbelltown Hospital, which was funded 
by the Government. At the time of awarding the Emerson Group a contract to work on 
this project, 19 February 2001, “the New South Wales Government did not have a 
system enabling it to ascertain that a company being paid for work on a major public 
hospital project was part of a group which owed it substantial sums in payroll tax” (Cole 
2003, vol. 8, p. 189). Commissioner Cole found an “incongruity where Government 
Code Implementation Guidelines required that contractors and subcontractors should 
ensure that their workers are appropriately engaged and remunerated and that the 
appropriate taxation requirements are complied with” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 190). 
However, “the government itself does not act on information possessed by its revenue 
arm that another company associated with the principal of a significant subcontractor 
owes it a large sum in payroll tax” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 190). In other words, the 
government requires compliance, but does not use its own information sources to check 
compliance. This highlights the root cause of the problem with payroll tax, it is a self-
assessment which places responsibility with the company to do the right thing. This 
system depends on the goodwill and lawful behaviour of employers. As a result, it 
creates opportunities where from December 1999 a company associated with Mr Harkin 
owned the NSW OSR a large sum in unpaid payroll tax, but he was still awarded a large 
government contract in 2001. 
The case poses questions about the responsiveness of the government to information 
about payroll tax noncompliance. The following extract shows the lengths the unions 
went to in order to tell the government that the Emerson Group were engaging in 
payroll tax noncompliance: 
On 9 August 2001 Mr Ferguson forwarded to the Hon. Morris Iemma, New 
South Wales Minister for Public Works and Services, a copy of a letter he had 
sent to the Labour Council of NSW, about the extent of non-compliance with 
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payroll tax in the construction industry. Ferguson cited the case of Emerson 
[Industries] and wrote that Harkin: ‘has been associated with numerous failed 
companies that have left behind millions of dollars on each occasion in unpaid 
group tax, workers compensation premiums and payroll taxes. Equally, millions 
of dollars have been left unpaid to small business for work undertaken.’ 
Ferguson sent another letter to the Minister on 15 August 2001 about Emerson 
Industries and the Campbelltown Hospital project, seeking an urgent 
investigation and seeking the introduction of measures to ensure subcontractors 
engaged by principal contractors working for the Government comply with their 
award and statutory obligations (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 183).  
On 24 September 2001, the Supreme Court of New South Wales ordered the winding-
up of one of the Emerson Group of companies. Therefore, the unions’ representations to 
the Minister had their desired effect and the Government finally investigated Mr 
Harkins’s business activities. Mr Harkin would have employed an accountant(s) in his 
business activities. His activities were at least large enough to accrue $266 093 in 
unpaid payroll tax. At a threshold rate of 5.45%, this suggests he had a total wages bill 
of at least $5 million. A company of this size would have needed an accountant(s). This 
leads to the question, what role would Mr Harkin’s accountants have played in his 
business activities? Certainly, the Emerson Group was involved in grouping and in 
other activities associated with seeking exemptions from payroll tax. However, these 
activities would have probably have been done by the owners/managers, that is, Mr 
Harkin on his own without the input of accountants.  
5.2.2.4 Human Resource Management Network Density 
HRM staff would have been involved in interaction between owners/managers and 
unions. Industrial relations matters usually involve HRM staff. If union officials were 
coercing employers with an objective to achieve industrial relations changes, such as 
sign an EBA or improve worker conditions, then HRM staff should have been involved 
in discussions. This is particularly the case in larger construction companies. The role 
would have been to offer owners/managers policy advice to ensure that construction 
CHAPTER 5: ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE - RELATIONSHIPS 248 
companies followed appropriate legislation and other lawful activity involving staff (for 
example, employee entitlements). However, the RC found evidence that human 
resource management staff sometimes stepped outside the boundaries of policy advice. 
A case study about Bovis Lend Lease Pty Ltd, a large construction company, illustrates 
how HRM staff may have been involved. The following extract summarises the case: 
Mr Eric Hensley is the Employee Relations Manager for Bovis Lend Lease Pty 
Ltd (Bovis), a position he has held since mid-1996. The notion that Bovis would 
pay $10 000 to the union picnic fund, and $10 000 to a memorial wall fund to 
‘recognise the assistance’ of the CFMEU is nonsense. The moneys were paid to 
fund Brcic’s employment by the CFMEU, as Hensley said. I reject Ferguson’s 
evidence, both in his statement, and orally. It was internally inconsistent, and 
unreliable. Bovis paid $20 000 to the CFMEU in accordance with the 
agreement. On 19 June 2000 Bovis received two tax invoices from the CFMEU: 
one invoice itemised a $10 000 payment to the ‘Memorial Wall Fund’; the other 
itemised a $10 000 payment for ‘CFMEU Annual Picnic Sponsorship’. Under 
examination, Hensley conceded that the invoices were misleading and that he 
had done nothing to have them corrected. The next day, 20 June 2000, Brcic 
resigned. On about 29 June 2000, Brcic was employed by the CFMEU as an 
organiser, effective from 3 July 2000. His gross salary was $41 927.60. The 
evidence in relation to this incident discloses the use of industrial pressure by 
Ferguson and the CFMEU aimed at forcing Bovis to re-employ a worker who 
had repeatedly shown contempt for his employer and a disinclination to do any 
of the work for which he had been employed. (Cole 2003, vol. 13, pp. 239-248). 
This case implicates both HRM staff and Bovis accounting staff. The HRM staff, 
represented by Hensley, authorised invoices which he conceded were misleading. 
Accounting staff would have processed these tax invoices.  
5.2.2.5 Project Managers Network Density 
Project managers play an important role in construction companies. They manage all 
aspects of a building project often as a turnkey task, from design to hand over to the 
customer. This includes managing operations and costs, as well as subcontractors. The 
following extract from a case described in the RCR illustrates the role of project 
managers working for a large construction company.  
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Mr Adrian Powell is a Project Manager employed by Westfield Design & 
Construction Pty Ltd [a large construction company].  As Project Manager, he 
has overall responsibility for the day to day running of the project he is 
employed to manage. A number of site-based personnel report to him and, in 
turn, he reports to a General Manager at Westfield Design & Construction Pty 
Ltd in Sydney. Powell was responsible for project management at Westfield 
shopping centres at both Airport West and Fountain Gate. Westfield Design & 
Construction Pty Ltd (Cole 2003, vol. 16, p. 273). 
The extract illustrates a typical project manager role. The phrase owners/managers 
incorporate all levels of supervision within an organisation. In a company as large as the 
Westfield Group, Mr Powell’s manager is most likely someone at levels below that of 
the group owners. Mr Powell is essentially the operations manager responsible for daily 
management on-site of construction projects. He has staff and some authority. He would 
also be responsible for liaising with other key stakeholders, particularly 
owner/managers (see above definition) and unions. The role of the project manager, 
therefore, was a coordinator.  
5.2.2.6 Accountants Network Density 
The role of accountants in the construction industry varied depending upon two factors: 
the firm size and the nature of the activity. Bragg (2007) suggests that in large firms, 
routine matters would typically be handled by an accountant and more complex matters 
by a tax expert, sometimes an internal staff member but often an external expert such as 
a registered taxation firm or accounting firm. Small firms would not employ a full-time 
accountant, nor a tax expert, so both routine and complex matters would be referred to 
external experts.  
The role of accountants in the seven unlawful activities identified by the RC is difficult 
to identify. The main focus of the RC was on other stakeholders: owners/managers and 
unions in particular. However, there is sufficient evidence to re-enact the role of 
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accountants in the industry’s unlawful activities. This may be done by looking at 
testimony regarding these activities and asking whether accountants would have been 
involved in some way. For example tax evasion. The individuals seeking to evade tax, 
owners/managers, would have interacted with accountants in conducting this activity.  
The following is an example of evidence about this type of unlawful activity. Union 
officials provided some evidence about how tax evasion occurs in the construction 
industry. The aim is to examine this evidence and to assess whether accountants were 
involved. Senior union official Ferguson alleged widespread group tax and payroll tax 
evasion and the use of sham subcontract arrangements and stated that: 
In some sectors such as formworking, much of the costing process is based on 
subcontractors not paying group tax, payroll tax or WorkCover premiums. 
While it cannot be proved I believe that major developers and builders may have 
actively promoted these activities among their sub-contractors. I have no doubt 
that they know of the arrangements and are happy to be complicit, as such 
practices lower their cost structure (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 64).  
In this statement, Ferguson is suggesting that large construction companies actively 
encouraged their subcontractors to engage in tax evasion because it would lower their 
costs. Given the activity involved cost management, accountants would have interacted 
with other stakeholders in this tax evasion. The same finding applies to the six other 
unlawful activities. While the level of involvement of accountants in these activities 
varied, accountants interacted with other stakeholders, particularly owners/managers 
when these unlawful activities were taking place.  
5.2.2.7 Regulators Network Density 
The main regulator of the construction industry was the Australian Federal Government. 
The government had several regulating agencies that interacted with the construction 
industry. The government’s main agency involved in taxation was the ATO. The ATO 
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was responsible for ensuring tax compliance in the construction industry. In a joint 
submission to the RC, the Australian Industry Group (AIG) and the Australian 
Constructors Association (ACA) suggested that “the Commission utilise the ATO 
submission to the Commission in order to inform itself on tax evasion issues” (Cole 
2003, vol. 9, p. 55). This statement shows that peak industry bodies trusted the ATO to 
know the nature and extent of tax evasion in the industry. The AIG and the ACA 
continued by stating that “the views expressed to the Commission by the ATO are to be 
preferred to views expressed by industry participants, some of whom make assumptions 
about tax evasion or avoidance from the perspective of a preference for particular 
industry working arrangements” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 55). This thinly veiled reference 
to union officials defends the industry bodies’ members from attack by arguing that 
Commissioner Cole should trust the ATO rather than the unions because the latter was 
trying to use tax evasion to coerce employers for other purposes, such as working 
arrangements.  
However, Commissioner Cole felt that the ATO was not an “industry regulator” (Cole 
2003, vol. 8, p. 139). Rather, the ATO’s responsibility is to ensure compliance with 
taxation laws (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 139). Its role is to ensure those who “evade payment 
of taxes are prosecuted, and deterred from further evasion and to minimise the loss of 
revenue” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 139). The ATO provided support for Commissioner 
Cole’s argument by noting that “on any reasonable resourcing level the ATO is unable 
to monitor individual compliance of all taxpayers across their range of obligations” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 81). The ATO therefore “utilises risk assessment and management 
approaches in order to direct its resources to areas of greatest risk, both within the 
building and construction industry and as between that industry and the remainder of the 
community” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 81). The ATO “tailors responses to different 
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taxpayer groups based upon their level of compliance risk and their history” (Cole 2003, 
vol. 9, p. 81). In these statements, the ATO is stating that it is not resourced to be a 
community watchdog and, therefore, its role is not to regulate industry behaviour. It 
prioritises its investigative activities by focusing on industry sectors representing the 
highest risk of tax evasion. This point is further illustrated by the fact that “of the top 
200 large ATO clients under regular review, 17 were from the construction industry” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 62). This represents 8.5%. While this is a significant figure, it 
shows that the ATO had more to focus on than the construction industry alone.  
While Commissioner Cole was careful to state that the ATO was not an industry 
regulator, it is included in this section on regulators because its role was to ensure 
compliance with tax payments.  In its submission to the RC, the ATO “noted its long 
history of involvement with the construction industry and that it had maintained a 
particular focus in relation to income tax issues, including withholding tax obligations 
and that, since the year 2000, has been addressing Goods and Services Tax (GST) 
issues” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 55). The ATO has identified significant areas of tax 
evasion and stated that “the industry warrants close attention due both to its size 
(approximately 6% of GDP, 13% of active Australian Business Numbers (ABN’s) and 
evidence of practices that indicate a high risk of non-compliance with taxation 
obligations” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 55). While concluding, that “estimating the revenue 
leakage for the construction industry was problematic and had not proved meaningful, it 
noted that high levels of cash are used in the industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 55). “It 
described the level of non-compliance as significant” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 55).   
The ATO explained that it was unable to act as an industry regulator because it could 
not “monitor the individual compliance of all taxpayers, and therefore uses risk 
management approaches to direct its finite resources to areas of greatest risk” (Cole 
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2003, vol. 9, p. 81). The way the ATO monitored risk areas explains their role in tax 
evasion in the construction industry. The ATO did this in three ways. (Cole 2003, vol. 
9, p. 81). First, the ATO relies on community information in the form of “tip-offs”. “For 
the nine months to 31 March 2002, the construction industry accounted for 906 (6 per 
cent) of 14 996 of the tip-offs received by the ATO, making it the third largest reported 
industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 81). While these figures indicate a significant proportion 
of tip off activity is related to the construction industry, it is surprising that there was 
not more, particularly given the unions’ history of threatening employers with 
disclosure.  
The ATO “undertakes routine analysis of tax lodgements and the levels of tax paid and 
other relevant data such as information from the AUSTRAC database” (Cole 2003, vol. 
9, p. 81). The ATO “engages in specific scoping verification and enforcement 
activities” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 81). For example, in its submission to the RC, the ATO 
reported that in “November 1999 the ATO undertook an analysis of AUSTRAC data 
concerning reportable cash transactions, sorted by location and industry for the 
preceding four years; and found large amounts of cash in formworking ($99.8 million), 
concreting ($62.3 million), scaffolding ($49.8 million), excavation ($34.4 million) and 
steelfixing ($13.9 million)” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 81). Commissioner Cole stated that 
this “suggested to the ATO that the payment of cash was a common practice throughout 
these sub-industries” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 81).   
The ATO tried to explain the tax evasion in the construction industry by pointing out 
the highly competitive nature of the industry and stated: “On average, 19.7% of 
businesses in this industry are in debt to the Tax Office – the average for all business 
clients is 7.9% and 20% of current insolvency/bankruptcy cases are from the industry” 
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(Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 55-56). “Non-payment of tax debts is seen by some in the industry 
as a means of remaining competitive” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, pp. 56). 
In its submission to the RC, the ATO highlighted that considerable revenue has been 
recovered from the construction industry through the ATO’s compliance activity and 
provided these examples: 
• Formworkers/Steelfixers 1998 – current $20.6 million 
• Scaffolders 1998 – current $8.0 million 
• Bogus labour hire February 2000 – current $126.1 million 
• Phoenix Companies 1998 – current $200.0 million 
• GST April 2001-April 2002 $24.3 million (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 56). 
This information supported the claim by industry groups, the AIG and the ACA, that the 
ATO could provide helpful information on the nature and extent of tax evasion in the 
construction industry. The ATO provided evidence to the RC on the types of 
construction companies most involved in tax evasion. The ATO “placed particular 
emphasis on the commercial trade services sector” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 55). However, 
the ATO admitted that it had insufficient resources to adequately police the construction 
industry and could only undertake random audits.  
In his recommendations, Commissioner Cole concluded that the ATO is well aware of 
the problem of tax evasion in the construction industry, had implemented risk 
management strategies, and was trying to drive cultural change (for example, through 
educational programs). In other words, he was happy with the performance of the ATO 
and felt it was doing all it could to eliminate tax evasion in the construction industry. 
His only way forward was to recommend that the Commonwealth should consider 
increasing the ATO resources for compliance activity in the building and construction 
industry (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 89).  
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Security of payments was another of the seven unlawful activities identified by the RC 
which concerned regulators. Commissioner Cole was critical of all governments for 
failing to “monitor, review and improve their approach to prequalification with a view 
to improving security of payments within the building and construction industry” (Cole  
2003, vol. 1, p. 113). Government is a major customer for the construction industry. It 
could set an industry standard by policing prequalification to ensure that companies it 
awards contracts to are able to demonstrate financial viability. Commissioner Cole 
recommended “the Commonwealth require, as a condition of the provision of 
Commonwealth funding to State or Territory projects, that tenderers be required to 
promote good payment practices to subcontractors on those projects” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, 
p. 114).  
There were some positive attempts by regulators to police security of payments. In 
Queensland, the Queensland Building Services Authority Act 1991 was amended in 
1999 “to improve security of payments to contractors and to ensure that licensees 
associated with failed business operations could not regain a licence by simply re-
inventing themselves” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 158). This type of legislation is necessary 
because it “provides the power to exclude any individuals or companies from holding a 
licence for a period of five years upon certain events occurring” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 
158).  
In NSW, the Code of Practice for the Construction Industry (CPCI) established 
principles and standards of behaviour which must be observed by companies “wishing 
to do business with the Government or working on projects to which the Codes apply, 
including those with private sector funding” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 189). Subsection 4.2 
of the CPCI “relates to security of payments and states that the highest ethical practices 
must occur throughout the contract chain, including between contractor and 
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subcontractor and between the subcontractor and his or her employees, to ensure that all 
parties receive payments due to them” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 189).  
In a case study called the Cairns Central project, several of the subcontractors, who 
worked on the Cairns Central project and experienced difficulties, expressed the view 
that “if the option of an independent arbitrator had been available at an earlier stage the 
problems could have been quickly resolved” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 234). The experience 
of these subcontractors bears out those comments. “Because it was too slow and too 
expensive to litigate, subcontractors in effect had no option but to accept whatever was 
offered to them by a head contractor, whether or not the offer fairly valued the work that 
had been done” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 234). 
Commissioner Cole recommended a number of reforms to the regulation of security of 
payments aiming to address the problems outlined in this section. The reforms are listed 
to illustrate the nature of changes to security of payments requested by Commissioner 
Cole. This list will be used later to explore the role of accountants in terms of this 
changed behaviour.  The reform proposals fell into two groups. These are as follows: 
The first group targets the financial performance of businesses in the industry, in 
order to reduce the risk of financial problems that lead to the failure to pay 
subcontractors. These strategies include: 
• utilising prequalification guidelines for government procurement processes to 
give greater scrutiny to financial viability of the contractor 
• enhancing licensing conditions to give greater scrutiny to the financial viability 
of the builder (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 245). 
The second group of proposals covers schemes to improve the mechanisms that 
assist subcontractors in recovering payments that are owed to them, or to provide 
some protection against the insolvency of parties higher up the contractual chain. 
Such mechanisms include: 
• codes of practice that specify the industry standards for payments to 
subcontractors; 
• trust funds; 
• compulsory insurance schemes; 
• improved training and information on subcontractors’ rights and responsibilities; 
• requiring certain contract clauses and prohibiting other contract clauses;  
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• arrangements to facilitate rapid adjudication of disputes (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 
245). 
Regulators had introduced a scheme specifically designed to address the problem of 
underpayment of employee entitlements before the RC.  In 2000, the Employee 
Entitlements Support Scheme (EESS) was introduced. It was a scheme funded by the 
Federal Government to cover basic payments of employee entitlements. It provided 
“capped payments that guaranteed employees  up to 29 weeks of pay (at ordinary time 
rates); up to 4 weeks unpaid wages; 4 weeks annual leave  (accrued in the last year); 5 
weeks pay in lieu of notice; 4 weeks redundancy payment; and 12 weeks long service 
leave, if any of these were eligible to employees” (Symes 2003, p. 134). The scheme 
applied to employees who were “terminated on or after 1 January 2000 as a result of 
their employer's insolvency” (Symes 2003, p. 134). A revised scheme, called the 
General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme (GEERS), was introduced on 
12th September 2001 (Symes 2003). The GEERS “paid all unpaid wages, all accrued 
annual leave, all accrued long service leave, all accrued pay in lieu of notice and up to 8 
weeks redundancy entitlements” (Symes 2003, p. 134). The amounts payable under the 
GEERS increased over the following decade through “annual indexation of the statutory 
cap and a number of revisions to the Operational Arrangements which govern the terms 
of the scheme” (Anderson 2014, p. 128). The most recent revision, which “took effect 
on 1 January 2011, reflected the Federal Labor Government’s Fair Entitlements 
Guarantee, an election promise made in 2010 by the Gillard Federal Government as part 
of its Protecting Workers’ Entitlements package” (Anderson 2014, p. 128). The 
statutory cap of “16 weeks’ redundancy pay for all workers was replaced by a cap of 
four weeks’ redundancy pay for each completed year of service” (Anderson 2014, p. 
128).  
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These schemes are particularly interesting because they were introduced prior to the 
conclusion of the RC and yet Commissioner Cole still found widespread underpayment 
of employee entitlements. This suggests these prior schemes were ineffective. On 
reflection, schemes such as GEERS probably provided a further incentive for 
unscrupulous company directors to seek insolvency and avoid paying employee 
entitlements because they may have felt the Government would cover their debt and be 
less likely to pursue them to pay their employees’ their employee entitlements. There is 
evidence prior to the RC, that companies had tried to avoid paying employee 
entitlements and had been successfully prosecuted by regulators, but employees were 
not always able to recover full compensation. In December 1997, “the Grafton 
Meatworks closed, and its holding company R J Gilbertson’s Pty Ltd, which owned 
land and buildings, denied liability for the AU$3 million in accrued entitlements for 245 
employees because they were employed by two asset-less labour supply companies in 
the group” (Anderson 2014, p. 127). An Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) investigation of the closure found a “deed of cross guarantee from 
the parent company that still applied, which meant the other companies in the 
Gilbertson group had to support the debts of the insolvent companies” (Anderson 2014, 
p. 127). Similarly, “Ghana-based Ashanti Goldfields covered for Cobar Mines Pty Ltd 
when it went into liquidation in January 1998, with 267 employees losing their jobs as 
well as accrued entitlements of AU$10.5 million” (Anderson 2014, p. 127). The threat 
of action by ASIC led to Ashanti paying the employees the majority of their employee 
entitlements, 85 cents in the dollar (Anderson 2014, p. 127). 
The regulators of the construction industry felt that the underpayment of employee 
entitlements was unlawful. The RC found that “a culture of lawlessness pervades every 
level of the industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 211). Among the many manifestations of 
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unlawfulness was the action of companies that evade paying rightful employee 
entitlements (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 211). The focus of regulators was on the fairness of 
procedural justice, particularly over-entitlement that is, greed. In this case, the RC 
placed blame on employers for arguing that employees were seeking more than they 
were entitled too (being greedy), when they and their unions were only seeking what 
they were legally entitled to.  
The regulators tried to enforce appropriate employee entitlements within the 
construction industry by referring to the definition of “pattern bargaining” which 
appeared in the Workplace Relations Amendment Bill 2000 (C’wth) (Cole 2003, vol. 5, 
pp. 57-58). Pattern bargaining “means a course of conduct or bargaining, or the making 
of claims, involving seeking common wages and/or other common employee 
entitlements”, which extends beyond a single business, and “is contrary to the objective 
of encouraging agreements to be genuinely negotiated between parties at the workplace 
or enterprise level” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 57). This was a lawful method for enterprise 
bargaining which would encourage uniformity in employee entitlements across the 
construction industry, that is procedural justice, but still allow flexibility to negotiate 
above normal employee entitlements, that is legitimate performance or bonus.  
While the regulator found evidence that “underpayment or miscalculation of workers’ 
wages and entitlements” is a substantial problem in the construction industry, it did not 
feel that it could fix the problem (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 202). Indeed Commissioner Cole 
said “it is unrealistic to expect statutory authorities to intervene each and every time a 
dispute arises in relation to compliance with statutory or award obligations, or 
obligations under workplace agreements” (vol. 7, p. 202). This suggests that the 
regulators were limited in terms of the role they could play in introducing equitable and 
fair employee entitlements uniformly across the construction industry. While the 
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regulator could introduce legislative change, Commissioner Cole is here explaining that 
the problem needed to be fixed by others, primarily employers.  
Commissioner Cole was critical of the State and Territory governments for not being 
tough enough about payroll tax evasion. He encouraged “the States and Territories to 
adopt measures to prevent evasion of payroll tax obligations” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 16). 
He acknowledged that while these governments had the right to impose their own view 
on payroll tax, it was an issue of national importance. He argued that tax evasion was 
“an issue of importance” in the construction industry (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 106). 
Commissioner Cole highlighted that if regulators were unwilling to properly enforce 
lawful behaviour regarding taxes, including payroll tax, unscrupulous individuals will 
“often evade other revenue obligations, and the proper payment of employee 
entitlements and obtain a competitive advantage over businesses which comply with 
their obligations” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 106). In other words, by allowing these 
individuals the opportunity to engage in tax evasion, fraudulent activity becomes an 
industry norm, and it spreads into other areas, as has been highlighted in this chapter.  
Commissioner Cole placed responsibility with the Federal Government for taking a 
tougher stance on payroll tax evasion. He recommended that “the Commonwealth 
should take the lead in encouraging States and Territories to introduce measures which 
eliminate fraudulent conduct such as the evasion of revenue obligations in the industry” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 106). One way forward would be to encourage the “revenue 
authorities to share information relevant to the detection of payroll tax evasion in the 
construction industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 107). His recommendation was that 
amendments be made to legislation to enforce a consistent tougher approach across the 
States and Territories. An initiative was the harmonisation of the key definitions of the 
payroll tax system, “particularly the definition of wages, between the different 
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jurisdictions is an important object, particularly in the building and construction 
industry where many large contractors operate nationally” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 107). 
The Payroll Tax Authority (PTA) website includes information on the harmonization of 
payroll tax legislation across the states and territories, showing that this was one of 
Commissioner Cole’s successful recommendations.   
There was also an example in the RCR of Government endorsing payroll tax 
noncompliance, although probably not intentionally. The following extract illustrates 
how payroll tax exemptions were part of an incentive package offered by the 
Queensland Government: 
The Queensland Government had a program to attract jobs and development to 
regional areas like Townsville. The Townsville City Council was anxious to 
attract investment to the area. At a mining industry seminar held at some time 
before 1996, Mr Tony Mooney, the Mayor of the Townsville City Council: 
‘…made it plain to industry leaders, senior government representatives, 
financiers and anyone else who is interested that ‘the Townsville community not 
only welcomes secondary industry such as metals and mineral processing but we 
are prepared to roll out the red carpet via incentives, fast-tracking approvals and 
any other assistance required’ (Cole 2003, vol. 18, p. 247). 
Thus, the Queensland Government used payroll tax exemptions to encourage 
investment from overseas. However, it presents confusion and contradiction to local 
companies in terms of their payroll tax obligations.  
One of the main reasons phoenix company activity flourished in Australia was the 
incompetence of the regulatory system. There was a lack of accountability, lack of 
cooperation, and inadequate legislation. The RC found that there was a lack of 
accountability in terms of regulating phoenix companies. Commissioner Cole stated that 
“there appeared to be no clear guidelines at the Federal Government level as to which 
agencies were responsible for detecting and policing fraudulent phoenix company 
activity in the construction industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 108). With no-one watching 
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them, companies would be more tempted to engage in unlawful behaviour. 
Commissioner Cole recommended that two agencies in particular, ASIC and the ATO, 
“be given appropriate resources to combat fraudulent phoenix company activity” in the 
construction industry (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 108) 
Regulators acknowledged they needed to cooperate more if they wanted to address 
phoenix company activity. The RC recommended that ASIC and the ATO should 
cooperate more by “sharing information in order to eliminate or diminish phoenix 
company activity” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 16). Similarly, Commissioner Cole asked that 
revenue authorities, including payroll tax authorities, should cooperate by sharing 
information relevant to the detection of fraudulent phoenix company activity (Cole 2003 
vol. 1, p. 107). To implement this recommendation, the Federal Government must work 
with the State and Territory Governments to permit their revenue authorities to share 
information. On a similar theme, Commissioner Cole recommended that the ATO be 
provided with “increased funding to be utilised for compliance activities in the building 
and construction industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 122).  
Despite the efforts of the RC to highlight the negative effects of phoenix activity, little 
was done to implement the measures recommended. In 2009 (six years after the RC), 
the Federal Government Treasury released a proposals paper entitled ‘Action against 
fraudulent phoenix activity’ (Anderson 2012).
 
The paper canvassed options to address 
fraudulent phoenix activity, which it estimated to cost the ATO AU$600 million per 
year at the time (Anderson 2012, p. 415). 
Commissioner Cole also sought to address the purpose for establishing phoenix 
companies as a way to eliminate them. With avoiding payroll tax being one of the 
purposes, he argued that enforcing payroll legislation might deter phoenix activity. He 
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recommended that the Federal Government encourage the State and Territory 
Governments to adopt “s16LA of the Pay-Roll Tax Act 1971 (NSW) to address phoenix 
company activities in the construction industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 106). If 
uniformity across Australia could be achieved by adopting this legislation, then it would 
make owners fearful of the consequences of phoenix company activity. These 
provisions in this Act “make all members of a group jointly liable for the payroll tax 
debts of other group members” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 106). This would make it more 
difficult to use phoenix companies to avoid tax. On a similar point, the lack of penalties 
failed to deter fraudulent activity. The RC found that “low levels of penalties have been 
imposed by the courts where persons have been convicted in relation to phoenix 
company activity in the construction industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 110). 
Commissioner Cole recommended that there needs to be “an increase in the maximum 
penalties provided in the Corporations Act 2001 (C’wth) for offences that may be 
associated with fraudulent phoenix company activity” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 110). This 
would act as more of a deterrent for fraudulent activity.  
Commissioner Cole also tried to address some of the opportunities for unlawful 
behaviour. For example, he tried to address the problem of allowing unscrupulous 
directors to voluntarily declare insolvency, by asking the Federal Government and the 
ATO to consider amending s222AOB of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (C’wth) 
(ITA Act 1936) “to remove the right of a director of a phoenix company involved in 
fraudulent activity to avoid the consequences of a Director’s Penalty Notice by placing 
the company into voluntary administration or into liquidation” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 
124). This sought tougher legislation to switch phoenix activity towards voluntary 
administration and trying to save the company, rather than unlawful behaviour.  
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While some of Commissioner Cole’s recommendations regarding phoenix activity were 
not adopted (see above), there was some success in terms of regulators taking a tougher 
stance. While actual data about phoenix activity and subsequent ASIC actions against 
directors are not publicly available, ASIC itself seems to know which prosecutions are 
related to phoenix activity. For example, in 2007, the ASIC Chairman Jeffrey Lucy 
issued a press release declaring that ASIC had “banned 40 directors for a total of 144 
years who have engaged in misconduct following company failures and repeat phoenix 
activity” (Anderson & Haller 2014, p. 490). This statement provides evidence of 
increased penalties to deter phoenix activity.  
The federal government also tried to respond to Commissioner Cole’s criticism of 
toothless legislation with two exposure drafts of legislation, the Corporations 
Amendment (Phoenixing and Other Measures Bill) 2012, passed into legislation in May 
2012 and the Corporations Amendment (Similar Names) Bill 2012 remained an 
exposure draft (Anderson & Haller 2014, p. 474). The legislation recognised that 
phoenix activity affects more than taxation authorities; such as employees, as well as 
other stakeholders. In introducing the legislation, the government made the following 
claims:  
These amendments will crack down on ‘phoenixing’, where directors try and 
avoid having to pay workers’ entitlements and other unsecured creditors by 
restarting their failed business using a similar company name, sometimes located 
in the same premises with the same staff and clients.  
Under these proposals, directors of a failed company can be held liable for the 
debts of a company that has a similar name to a pre-liquidation name of the 
failed company —otherwise known as a phoenix company.  
This will stop directors from exploiting the limited liability protections in the 
corporations law to avoid having to pay any debts, including workers' 
entitlements, that they incur in a ‘phoenix’ company.  
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This will ensure that directors cannot keep racking up debts through multiple 
‘phoenix’ companies and escape their obligations to pay workers’ entitlements 
and other creditors (Anderson 2012, p. 423).
 
 
Anderson (2012, p. 423) argued that “these were very ambitious claims, and seemed to 
promise that the government had finally heeded the repeated calls for legislation to 
tackle phoenix activity”. However, Anderson was quite cynical about whether these 
claims would actually be met and whether the legislation would be enforceable and 
indeed eliminate phoenix activity. She concluded that in “reality the proposed 
legislation does little to help those adversely affected by fraudulent phoenix activity and 
even less to deter company controllers from this harmful behaviour” (Anderson 2012, p. 
413). Further support for criticism of the regulator’s inability to address Phoenix 
activity was provided in 2012 in response to a consultant’s report on phoenixing in 
Australia (see Owen 2012 above). Fair Work Australia indicated they would establish 
relationships with other regulators, including the ASIC and the ATO, to work 
collaboratively in this area (Owen 2012). The Federal Government responded with a 
statement that it had introduced stronger legislation, with the Corporations Amendment 
(Phoenixing and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Phoenixing Act 2012), which came into 
effect on July 1 2012, to empower the corporate regulator, ASIC, to order the winding 
up of companies that directors abandon in the context of fraudulent phoenix activity 
(Owen 2012). Almost ten years after the RC made recommendations calling for 
cooperation between regulators and stronger legislation, these measures were beginning 
to be implemented. However, Anderson (2012) argued from a legal perspective that 
these measures were difficult to enforce; inferring that phoenix activity would continue.  
Commissioner Cole recommended changes to the legislation to address payment delays 
in employee entitlements due to EBA’s. He recommended that The Building and 
Construction Industry Improvement Act: 
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a. provide that the objective of enterprise negotiations should be to reach a new 
agreement prior to the nominal expiry date of any existing agreement; and 
b. provide that any obligation imposed on an employer under an enterprise 
bargaining agreement to pay any wages, allowances, contributions or any other 
monetary benefits to or on behalf of employees cannot be made retrospective 
beyond the date of agreement unless the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission is satisfied that the employer has unreasonably delayed 
negotiations (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 64). 
There are two types of issues involving inappropriate payments in the construction 
industry: project payments and liquidation. In some countries and on some projects it is 
unlawful or not permitted for contractors to withhold payments to subcontractors 
because of delayed and incomplete payments from the owner. For example, the United 
States Department of Transportation has regulations requiring that general contractors 
pay their subcontractors after the completion of subcontracts, even if they have not 
received their own payment from the owner (Touran, Atgun & Bhurisith 2004). The 
security of payments legislation operating in the states of Australia also nullifies the 
effect of the “pay when paid” and “paid if paid” clauses in a contract, in order to protect 
subcontractors from the practice of owners and contractors arbitrarily delaying or 
denying payment (Uher & Brand 2008).  
5.2.2.8 Trade Unions Network Density 
The unions interacted regularly with staff, and with owners/managers, and also with 
regulators. This interaction was frequent and in high volumes, with many individuals in 
these other stakeholder groups. Therefore, unions had a high density within the 
construction industry’s social networks. However, this level of interaction was not a 
positive factor in the industry’s social networks. As outlined above, high density should 
generate more opportunity to build and maintain relationships, resulting in increased 
communication, trust, and social dependency. This was certainly not the case with the 
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unions and other stakeholders in the construction industry. While it may have occurred 
in interactions between unions and staff, who were union members, it was not so in 
interactions with other stakeholders. With these other stakeholders, the characteristics of 
low density emerged namely mistrust and conflict.  
In their interactions with other stakeholders, the unions played several roles. With staff, 
the unions were advocates. The unions were concerned that employers met their 
obligations towards employees, the unions’ members, in two ways. First, the unions 
wanted to ensure that employers paid employees what they were legally entitled to 
while working for the firm, in both salary and non-salary terms. For example, workers 
should have the firm contribution towards superannuation automatically deposited into 
their super fund at each pay. Second, the unions wanted to ensure that workers’ were 
paid what they were owed if the firm went out of business. For example, if a firm 
becomes insolvent and closes its doors, its employees would often not receive payment 
for outstanding leave. The unions negotiated with owners or investors and managers to 
ensure that workers’ rights were protected against these issues.  
The unions’ focus was on entitlement as a right. The unions tried to ensure their 
members, that is construction industry employees, were treated equitably. They felt that 
equitable employee entitlements, was their workers’ right. In other words, the unions 
wanted distributive justice in terms of employee entitlements. The RC found that the 
unions “desired uniformity of outcomes for members as a basic tenet of collectivism. It 
also reinforced the unions’ bargaining power and their ability to dictate outcomes on 
building sites” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 208). Some regulators offered support to the 
unions in advocating procedural justice for employees in terms of their employee 
entitlements. “The Western Australian Department of Consumer and Employment 
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Protection submitted to the Royal Commission that unions in the building industry had a 
legitimate role to play in enforcing employee entitlements” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 25).  
With regulators, the unions were whistle-blowers. The three main areas focused on by 
unions were tax evasion, phoenix company activity, and security of payments. The 
unions used the first activity, tax evasion, to threaten owners/managers in negotiations 
for better conditions for their members. The unions used the two latter activities, 
phoenixing and security of payments, to protect members from not being paid their 
entitlements.  
The unions played a positive role in surfacing the problem of tax evasion. In 
submissions to the RC there are numerous examples of unions providing evidence of tax 
evasion. In Queensland, Mr Wallace Trohear, State Secretary of the Construction, 
Forestry, Mining & Energy, Industrial Union of Employees, Queensland and Branch 
Secretary of the Construction and General Division of the CFMEU estimated that “up to 
65 per cent of the building and construction industry was on sham subcontracting 
arrangements and is only paying tax on the amount received as award or Enterprise 
Bargaining Agreement (EBA) rates” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 53). 
The unions would have been aware of phoenix activity, as it would have affected their 
members, particularly in the case of insolvency where people may have lost their jobs. 
Commissioner Cole felt that the unions might be used as a “whistle-blower” in the sense 
of making the regulators aware of unlawful behaviour. However, there was no process 
for community consultation undertaken by the ATO (ATO) (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 125). 
The history of trade unionism in Australia was to battle against the government. 
Regulators were often seen as the enemy rather than an ally.  It is hard to imagine that 
the unions would have been keen to help the ATO. However, Commissioner Cole 
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recommended establishing a BCIF “to examine taxation issues of significance to the 
construction industry including phoenix company activity, and to develop workable 
solutions to the issues and problems identified” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 125). The forum 
was intended to include representatives of all major industry participants including 
unions and employer organisations (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 125). 
The unions were concerned about security of payments because it affected the 
livelihood of their members. The CFMEU told the RC that: 
Principal contractors frequently fail to make payments due under contracts at the 
time which they are due. Sometimes there are legitimate disputes as to the 
proper performance of contracts by the sub-contractor; in other cases the 
principal simply withholds payment for spurious reasons, knowing that the 
subbie does not have the means to pursue legal remedies or that the time and 
cost of litigation is not justified by the amount owed. The situation is further 
complicated by the use of verbal agreements, particularly in relation to 
variations. This is one of the major reasons for the high level of insolvencies in 
the building and construction industry (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 235). 
The issues raised in this case, that is, withholding payment for illegal reasons, exerting 
influence over weaker stakeholders, and lack of regulation and corporate governance, 
are important themes explaining social behaviour within the construction industry, and 
are examined further in the next section.  
With owners/managers, the unions were adversaries. The main adversary role was in 
negotiating employee entitlements. The unions’ focus on procedural justice was to 
engage with employers when employee entitlements expectations were not met. The RC 
found in Victoria that union officials of the CFMEU followed their own agreements, 
namely the Victorian Building Industry Agreement and the National Building and 
Construction Industry Award 2000 (NBCIA), rather than the regulators’ Workplace 
Relations Act 1996 (C’wth) (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 177). As a result, the unions adopted 
an aggressive stance with employers and represented the biggest fallout from procedural 
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injustice regarding employee entitlements. The RC investigations into employee 
entitlements found that employers were “routinely insulted, abused, harassed and 
intimidated, often for the purpose of pressing employers to make corrective payments to 
employees, and with the premature assertion that the employer’s records were not in 
order” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 177). Commissioner Cole here is suggesting that the unions 
tended to skip over the processes of procedural justice and jumped straight to the fallout 
step, assuming, perhaps incorrectly, that all employers were underpaying employee 
entitlements. This adversarial approach, outside the regulatory framework, meant that 
the end process of employee entitlements, managing fallout, was not begun in good 
faith by both parties.  
Further evidence that the unions approached this issue as an aggressor was provided by 
an industry group, the Housing Industry Association Limited (HIA), which claimed the 
unions sought to recover superannuation or redundancy contributions by often acting 
outside the legal system (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 33). The HIA claimed that the “unions 
commonly use industrial pressure to enforce payment of what they regard as workers’ 
entitlements”; including over-award “entitlements” which the employer has in point of 
fact never agreed to pay (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 33). This is an example of the unions 
claiming overentitlement, which employers would claim was procedural injustice, 
particularly because the industrial pressure was not really about the protection of the 
unions member “legal rights but rather part of the bargaining process between 
employers and employees” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 33). The unions were using the 
pretence of unpaid employee entitlements to leverage better working conditions for their 
members.  
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5.2.2.9 Competitors Network Density  
Within the context of the analysis presented in this chapter, competitors are other 
construction companies. The analysis of owners/managers outlined above, therefore, 
applies to competitors. The best way to understand the peculiar nature of the interaction 
between competitors in the construction industry is to consider the complex contracting 
system, consisting of head contractors, contractors, and sub-contractors, who despite 
being competitors, often worked together on projects. The behaviours found by the RC 
were so widespread they were often described as industry culture. An example of the 
impact of this finding is provided by phoenix company activity. Commissioner Cole 
noted that phoenix behaviour even affects competitors. “Companies that fail to pay 
taxes, superannuation contributions and employee entitlements can undercut prices in 
tenders made by law-abiding companies, which may be induced to act in a similar 
manner if phoenix activity is not detected and prosecuted” (Anderson 2012, p.  413). 
This indicates that the role of competitors was imitators.  
5.2.2.10 Customers Network Density 
Customers interacted regularly with owners/managers, and also project managers. This 
interaction was frequent and in high volumes with many individuals in these other 
stakeholder groups. Therefore, customers had a high density within the construction 
industry’s social networks. However, this level of interaction was not a positive factor 
in the industry’s social networks. As outlined above, high density should generate more 
opportunity to build and maintain relationships, resulting in increased communication, 
trust, and social dependency. In many ways, this was the case in relationships between 
customers and construction companies. Strong relationships would certainly have 
helped companies get work. However, there was also a dark side to the interaction with 
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customers, which exhibited the characteristics of low density, that is, mistrust and 
conflict.  
In their interactions with construction companies, the role of customers was bargain 
hunter. An example of this was the way that construction companies “bought work”. 
The RC reported that representatives of governments and other industry clients said that 
major contractors may sometimes “buy” work (Cole 2003, vol. 6, p. 40). Governments 
and clients will accept a tender price which is seen to be very low, if that tenderer is 
known to understand the scope of the project and to be otherwise considered “reliable” 
by the client (Cole 2003, vol. 6, p. 40). As a result, “for a head contractor to ensure 
profit at the end of a project, considerable pressure is often applied by the head 
contractor with the aim of reducing the costings provided by tendering subcontractors” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 6, p. 40); and “this same process is then replicated down the chain of 
sub-subcontractors” (Cole 2003, vol. 6, p. 40). This flow-on affect illustrates how cut 
throat the construction industry is. Large companies tender for projects at prices so low 
that profit is very difficult with the sole objective of ensuring cash flow and 
employment for staff. To make a profit, they exert their power over sub-contractors, 
who depend upon the large contractors for their own survival, who then must also lower 
their prices to win the work.  
Subcontractors told Commissioner Cole that “bid shopping is commonplace, and creates 
enormous problems and, given that tenders are usually prepared on the basis of slim 
profit margins, requires subcontractors to, in turn, put pressure on the tender prices they 
seek from sub-subcontractors” (Cole 2003, vol. 6, p. 41). It leads contractors to “take 
short-cuts in order that they are able to retain a profit at the end of the work” (Cole 
2003, vol. 6, p. 41). The use of this word “short-cuts” is particularly interesting. While 
reducing the quality of work (for example, through time spent) or quality of materials 
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are obvious short-cuts, it is also very possible that this was not properly reported in 
profit and loss statements. These short cuts were a “practice which is commenced at the 
top level and, by necessity, pushed down through each of the levels in the chain of 
contracting” and Commissioner Cole found that it “goes all the way down the chain”, 
because “to survive, a subbie has to do it to the next person below them in the chain” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 6, p. 41).  
Subcontractors face pressure to underbid competitors when quoting for jobs. This can 
result in a subcontractor quoting a price lower than cost, making it impossible for the 
subcontractor to make a profit. “Cash flow problems can lead to the subcontractor 
avoiding paying group tax, payroll tax, and workers compensation premiums so that 
they can pay their employees” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 133). Subcontractors can delay 
making payments as they are only required to remit tax payments periodically. The 
subcontractors “can pay some wages in cash to its employees, as did a number of 
formworking company operators in Sydney, who were audited by the ATO in early 
1999” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 133). 
5.2.2.11 Industry Associations Network Density 
Industry associations or employer groups interacted regularly with owners/managers, 
and less regularly with regulators. Their role was as an advocate for construction 
companies, in the same way that unions were advocates for staff. Industry associations 
were typically defensive about allegations of unlawful behaviour, such as tax evasion, 
by their members. Mr Wilhelm Harnisch, Chief Executive Officer of Master Builders 
Australia Inc (MBA Inc) stated that: “Any allegation that there is widespread practice of 
avoidance needs to be properly tested. MBA Inc is not aware of any endemic problem 
of avoidance in the building and construction industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 55). The 
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Housing Industry Association (HIA) submitted that: “As evidence to date before the 
Commission has demonstrated, evasion of tax is undoubtedly attempted by some 
employers, some employees and some contractors, and there is no reason and no 
evidence to suggest that one group is in general worse or better than any other” (Cole 
2003, vol 9, p. 55). The HIA are admitting here that tax evasion occurs but aimed to 
deflect blame or further enquiry by saying it would be difficult to identify who engages 
in the unlawful behaviour, one group or the other. However, other industry groups could 
identify industry sectors for investigation. The Civil Contractors Federation (CCF) 
stated that “the extent of income tax evasion in the industry is unknown in our opinion” 
(Cole 2003 vol. 9, p. 55). However, the CCF was in agreement with the unions that 
there has been misuse of Australian Business Numbers (ABN’s) and that cash was still 
an issue in the industry, although likely to be more so at the “smaller end of the market” 
(Cole 2003,  vol. 9, p. 55). By the smaller end, they meant small subcontractors rather 
than larger companies.  
5.2.2.12 Suppliers Network Density 
Suppliers are organisations who provide services related to employee entitlements such 
as superannuation funds. One of the larger funds is Cbus. In their submission to the RC, 
Cbus stated that “ultimate compliance levels for Cbus employers was close to 90 per 
cent, although it was noted that this cannot be said to be indicative of the industry as a 
whole” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 29). “About 28 per cent of the building and construction 
industry workforce had their superannuation entitlements paid into Cbus” (Cole 2003, 
vol. 9, p. 30). This finding indicates that there was a high proportion of superannuation 
paid for about a third of the industry’s employees; although 100% compliance would be 
better than 90%.  
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There was also positive news in terms of how employers responded to non-compliance 
of employee entitlements. In the case of Cbus, if superannuation payments fall into 
arrears, that is, are not paid on time, then arrears letters are sent. Cbus’s credit control 
manager takes action to obtain the missing payments, presumably by contacting the 
accounting staff at the construction company. In their submission to the RC, Cbus 
explained that arrears letters are sent to construction industry employers on average in 
10% of cases, which is significantly less when compared to other industries (up to 40%) 
(Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 30). Cbus offers further positive feedback: 
Our company has been able to recover a significant portion of that 10 per cent. 
So our actual default rate, I believe, is very low for any fund, let alone a fund 
that is operating in an industry that presents a number of challenges to try to 
recover employees’ entitlements, where there are a very small number of 
employees, where they are not using, in most cases, electronic facilities, and 
where there is a very high level of mobility (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 30). 
This suggests that suppliers of financial services associated with employee entitlements 
in the construction industry may have been fairly satisfied in their dealings with the 
industry. Further, that employers tended to try to comply and to do the right thing by 
their employees in terms of employee entitlements.  
5.2.2.13 Summary of Social Network Interaction 
In conclusion, the following figure summarises the types of interactions between the 
construction industry stakeholders.  
CHAPTER 5: ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE - RELATIONSHIPS 276 
 
Figure 5 - 5.1: Stakeholder Interaction 
The text boxes underneath each connecting line describe the role of each stakeholder in 
this interaction. The figure shows that the construction industry’s social networks were 
dominated by interaction between a few stakeholders, such as owners/managers, trade 
unions, and regulators, who had high density within these networks. However, in the 
next section it can be seen that high network density is not always a positive factor.  
5.2.3 Social Behaviour 
5.2.3.1 Introduction 
This section examines the social behaviour of the construction industry using the 
stakeholder ethical perspective. If relationships were characterized by cohesion and 
harmony within the social network, generated by equality, democracy and participation 
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amongst all stakeholders, then the construction industry would be considered to have 
ethical social behaviour. However, if relationships were characterized by fragmentation 
and discord, generated by inequality, repression, and exclusion, then the industry would 
demonstrate unethical social behaviour. This unethical behaviour will be explained by 
ST’s managerial perspective.  
SNA’s heterogeneity and homogenity constructs will be used to examine behaviour 
between these stakeholder groups, with a particular focus on their harmony and 
cohesion. This is to examine stakeholder behaviours when they interacted in terms of 
their heterogeneity and homogeneity. The aim is to further explore the harmony and 
cohesion of social relationships within the construction industry. Harmony would 
indicate tolerance and respect between stakeholder groups. Cohesion would indicate 
efficient teamwork. The analysis will identify the overall network behaviour. It will also 
highlight differences in behaviour between stakeholders, that is, which groups seek 
harmony and cohesion and which do not. This analysis is looking for common themes 
in terms of homogeneity in actor attitudes, beliefs and practices. If inclusive 
(heterogeneous), the social network welcomes different types of members and is 
tolerant of different views, if exclusive (homogenous), it allows membership only to 
people who are similar (Stone 2001). Heterogeneity is a positive factor in social 
networks because it identifies the subjective nature of diversity in opinions. The more 
heterogeneity, the more tolerance and respect for different stakeholders. This results in 
ethical behaviour in terms of harmony. This analysis is looking for common themes in 
terms of constraints, which explores the extent to which a network membership is 
democratic; if democratic, decisions will be taken horizontally; if non-democratic, 
decisions will be taken vertically (Anklam 2005). Democracy is a positive factor in 
social networks because it helps in controlling the activities. The more shared control 
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within the network, the more efficient the group is because it allows divergent thought, 
creativity, and innovation; which ultimately results in ethical behaviour in terms of 
cohesion. 
5.2.3.2 Overall Social Network Harmony 
In general, there is a strong homogeneity in terms of stakeholder attitudes, beliefs and 
practices within the construction industry’s social networks. . This meant that the social 
networks allowed membership only to people who were similar. This created 
disharmony because the social networks excluded people who did not accept and follow 
the norms of behaviour, which in turn caused conflict between stakeholders.  
Evidence for the heterogeneity of the social networks is found in the construction 
industry’s unlawful behaviour. There was a culture of unlawful behaviour within the 
industry that made certain activities part of normal social behaviour. Stakeholders were 
encouraged to cooperate and participate in this unlawful activity. Harmony was 
maintained while stakeholders agreed to the unlawful activity. However, conflict 
emerged when stakeholders refused to participate. 
The first cultural behaviour found in stakeholders’ unlawful activities was “an attitude 
of resigned acceptance” amongst contractors (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 28). There was a 
widespread perception amongst industry stakeholders that inappropriate behaviours had 
existed for many years and that these would not change. There was a common “feeling 
that the industry, as it presently exists, has not changed in any material respects for a 
long period, and that there is effectively nothing which they (contractors) can do to 
improve the industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 28). Commissioner Cole found that 
contractors, as business people, were pragmatists in that “they will conduct business in 
the existing conditions in whatever way they can, which is most profitable for their 
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enterprise” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 28). However, they were also accepting of the power 
exerted by unions over the industry.  
Industry structure was used as an excuse for inappropriate behaviour in the construction 
industry. Commissioner Cole argued that contractors felt powerless to respond. In other 
words, to act appropriately, rather than, inappropriately. While they were “frustrated” 
by the power of the unions and that the unions had essentially “usurped aspects of 
control of their businesses”, contractors know that there was no “unified approach by 
business, whether head contractors or subcontractors, towards resisting demands by the 
unions” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 28). This meant that contractors knew they stood alone 
against the unions and they could not exert any power as individual companies against 
the unions.  
The RC also found that contractors feared “being singled out by unions because of the 
great loss which can occur to an individual contractor, and thus accede to industrywide 
arrangements” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 28). They preferred to “accept restrictive practices 
affecting the flexibility and productivity of their businesses than to seek to improve 
productivity by arrangements which would attract the ire of unions” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, 
p. 28). This suggests that inappropriate behaviours affecting profit and loss disclosure 
would have been tolerated by employers who felt they had no choice. However, they 
would have been also unwilling to record this inappropriate behaviour in financial 
statements, which suggests that some form of manipulation occurred in profit reporting. 
The strong homogeneity within the construction industry’s social networks created an 
industry culture which tolerated unlawful activity. The second cultural behaviour found 
in stakeholders’ unlawful activities was the widespread use of cash payments. This was 
done to help individuals and companies avoid paying tax. In the construction industry, if 
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an individual is paid cash in return for goods or services there is the possibility that they 
will not disclose this payment to the taxation authorities and, therefore, avoid paying 
income tax. This practice was commonplace in the construction industry.  
The following example from Tasmania illustrates how employers and  head contractors, 
could “pretend” employees were contractors to help them both avoid tax.  
Atkins gave the example of a foreman, for example, engaged by a small 
commercial builder, who he said as a matter of law was clearly an employee, but 
who was paid an hourly rate of $25 as a subcontractor. Atkins said the correct 
hourly rate under the relevant award for such a person was $25.72 an hour. He 
said that, in addition, the employer was evading its obligations as to 
superannuation, redundancy, long service leave, holiday leave, sick leave and 
public holidays. The employer was also saving on the cost of workers’ 
compensation insurance, public liability insurance, payroll tax and 
administrative overheads. He said the advantage to the foreman of being treated 
as a subcontractor was an increase in the gross amount received each week, the 
opportunity to split income with his partner, and the greater availability of tax 
deductions relating to depreciation and office expenses (Cole 2003, vol. 12, pp. 
445-446). 
In its submission to the RC, the ATO explained the extent and nature of cash payment 
activity in the construction industry; primarily as tax evasion. ATO audit activity 
between 1990 and 1995 “regularly identified undeclared cash payments to contractors, 
payments of cash to employees claiming social security benefits and undeclared cash 
payments for weekend work by employees legitimately employed on weekdays” (Cole 
2003, vol. 9, p. 56). Starting in 1996, “the ATO conducted an Olympics project which 
examined activities on all Olympic related construction sites which uncovered 
undeclared cash payments, particularly to formworkers and steelfixers working on 
Olympic projects”. (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 56). Between 1997 and 1999 the ATO 
investigated “cash in hand” payments in labour intensive sub-industries and “undertook 
audit activity in the formworking and steelfixing sub-industries to identify cases 
involving untaxed cash payments to workers” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 56). “Audits 
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completed on 13 formworkers and steelworkers identified untaxed cash payments in 11 
of the cases” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 56). This suggests a very high proportion of 
companies involved in tax evasion (85% in this example). “The cash payments were for 
overtime, RDO’s (rostered days off) and bonuses” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 57). “In two 
cases, records were falsified by attempting to pass off cash payments as purchase of 
materials” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 57).  
The ATO’s Assistant Commissioner, Mr Ian Read, gave evidence to the RC that cash 
transaction analysis of banking industry data confirmed that “payment of cash is a 
common practice in the industry, particularly in the labour intensive sectors” (Cole 
2003, vol. 9, p. 57). Analysis by the ATO in the period from July 2000 to September 
2002 showed that “most cash transactions occur in New South Wales (54 per cent) 
followed by Victoria (22 per cent), with the rest of Australia making up the balance” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 57). This information provided by the ATO identified the main 
industry sectors and locations of cash payment activity associated with tax evasion. It 
suggests that smaller companies, and even sole traders, were most involved. These types 
of companies would not have employed internal accountants and would probably limit 
their use of accountants to doing annual income tax returns. However, this still 
implicates external accountants, that is, chartered accountants who would have 
completed tax returns for these individuals who were engaged in tax evasion. Further, 
the complex contracting system within the construction industry meant that larger 
companies would have been involved in this type of activity because they would have 
been paying the smaller companies the cash payments. These larger companies would 
often employ internal accountants who may have been involved in classifying cash 
payments as something else, for example, purchasing materials or sponsorship.  
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The cooperation of companies and individuals to engage in unlawful activity was 
highlighted with widespread tax evasion within the construction industry. An example 
was fraudulent claims for GST Input Tax Credits. The ATO Assistant Commissioner 
Read gave evidence to the RC that the introduction of the GST in Australia represented 
an emerging risk in terms of tax evasion. ATO Assistant Commissioner Read gave this 
example of these schemes: 
• Company A accumulates a tax debt. Company B is formed in anticipation of 
Company A being unable (or unwilling) to pay its debts. 
• Company A sells its fixed assets to Company B at a reasonable market price. Tax 
invoices are provided. The type of assets transferred would include equipment. 
• Company B claims the GST paid on the purchase price of the equipment as an input 
tax credit in the next BAS [Business Activity Statement] that it lodges with the 
ATO. This would ordinarily result in a refund of GST being paid to Company B, 
unless this amount was offset against some other tax liability of Company B. 
• Company A may or may not lodge a BAS. In any event it simply adds the GST debt 
to the already growing list of debts it owes the ATO. 
• Company B may not actually pay for the equipment despite what is indicated on tax 
invoices and other relevant documentation held by Company A and Company B. 
• Company A uses the voluntary administration process as a safe refuge from its 
creditors. 
• If the equipment is not paid for in full by Company B, and Company A goes into 
liquidation it is up to the liquidator to either recover the assets from Company B or 
chase the debt owed by Company B to Company A. 
• If the ATO confirms that Company B has received a GST refund as a result of 
fraudulent intent, then action will be taken to recover the tax refunded and refer the 
matter for prosecution investigation. 
• The obvious scenario may well be that Company B will have, or will claim to have, 
suffered some economic misfortune and will not be able to pay its debt to Company 
A or to the ATO. 
• In time, Company B will fail and Company C will be formed to continue the cycle. 
(Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 61). 
In reviewing this example provided by the ATO Assistant Commissioner Read, the 
importance of cooperation between stakeholders can be seen in this unlawful activity. It 
shows how companies and unscrupulous individuals helped one another to avoid paying 
tax.  
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The third cultural behaviour found in stakeholders’ unlawful activities was a shared 
agreement on the need to cut costs. Given the small profit margins, some companies felt 
they could gain an edge over the competition by decreasing their expenses. A typical 
method for achieving this goal was to underpay employee entitlements. The RC found 
that construction companies avoided “the proper payment of employee entitlements to 
obtain a competitive advantage over businesses which comply with their obligations” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 106). The inference was that companies had to engage in this 
unlawful activity, that is participate in this cultural norm, or risk having lost competitive 
advantage due to high costs.  
The fourth cultural behaviour found in stakeholders’ unlawful activities was social 
dependence on financial viability. The complex nature of contracting within the 
construction industry means that companies depend upon one another for work. Large 
companies, that is, head contractors, will outsource parts of their construction projects 
to smaller companies, sub-contractors. Sub-contractors may also outsource part of their 
contract to other companies, which are their sub-contractors. Three themes emerged. 
The first theme was providing misleading financial information. This web of 
outsourcing creates business risk. A significant risk is whether the sub-contractor is paid 
for the work they complete for another company. In order to manage this risk, the 
construction industry uses a method called prequalification. “Prequalification involves 
assessing the financial viability and the capacity of firms to undertake various types of 
building and construction work” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 113). This assessment assists 
clients and contractors to select firms for projects (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 113). 
“Prequalification can reduce the risk that the contractors chosen for the project will 
experience financial difficulty and then fail to pay subcontractors” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 
113). 
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The problem in the construction industry is that some unscrupulous individuals provide 
false information at prequalification which fails to disclose the true financial health of 
the company. This misleading information is designed to help the company win the 
contract. The RC described this problem as “the operation of ‘rogue’ builders who 
deliberately delay or avoid the payment of subcontractors” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 231).  
The second theme in this cultural behaviour was lack of capability to assess financial 
health. Many construction companies, particularly small companies, are led by 
individuals with limited business training or education. Many of these individuals are 
tradesmen who have set up their own business to provide a specific trade or other 
service. It would be challenging for many of these individuals to assess the financial 
health of other companies they deal with. Commissioner Cole found that many of these 
individuals “lack business and financial understanding” (Cole 2003, vol. 4, p. 98). It 
would be relatively easy for unscrupulous individuals to hide information or mislead 
others.  
Commissioner Cole felt that the solution to this problem was education. He argued that 
“education and training would improve the expertise of subcontractors, and the ability 
of companies to assess the commercial risk of those they deal with” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, 
p. 115). He recommended that “the Commonwealth initiate an education campaign, 
aimed primarily at small subcontractors, to explain the Commonwealth’s security of 
payments arrangements and improve subcontractors’ understanding of the various 
mechanisms, including state mechanisms, which they can use to protect their interests 
and their understanding of their rights and obligations under common forms of contract” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 115). 
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The third theme in this cultural behaviour was the construction industry’s complex 
contracting system created opportunities for unscrupulous individuals to exploit 
inadequate security of payments. Commissioner Cole explained that the hierarchical 
chain of contracts means that “non-payment of one subcontractor can affect payments to 
other subcontractors or suppliers down the contractual chain” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 
223). The financial failure of any one party in the contractual chain often caused a 
“domino effect” on other parties, which meant that inadequate security of payments had 
an impact that could spread throughout the industry.  
The domino or knock-on effect of contracting within the construction industry created 
other problems. The RC found that security of payment problems were not confined to 
projects undertaken by rogue or insolvent builders, and they could “arise on projects 
involving some of the largest contractors in Australia” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 231). The 
CCF submission to the RC stated that “unfortunately, tactics of deliberately delaying 
payments in this industry is not limited to rogue builders or head contractors in the 
industry and is now in fact common practice throughout the contract chain commencing 
with the client, and this in turn creates ever increasing cash-flow problems throughout 
the contract chain” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 231). This explains that security payment was 
not restricted to those who could not pay, due to legitimate business failure, or who 
would not pay, such as rogue contractors, it also involved those who could pay but 
chose not because they had the power to do so. This latter group involved large 
successful construction companies which would certainly been able to provide security 
payment for any of their subcontractors, to demonstrate their capacity to pay for work. 
However, this group sometimes chose not to pay, perhaps to improve their cash flow or 
other financial goals, and to delay payment, that is, pay when they chose to rather than 
when the work was completed. They could do this because the small companies had 
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little funds to fight them in court, and they depended upon the larger companies for 
future work.  
Commissioner Cole found that unscrupulous individuals were using “non-payment of 
existing claims as a bargaining tool to reduce subsequent claims” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 
231). These individuals were essentially exploiting non-payment in order for the small 
company to receive future work and the possibility of future payment.  
 
In summary, the homogenous nature of the behaviour of social networks in the 
construction industry was found in a culture of unlawful behaviour. The analysis found 
that this culture was shaped by the complex contracting system. Owners/managers of 
construction companies at each stage of the system, that is head contractors (large 
companies), contractors (medium sized companies), and sub-contractors (small 
companies), tended to cooperate in cultural behaviours seen as the normal way of doing 
business. Failure to participate in these cultural behaviours often meant higher costs 
which placed companies at a serious competitive disadvantage in an industry with small 
profit margins.  
5.2.3.3 Overall Social Network Cohesion 
While at face value it may seem that the social networks within the construction 
industry’s contracting system achieved a sense of harmony via cooperation, it actually 
generated disharmony within the industry’s overall social network. This disharmony 
was caused by conflict with other stakeholders, particularly unions and regulators, who 
had different views and did not want to cooperate with the contracting system’s cultural 
behaviours. The outcome of this disharmony between the contracting system and other 
stakeholders was lack of democracy in the overall social network. Undemocratic 
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behaviours emerged in power differentials between stakeholders. This caused poor 
cohesion and inefficiencies in the network’s social behaviours. This was best illustrated 
by industrial disputes where one stakeholder, the unions, opposed the behaviours of 
other stakeholders, the owner/managers. Inefficiencies emerged in work delays and lost 
profitability. These problems can be examined by looking at the behaviours of the two 
most vocal opponents of the contracting system: unions and regulators.  
The unions played a positive and negative role in shaping social behaviour within the 
construction industry. While the RC tended to focus on the negative behaviour of the 
unions, and painted the unions as the industry’s villains, the unions certainly played a 
positive role as well, particularly in acting as advocates for their members. The unions’ 
positive social behaviour occurred when advocating for their members to 
owners/managers, usually about employee entitlements; and in acting as a whistle-
blower to the regulators to highlight injustices on behalf of their members. Unions 
negotiated favourable employment conditions for their members; such as increased 
wages to contractors’ employees’ entitlements and also increased wages for 
subcontractors’ employees. In both cases, the RC found that head contractors agreed to 
improved conditions as a means of avoiding costly industrial disputes (Cole 2003, vol. 
5, p. 116). “Subcontractors employed the bulk of labour on a building site and 
consequently most of the costs associated with these favourable conditions were borne 
by subcontractors in the short term” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 116). In the longer term these 
costs were passed onto the contractor and then onto the customer. This subtle distinction 
between the short term and long term cost burden is important because owner/managers 
could deny subcontractors’ employees their wages increase if they delayed or withheld 
payment (see processes 3c and 3d in figure A1.5 in appendix 1). The unions could play 
a positive role here by ensuring contractors met their obligations both for their own 
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employees, in relation to employee entitlements and for subcontractors’ employees, in 
the latter case by paying on time.  
The unions also played a positive role as whistle-blower to the regulators. However, 
much of this was bluff. Transcripts of the RC hearings showed that union officials could 
only estimate the extent of tax evasion in the industry. When pressed for facts, 
documents or other evidence of these claims, the union officials typically used broad 
industry statistics to estimate the proportion of employers and subcontractors involved 
in tax evasion. When pushed further, officials often blamed the ATO for being 
uncooperative and either not acting on information forwarded by the unions or not 
providing the unions with information. The following extract illustrates this point: 
Mr Bentleigh Carslake, President of the Construction, Forestry, Mining and 
Energy Union, Construction and General Division, South Australian Divisional 
Branch (CFMEU South Australian Divisional Branch), while complaining that 
public authorities, such as the ATO, are ineffective in dealing with tax evasion 
in the industry said that he had given away phoning the ATO about four years 
ago, apparently because nothing had changed as a result of the calls (Cole 2003, 
vol. 9, p. 54). 
It may be argued that the unions had heterogeneous and democratic social behaviours in 
their social networks with their members. Union members would come from a diverse 
demographic background and often from different vocational groups and working for 
different organisations. Yet these differences were tolerated and a sense of belonging or 
union solidarity was encouraged. Similarly, unionism is based on collective decision 
making, for example communism, and decisions would have to be agreed to by 
members. The construction industry’s union movement, therefore, had the behaviours of 
harmony and cohesion.  
The unions did not have the same type of social behaviour with other construction 
industry stakeholders; particularly owners/managers. When whistle-blowing for 
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members, union officials played a negative role by using tax evasion as a threat to 
intimidate and coerce employers. Union officials would threaten to tell the ATO about 
tax evasion if employers did not cooperate with them. The unions sometimes played the 
role of industry regulator. The RC heard evidence that union officials carried out audits 
of construction companies’ books in the self-appointed role of industry regulator. 
Officers of the CFMEU Victorian Building Unions Divisional Branch, Construction and 
General Division, carry out two different types of “audits” of various contractors, 
described as “wages claims” and “book audits” (Cole 2003, vol. 15, p. 55). When they 
contacted companies to be audited, union officials would fax a pro-forma which 
outlined the type of information they required for the audit. The pro-forma stated “that, 
if all of the material listed is not brought to the audit, the audit will not be started” (Cole 
2003, vol. 15, p. 55). The 13 types of records required by the pro-forma for audit were: 
1. Official wage records… 
2. Cash payment book… 
3. C+Bus Returns from… 
4. Redundancy (Incolink) returns… 
5. Long Service Leave (Co Invest) returns… 
6. WorkCover payments from… 
7. Payments to Taxation Office payee… 
8. Reconciliation to Taxation PPS… 
9. Cheque Butts… 
10. Bank Statements… 
11. Copies of Group Certificates – Financial year… 
12. Delete Tax File No. [from any of the foregoing records] 
13. Invoices from Subcontractors from…(Cole 2003, vol. 15, p. 55). 
These activities would have involved accountants to prepare and provide the 
information for audit.  The union official had directed contractors who attended a book 
audit without all 13 types of records to leave and return with them (Cole 2003, vol. 15, 
p. 56). 
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An illustration of the coercive pressure placed on employers by unions acting as 
industry regulatory when conducting book audits is provided by the following case 
study found in the RCR: 
Kenoss Contractors received two requests for time and wage book inspections 
from Primmer. The first time and wage book inspection took place on 13 April 
2000 in response to a request made on 29 March 2000. Mr Peter Zaboyak, 
Assistant Secretary of the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, 
Construction and General Division, New South Wales Divisional Branch, 
attended the inspection with Primmer on behalf of the CFMEU. Mr Frank 
Gillingham, Director Industrial Relations of the Master Builders Construction 
and Housing Association of the Australian Capital Territory, attended on Kenoss 
Contractors’ behalf, with Brendas and Mr Bruce Ford, Kenoss Contractors Pty 
Ltd site engineer for the Moruya project. Also in attendance were Brown and Mr 
Andrew Burns of Allied Constructions Pty Ltd. Throughout the inspection, 
Primmer and Zaboyak were generally aggressive and threatening. At one point, 
Zaboyak said words to the effect, ‘You’ll never get any work in NSW. The 
NSW Government will never give Kenoss any work. I will call the taxation 
department. I’ll call the Long Service Leave Board. I’ll call superannuation and 
workers’ compensation. We’ll get a subcontractors’ compensation audit. We’ll 
make you pay back pay for all the contractors as though they were employees.’ 
After the meeting ended, Zaboyak came up to Brendas and spoke to him in a 
quiet and friendly voice. Zaboyak told Brendas that if Kenoss Contractors 
signed an EBA, the company would not have any more problems (Cole 2003, 
vol. 19, p. 353). 
Commissioner Cole found that this case study illustrates: 
a. the unauthorised and unnecessary stoppage of work by a union organiser; 
b. the continuous and unrelenting campaign by a union organiser to have a 
contractor sign a union-endorsed EBA. The campaign included: 
(i) repetitive wage book inspections; 
(ii) the raising of safety allegations; 
(iii) the threat to report the company to taxation, insurance, workers’ 
compensation and other authorities; 
(iv) the threat to prevent the company from obtaining work in New South 
Wales; 
(v) stoppage of work; and 
(vi) the threat to a head contractor engaging the contractor that it would be 
responsible for moneys allegedly not paid by the contractor  (Cole  2003, 
vol. 19, p. 358). 
The case also illustrates the responsiveness of employers to the pressure applied by a 
union official. This pressure was described as ‘unrelenting, by Commissioner Cole. 
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The regulators opposed the cultural behaviours associated with unlawful activity in the 
construction industry. However, they were heavily criticised for not sufficiently 
engaging with other industry stakeholders. Commissioner Cole was critical of the lack 
of regulation of several unlawful activities conducted by the construction industry. For 
example, security of payments was a particular problem in the construction industry. 
Earlier it was shown how Commissioner Cole portrayed small companies as powerless 
victims of inadequate security of payments. One way to give victims power is 
appropriate opportunities to pursue legal action. However, Commissioner Cole argued 
that the security of payment problem in the construction industry was “exacerbated by 
the absence of an effective adjudication and enforcement mechanism in relation to 
disputes over progress payments, and the high cost and long delay in pursuing payment 
claims through the court system” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 223). Given the companies who 
were victims of inadequate security of payments were often too small to be able to fight 
larger companies in the courts, this meant that few would bother to take legal action.  
 
5.3 Accountants Behaviour 
In analysing the behaviour of accountants within the construction industry’s social 
networks, the focus is on the accounting practices associated with unlawful behaviour 
identified by the RC. As noted in section 5.1 of this chapter, the RC found the following 
unlawful activities which may have involved accounting practice: (1) tax evasion, (2) 
underpayment of employee entitlements, (3) non-compliance with payroll tax, (4) 
creation of phoenix companies, (5) making of and receipt of inappropriate payments, (6) 
absence of adequate security of payments for sub-contractors, and (7) profit 
manipulation. The analysis is to examine accounting practice within the context of these 
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seven activities. That is, it to identify whether accountants were involved in these 
activities, and if so, to what extent; and who they interacted with in these activities.  
The following table presents the characteristics in respective categories from the 
analyses. Section 1.5.3 (see chapter 1) explained how these codes were derived. These 
business processes are listed in the table. Only unlawful activities and their processes 
are included in the analysis. The numbers are part of the numbering for the total 
processes involved in each activity such as tax evasion. These are listed in the figures in 
appendix 1. The processes listed in the table below are only the unlawful processes 
involving accountants. 
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Table 21 - 5.2: Accountants’ Behaviour in Construction Industry Social Networks 
Table 5.2: Accountants’ Behaviour in Construction Industry Social Networks 
Process Interaction Harmony Cohesion 
Tax Evasion (see figure A1.1) 
2a. Treatment of tax losses High density - Lead Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic - 
Expert 
3a. Minimising tax payments High density – 
Follow 
Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic - 
Expert 
3b. Revaluation of non-current assets High density – Lead Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic - 
Expert 
3c. Offsetting deferred tax assets High density – Lead Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic - 
Expert 
3d. Offsetting deferred tax liabilities High density – Lead Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic - 
Expert 
3e. Making tax payments High density – 
Follow 
Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic - 
Expert 
Employee Entitlements (see figure A1.2) 
1b. Record entitlements in income statement as an expense Low density - Alone Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic - 
Expert 
1c. Manipulate entitlements to lower expenses High density – 
Follow 
Heterogeneity - Tolerance Democratic - 
Expert 
1e. Declaring insolvency to avoid payments of entitlements High density – 
Follow 
Heterogeneity - Tolerance Democratic - 
Advisor 
Payroll Tax(see figure A1.3) 
1a. Recognise the payroll tax liability Low density – 
Follow 
Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic - 
Expert 
1b. Calculate threshold figure Low density - Alone Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic - 
Expert 
Inappropriate Payments(ss figure A1.5) 
1b. Identify supplier invoice Low density - Alone Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic – 
Expert 
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Table 5.2: Accountants’ Behaviour in Construction Industry Social Networks 
Process Interaction Harmony Cohesion 
1c. Match invoice with purchase order from purchasing 
department 
Low density - Alone Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic – 
Expert 
1d. Check proof that goods have been received from receiving 
department 
Low density - Alone Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic – 
Expert 
1e.Authorize payment Low density - Alone Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic - 
Advisor 
2b. Transfer funds from the company to the supplier Low density - Alone Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic – 
Expert 
2c. Record as an expense on the income statements Low density - Alone Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic – 
Expert 
2d. Record as a cash outflow on the cash flow statements Low density - Alone Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic – 
Expert 
Phoenix Company Activity(see figure A1.4) 
1c. Voluntary closure: bankruptcy High density – 
Follow 
Homogeneity - Outsider Democratic - 
Advisor 
2a. Assets transferred to the new company High density – 
Follow 
Heterogeneity - Tolerance Democratic – 
Expert 
3a. Liabilities of the failed company NOT paid to creditors High density – 
Follow 
Heterogeneity - Tolerance Undemocratic – 
Challenged 
4a.Avoid punishment from creditors High density – 
Follow 
Homogeneity - Outsider Democratic - 
Advisor 
Security of Payments(see figure A1.6) 
1a. Financial performance High density – 
Follow 
Homogeneity - Enemy Undemocratic – 
Challenged 
1c. Prequalification scrutiny High density – 
Follow 
Homogeneity - Enemy Undemocratic – 
Challenged 
2a. Recovering payments High density – 
Follow 
Homogeneity - Enemy Undemocratic – 
Challenged 
2b. Code of practice Low density - Alone Homogeneity - Enemy Democratic – 
Expert 
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Table 5.2: Accountants’ Behaviour in Construction Industry Social Networks 
Process Interaction Harmony Cohesion 
Profit Manipulation(see figure A1.7) 
2a. Exceptions to accounting standards Low density - Alone Homogeneity - Enemy Democratic – 
Expert 
2d. Falsely representing the long-term capacity of the firm to 
generate earnings 
High density – 
Follow 
Homogeneity - Outsider Undemocratic – 
Challenged 
3a. Creative accounting High density – Lead Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic – 
Expert 
3b. Differences between book and tax profits High density – Lead Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic – 
Expert 
3c. Impression management High density – 
Follow 
Homogeneity - Outsider Democratic - 
Advisor 
3d. Accrual accounting: delaying expenses High density – 
Follow 
Heterogeneity - Respect Democratic – 
Expert 
4a.Fraud Low density - 
Follow 
Homogeneity - Outsider Undemocratic – 
Ignored 
4b.Falsifying or altering documents Low density - 
Follow 
Homogeneity - Outsider Undemocratic – 
Challenged 
4c.Deleting transactions from records Low density - 
Follow 
Homogeneity - Outsider Undemocratic – 
Challenged 
4d.Recording forged transactions Low density - 
Follow 
Homogeneity - Enemy Undemocratic – 
Challenged 
4e.Concealing significant information Low density - 
Follow 
Homogeneity - Outsider Undemocratic – 
Challenged 
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High density – Lead; Heterogeneity – Respect; Democratic - Expert 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant initiates 
interaction, where the accountant’s participation is valued by other stakeholders, and 
where the accountant’s opinion is more important than any other stakeholders. In this 
type of social network, the accountant would have a strong influence in controlling the 
behaviour of other stakeholders involved in the activity. Therefore, unlawful behaviour 
would have been allowed by the accountant. There are six processes which have these 
characteristics (16% of all unlawful processes listed in table 5.2). Four of these 
processes are in tax evasion (2a, 3b, 3c, and 3d) (66% of this activity’s processes); and 
two are in profit manipulation (3a and 3b) (19% of this activity’s processes). Common to 
these processes is that they are all core accounting work. 
The following table presents a simple classification of the work accountants do.  
Table 22 - 5.3: The Process of Accounting 
Table 5.3: The Process of Accounting 
Identifying Measuring Communicating Decision Making 
Transactions that 
affect the entity’s 
financial position 
are taken into 
consideration. They 
must be able to be 
reliably measured 
and recorded 










reports such as 
income statements, 
balance sheets and 
statements of cash 
flow. 
Accounting 
information is used 
for a range of 
decisions by 
external and 
internal users.  
Source: (Birt, Chalmers, Byrne, Brooks & Oliver 2010, p. 5). 
Using this table, the tax evasion activities are mainly measuring, and the profit 
manipulation activities are mainly communicating. The measurement role mainly 
involved classification of assets with the aim of reducing the amount of tax payable. In 
the communication role, the accountant needs to consolidate financial information and 
produce regular reports (Birt et al. 2010). Therefore, if the accountant was involved in 
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unlawful behaviour associated with these activities, it mainly involved financial 
reporting.  
When the processes characterised by this behaviour are examined, it is clear that only 
accountants are qualified to do this type of work. Therefore, accountants would have 
assumed a leadership role in social networks involved in these unlawful activities 
because others depended upon them to do this work. This has implications for this study 
in the examination of the role of accounting. Given the nature of the social behaviour in 
processes with these characteristics, accountants were heavily involved in these unlawful 
activities. Given the nature of these activities, the decision makers must have sought the 
involvement of accountants. The question then emerges: did accountants respond by 
telling decision makers that they must follow accounting standards at all times? If so, 
this would support the argument for accounting as objective practice. Or did accountants 
respond by doing creative accounting to help their employers’ goals? If so, this would 
support the argument for accounting as subjective practice. In order to examine these 
questions further, some of the processes are discussed in more detail.  
The role of accountants in the processes associated with tax evasion will vary depending 
upon two factors: firm size and the nature of the activity. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
construction industry is divided into large firms, known as head contractors, and small 
firms, known as sub-contractors. In large firms routine matters would typically be 
handled by an accountant, and more complex matters by a tax expert, sometimes an 
internal staff member but often an external expert from a taxation firm or accounting 
firm. Small firms would not employ a full-time accountant, nor tax expert, so both 
routine and complex matters would be referred to external experts. This implicates 
external accountants who would have led social networks associated with complex 
taxation matters for all firms, and also routine matters for small firms.  
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Profit manipulation involved nine of the unlawful processes listed in table 5.2. Of these, 
only two: 3a. creative accounting and 3b. differences between book and tax profits, had 
the characteristics of high density – lead; homogeneity – respect; democratic – expert. 
Creative accounting was the domain of the accountant. Whereas other stakeholders may 
have asked accountants to ‘be creative’ in the way they identified, measured and 
communicated the numbers, how they did it was up to the accountant. On the other hand, 
companies report book and tax profits differently because they are communicating to 
different audiences. This is a common accounting activity and accountants would have 
led this activity as a part of normal way of doing their work. Where the social behaviour 
becomes suspicious is when the process was to manipulate rather than report profit. 
Profit manipulation includes falsifying information and trying to mislead readers of 
financial reports. In this case, whereas owner/managers may have directed accountants 
to manipulate differences between book and tax profits, only the accountant would have 
known how to do this. Given this process is classified in this behaviour, accountants 
would have taken the lead role, which implicates them, and provides further evidence for 
accounting as a subjective process. This activity provides evidence of subjective 
accounting. 
High density – Follow; Heterogeneity – Respect; Democratic - Expert 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant responds 
to a request from others to interact, where the accountant’s participation is valued by 
other stakeholders, and where the accountant’s opinion is more important than any other 
stakeholders. In this type of social network, the accountant would have some influence 
in controlling the behaviour of other stakeholders involved in the activity. Therefore, 
unlawful behaviour would have been tolerated by the accountant. There are three 
processes which have these characteristics (8% of all unlawful processes listed in table 
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5.2). Two of these processes are in tax evasion (3a and 3e) (33% of this activity’s 
processes); and one is in profit manipulation (3d) (9% of this activity’s processes). 
Using table 5.3 again to classify these processes in terms of accounting practice, the tax 
evasion activities are decision making, and the profit manipulation activity is about 
measurement. In decision making, the accountant provides information to assist 
owners/managers to take action. In this case, it was to evade tax. In measurement, the 
accountant delayed expenses to help improve the financial position. 
The reason why accountants played a reactive role in social networks involved in these 
unlawful activities, despite it being accounting work, was that these processes were not 
routine or normal accounting practice. While it may be argued that minimising tax and 
making tax payments are routine accounting tasks, unlawful behaviour in these areas 
would have been led by others, for example owners/managers. It is unlikely that an 
accountant would seek to minimise tax or delay expenses on their own initiative. It is 
more likely they would be directed to do so. Given the widespread tax evasion in the 
construction industry and the RC’s finding that this activity was unlawful, accountants 
must have been directed to provide information to assist owners/managers in this 
activity. Similarly, while accrual accounting is normal accounting practice, doing it for 
the purposes of profit manipulation would have been initiated by others, for example 
owners/managers, and would not have been routine accounting practice. This activity 
provides evidence of subjective accounting. 
High density – Follow; Heterogeneity – Tolerance; Democratic - Expert 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant responds 
to a request from others to interact, where the accountant’s participation is tolerated by 
other stakeholders, and where the accountant’s opinion is more important than any other 
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stakeholders. In this type of social network, the accountant would have little influence in 
controlling the behaviour of other stakeholders involved in the activity. Therefore, while 
unlawful behaviour may have been discouraged by the accountant, this would have had 
little effect. There are two processes which have these characteristics (5% of all unlawful 
processes listed in table 5.2). One of these processes is in employee entitlements (1c) 
(33% of this activity’s processes); and one is in phoenix company activity (2a) (25% of 
this activity’s processes). Using table 5.3 again to classify these processes in terms of 
accounting practice, the employee entitlement activity is about identifying, and the 
phoenix company activity is about decision making.   
The first process, 1c. manipulating entitlements to lower expenses, would have required 
the accountant to identify business transactions, specifically payment of wages and 
salaries. If the owner/managers were not paying wages and salaries at the correct rate, it 
is not the accountant’s role to challenge this decision. It is likely accountants would 
respond to a request for information, their advice would be tolerated, and they would be 
asked to amend expenses because that was part of their job. 
The second process, 2a. assets transferred to a new company, would have required 
reporting on the balance sheet (BS). Commissioner Cole reported on how companies did 
this to avoid paying GST. In this case, accountants would have been asked to do the 
assets transfer. If the accountant challenged the decision, it is likely they would have 
been tolerated due to their expert status. It is likely that accountants would have been 
heavily involved in this activity because it required financial skills and capabilities. As 
this activity was considered unlawful by the RC, it implicates accountants and is further 
evidence of the subjective role of accounting.  
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Given that process 1c. manipulating entitlements to lower expenses was the process with 
the most scope for unlawful behaviour associated with employee entitlements, further 
analysis is presented in this section. The analysis has shown that the recording of 
entitlements was identified as an activity where unlawful behaviour could occur (see 
process 1b in figure A1.2 in appendix 1). The analysis suggested that employee 
entitlement should be recorded as an expense on the income statement (IS). However, 
employee entitlement liabilities might also be recorded as provisions in BS’s (Davis & 
Burrows 2003). Non-accountants may interpret this action as reserving specific assets or 
cash flows to meet the eventual claims. However, these provisions simply represent 
claims against assets in general and are vulnerable to any reduction in asset values in the 
event of financial trouble (Davis & Burrows 2003).  
Employee entitlements might be classified as a source of company finance, particularly 
of working capital (see measuring business transactions: classifying, in table 5.3). Davis 
and Burrows (2003) argued that employee entitlements are a cheap source of funding. 
Like trade credit, entitlements ostensibly represent a free source of capital, that is, they 
are available at a zero explicit interest rate (Davis & Burrows 2003). However, this 
ignores the impact of nominal-wage growth (Davis & Burrows 2003). Davis and Burrow 
(2003, p.174) provide an example of a week of long service leave which accrues in year 
0 but which is taken in year 10, will be paid at the remuneration level applying in year 
10.  “Hence, the implicit cost of entitlements as a source of capital (and equivalently, the 
rate of return to the providers of such finance) is approximately the annual rate of 
remuneration growth” (Davis & Burrows 2003, p. 174). Davis and Burrows are 
explaining how employee entitlement, long service leave in this example, still has a cost, 
although it is still a very inexpensive source of capital compared to other forms of debt.  
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De Fazio (2009) argues that there are differences in financial and taxation accounting, 
which may explain why accountants had limited involvement in tax evasion associated 
with the construction industry. The following is an extract from De Fazio (2009) which 
explains the subjective nature of accounting, more specifically, the role accountants 
typically play in some of the seven unlawful activities, particularly tax evasion, profit 
reporting, and employee entitlements: 
Financial and tax accounting  both record income  and expenses over a period of 
time to arrive at some measure  of  profit   However,  despite this  commonality,   
there  is  a  significant  lack  of  conformity between the two measures of profit 
determined  under  both the systems. In fact, studies have indicated profit 
discrepancies amounting to billions of dollars. In a number of countries, 
especially within Europe, the tax accounting system has to some extent been 
aligned with the financial accounting system; however, in Australia, the two 
systems remain independent of each other. Nonetheless, the desire for conformity 
and the inevitable divergence of the two systems has been the topic of much 
debate over the years. The matter has been described by researchers as ''perennial 
and pervasive - perhaps even eternal and universal".  However, what has 
emerged from the literature is a set of generally accepted reasons which explain 
why the two systems will treat the same transaction or event in two completely 
different ways. The primary reason is that the two systems have different 
objectives; other reasons relate to the principles and practices which are used to 
ensure these  overall objectives  are  achieved,  including   the  different   levels  
of  discretion allowed by both systems and the different methods used to allocate 
income  and expenses  to the correct accounting period (p. 29). 
This extract provides several themes which may be used to explore accountants’ role in 
employee entitlement avoidance and in tax evasion. First, identify the goals of the 
organisational systems, that is, stakeholder interaction. Second, identify the level of 
discretion available to accountants by accounting principles and standards. Third, 
identify the method for allocating income and expenses in terms of employee 
entitlement. This next extract from De Fazio (2009) provides further insight: 
The level of discretion permitted in the systems is the next reason considered to 
explain why certain transactions are dealt with differently under the two regimes. 
The rules of financial accounting are incapable of producing a single profit figure 
because they allow accountants a considerable degree of discretion; therefore, 
different accountants may arrive at different figures. There are several qualitative 
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characteristics which are fundamental to financial accounting. Due to the nature 
of these characteristics, accountants are often required to reach a trade-off 
between them - a balancing exercise which is largely a matter of professional 
judgment. In  tax  accounting there is  a  requirement to derive  one  single figure 
on  which to  base  an assessment, and it is therefore an inherent requirement that 
a higher level of precision and certainty exists. Once a taxpayer is assessed and 
his/her tax liability determined for a period, it is essentially of a conclusive 
nature and will be subject to a reassessment only in limited cases. Especially in 
light of the fact that tax laws result in compulsory tax obligations upon 
taxpayers, the inherent uncertainty of financial accounting is both "undesirable 
and inappropriate in the context of the enforced confiscation of property". This 
need for greater certainty is further enforced in light of the fact that fines and 
penalties can be imposed upon taxpayers who get it wrong (p. 31).  
This extract provides several further themes for analysis in the role of accountants in 
unlawful activity associated with tax evasion and employee entitlements. First, financial 
accounting is described as “qualitative” (De Fazio 2009, p. 31). This word suggests a 
level of interpretation and judgment used by accountants to report on numbers, in other 
words, subjectivity. Second, tax accounting is described as requiring “precision” and 
“certainty” (De Fazio 2009, p. 31). These words suggest a level of accuracy by 
accountants and objectivity. It requires accuracy because of the consequences of 
mistakes, such as fines. Third, financial accounting’s “inherent uncertainty” (De Fazio 
2009, p. 31) is seen as a bad thing; “undesirable and inappropriate” (De Fazio 2009, p. 
31). De Fazio (2009) is arguing that accounting should be objective and subjective 
accounting is poor practice. She also highlights the inherent problem in objective 
accounting, here represented as tax accounting, and subjective accounting, here 
represented as financial accounting: the possibility of arriving at two separate numbers 
or set of accounts based on the same raw financial data. If accounting is to assist the 
construction industry restore society’s confidence, the public must trust their numbers 
and their reporting of financial data.  
This next extract from De Fazio (2009) examines the role of accountants and employee 
entitlements: 
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Employee leave entitlements are also generally recognised as a liability and 
expense within the financial statements of an entity to the extent they are 
probable, capable of a reliable estimate and relevant for the decision-making 
needs of users. However, unlike accounting for warranties, employee leave 
entitlements are not classified as provisions; rather, they are accruals, another 
classification of liabilities. Accruals are distinctly different from provisions 
because, although some estimation may be required in terms of the amount and 
timing, financial accounting considers that there is not the same level of 
uncertainty as that inherent in provisions (p. 34).  
This extract defines employee entitlements in terms of leave. It explains how 
accountants typically treat employee leave entitlements as accruals or a liability. It also 
suggests a defence of subjective accounting in the estimation of employee leave 
entitlements by claiming they do not require the same level of certainty as provisions 
because they are placed in accruals.  
De Fazio (2009) next looks at employee leave entitlements in more detail: 
Two types of leave entitlements will be considered. The first is short-term leave 
which falls due within 12 months after the period in which the employee renders 
the related service - this includes annual leave and sick leave. The other is long-
term employee benefits which do not fall due within a 12-month period and 
which include long-service leave. Short-term employee benefits may be either 
accumulating or non-accumulating. Accumulating leave will include amounts 
which may be carried forward to subsequent periods when the employee has any 
unused amounts. Accumulating leave may in turn be vesting or non-vesting - in 
both cases, as the employee renders the related service, an obligation generally 
arises which leaves the entity with a present liability and therefore both an 
accrual and expense must be accounted for. Accumulating vesting leave is 
unconditional and therefore will entitle the employee to a cash payment equal to 
the accumulated leave when they cease employment - it is appropriate to account 
for the entire amount of this leave as an accrued liability and as an expense. The 
progressive entitlement to the leave is an additional cost of employment; as the 
employee renders service to the entity, his/her entitlement to the leave increases 
and becomes an irrevocable obligation upon the entity. Thus, it is probable that 
the entity will be required to make a payment in the future upon the employee 
using the leave or upon his/her resignation (p. 34). 
This extract highlights the significance of employee leave entitlements as a cost of doing 
business. Long-term leave, such as leave accumulated over more than twelve months, 
can represent a very significant cost. Organisations often try to persuade employees to 
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take their annual leave so that it does not accumulate. If this leave does accumulate, 
organisations can be liable to pay employees substantial funds if they resign or retire. 
These may be funds the organisation does not have available, particularly in the case of 
construction industry companies who may be operating under severe financial 
constraints.  
The next extract from De Fazio (2009) looks at how accounting standards are meant to 
treat employee leave entitlements: 
In terms of the accounting treatment of long-service leave, it is practical to 
consider the former guidance section which was part of the accounting standard 
AASB 119 Employee Benefits, where three categories of long-service leave 
entitlements are identified: 
1. Pre-conditional period: This period will not create a legal entitlement for 
long-service leave. Therefore, if the employee ceases employment during this 
period, he/she will not receive any benefit in relation to this type of leave. 
2. Conditional period: Following from the pre-conditional period, the employee 
will now have an entitlement to long-service leave, accrued from the 
commencement of employment. Although the employee is not eligible to 
take long-service leave during this period, he/she is entitled to a payout of 
any accrued amounts upon ceasing employment. 
3. Unconditional period: At this stage, the employee is entitled to use his/her 
long-service leave. If he/she ceases employment during this period, like the 
conditional period, he/she will receive payment for any accrued entitlements 
(p. 35). 
The extract provides guidelines in terms of how to classify employee leave entitlements, 
in this case long service leave, and then how to treat these classifications in terms of 
accrual accounting. It is quite straightforward and accountants who follow it may simply 
be classifying employees into one of these three time periods. This suggests the accrual 
accounting of employee leave entitlements should be objective because the accounting 
standards are unambiguous and do not need much interpretation or judgment. This raises 
the questions of why these standards were not always followed and why accrual 
accounting of employee leave entitlements became a subjective practice in the 
construction industry.  
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De Fazio (2009) next examines these questions: 
Similar to the financial accounting of short-term employee benefits discussed 
above, long-service leave is also recognised for the periods in which the 
employee provides service to the entity; the rendering of service is taken to give 
rise to a liability even when the benefit is non-vesting, as is the case during the 
pre-conditional period. These amounts of leave are conditional upon the 
employee's future employment. However,  they  still  give  rise  to  a  
constructive  obligation because,  after  each successive  reporting date,  the 
future service that the employee will have  to render for the entitlement to  be  
vested  is  reduced. It  is  required   that  the  entity   factor  into  the  calculation  
of  accrued long-service leave the fact that some employees may never reach the 
vesting stage. This, however, will only affect the measurement of the obligation 
and not whether a present liability is taken to exist. The ultimate payment 
associated with long-service leave is based on the salary of the employee at the 
time the leave is taken or, alternatively, paid out. Most of the time this, will not 
equal to the salary of the employee at the time when the benefit accrues to them. 
Therefore, projections must be made in respect of future salary rates, inflation 
rates and any promotion prospects. Further, there is a requirement to measure and 
recognise long-service leave at its present value - thus a consideration must be 
made as to the appropriate discount rate to use. The reliability aspect of 
recognition is met with short-term employee benefits without the need to apply 
actuarial assumptions or discounting since it is appropriate to base measurement 
on current salary rates. However, there is still a requirement, as already stated, to 
factor in the possibility that the employee may not continue employment and 
thus his/her entitlement to accumulating non-vesting leave (p. 35). 
This extract explains how the accrual accounting of employee leave entitlements is not 
as straightforward as the accounting standard suggests. The reality of accounting 
practice associated with this activity is quite complex. There is considerable need for 
judgement and interpretation suggesting a need for subjective accounting. Judgements 
must be made about the proportion of employees who reach the various time periods, 
referred to as the ‘vesting stage’, the likely salary of these employees when they wish to 
take leave, the proportion of employees who will leave and take their entitlements with 
them. Some might even call this guess work. It certainly requires subjective opinion and 
allows opportunity for arriving at different numbers or creative accounting. It also 
creates opportunity for unscrupulous individuals to persuade accountants to make 
incorrect judgements leading to unlawful behaviour and ultimately denial of employees’ 
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rights to leave payments. This could happen when unscrupulous individuals tell 
employees they cannot afford to pay their leave because they did not put enough funds 
aside.  
Accountants would be unlikely to be involved in negotiating salary or non-salary 
entitlements for employees. These negotiations would most typically involve managers, 
human resources, and unions. In this case, it is unlikely that accountants were involved 
in this unlawful behaviour, other than to record the outcome of negotiations as an 
expense on the IS. In most activities associated with this matter, accountants would 
probably have followed accounting rules, that is the accounting standards. However, 
some of the processes involved in the employee entitlements process generate doubt 
about the role of accountants. While accountants are unlikely to have been involved in 
negotiations about levels of employee entitlements or whether this was applied 
equitably, they would have been involved in activities associated with identifying, 
measuring and reporting financial transactions associated with employee entitlements. 
After all, this is the work that accountants do. The issue is how much involved were they 
in unlawful behaviour associated with this activity.  
Our first clue is to look at the type of information accountants provided to others 
associated with underpaying employee entitlements, that is, company directors. The 
Corporations Act 2001 provides guidance on how directors must act if a responsible 
person gives them information to suspect insolvency. The responsible person, in this 
case, must be accountants. This provides evidence of the social practice of insolvency 
and the role of the accountant. In section 588H (2) of the Corporations Act 2001, 
company directors are provided with several defences to protect them against legal 
action for not paying employee entitlements. Firstly, there is a defence if the director can 
prove that, at the time the debt was incurred, “the director had reasonable grounds to 
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expect (and did expect) that the company was solvent and would remain so” (Symes 
2003, p. 138). It is important to note that the legislation uses the phrase “reasonable 
grounds to expect solvency” and not “reasonable grounds to suspect insolvency” 
(Corporations Act 2001, s. 588H (2)). This means that the director should have 
information that he/she could trust. The director is not expected to guess or suspect; they 
are only expected to know or expect. This language is important because it places more 
responsibility on the provider of the information, the accountant, rather than the director. 
It is the role of the accountant to ensure the director knows rather than guesses that the 
company is solvent. It also suggests an escape clause for directors to avoid their 
responsibilities in terms of employee entitlements. They can blame their accountants for 
not making them fully aware of the company’s financial position.  
The second clue, and the director’s second defence provided by the Corporations Act 
2001, is if he/she had “reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that a competent 
and reliable person was responsible for providing the director with adequate information 
about whether the company was solvent (s588H(3))” (Symes 2003, p. 139). This 
language is important in establishing a power differential in the relationship between the 
directors and accountants. It essentially provides legislative authority for company 
directors to assess the competence of accounting staff; whether employed by the director 
as full-time staff (internal accountant) or as an accounting consultant (external 
accountant). The words “competent and reliable person” place authority with the director 
to assess the ability of the accountant to provide trustworthy information. The following 
phrase “adequate information” is also loaded with power allocated to the director. The 
director may use this to argue their accountant was incompetent and provided inadequate 
accounting information, therefore laying blame on the accountant, and avoiding 
responsibility for underpaying employee entitlements.  
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The third clue, and the director’s third defence provided by the Corporations Act 2001, 
is whether “that other person was fulfilling that responsibility” (s588H (3), Symes 2003, 
p. 139). Once again, this language provides evidence of the power allocated to company 
directors over accounting staff in managing employee entitlements and in insolvency 
activities. The phrase “fulfilling that responsibility” invests company directors with the 
scope to evaluate how well the person providing them with financial information, that is, 
the accountant, was doing their job. In summary, the legislation not only gave directors 
three escape clauses to avoid their responsibilities in regards to employee entitlements, it 
placed responsibility with accountants and directors with authority to evaluate the 
quality of accountants’ information, their competence, and their performance.  
In summary, accountants would have been involved in work associated with the 
employee entitlements process. There are three specific employee entitlements processes 
that were unlawful and involved accountants: 
• 1b. Record entitlements in the IS as an expense. 
• 1c. Manipulate entitlements to lower expenses 
• 1e. Declaring insolvency to avoid payments of entitlements 
More specifically, recording entitlements as an expense would have been reporting on 
the IS. Manipulating entitlements to lower expenses would have required identifying 
business transactions, specifically payment of wages and salaries. Declaring insolvency 
to avoid payments of entitlements would have involved decision making about paying 
debts. This activity provides evidence of subjective accounting. 
High density – Follow; Heterogeneity – Tolerance; Democratic - Advisor 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant where the 
accountant responds to a request from others to interact, where the accountant’s 
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participation is tolerated by other stakeholders, and where the accountant’s opinion is 
advice. In this type of social network, the accountant would have little influence in 
controlling the behaviour of other stakeholders involved in the activity. Therefore, while 
unlawful behaviour may have been discouraged by the accountant, this would have had 
little effect. There is one process which has these characteristics (3% of all unlawful 
processes listed in table 5.2). This process is in employee entitlements (1e) (33% of this 
activity’s processes). Using table 5.3 again to classify these processes in terms of 
accounting practice, the employee entitlement activity is about decision making.  
The process, 1e. declaring insolvency to avoid payments of entitlements, would have 
involved decision making about paying debts. This decision would be made by 
owners/managers. Accountants’ involvement would have been to advise on whether the 
company was solvent, and also to provide figures on employee entitlements liabilities. It 
is unlikely that accountants would have contributed to decisions to deliberately wind the 
company up in order to avoid paying employees. Therefore, it may be concluded this 
activity is evidence of objective accounting. However, as discussed in the previous 
section, activities associated with employee entitlements provide scope for creative 
accounting and subjectivity.  
High density – Follow; Heterogeneity – Tolerance; Undemocratic - Challenged 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant responds 
to a request from others to interact, where the accountant’s participation is tolerated by 
other stakeholders, and where the accountant’s opinion is disputed by other stakeholders. 
In this type of social network, the accountant would have very little influence in 
controlling the behaviour of other stakeholders involved in the activity. Therefore, while 
unlawful behaviour may have been challenged by the accountant, this would have had 
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little effect. There is one process which has these characteristics (3% of all unlawful 
processes listed in table 5.2). This process is in phoenix company activity (3a) (25% of 
this activity’s processes). Using table 5.3 again to classify these processes in terms of 
accounting practice, the employee entitlement activity is about decision making.  
The process, 3a. Liabilities of the failed company not paid to creditors, would have 
involved decision making about paying debts. This decision would be made by 
owners/managers. Accountants’ involvement would have been to provide information 
about liabilities and creditors. It is unlikely that accountants would have agreed with 
decisions not to pay creditors as it would seem unethical, and objections by accountants 
would have been challenged by owners/managers. Therefore, it may be concluded this 
activity is evidence of objective accounting. Accountants engaging in this practice would 
have clearly stepped over the boundary from creative accounting to unethical behaviour 
and would have been aware of these boundaries.  
High density – Follow; Homogeneity – Outsider; Democratic - Advisor 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant responds 
to a request from others to interact, where the accountant’s participation is excluded by 
other stakeholders, and where the accountant’s opinion is advice. In this type of social 
network, the accountant would have almost no influence in controlling the behaviour of 
other stakeholders involved in the activity. Therefore, while unlawful behaviour may 
advised against by the accountant, this would have had little effect. There were three 
processes which had these characteristics (8% of all unlawful processes listed in table 
5.2). Two of these processes are in phoenix company activity (1c and 4a) (50% of this 
activity’s processes); and one is in profit manipulation (3c) (9% of this activity’s 
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processes). Using table 5.3 again to classify these processes in terms of accounting 
practice, the employee entitlement activity is about decision making.  
The first process, 1c. voluntary closure: bankruptcy, would have involved decision 
making about business viability. This decision would be made by owners/managers. 
Accountants’ would have been excluded from decisions. However, if accountants were 
asked an opinion on financial matters, it would have been considered as advice due to 
their expertise.  
The second process associated with phoenix company activity, 4a. avoid punishment 
from creditors, would have involved decision making about not paying creditors. Once 
again, this decision would have appeared unethical to accountants and, as a result, 
owner/managers would probably have tried to hide this activity from them. However, if 
accountants did become aware or involved, it is likely their opinion would have been 
considered as advice due to their expertise.  
The third process, 3c. impression management, was associated with profit manipulation. 
It would have involved communicating company performance. This is a normal and 
important part of what accountants do; they report on company financial performance. 
However, this process becomes unlawful when company performance is falsely reported 
and external stakeholders, particularly investors and regulators, are intentionally misled. 
In these circumstances, accountants would have objected to presenting false information 
and been excluded from the reporting. If accountants did become aware or involved, it is 
likely their opinion would have been considered as advice due to their expertise. Given 
50% of phoenix company processes were listed in this behaviour, further analysis is 
included in this section.  
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It is very clear from the RCR that the unlawful behaviour associated with phoenix 
company activity was driven by self-interest. Indeed, Commissioner Cole makes a 
statement which provides excellent insight into the social practice of unlawful behaviour 
within the construction industry: 
There are extreme examples of self-interest, exercised in disregard of the effect 
on others. Phoenix companies epitomise the problem of a culture of self-interest 
(Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 208). 
The main driver in phoenix company activity was company directors. These individuals 
were motivated to avoid paying debts and to establish a new business to replace their 
failed business. The self-interest described by Commissioner Cole was the goal of these 
directors to preserve their personal wealth at the expense of others; including their 
employees, creditors and taxation authorities. The insight provided by the word “self-
interest”, is that it suggests that other industry stakeholders, including accountants, were 
not to blame. The directors did this for their own benefit. It is also important to recognise 
that directors were legally obliged to act in a lawful manner when facing insolvency or 
when engaging in phoenix activity. The following extract from the Corporations Act 
2001 explains these obligations: 
The directors’ duties powers contained in ss 180–184 of the Corporations Act 
can be used by ASIC or the company’s liquidator against company directors who 
misuse their powers by engaging in phoenix activity. Under s 181(1), directors 
must exercise their powers in good faith in the best interests of the company and 
for a proper purpose. Under s 182(1), directors must not improperly use their 
position: to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else, or to cause 
detriment to the corporation. Many of the actions of directors who engage in 
phoenix activity would amount to breaches of these duties, which have criminal 
equivalents under s 184 or may be actioned by ASIC as civil penalty breaches 
under pt 9.4B of the Corporations Act (Anderson 2012, p. 420).  
However, Commissioner Cole found that some directors were misusing their power to 
gain advantage for themselves over others, for example subcontractors and other 
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creditors. Therefore, these individuals were breaking the law under the Corporations Act 
2001.  
Company directors cannot act in complete social isolation. They need to work with 
others to achieve their goals. Almost all of the phoenix company processes involve 
financial information. The directors must have worked with accountants, either 
individuals employed as full-time staff, that is internal accountants, or staff from an 
accounting firm, that is external accountants, in gathering information associated with 
phoenix company processes. More specifically, voluntary closure: bankruptcy (process 
1c) would have required reporting on the IS and CFS; assets transferred to the new 
company (process 2a) would have required reporting on the BS; liabilities of the failed 
company not paid to creditors (process 3a) would have involved decision making about 
paying debts; and avoiding punishment from creditors (process 4a) may have involved 
communication via reporting, that is, falsifying reports. This activity provides evidence 
of subjective accounting.  
High density – Follow; Homogeneity – Outsider; Undemocratic - Challenged 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant responds 
to a request from others to interact, where the accountant’s participation is excluded by 
other stakeholders, and where the accountant’s opinion would be disputed. In this type 
of social network, the accountant would have almost no influence in controlling the 
behaviour of other stakeholders involved in the activity. Therefore, while unlawful 
behaviour may have been challenged by the accountant, this would have had little effect. 
There is one process which has these characteristics (3% of all unlawful processes listed 
in table 5.2). This process is in profit manipulation activity (2d) (9% of this activity’s 
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processes).Using table 5.3 again to classify these processes in terms of accounting 
practice, the employee entitlement activity is about decision making.  
The process 2d., falsely representing the long-term capacity of the firm to generate 
earnings, would have involved decision making about business viability. This decision 
would be made by owners/managers. Accountants’ would have been excluded from 
decisions. If accountants became aware or involved, it is likely they would have 
challenged the figures, and their opinion would have been disputed. This activity 
provides evidence of objective accounting. 
High density – Follow; Homogeneity – Enemy; Undemocratic - Challenged 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant responds 
to a request from others to interact, where the accountant is denied any contact with 
other stakeholders, and where the accountant’s opinion would be disputed. In this type 
of social network, the accountant would have no influence in controlling the behaviour 
of other stakeholders involved in the activity. Therefore, while unlawful behaviour may 
have been challenged by the accountant, this would have had no effect. There are three 
processes which have these characteristics (8% of all unlawful processes listed in table 
5.2). All of these processes are in security of payments (1a, 1c, and 2a) (75% of this 
activity’s processes). Using table 5.3, the security of payments activities are mainly 
communicating.  
In conducting the communication role, the accountant needs to consolidate financial 
information and produce regular reports (Birt et. al 2010). Therefore, if accountants were 
involved in unlawful behaviour associated with these activities, it mainly involved 
financial reporting. The reason that the accountant was excluded from social interaction 
associated with security of payments was that unscrupulous individuals and companies 
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were trying to hide information. Given 75% of security of payments processes were 
listed in this behaviour, further analysis is included in this section.  
In order to examine these questions further, some of the processes are discussed in more 
detail. The first unlawful process associated with security of payments, 1a. financial 
performance involves prequalification. “Prequalification involves assessing the financial 
viability and the capacity of firms to undertake various types of construction work”  
(Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 245). It reduces the “risk that the contractors chosen for the project 
will experience financial difficulty and then fail to pay subcontractors” (Cole 2003, vol. 
8, p. 245). This is at the start of the security of payments process. At this stage, 
accountants might be involved in two ways. If they are employed as an internal 
accountant for a large company, for example a head contractor, they might be asked to 
request financial information from subcontractors tendering for a part of a construction 
project managed by the head contractor. In this interaction, the accountant might deal 
with internal stakeholders: management and project manager; and external stakeholders 
such as suppliers, who would be subcontractors in the case of labour. It is unlikely that 
any unlawful behaviour would involve internal accountants at this stage.  
Subcontractors will have to provide head contractors with financial information. Two 
decisions are made at this point by the owner/manager of the subcontractor. The first 
decision is about who should prepare the financial statements. Many mid-sized 
companies would be large enough to employ an internal accountant and, therefore the 
accountant would prepare the financial information. Small companies would not be able 
to afford to pay an internal accountant, but they could use their external accountant (for 
example, tax agent) to prepare the financial information. However, paying an accountant 
would cost money that small companies often did not have, so the financial information 
might often have been prepared by the owner/manager. It is assumed that security of 
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payments are not requested in reverse, that is, that subcontractors ask head contractors 
for financial information about their capacity to pay!  
There were two types of unlawful behaviour at this stage. First, honest mistakes were 
made by people who submitted financial information which was incorrect. This was 
particularly the case if the information was not provided by accountants, but rather by 
owners/managers. Second, false information was deliberately submitted with the 
intention to mislead others. This misleading information was often designed to help the 
company win the contract. It is unclear from the RCR who submitted this false 
information, other than it is known that it was done by unscrupulous individuals often 
called ‘rogue builders’. This phrase suggests false information was provided by 
owners/managers, therefore the inclusion of the word ‘builder’, however, this could refer 
to a company, which means that accountants might have been involved in submitting 
false information. However, it is most likely it was owner/managers who engaged in this 
unlawful behaviour.  
In the second process associated with security of payments, 1c. prequalification scrutiny, 
the company requesting the financial information, that is,  the head contractor, examined 
the information to assure that the contractor was financially healthy and capable of 
paying its bills through the life of the contract. This analysis would have been done by 
accountants. It was done unlawfully because companies who apparently ‘passed’ the 
scrutiny test were later found not to be able to pay their bills. This raises the question: 
how could accountants get this wrong? Was this financial analysis prepared incorrectly 
with deliberate intent or did it contain honest mistakes? The answer to these questions 
lies in the complex nature of the contracting system in the construction industry. Head 
contractors themselves would have to provide financial information to their customers, 
being the owner of the construction project. In this interaction, accountants at the 
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customer would request and then scrutinise the financial information of the head 
contractor. The head contractor accountants would be required to submit financial 
information to the customer’s accountant.  
Numerous case studies in the RCR show how head contractors were sometimes at the 
centre of security of payment problems. Does this mean that accountants interacting 
about the scrutiny of prequalification financial information engaged in unlawful 
behaviour? Did the customer accountant ask for the wrong information or interpret it 
incorrectly? Did the head contractor supply wrong information (honest mistake) or 
misleading information (intent)? The answer to these questions lies with the head 
contractor’s defence. In the Multiplex case, the head contractor argued that they delayed 
or withheld payment to subcontractors because the customer had not paid them progress 
payments. If the head contractor’s testimony is accepted, then the fault lies at the start of 
the contracting value chain with the customer. This suggests that there was no unlawful 
behaviour between the accountants in the head contractor’s submission of financial 
information to the customer and their scrutiny. However, it does suggest a flaw in the 
contracting system. Whereas the system works so that the company trying to win work is 
required to submit security of payment, financial information, there is no requirement for 
the company awarding the work to provide its contractors with security of payment.  
The process of scrutiny becomes more problematic further down the value chain. The 
head contractor’s accountant would have scrutinised the financial information of the 
subcontractors. In the case of mid-sized companies, this would have involved interaction 
between the head contractor’s accountant and the subcontractor’s accountant. In small 
companies, the head contractor’s accountant would have interacted with the 
owner/manager as they would not have employed an internal accountant. The problem in 
this interaction was that some unscrupulous individuals provided false information at 
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prequalification which failed to disclose the true financial health of the company. If the 
provider of the false information was accountants, then it may be concluded that 
accountants were involved in unlawful behaviour. However, accountants might also 
have engaged in inappropriate behaviour if they ignored (intent) or misinterpreted 
(honest mistake) financial information provided for scrutiny.  
In terms of examining the behaviour of the social networks surrounding the unlawful 
processes involving accountants and security of payments, two conclusions are drawn. 
First, the social networks were heterogeneous. The people making decisions about these 
processes would have been relatively large in number. Therefore, the network would 
have been relatively large. It might have included a number of accountants from firms at 
various stages in the value chain, including the customer, head contractor, subcontractor, 
and other smaller subcontractors, as well as management in the larger companies, 
owner/manager for smaller companies, and perhaps suppliers from the legal system if 
matters went to court. The accountant would have held some power in this network as 
the processes involved reporting and interpreting financial information and this would 
give them expert status. This power would be differentiated by the accountant’s position 
in the value chain. The further up the chain, for example head contractors, the more 
power the accountant would have held over other accountants. Management in large 
companies and owner/managers in smaller companies would have also held considerable 
power over the other network members as they controlled whether the others were 
employed. The shared mental model of this network would have been to win work and 
maintain cash flow, perhaps at any cost, as it represented their employment. It is likely 
the network would have operated with low trust as individuals tried to hide information.  
The social network operated under high constraint. Decisions would have been vertical, 
that is top down, and non-democratic, in the sense that the manager in large companies 
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and the owner/manager in smaller companies would have told the other network 
members what he/she wanted and that they were to implement that decision. Under these 
circumstances, accountants would have been under considerable pressure to scrutinise 
financial information about security of payment with a creative accounting approach. 
Their role would have been to scrutinise in a way that helped the other network 
members. This activity provides evidence of subjective accounting. 
Low density – Follow; Heterogeneity – Respect; Democratic - Expert 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant responds 
to a request from others to interact, where the accountant’s participation is valued by 
other stakeholders, and where the accountant’s opinion is more important than any other 
stakeholders. In this type of social network, the accountant would have influence in 
controlling the behaviour of other stakeholders involved in the activity. The accountant 
is only involved if invited, but then unlawful behaviour would have been challenged by 
the accountant, and this would have had some effect. There was one process which had 
these characteristics (1b) (3% of all unlawful processes listed in table 5.2). This process 
– a. recognise the payroll tax liability - was in payroll tax (1b) (50% of this activity’s 
processes). Using table 5.3 again to classify this process in terms of accounting practice, 
the payroll tax activity was about identification.  
This involves identifying transactions that affect the entity’s financial position, so that 
they able to be reliably measured and recorded. This process would have involved small 
social networks, largely the accountant working with one or two others, for example 
taxation authorities, asking for information.  These activities required the expertise of an 
accountant and, therefore, other stakeholders would have respected their capability as 
experts, and allowed them to do this work largely without interference. Given that 50% 
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of payroll tax processes were listed in this behaviour, further analysis is included in this 
section.  
In reconstructing the reality of how accountants were involved in payroll tax activity, it 
is necessary to determine whether accountants acted objectively and stood above all 
other organisational activity and acted as a type of guardian of the public interest or 
whether they acted subjectively because they were influenced by the social interactions 
within their organisational setting.  
The case for acting objectively is based on two assessments. First, what proportion of 
the payroll tax process involved accountants? Weak involvement in an activity 
associated with unlawful behaviour, such as  payroll tax, supports the case that 
accounting is objective. It suggests this was carried out independently of accounting. 
This implies that the inappropriate behaviour may not have occurred if accounting was 
involved. Strong involvement in an activity associated with unlawful behaviour, such as 
payroll tax, supports the case that accounting is subjective for it suggests that 
accountants had to change their behaviour in response to those who desired the 
behaviour. Second, to what degree would accountants working in these processes have 
followed the rules, that is, the accounting standards, with no adjustment or 
interpretation? No adjustment supports the case for accounting as objectivity; whereas 
adjustment supports subjectivity.  
On the first point, the proportion of payroll tax processes which involved accountants 
was 56% (5 of 9). This suggests that accounting was involved. On the second point, 
accountants working in these processes would have followed the rules more often than 
not. Only two of the five payroll tax processes involving accountants were associated 
with unlawful behaviour (see bold red processes in figure A1.3 in appendix 1). There is 
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evidence that construction companies complied with one of these processes, 1a. 
Recognise the payroll tax liability, when the PTA contacted them, and this often 
occurred through honest mistake rather than deliberate intent to avoid paying tax. The 
other process, 1b. calculate threshold figure, may have involved accountants using false 
information. It is likely that accountants would have had to adjust their behaviour in this 
process. Overall, this activity provides evidence of objective accounting. 
Low density – Alone; Heterogeneity – Respect; Democratic - Expert 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant where the 
accountant does the activity largely in isolation from others, where the accountant’s 
participation is valued by other stakeholders, and where the accountant’s opinion is more 
important than any other stakeholders. In this type of social network, the accountant 
would have strong influence in controlling the behaviour of other stakeholders involved 
in the activity. Therefore, if unlawful behaviour occurred, it would have been approved, 
and perhaps even encouraged by the accountant. There are eight processes which have 
these characteristics (22% of all unlawful processes listed in table 5.2). The majority of 
these processes (six) are in inappropriate payments activity (86% of this activity’s 
processes). One process is in employee entitlements (33% of this activity’s processes). 
One process is in payroll tax (50% of this activity’s processes). Using table 5.3 again to 
classify this process in terms of accounting practice, the inappropriate payments 
processes are mainly about identification.  
This involves accountants identifying business transactions. A business transaction is 
“an event that affects the financial position of an entity and can be reliably measured and 
recorded” (Birt et al. 2010, p. 4). Business transactions include: withdrawals of cash by 
the owners/investors, payment of wages and salaries, earning of fees revenue, and 
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payment of taxes and expenses. The accountant needs to keep track of events involving 
money at the entity. This is a core business activity for accountants. If there is unlawful 
behaviour associated with this activity, as found by the RC, this means that accountants 
must have been involved. This suggests that accounting was a subjective process and 
that accountants would have been under pressure from other stakeholders to engage in 
inappropriate payments. Given 86% of inappropriate payments processes were listed in 
this behaviour, further analysis is included in this section.  
The RC found inappropriate behaviour in the way the construction industry made and 
received payments. In an industry with such complex contractual arrangements, and the 
subsequent power differentials, along with higher than normal incidence of insolvency, 
there was significant cause for inappropriate payment behaviour and it became part of 
the industry culture.  
The construction industry’s inappropriate behaviour regarding making and receiving 
payments may be summarised into five issues: 
1. Buying industrial peace 
2. Including inappropriate payments in industrial agreements 
3. Delaying payments to employees, for example wage increases or other entitlements 
4. Unions demanding payment during industrial action 
5. Unions exerting pressure to ensure employee entitlements are paid 
For the purposes of this study, accounts payable is most interesting in terms of 
accountants’ role in authorizing payment. The RC identified the making and receipting 
of inappropriate payments as inappropriate behaviour by the construction industry. This 
means that someone within construction firms decided to pay for goods and services that 
were inappropriate, in other words, to give cash to a supplier for something the firm 
should not be purchasing. It also means that someone, in all likelihood accounts payable 
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staff, authorized the transaction, and recorded the payment as an expense. In this case, 
step two in the accounting process is being considered and the murky area of classifying 
expenses for recording in financial reports. It is called murky because it is unclear what 
exactly accounts payable staff did here, other than employ creative accounting to 
describe a transaction involving an inappropriate payment as something else, perhaps 
something appropriate, in the classification of expenses for the IS.  
The case for acting objectively is based on two assessments. First, what proportion of 
the payments process involved accountants? Weak involvement in an activity associated 
with unlawful behaviour, such as payments, supports the case that accounting is 
objective. This would mean the activity was carried out independently of accounting. On 
the other hand, strong involvement in an activity associated with unlawful behaviour, 
such as payments, supports the case that accounting is subjective. It reveals that 
accountants had to change their behaviour in response to those who desired the 
behaviour. Second, to what degree would accountants working in these processes have 
followed the rules, that is the accounting standards, with no adjustment or interpretation? 
No adjustment supports the case for accounting as objectivity; whereas adjustment 
supports subjectivity.  
The proportion of payments processes which involved accountants was 64% (9 of 14) 
(see appendix 1). This indicates that accounting was involved at a high level. 
Accountants working in these processes would have rarely followed the rules. All of the 
nine payments processes involving accountants were associated with unlawful 
behaviour. It is very likely that accountants would have had to adjust their behaviour in 
these processes. This supports the case for subjectivity. 
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The issue is whether accountants interacted with others in doing the tasks associated 
with payments or whether they did this work alone. The analysis suggests accountants 
would have been involved in nine of the fifteen processes associated with payments. Of 
these fifteen processes, our main interest is with those fourteen processes identified as 
involving unlawful behaviour. Of these fourteen processes, nine involved accountants. 
Therefore, it may be assumed that none of the nine processes involving accountants and 
payments were always conducted lawfully following accounting standards. This activity 
provides strong evidence of subjective accounting. 
Low density – Alone; Heterogeneity – Respect; Democratic - Advisor 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant where the 
accountant does the activity largely in isolation from others, where the accountant’s 
participation is valued by other stakeholders, and where the accountant’s opinion is 
advice. In this type of social network, the accountant would have some influence in 
controlling the behaviour of other stakeholders involved in the activity. Therefore, if 
unlawful behaviour occurred, it would have been approved, and perhaps even 
encouraged by the accountant. There was one process which has these characteristics 
(3% of all unlawful processes listed in table 5.2). The process was in inappropriate 
payments activity 14% of this activity’s processes). Using table 5.3 again to classify this 
process in terms of accounting practice, the inappropriate payments processes are mainly 
about identification.  
The process was 1.e Authorize payment. This is an important part of inappropriate 
payments because it represents the approval step. If accountants were approving 
inappropriate payments, this implicates them in unlawful behavior. However, the 
analysis shows that this process was slightly different from the other six inappropriate 
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payment processes listed in table 5.2 (see above). In this case, the accountant’s role is as 
an advisor, whereas in the other processes they are seen as experts. This means that in 
process 1e. accountants have less power and, therefore, less influence over unlawful 
activities. It suggests that accountants may be less involved in authorizing payment and 
that other stakeholders made final decisions. This activity provides evidence of objective 
accounting. 
Low density – Alone; Homogeneity – Enemy; Democratic - Expert 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant does the 
activity largely in isolation from others, where accountants are denied any contact, and 
where the accountant’s opinion is more important than any other stakeholders. In this 
type of social network, the accountant would have little influence in controlling the 
behaviour of other stakeholders involved in the activity. Accountants were excluded 
from social networks associated with these activities, because other stakeholders knew 
they would disapprove, and that they would be justified as they were experts. Therefore 
they had little effect on this unlawful behaviour. There were two processes which had 
these characteristics (5% of all unlawful processes listed in table 5.2). One process, 2b. 
code of practice, was in security of payments (25% of this activity’s processes). The 
other process, 2a. exceptions to accounting standards, was in profit manipulation (9% of 
this activity’s processes). Using table 5.3 again to classify this process in terms of 
accounting practice, these processes were about identification.  
This involves identifying transactions that affect the entity’s financial position, so that 
they are able to be reliably measured and recorded. These processes involved 
accountants developing appropriate ways to prepare financial statements. This was work 
only an accountant could do and, therefore, other stakeholders would have respected 
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their capability as experts, and allowed them to do this work largely without 
interference. However, these processes would have caused problems for unscrupulous 
individuals who wanted to engage in unlawful processes associated with the two 
activities – security of payments or profit manipulation (see table 5.3). These individuals 
would have seen accountants as the enemy and would have excluded them from social 
interaction involving these other processes. Accountants who tried to impose standards 
onto these unscrupulous individuals would have been avoided. This activity provides 
evidence of objective accounting. 
Low density – follow; Homogeneity – Outsider; Undemocratic - Challenge 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant responds 
to a request from others to interact, where secrets are held from the accountant, and 
where the accountant’s opinion is disputed by other stakeholders. In this type of social 
network, the accountant would have little influence in controlling the behaviour of other 
stakeholders involved in the activity. If accountants tried to discourage unlawful 
behaviour they would be challenged, and therefore they had little effect. There were 
three processes which had these characteristics (8% of all unlawful processes listed in 
table 5.2). These processes were all in profit manipulation (27% of this activity’s 
processes). Classifying this process in terms of accounting practice, using table 5.3 
again, the profit manipulation processes were about measurement, communication, and 
decision making.  
These processes would have involved small social networks, largely the accountant 
working alone with owners/managers who wanted to manipulate profit reporting. These 
activities would have been secretive. Decisions and information would have been 
withheld from the accountant. If the accountant became aware or involved and disagreed 
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with other stakeholders, the accountant’s opinion would have been challenged. Under 
these circumstances, it is likely the accountant would have been directed to cooperate. 
Given the high proportion of profit manipulation processes with these characteristics, 
further analysis is included in this section.  
The cases of Enron, Tyco, and Xerox provide evidence of the role of accountants in 
profit manipulation. They are useful for this study because the practice of profit 
manipulation was made publicly available through legal investigations by regulators, 
and also because their practices are considered widespread (Desai 2005, p. 171). In all 
three cases, the main stakeholder was management. Management engaged in self-
deception and the ability to disengage oneself from responsibility (Desai 2005, p. 190). 
This unethical behaviour at the top has the tendency to cascade throughout the 
organisation, in other words, to reach accountants. However, as Commissioner Cole did 
with the RC findings, investigators of these cases in the United States blame the system. 
Whereas Commissioner Cole criticises society for providing insufficient power for 
authorities to deal with inappropriate behaviour, in the United States investigators found 
a “system that allows managers to characterize income differently depending on the 
audience legitimizes earnings manipulation and permits managers a certain license” 
(Desai 2005, p. 190). While the inappropriate behaviour cannot be condoned, in both 
circumstances investigators have included society, here represented as the system, for 
allowing profit manipulation to occur.  
The proportion of profit manipulation processes which involved accountants was 64% 
(12 of the 13 processes) (see appendix 1). This suggests that accounting was involved at 
a high level; which supports the case for subjectivity. Accountants working in these 
processes have rarely followed the rules. 10 of the 12 profit manipulation processes 
involving accountants were associated with unlawful behaviour (see appendix 1). It is 
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very likely that accountants would have had to adjust their behaviour in these processes. 
This further supports the case for subjectivity. 
The problem processes would be included in several activities normally conducted by 
accountants. More specifically, in terms of identification, the accountant would have to 
keep track of payment of tax. In measurement, the accountant would need to continually 
assess payment of wages as it would increase expenses and reduce cash. In terms of 
communication this would have required reporting on the IS and CFS. In terms of 
decision making this would have involved advice to owners/managers about paying 
debts and may have involved communication via reporting (that is, falsifying reports) to 
investors.  This analysis shows that this problem process heavily involved accountants. 
The fact that this process was manipulated via creative accounting provides evidence for 
the case of accounting as subjectivity. Further evidence is provided by the amount of 
pressure exerted on accountants to be creative with this process. This activity provides 
evidence of subjective accounting. 
Low density – follow; Homogeneity – Outsider; Undemocratic - Ignored 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant responds 
to a request from others to interact, where secrets are held from the accountant, and 
where the accountant’s opinion is ignored by other stakeholders. In this type of social 
network, the accountant would have no influence in controlling the behaviour of other 
stakeholders involved in the activity. If accountants tried to discourage unlawful 
behaviour they would be ignored, and therefore they had no effect. There was one 
process which had these characteristics (3% of all unlawful processes listed in table 5.2). 
This process was in profit manipulation (27% of this activity’s processes). Classifying 
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this process in terms of accounting practice, using table 5.3 again, the profit 
manipulation process was about decision making.  
The process was 4a fraud. This is discussed in more detail later in section 6.3.2.2: 
Societal Contract Breach. This activity provides evidence of subjective accounting. 
Low density – follow; Homogeneity – Enemy; Undemocratic - Challenged 
Social networks with these characteristics are situations where the accountant responds 
to a request from others to interact, where the accountant is denied any contact with 
other stakeholders, and where the accountant’s opinion would be disputed. In this type 
of social network, the accountant would have little influence in controlling the behaviour 
of other stakeholders involved in the activity. Therefore, while unlawful behaviour may 
have been challenged by the accountant, this would have had no effect. There was one 
process which had these characteristics (3% of all unlawful processes listed in table 5.2). 
This process was in profit manipulation (9% of this activity’s processes). Classifying 
this process in terms of accounting practice, using table 5.3 again, the profit 
manipulation process was about decision making.  
The process was 4d.Recording forged transactions. This activity may be described as 
fraudulent and it would not be acceptable behaviour in the view of accountants. This is 
discussed in more detail later in section 6.2.5: Owners/Managers and General Public. 
This activity provides evidence of objective accounting. 
From this discussion, the main issue which emerges is whether accountants interacted 
with others in doing the tasks associated with profit manipulation, for example, or 
whether they did this work alone. The analysis suggests that accountants would have 
been involved in twelve of the 20 processes associated with profit manipulation. Of 
CHAPTER 5: ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE - RELATIONSHIPS 331 
these twelve processes, our main interest is with those eleven processes identified as 
involving unlawful behaviour. Of these eleven processes, ten involved accountants. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that only two of the twelve processes involving 
accountants and profit manipulation were always conducted lawfully following 
accounting standards.  
This analysis shows that accountants would have been heavily involved in profit 
manipulation activities. This activity provides strong evidence of subjective accounting. 
The analysis has identified four types of social practice involving accountants and other 
stakeholders in the construction industry.  
Figure 5.2 presents a conceptual model of this social practice. Four quadrants are 
identified based on the three themes of interaction, harmony and cohesion used as the 
analytical framework for this section.  
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Figure 6 - 5.2: Conceptual Summary of Accountants’ Social Practice 
Ideally, accounting social practice should be in the top right hand quadrant, trust. In this 
quadrant, the social networks are high density, strong harmony, and strong cohesion. 
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The relationships within this quadrant are close and the social network is efficient. The 
accountant works with other stakeholders to achieve mutual goals.  
The social practice described in the three remaining quadrants is less than ideal. In the 
top left hand quadrant, isolated, the social networks are low density, strong harmony, 
and weak cohesion. The relationships within this quadrant are distant and the social 
network is inefficient. The accountant is left alone but is respected if asked for an 
opinion. In the bottom right hand quadrant, police, the social networks are low density, 
weak harmony, and strong cohesion. The relationships within this quadrant are remote 
and the social network is efficient. The accountant is avoided, but others will follow 
their direction, if the accountant becomes aware or involved. In the bottom left hand 
quadrant, hostile, the social networks are low density, weak harmony, and weak 
cohesion. This is the worst case scenario of accounting social practice. The relationships 
within this quadrant are remote and the social network is inefficient. The accountant is 
excluded, and others will reject their direction, if the accountant becomes aware or 
involved. 
Next, the seven unlawful activities are mapped into the conceptual framework to 
summarise the nature of unlawful social practice involving accounting in the 
construction industry.  
 
Figure 7 - 5.3: Summary Map of Unlawful Behaviour involving Accountants 
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The percentages are the proportion of unlawful processes involving accountants for that 
activity. Figure 5.3 highlights the high proportion of accountant involvement. The figure 
helps identify where the seven unlawful activities most fit within the four types of 
accounting social practice identified by this study (see figure 5.2). For example, the two 
activities tax evasion and employee entitlements sit within the ‘trust’ quadrant. This 
means that these unlawful activities occur within the context of accountants’ traditional 
role as trusted expert. This is particularly concerning because it shows that even in 
circumstances where the role of accounting would be expected to be objective, that is 
follow the standards without any adjustments, unlawful behaviour still occurred.  
The findings will be examined further in chapter 7 and form the basis of the practical 
and policy guidelines produced by this research. Why this social practice involved 
unlawful behaviour is examined next.  
 
5.4 Conclusions  
The purpose of this chapter was to reconstruct the social reality of how accountants work 
within the construction industry. The chapter has examined the first of three constructs 
adopted from ST, relationships, to explore the social practice of accounting in the 
construction industry. From the analyses, this chapter provides three groups of findings: 
(1) understanding the nature of social interaction involving accountants and other 
stakeholders within the construction industry using SNA theory; (2) discussing whether 
social practice in the construction industry was ethical or managerial using ST; and (3) 
drawing conclusions about accountants’ relationships which lead to chapter six and 
further exploration of the impact and expectations.  
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The first findings relate to the nature of social interaction. Two dimensions of SNA 
theory were applied: explanatory mechanisms, which refer to how network ties are seen 
to function; and explanatory goals which refer to network outcomes. Explanatory 
mechanisms include patterns of interconnection. One of the characteristics used was 
density. Density is a positive factor in social networks because it measures frequency of 
interaction. The more density, the more opportunity to build and maintain relationships, 
which results in increased communication, trust, and social dependency. By contrast, 
low density indicates separateness, which results in isolation, mistrust, and conflict. 
The construction industry’s social networks were dominated by interaction between a 
few stakeholders, the owners/managers, trade unions, and regulators, who had high 
density within these networks. The remaining stakeholders, including accountants, had 
lower density. The research found that social interaction within the construction industry 
contradicted previous research on network density (Stone 2001; Anklam 2005). Sections 
2.2.4 (chapter 2) and 5.2.2.1 (chapter 5) provide details of this literature. SNA allows 
measures of social quality and social structure. Density is part of network structure. The 
structural measures are based on measuring connections. Density, is used to examine the 
interconnectedness of social networks (Stone 2001; Anklam 2005). Density is a positive 
factor in social networks because it measures frequency of interaction. The more density, 
the more opportunity to build and maintain relationships, which results in increased 
communication, trust, and social dependency. In contrast, low density indicates 
separateness, which results in isolation, mistrust, and conflict.  
The findings from chapter 5 contradicted previous research because it showed that high 
network density was not always a positive factor; rather it often had a negative impact 
on social relations. This contradiction with previous research is explained by differences 
in interacting with people and positions. When interacting with people, high network 
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density will often lead to positive social interactions, as individuals get to know one 
another and build a sense of trust and reciprocity. However, when dealing with positions, 
the individual becomes somewhat obsolete, particularly in adversarial situations such as 
the construction industry. People see the person they are interacting with as being from 
management or from the trade unions and they immediately adopt an adversarial 
position irrespective of their frequency of interaction. Their positions means they are not 
allowed the opportunity to like each other on a personal level.   
This finding is explained further by the different types of interaction between 
stakeholders identified by this research (see figure 5.1). It describes the social roles 
played. Whereas unions play multiple roles as advocates (for members), adversaries (for 
owners/managers), and whistle blowers (for regulators), the owners/managers are 
negotiators (for staff), and avoiders (for regulators), as well as adversaries (for trade 
unions). Accountants play the role of providing information and reporting. The study, 
therefore, contributes to understanding of explanatory mechanisms within SNA theory 
by explaining that high network density can create negative social interaction; and this is 
conceptualised by different social roles which distinguish positional interaction rather 
than people interaction.  
Explanatory goals include actor attitudes, beliefs and practices, as a function of social 
ties. Two measures were used: harmony and cohesion. These measures combined to 
explain the social behaviour of accountants associated with the unlawful activities 
identified by the RC. The first measure, harmony, was defined by levels of homogeneity 
and heterogeneity within the social network. Harmony indicates tolerance and respect 
between stakeholder groups. Strong harmony creates homogeneity. Homogenous 
networks generate equality, democracy and participation amongst all stakeholders. By 
contrast, weak harmony and cohesion creates heterogeneity. Heterogeneous networks 
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are characterized by fragmentation and discord, generated by inequality, repression, and 
exclusion. The list of processes associated with the unlawful activities identified by the 
RC had more heterogenous than homogeneous social networks. Almost two thirds 
(62%) of the 37 processes listed in table 5.2 were heterogenous, while about one third 
(38%) were homogeneous. This finding indicates that accountants’ social networks, 
defined as the social practice around each process outlined in table 5.2, were more likely 
to have harmony because they were respected or tolerated by other stakeholders. This 
was evident in certain unlawful activities including tax evasion, employee entitlements, 
payroll tax, and inappropriate payments. A significant proportion of accountants’ social 
networks had disharmony and lacked cohesion because they were seen as outsiders or 
the enemy. This was evident in phoenix company activities, security of payments, and 
profit manipulation. The analysis which follows table 5.2 varies in length in terms of the 
15 configurations of social behaviour presented. The longer sections refer to specific 
unlawful behaviours, such as inappropriate payments, which dominate a configuration. It 
provides opportunity to explore the nature of the behaviour within the social behaviour 
construct in more detail. Other configurations with one or two processes only are, 
understandably, much briefer discussions, and some, like fraud, are mentioned briefly 
and referred other sections which explore it in much more detail. 
The study here makes an important contribution to SNA theory. Whereas, previous 
research argues that harmony is a positive social practice, this study’s findings show that 
it can be a negative factor, particularly if the rest of the network is behaving unlawfully. 
In these circumstances, traditional measures of harmony such as homogeneity are 
actually a bad thing because it reveals that accountants, in this case, are accepting of the 
unlawful behaviour of the others within their social network. Therefore, the finding that 
two thirds of the accountants’ social networks are homogenous is actually a bad result. It 
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suggests that accountants did comply with unlawful behaviour in the following 
activities: tax evasion, employee entitlements, payroll tax, and inappropriate payments. 
Unlawful behaviour in these activities could not have occurred without accountants’ 
knowledge and, the findings suggest, without their cooperation.  
There is some defence for accountants doing the right thing. More than one third of 
social networks were heterogeneous, which means that accountants were excluded, 
mainly because unscrupulous individuals knew accountants would not cooperate with 
their unlawful behaviour. This suggests that in the following activities, phoenix 
company activities, security of payments, and profit manipulation was hidden from 
accountants or their advice was ignored. The second measure, cohesion, indicates 
efficient teamwork. It is defined by the democracy of accountants’ social networks in 
each process. High cohesion means shared control with other stakeholders involved in 
the unlawful activity. Low cohesion means no shared control. This measures how much 
accountants’ opinions were listened to by other stakeholders. Almost three quarters 
(73%) of the 37 processes listed in table 5.2 were democratic, while about one quarter 
(27%) were undemocratic. This finding indicates that accountants’ social networks, 
defined as the social practice around each process outlined in table 5.2, were more likely 
to have democracy because they were considered experts or advisors by other 
stakeholders. This was evident in certain unlawful activities including tax evasion, 
employee entitlements, payroll tax, and inappropriate payments. A significant proportion 
of accountants’ social networks were undemocratic and lacked efficiency because their 
opinion was challenged or ignored. This was evident in phoenix company activities and 
security of payments. Profit manipulation had elements of both but was slightly more 
undemocratic. 
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The study makes a further important contribution to SNA theory. Whereas, previous 
research argues that cohesion is a positive social practice, this study’s findings show that 
it can be a negative factor, particularly if the rest of the network is behaving unlawfully. 
In these circumstances, traditional measures of cohesion such as democracy are actually 
a bad thing because it reveals that accountants, in this case, are agreeing with the 
unlawful behaviour of the others within their social network. Therefore, the finding that 
three quarters of the accountants’ social networks are democratic is actually a bad result. 
It suggests that accountants did agree with unlawful behaviour in the following 
activities: tax evasion, employee entitlements, payroll tax, and inappropriate payments. 
Unlawful behaviour in these activities could not have occurred without accountants’ 
participation and, the findings suggest, without their agreement.  
The findings then presented several social network scenarios which summarised the 
three measures of accountants’ social practice: interaction, harmony, and cohesion. 
Fifteen scenarios were presented, each illustrating different combinations of the three 
measures. Of these fifteen scenarios, nine provided evidence for subjective accounting, 
and six for objective accounting. Overall, the analysis provides support for the argument 
that accounting is a subjective practice.  
The analysis identified four types of social practice involving accountants and other 
stakeholders in the construction industry, which was conceptualised as four quadrants: 
trust, police, isolated, and hostile (see figure 5.3).  The four quadrants are identified 
based on the three themes of interaction, harmony and cohesion used as the analytical 
framework for this section. Ideally, accounting social practice should be in the top right 
hand quadrant, trust. In this quadrant, the social networks are high density, strong 
harmony, and strong cohesion. The relationships within this quadrant are close and the 
social network is efficient. The accountant works with other stakeholders to achieve 
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mutual goals. However, as discussed above, the strong social networks in this quadrant 
are very concerning in terms of the role of accountants. The two unlawful activities 
mapped in this quadrant, tax evasion and employee entitlements (see figure 5.3), mean 
that accountants were interacting, complying, and agreeing with other stakeholders 
engaged in inappropriate behaviour associated with these activities. The trust role was 
abused by accountants who instead used this trust to work with, rather than against, 
stakeholders who breached the societal contract.  
The social practice described in the three remaining quadrants is less than ideal. In the 
top left hand quadrant, isolated, the social networks are low density, strong harmony, 
and weak cohesion.  The relationships within this quadrant are distant and the social 
network is inefficient. The accountant is left alone but is respected if asked for an 
opinion. The unlawful activities mapped in this quadrant, inappropriate payments and 
payroll tax, are done in isolation from accountants. There is evidence that accountants 
try to correct inappropriate behaviour if they become aware, but it is often kept hidden.  
In the bottom right hand quadrant, police, the social networks are low density, weak 
harmony, and strong cohesion. The relationships within this quadrant are remote and the 
social network is efficient. The accountant is avoided, but others will follow their 
direction, if the accountant becomes aware or involved. The unlawful activities mapped 
in this quadrant, phoenix companies, are done by owners/managers for specific 
purposes. If necessary, owners/managers will consult accountants for advice and will 
follow that advice as their aim is to manage their financial situation. However, much of 
the processes associated with phoenix companies can be done without accountants.  
In the bottom left hand quadrant, hostile, the social networks are low density, weak 
harmony, and weak cohesion. This is the worst case scenario of accounting social 
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practice. The relationships within this quadrant are remote and the social network is 
inefficient. The accountant is excluded and others will reject their opinion if the 
accountant becomes aware or involved. The unlawful activities mapped in this quadrant, 
security of payments and profit manipulation, are done by excluding accountants. 
Stakeholders who engage in these activities probably know accountants will not 
cooperate or agree with unlawful behaviours. Therefore, while this social practice is 
undesirable for accountants because they are excluded from the organisation’s financial 
activities, it is also a good result. On the positive side, the study found that accountants 
are not significantly involved in these unlawful activities. On the negative, if they were 
involved, they may have been unable to persuade unscrupulous individuals not to engage 
in unlawful behaviours.  
In summary, the chapter provided understanding of the relationships within the 
construction industry. It provided evidence for the managerial perspective of ST which 
argues that management will be likely to respond to the expectations of particular 
(typically powerful) stakeholders. This does not, however, support the ethical 
perspective of ST, which proposes that all stakeholders should be treated equally and 
that the (economic) power of various groups should not allow them to have differential 
influence over the firm. The outcome of this analysis is the social contracts which are 
‘negotiated’ with different stakeholder groups. The results argue that accounting is a 
subjective rather than objective process. Ideally, the seven unlawful activities mapped in 
figure 3 should be in the top right hand quadrant – trust – and accountants should be 
working closely with other stakeholders to ensure these activities are performed 
lawfully. Unfortunately that was not the case in the construction industry. In chapter 6 
the two remaining stakeholder constructs, impact and expectations, will be examined to 
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understand why accountants behaved this way and the outcomes in terms of the different 
social contracts.  
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CHAPTER 6: ACCOUNTING AS 
SOCIAL PRACTICE - IMPACT AND 
EXPECTATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine the second and third constructs, impact and expectations. It 
builds on chapter 5 by exploring why stakeholders behave the way they do in social 
relationships, which is impact, and then the outcomes of this behaviour, which is 
expectations. Impact is defined in terms of management’s willingness to listen to various 
stakeholder groups and adjust their behaviour accordingly (Gray, Owens & Adams 
1996). It examines the power or level of influence of each group. Chapter 5 introduced 
democracy as a measure of cohesion within social networks. Democracy indicates 
shared power or influence. It creates cohesion because decision making is efficient. 
Stakeholders show one another trust, respect, and tolerance creating equity within group 
dynamics. It allows people to find convergence, which is agreement, more quickly. 
Chapter 5 found that three quarters of the accountants’ social networks are democratic. 
However, it also found that this is actually a bad result. It suggests that accountants did 
agree with unlawful behaviour in the following activities: tax evasion, employee 
entitlements, payroll tax, and inappropriate payments. Unlawful behaviour in these 
activities could not have occurred without accountants’ participation and, the findings 
suggest, without their agreement.  
Chapter 6 explores the impact of these findings from chapter 5. It examines how 
accountants have been persuaded to comply with unlawful behaviours. The study looks 
at this from three perspectives. First, impact which is about management’s willingness to 
CHAPTER 6: ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE - IMPACT AND EXPECTATIONS 345 
listen to other stakeholders. In this study, this means whether people involved in 
unlawful behaviours were willing to accept accountants’ advice. This raises questions 
about accountants’ level of influence in the construction industry. If accounting is an 
objective practice, it may be inferred that unscrupulous individuals received advice from 
accountants but chose to ignore it. This assertion is based on the assumption that 
objective practice would always uphold appropriate financial behaviour, for example 
following accounting standards or taxation law. This places the blame for unlawful 
behaviour solely with other stakeholders and not accountants. If accounting is a 
subjective practice, this means that some accountants would have changed their advice 
depending upon their circumstances. This means some accountants would have adjusted 
their advice to assist management, with creative accounting, or they would have even 
actively participated in the unlawful behaviours, for example by aiding management in 
tax evasion. This suggests that accountants share the blame for unlawful behaviour.  
Chapter 5 found that a majority of social practice scenarios associated with the seven 
unlawful activities identified by the RC provided evidence that accounting is a 
subjective practice. Therefore, chapter 6 proceeds on that basis and focuses on the latter 
position: accountants changed their advice and/or actively participated in unlawful 
behaviours. This means that accountants were listened to and they did have a degree of 
influence in the construction industry. Chapter 5 found this was true, certainly in the 
case of tax evasion, employee entitlements and payroll tax. In some of the other 
unlawful activities, it may be argued that unscrupulous individuals tried to keep 
inappropriate behaviour hidden from accountants or chose to ignore their advice. 
However, chapter 5 certainly indicated that accountants were involved and most likely 
actively participated in social networks conducting unlawful activities. Therefore, ST’s 
perspective on impact is proven. While accountants had less influence than some other 
CHAPTER 6: ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE - IMPACT AND EXPECTATIONS 346 
stakeholders, they were listened to. Why accountants were willing to change their advice 
or actively participate in these unlawful activities is now examined.  
Commissioner Cole explained the cultural problems which led to the construction 
industry’s unlawful behaviours were being driven by self-interest. He was quite 
accepting of this self-interest and describes it as “understandable” (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 
12). In pursuing their individual interests, he felt stakeholders were behaving normally in 
the sense that it is to be expected. Indeed, Commissioner Cole concluded that in 
pursuing their different interests, these stakeholders “would not act inappropriately in 
any objective sense” (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 12). This then raises the question why the RC 
found behaviour associated with this self-interest unlawful and inappropriate conduct, 
and if so, why this had been allowed to continue. Commissioner Cole found that the 
switch from appropriate to inappropriate behaviour occurred due to conflicting time 
perspectives. Customers and companies had a short-term focus and the unions had a 
long-term focus. This created conflicts which exerted considerable pressure on these 
stakeholders, and an emerging power differential created opportunities to engage in 
unlawful behaviour. The measures used to explore Commissioner Cole’s perspective of 
self-interest are, therefore, short-term versus long term interests.  
The third perspective is provided by theory on power and politics. Whereas chapter 5 
used SNA theory to extend ST’s construct of relationships, chapter 6 uses power and 
politics theory to extend ST’s construct of impact. Power is traditionally defined as the 
ability to change other people’s behaviour so that they do what they want them to do 
(Myers, Hulks & Wiggins 2012). There are two views on power in the literature: power 
as an individual property and power as embedded in organisational structures and 
processes (Buchanan & Badham 2008). This is best expressed by defining the cause of 
power: 
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• Positional power: derived from your personal position, for example 
owners/managers would have strong positional power 
• Coercive power: your ability to threaten others and carry out your threats, for 
example trade unions would have strong coercive power 
• Expert power: derived from knowledge and experience, for example accountants 
would have strong expert power  
• Reward power: your ability to reward others for example human resource 
management have strong reward power 
• Personal of referent power: based on others liking you for example this may be 
close personal relationships necessary to win contracts. 
• Information power: derived from access to data, for example regulators would 
have strong information power.  
Power translates into organisational politics. Political behaviour sometimes takes the 
form of two or more parties publicly fighting their differences. However, it is usually 
much more subtle (Myers, Hulks & Wiggins 2012). In many cases politics occurs 
completely under the surface of public dialogue (Kotter & Schlesinger 1979). Aristotle 
advocated politics as means of reconciling need for unity in the community with 
recognition there were diverse interests (Myers, Hulks & Wiggins 2012). The 
operationalization of political behaviour in this chapter is how stakeholders persuaded 
others to comply with unlawful activities, to achieve unity within their social networks.  
The third construct from ST is expectations. Expectations may be defined in terms of the 
social contract for each stakeholder group. It answers questions about what each of the 
groups expect of accounting, and how these expectations differ. This study proposes that 
the construction industry’s stakeholder groups will have different social contracts with 
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accountants employed by the industry. This will be manifested in differences compared 
with the overall social contract, that is, the RC and between the expectations of the 
various groups.  
In summary, ST identifies the various groups with a vested interest in the industry, but 
also their different expectations of accounting practice, manifested as multiple social 
contracts. The unlawful behaviour associated with other construction industry activities 
suggests that the industry tended to adopt a managerial rather than ethical perspective on 
stakeholder expectations. Clearly, not all stakeholder groups are equal in the 
construction industry. Questions raised include whether differences in power within 
these groups create conflict over accounting practice. If so, who was in control and what 
were their expectations of accounting within the industry. ST allows an opportunity to 
further examine the tension between accounting as an objective rule-based system versus 
a subjective reality. It allows comparison of the role of accounting in the construction 
industry, whether the role was based on a sense of responsibility, that is, doing the right 
thing or whether it was about demand, that is, meeting the interests of the most powerful 
stakeholders. SNA will be used to enhance ST by examining the macro level interactions 




This section examines the impact of the social relationships between the construction 
industry’s stakeholders. Impact may be defined in terms of management’s willingness to 
listen to various stakeholder groups and adjust their behaviour accordingly. It measures 
the power or level of influence of each group. The managerial perspective of ST argues 
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that management will be likely to respond to the expectations of particular (typically 
powerful) stakeholders (Gray, Owens & Adams 1996, p. 45). A fundamental cause of 
the problems that led to the RC was that the industry’s management were influenced by 
the demands of different stakeholders, the unions in particular. The RC also found non-
industrial relations issues such as tax evasion and unlawful acceptance and reporting of 
commissions/cash payments. This raises the question of which stakeholder groups 
influenced these behaviours and why. 
The construction industry is a complex industry, with significant interaction between 
external stakeholders due to the nature of the contracting process. This complexity 
generated conflicting stakeholder interests. Fundamental to this conflict was self-
interest, particularly the desire for survival, often at the expense of others. Commissioner 
Cole stated: “representatives of certain segments of the industry naturally endeavour to 
maximise the interests of the sector they represent” (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 12). For 
example, unions seek to advance the interests of their members; companies seek to 
maximise their profits; and governments see their interests from their role as major 
clients of the industry, but they are also important regulators (Cole 2003, vol. 2, p. 12).  
This then raises the question why the RC found behaviour associated with this self-
interest unlawful and inappropriate conduct, and if so, why this had been allowed to 
continue. Commissioner Cole found that the switch from appropriate to inappropriate 
behaviour occurred due to conflicting time perspectives. Customers and companies had a 
short-term focus and the unions had a long-term focus. This created conflicts which 
exerted considerable pressure on these stakeholders, and emerging power differential 
created opportunities to engage in unlawful behaviour.  
The RC found that: 
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The unlawful and inappropriate practices occur because of a clash between the 
short term project profitability focus of the providers of capital, clients, head 
contractors and subcontractors on the one hand, and the long term aspirations of 
the union movement, especially the CFMEU, to dominate, control and regulate 
the industry for its benefit and what it perceives to be the benefit of its members, 
on the other hand (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 10).  
Those stakeholders with long-term interests, that is the unions, were aware that those 
with a short term focus were vulnerable to project delay and cost. Those stakeholders 
with a short-term focus knew that to “surrender to demands” was “the better immediate 
economic alternative to long drawn out conflict” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 10). This created 
an “inequality of bargaining power” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 10) which led to “quick fix 
solutions” driven by “commercial expediency” which “supplanted insistence on legal 
rights, adherence to ethical and legal norms and the pursuit of legal remedies” (Cole 
2003, vol. 3, p. 10). In other words, the contractors felt they had no choice but to comply 
with union demands. The quick fix solutions were where self-interest spilled over into 
unlawful and even illegal behaviour. This was relevant to profit reporting because 
contractors were under enormous pressure to make a profit. Their willingness to 
succumb to the quick fix solutions was not fully disclosed in their profit reporting. Much 
of the inappropriate behaviour was a result of pressures on the profit and loss statement 
created by conflicting self-interest amongst these industry stakeholders.  
The analysis which follows will examine who had power, the nature of this power, and 
how they used it to persuade other stakeholders to do what they wanted. The focus in 
this analysis is on understanding the interaction between owners/managers and other 
stakeholders. The aim is to establish which stakeholders held power over whom.  
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6.2.2 Unions and Owners/Managers 
The main battle for power between stakeholders was between owner/managers and 
unions. The RC contains considerable evidence that the unions tried to exert power over 
owners/managers. The first impact of this behaviour was unions threatening to expose 
employers to regulators. The most common threat was to expose tax evasion. There is 
considerable evidence throughout the RCR about the unions threatening employers with 
exposure to the ATO. In effect, the unions coerced employers to cooperate with 
industrial demands. Failure to cooperate meant the unions would go to the ATO and 
claim that the company was doing something illegal regarding taxation payments. This 
was a type of industrial extortion or blackmail. The widespread use of this threat, and the 
frequency of cooperation by employers in response to the threat, indicates that tax 
evasion was common. The unions knew that construction companies engaged in tax 
evasion and they used this knowledge to intimidate and threaten employers with 
disclosure. The unions’ behaviour is strong evidence that tax evasion was commonplace. 
The following extract illustrates a typical exchange between a union official (Ferguson) 
and an employer (Hackett): 
In the Hackett Laboratory Services Pty Ltd (Hacketts) case study, that company 
did not have a union-endorsed enterprise bargaining agreement. In May 2000 
Ferguson attended a meeting with representatives of Hacketts and said he wanted 
Hacketts to take up a CFMEU endorsed enterprise bargaining agreement. He said 
‘I want a deal and I want it today’, that he had friends in the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO), and could have the company ‘go down the tube’ and have Mr 
Hackett, a director of the company, put in gaol on tax matters (Cole 2003, vol. 3, 
p. 17). 
In this extract, the strength of the threat by the unions is found in the emotive language 
used. Not only was the union official threatening accusations of tax evasion to the ATO, 
he was reinforcing the consequences of enforcing the threat. The use of the phrase ‘go 
down the tube’ threatens business closure. The failure of a business must be one of the 
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serious fears of any employer at it affects their livelihood and reputation. The threat of 
going to jail is also designed to evoke the greatest possible reaction from the employer, 
Hackett, as it threatens an individual’s personal freedom. In this extract, the union 
official has not only threatened to make accusations of tax evasion to the authorities, but 
also the employer’s livelihood and freedom. The use of language and threats are 
intimidating and designed to gain maximum benefit for the person issuing the threat, 
being the union official.  
The case involving Hackett Laboratories and the CFMEU further illustrates the 
aggressive language used by union officials to coerce compliance with their demands. 
This case was about getting Hackett to agree to sign a new EBA. The CFMEU official, 
Ferguson, told the company’s owner, Hackett, that “I want a deal and I want it today” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 59). This is very uncompromising language and asserts the union 
official’s dominance in this relationship and how he used his power to demand 
cooperation. “Ferguson then said he had friends in the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 
and he could have the company ‘go down the tube’ and have Hackett put in gaol on tax 
matters” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 59). These are very hostile threats to Hackett’s business 
survival, livelihood, and personal freedom. He must have been under considerable 
pressure to comply with the union. Ferguson supported his threat by stating that he “had 
information from the ATO that Hackett Laboratory had tax problems” (Cole 2003, vol. 
13, p. 59). It is unlikely that the ATO would provide such information to Ferguson. 
Other union officials complained to the RC that the ATO did not cooperate with them by 
exchanging information about tax evasion. Nevertheless, Ferguson exerted this pressure 
on Hackett. Ferguson then introduced money into the exchange. Not satisfied with an 
EBA agreement, Ferguson said “that a claim that the CFMEU had put in for workers’ 
compensation and a wage claim from a past employee on a previous contract still had to 
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be paid” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 59). A witness told the RC that “the CFMEU had put in 
the ‘usual exaggerated claim’ of $24 000 for the past employee”, which Ferguson said 
“he would reduce that to $5 000 if his demands were met” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 59). 
The use of the phrase “usually exaggerated claim” suggests that unions often engaged in 
making exorbitant financial claims; and the reduction in financial demands reveals the 
capacity to negotiate on these false claims. 
The unions were aware of tax evasion activity at least thirteen years before the RC as 
early as July 1990, when the Royal Commission into Productivity in the Building 
Industry in New South Wales (Gyles 1992). The National Secretary of the Building 
Workers' Industrial Union of Australia (BWIU) later complained that “From day one … 
the union called upon Commissioner Gyles to investigate … illegal behaviour in relation 
to tax avoidance, ‘cash in hand’ payments, under-payments of wages and breaches of 
safety and award regulations” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 37). Gyles (1992) had ignored the 
claims. This incident shows that union officials were willing to disclose tax evasion and 
other unlawful behaviour at this time; well before the RC. It suggests that the use of 
coercion by the unions was probably very well established industry behaviour in the 
decade before the RC and also that tax evasion was common behaviour well before the 
RC.  
Commissioner Cole found that the “culture of lawlessness” was so embedded within the 
construction industry that “participants in the industry instinctively succumb to the 
exercise of industrial muscle in the interests of commercial expediency and survival” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 211). These employers “prefer to capitulate to unlawful or 
otherwise inappropriate demands or to allow unlawful or otherwise inappropriate 
practices to continue, rather than resort to the law to enforce their rights” (Cole 2003 vol. 
3, p. 211). Commissioner Cole explains that if employers try to enforce their legal rights, 
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they will “risk, at best, raising the ire of other participants in the industry and at worst, 
making a martyr of oneself and putting one’s business and livelihood at risk” (Cole 
2003, vol. 3, p. 211). This means the risks outweigh the benefits of seeking to enforce 
legal rights. Commissioner Cole portrays employers as the victims. This language is 
very sympathetic towards employers and the use of words such as “succumb” and 
“capitulate” suggests the pressure being exerted on employers. The description of the 
unions as “industrial muscle” illustrates the use of force. The word “martyr” is very 
evocative and suggests strong support for employers in the face of union pressure.  
Commissioner Cole found that one of the reasons that unions tried to coerce employers 
with threats about taxation disclosure was so that they agreed to EBA’s. Commissioner 
Cole found “a number of subcontractors who have refused to enter in EBA’s with the 
CFMEU have been the subject of unwarranted occupational health and safety complaints 
and complaints to taxation, environmental, workplace safety and workers compensation 
authorities” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 15). He added that “those complaints, or threats of 
complaints, have been made by union officials for the purpose of applying pressure on 
subcontractors to enter into EBA’s with the CFMEU” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 15). There 
are numerous examples and case studies in the RCR. The following analysis highlights 
some of the main findings. The following case involves The Civil Management Group 
Pty Ltd (Civil Management Group) in New South Wales.  
Mr Peter Primmer, an organiser employed by the CFMEU in its Construction and 
General Division, New South Wales Divisional Branch, sought entry to a site 
without prior notice to look around and inspect the machinery. He produced a 
union card which identified him as a union official. The site foreman, Mr Russell 
Larkham, refused to allow the organiser to enter the site and asked him to leave. 
Primmer then asked whether the workers on site had Australian Business 
Numbers (ABNs) or whether they were paid wages. Larkham told Primmer that 
as far as he was aware, the workers were on ABNs. Primmer told Larkham he 
would ensure the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and WorkCover visited the 
site. Larkham asked Primmer to leave three more times and threatened to call the 
police. Each time, Primmer started ranting. He asked Larkham if Larkham was 
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preventing him from performing a safety inspection. Primmer told Larkham he 
was going to shut the site down and shut down other sites where the company 
was working. Primmer finally left after Larkham told him he had called the 
police. On his way out, Primmer again told Larkham he would have the ATO 
and WorkCover attend the site. He asked Larkham what other sites Civil 
Management Group was working on and said he would close down all other 
Civil Management Group jobs. Primmer told Larkham to ‘get your boss down 
here and tell him to bring his cheque book. You’ll lose your job over this; I’ll see 
that you’ll lose your job’ (Cole 2003, vol. 7, pp. 176-177). 
In this case, the issue surrounds the right of the union official, Primmer, to enter the 
building site. Primmer wanted to enter the site to inspect the machinery; presumably for 
occupational health and safety concerns. The employer representative, Larkham, did not 
want Primmer to enter the site; because he (Primmer) had not made an appointment and 
he (Larkham) wanted time to prepare for an inspection of equipment. There were a 
number of serious threats made by both parties. Primmer began with threats associated 
with tax evasion, whether the workers had ABN’s. This inferred that the employer was 
doing business illegally. In response, Larkham threatened to call the police. Both parties 
were using threats based on having the law on their side. Primmer argued the authorities, 
the ATO, were on his side, and that Larkham risked getting into trouble with the ATO 
because his workers were doing something illegal: not having an ABN was a means to 
avoid paying tax, due to cash payments instead. Larkham, on the other hand, was saying 
the police were on his side and that if he called them they would visit the site and eject 
Primmer. As the owner of the building site, Larkham felt he had the right to deny 
Primmer entry and that the police would support him. Primmer then resorts to threat to 
livelihood and attacks both the company’s survival, he would close the company down, 
and also Larkham’s livelihood, “you’ll lose your job”. The exchange reveals the level of 
animosity in the relationships between employers and contractors and the extent of 
threats both sides were willing to raise.  
CHAPTER 6: ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE - IMPACT AND EXPECTATIONS 356 
Commissioner Cole found numerous threats by union officials to employers had 
recurring themes across different sized companies and across all states of Australia: 
threat to company survival and/or employers’ livelihood or job and the use of the ATO 
as the tool used for coercion. The following was a typical exchange: 
The Australian Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers’ 
Federation (Queensland Branch) Union of Employees (BLF Q), Mr Jamie 
McHugh, told a contractor, in relation to a single employee who was not a union 
member, ‘If you don’t have him in the union you’ll be off this job’. When later 
challenged about the worker’s right to freedom of association, McHugh said: 
Well, I’m going to speak to [the head contractor] so you won’t have any work of 
theirs on the Gold Coast; and I’m going to get the taxation department to go 
through [the contractor’s] books. That’ll fix you (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 243, 
emphasis in the original). 
There were numerous examples scattered throughout the RCR of union officials using 
tax evasion as a form of coercion. On some occasions when rights of entry were 
challenged and entry to a building site denied , CFMEU organisers “resorted to making 
threats to get the site foreman sacked or the subcontractor removed from the site, or to 
call in the Australian Taxation Office, WorkCover NSW or other government bodies” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 12, p. 52).  
The Cables at Cammeray site case study in volume thirteen of the RCR provides an 
opportunity for detailed analysis of the union official’s behaviour regarding tax evasion 
and coercion. The aim is to identify whether accountants would have been involved in 
these types of situations. The case study describes that Mr Wayne Holland was the 
Construction Manager for Manu Enterprises Pty Ltd (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 33). The 
case describes Holland’s interaction with union official Mitchell, when Manu 
Enterprises was engaged on the Cables at Cammeray site to construct 23 residential 
apartments and three retail shops. “The project was valued at $5.5 million” (Cole 2003, 
vol. 13, p. 33). Ball was a subcontractor employed by Manu on the project.  
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On 11 February 2002 Holland met Mitchell at the site. Mitchell told Holland he 
wanted Ball off the site and out of business. Holland replied that he had no 
reason to terminate Ball’s contract. Mitchell told Holland that Manu had to get 
rid of Ball or the union would see that Manu ‘went down too’. Mitchell told 
Holland that Ball was a ‘shonk’; did not pay his workers or have any insurance 
and had been run off the Promenade site at Manly. Mitchell conducted a site 
safety inspection. Mitchell told Holland he could arrange for a range of audits of 
workers compensation, tax, immigration and insurance. While on site, Mitchell 
telephoned Mr Brian Parker, Branch Assistant Secretary of the Construction, 
Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, Construction and General Division, New 
South Wales Divisional Branch, and handed the telephone to Holland. Parker 
asked to speak to Holland about Enterprise Bargaining Agreements (EBAs) at a 
meeting at the union’s offices at 2.30 pm on 12 February 2002. Parker talked 
about coming on site and addressing safety issues, wages books, workers 
compensation certificates, superannuation and a range of other matters. On 12 
February 2002 at about 2 pm Holland telephoned Parker and told him that he 
would not be attending the proposed meeting because Ball’s statutory 
requirements were in order. Parker told Holland if he did not attend the meeting, 
there would be consequences. Parker said the CFMEU would stop all Manu’s 
jobs; stop all the subcontractors on site; call WorkCover out on site; call the 
Department of Immigration out to the site; and call the Taxation Office to 
conduct audits on Manu and all its subcontractors. Parker said Ball was a ‘shonk’ 
and the CFMEU was going to get rid of him (Cole 2003, vol. 13, pp. 33-34).  
Commissioner Cole concluded that the case study illustrates: 
a. the role that a union, through an organiser, seeks to play as the arbiter of who 
should work in the industry; 
b. the methodology employed by a union organiser to achieve the industrial 
objectives of the union, namely, to: 
i. raise safety issues; and 
ii. threaten inspections regarding workers compensation, tax, immigration 
and insurance. This threat is made not because of any true concerns 
regarding these matters, but because the organiser knows that such 
inspections will cause disruption to the work, involve cost and loss to the 
builder, and the likelihood that the builder will acquiesce in the union’s 
demands, rather than suffer the disruption and loss (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 
37). 
It is an interesting case as it shows the language and behaviour of union officials to 
achieve their goals. It is threatening and intimidating. Unions would exert industrial 
pressure on employers to ensure their members were paid; including employee 
entitlements such as superannuation payments (see section 6.3.3: Employee Entitlements 
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for more). While this is a legitimate activity, the unions often went about achieving this 
aim illegitimately. The RC found that “unions often disclose details about a 
subcontractor’s arrears in superannuation contributions … to a head contractor, as a 
means of causing the head contractor to exert pressure on the subcontractor to bring 
contributions up to date” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 22). The unions had power over the 
contractors because they could exert industrial pressure, for example strike action 
causing project delays. The unions also knew that the contractors held power over 
subcontractors because they could withhold progress payments from a subcontractor. 
Even though their subcontractors’ superannuation payments may not appear to be any 
business of the contractor, the unions made it their business by threatening industrial 
action. The contractors had no choice but to respond by exerting pressure on their 
subcontractors to make payments. This created a difficult situation for struggling 
subcontractors. Should they risk not being paid by their contractor due to union pressure, 
or should they delay or withhold their own payments to their employees by not making 
superannuation payments? In either case the subcontractor’s cash flow is negatively 
impacted, and the best decision is to comply with super payments to ensure they are paid 
by the contractor. 
The RC provided an excellent case study, Lavarack Barracks, for examining how unions 
used project agreements in an unlawful way. The following extract summarises the case: 
Lavarack Barracks in Townsville, Queensland, has the largest population of any 
Army Base in Australia. It was almost entirely rebuilt during the 1990s. There 
were four stages in the redevelopment. Stage two was approved in mid-1998, 
with a budget of $139 million, and work began on the project late-1999. Thiess 
was engaged as the managing contractor. The Code and the Implementation 
Guidelines applied to the project. A fundamental premise of the Code and 
Guidelines is that the terms and conditions of employment on the site are worked 
out at the enterprise level. The Queensland Statement of Intent, which was and is 
not a registered agreement, requires employers to make weekly contributions to 
named superannuation and redundancy schemes on behalf of each of their 
employees. 
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From the beginning of Stage two of the project there was explicit union pressure 
to make such payments in relation to Stage two. The unions contended that such 
payments were ‘standard’ and thus required to be made. The CFMEU said that it 
wanted to use Lavarack as a test case in relation to the Code. The managing 
contractor, Thiess, was not itself opposed to a project agreement but it recognised 
that it needed Commonwealth approval to enter into a project agreement. 
The initial response of the Commonwealth, through the Department of Defence, 
was that a project agreement was unacceptable. A substantial nationwide union 
campaign against Thiess, then ensued putting Thiess under considerable pressure 
and also resulting in considerable delays on the Lavarack Barracks site itself. The 
expressed union view was that the Code was only a policy with no legal force, 
and that its experience throughout Australia was that generally there was a ‘way 
around’ the Code. The threat was also made that Lavarack Barracks would 
become a political battle ground over this issue, to the detriment of Thiess and 
the project itself. Thiess therefore sought to argue that there was a demonstrable 
benefit to the Commonwealth in having a project agreement, even though this 
might result in increased costs of up to $3.62 million. Defence decided to 
authorise Thiess to negotiate a project agreement, provided it otherwise complied 
with the Code and the Implementation Guidelines. Defence also advised that in 
general ‘the Queensland Statement of Intent is not an appropriate basis for 
negotiating a project agreement’. This was, and was said to be, because of the 
inconsistencies between the Statement of Intent, and the Code and the 
Implementation Guidelines. 
The union’s demand that Thiess depart from the Code was known to Defence to 
be a recurrent feature of the dispute, and despite the fact that Thiess was openly 
putting pressure on the subcontractors for them to make the redundancy and 
superannuation payments, which the Code prohibited (Cole 200, vol. 7, pp. 126-
128).  
This case provides several findings in terms of the political power of the construction 
industry trade unions and how union officials exerted this power. The unions did not use 
this power to direct owners/managers to conduct unlawful financial activities. The 
construction companies engaged in unlawful behaviours in response to union pressure 
however these activities were decisions taken by the companies themselves. The unions 
would argue they were only exerting pressure to ensure their members, employees of the 
construction companies and sub-contractor, were paid what they were entitled to. The 
case also highlights how regulators’ attempt to improve unlawful behaviour in the 
industry was largely unsuccessful.  
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Another means used by unions to demand financial contributions was a practice called 
“dual ticketing”. This practice begins with coercion to ensure employees are union 
members. For example, a contractor was told by an organiser for the CFMEU, 
Construction and General Division, Victorian Building Unions Divisional Branch, “that 
if his employees wanted to work in the city they had to join the union, and that it did not 
matter how small the job was” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 241). A response from some 
employers was to purchase “casual tickets as a means of avoiding industrial disruption is 
a problem” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 241). Commissioner Cole provided an interesting case 
study to illustrate: 
The evidence in relation to Westfield Design and Construction Pty Ltd 
(Westfield) in Victoria is a good illustration. The evidence was that, as a rule of 
thumb, Westfield purchases two CFMEU tickets per shop in its shopping centre 
developments to minimise the risk of the CFMEU causing industrial unrest 
during the fit-out stage, when any disruption will be likely to delay completion 
and the opening of the shopping centre. In November 1998, for example, 
Westfield paid $18 500 to the CFMEU for 100 union tickets, notionally for 
workers on the Airport West project. No individuals became members as a 
consequence of the payment. Similar payments were made on other Westfield 
redevelopment projects (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 241). 
This is a particularly interesting case because it reveals evidence about accounting 
practice associated with making and receiving payments. The $18 500 funds would have 
been authorised as a legitimate expense (see process 2c in figure A1.5 in appendix 1) 
and may even have been in response to a legitimate invoice from the union (see process 
1b in figure A1.5 in appendix 1), with both recorded as union membership fees. 
However, what happened when it was realised that no actual employees became 
members? Was the payment made with an awareness that employees would not actually 
join the union, or did this awareness come afterwards? These are important questions in 
reflecting upon the role of accountants in this type of activity.  
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The RC also found that this behaviour was long-standing. Since about 1997 some head 
contractors had implemented a “no union-endorsed enterprise bargaining agreement, no 
start policy” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 11). The major reason head contractors apply pressure 
on subcontractors to make such EBA’s was to avoid industrial action, which would 
“result in heavy liquidated damages payments where contractual deadlines are not met, 
and to avoid difficulties and delays due to minor, trivial or spurious occupational health 
and safety breaches being repeatedly raised by unions thus causing disruption or loss” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 11). This finding illustrates how much power the unions exerted 
over the complex contractual arrangements in the construction industry. The unions 
coerced EBA’s onto contractors who, in turn, demanded that their subcontractors also 
complied with the EBA. The EBA extorted inappropriate payments from contractors and 
subcontractors in return for industrial peace. 
Making inappropriate payments was a mechanism for unions to exert their power over 
owners/managers. Associated with buying industrial peace, some unions negotiated 
workplace agreements with contractors which included inappropriate payments in the 
agreements. Although unregistered, these agreements were the unions’ mechanism for 
enforcing their demands upon the contractors. The RC found that unregistered 
agreements between some large contractors and some unions were made in two States. 
“In Victoria the agreement was known as the Victorian Building Industry Agreement 
and in Queensland (VBIA) the document was known as the Queensland Construction 
Sector Statement of Intent” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 10). These agreements fulfil many of 
the functions of project or site agreements, and “are prescriptive on a range of matters 
including working hours, rostered days off, leave entitlements, redundancy payments, 
dispute resolution and the payment of site allowances” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 10). A 
framework of site allowances, operated in New South Wales, known as the “Sydney 
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Matrix” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 11). “Each site in the Sydney CBD and many in the 
suburbs and beyond attract payments at rates specified in the Matrix, according to the 
dollar value of the project, regardless of what other industrial instruments are in place” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 11). 
If the union engages in industrial action such as work stoppage, union members involved 
in the stoppage are not paid for that time period. For example, if the union directs its 
members not to work on Friday, those employees who follow the union’s directions and 
do not work on Friday will not be paid for that day. However, the RC found that the 
unions had identified a loophole where they could ensure their members were paid even 
while absent from work during industrial action. Commissioner Cole found that there 
were situations where safety has been claimed merely to justify the payment of wages 
for the duration of stoppages over other unrelated workplace issues (Cole 2003, vol. 15, 
p. 42). In these circumstances, the unions have claimed that occupational work and 
safety issues mean the worksite is unsafe for their members. By declaring the site unsafe, 
employees are still entitled to be paid. However, when this occurs during a period of 
industrial action, then it raises questions about whether the site is really unsafe or 
whether the unions are using it as an excuse to ensure their members are still paid whilst 
taking strike action.  
6.2.3 Owners/Managers and Staff 
The relationship between owners/managers and staff was different. In this case, 
owners/managers held power over staff and exploited them for financial gain. 
Owners/managers had three types of relationships with staff. First, full-time employees 
were exploited by owners/managers by withholding or refusing to pay employee 
entitlements.  
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There was legislative protection of subcontractors to be paid employee entitlements by 
the employer (known as the head contractor) as a way of addressing deliberate 
underpayment of employee entitlements. In New South Wales, the Industrial Relations 
Act 1996 (NSW), s127, provides that “a principal may be liable for payment of 
remuneration to employees who have not been paid for work done in connection with a 
business undertaking of the principal contractor” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 26). This gave 
employees scope to take legal action against employers for unpaid employee 
entitlements, even if they were considered subcontractors. The type of employee 
entitlements includes “superannuation and in some cases redundancy fund, income 
protection fund, and long service leave fund contributions” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 26). 
The problem was that this legislative protection was not uniform across the other states. 
Only Queensland had something similar, but there employers, head contractors, were 
only liable for wages of the employees of subcontractors in some circumstances, but this 
did not extend to other entitlements (Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld), Chapter 11, 
Part 2).  
Inappropriate payment activity involved delaying or withholding payments and incorrect 
recording of transactions. The former mainly involved external interactions, that is, 
contractors delaying or withholding payments from subcontractors. However, it also 
included delays in payments to employees. Commissioner Cole found that EBA’s was a 
forum for contractors to delay payments of employee entitlements, for example wage 
increases. He argued that “it is in the interests of all parties for agreement to be reached 
on the terms of a new enterprise bargaining agreement before any existing agreement 
reaches its nominal expiry date” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 64). In order to be able to achieve 
this, Commissioner Cole indicated a need for legislative provisions for new EBA’s to be 
concluded prior to the expiry date of existing EBA (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 64). 
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Some unscrupulous contractors delayed paying employees wage increases as a way of 
improving their cash flow. When employees engage in enterprise bargaining to protect 
and perhaps improve their working conditions the outcomes of the bargaining should 
commence as soon as possible so that employees receive their agreed entitlements. 
Commissioner Cole argued that an important incentive for the timely completion of 
enterprise bargaining negotiations would be “statutory prohibition on agreements 
providing for retrospective payments of any monetary benefits to employees” (Cole 
2003, vol. 5, p. 64). In other words, Commissioner Cole wanted legislation which 
prevented owners/managers from delaying payment of employee entitlements. Delays 
added risk because construction companies regularly went out of business meaning 
employees were not paid what they were entitled to. Ideally, entitlements should be paid 
when they were due and when the company was solvent and in a position to pay.  
The RC also found substantial evidence of “underpayment or miscalculation of workers’ 
wages and entitlements” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 202). Underpayments and miscalculations 
may occur inadvertently or deliberately. However, good corporate governance requires 
any organisation to comply with statutory or award obligations, or obligations under 
workplace agreements (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 202). 
While the RC identified superannuation underpayment as an issue, it was more about 
employers avoiding paying superannuation by encouraging employees to act as 
subcontractors. Both the unions and suppliers, superannuation funds such as Cbus, 
indicated that employers tried to comply with superannuation payments for their actual 
employees. In their submission to the RC, the CFMEU “gave evidence that compliance 
with superannuation in the industry was probably better than with most other areas of 
employee entitlements” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 30). The unions indicated that “employers 
who may not pay other entitlements often choose to pay superannuation and, in some 
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instances, redundancy payments as well” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 30). The unions took 
credit for this arguing that they had to be on-site every day to pressure employers to do 
the right thing.  
The second type of relationship was with sub-contractors. Sub-contractors were also 
exploited by owners/managers by withholding or refusing to make payments. 
Commissioner Cole stated that he had “heard a deal of evidence about union demands 
upon head contractors and subcontractors that did not, or did not obviously, relate to the 
relationship between employers and their employees” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 40). This 
language placed the blame for inappropriate behaviour firmly with the unions. The 
demands referred to by Commissioner Cole here suggest that the unions had stepped 
outside the boundaries of normal industrial relations. In other words, they involved the 
unions and union officials themselves, rather than issues affecting employees. “Much of 
the evidence associated with these demands by the unions related to inappropriate 
payments or enforced donations either to unions funds or charities” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, 
p. 40). This raises questions about how these payments were classified and recorded, for 
example see processes 1d. and 2b. in figure A1.5 in appendix 1, in particular. How 
would an accountant respond if asked by their boss, the company director, to treat a cash 
donation to a union official as something else? 
The RC found that head contractors, in particular, were willing to “succumb to the 
financial demands of unions to buy industrial peace” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 206). This 
language includes several very strong words loaded with meaning. The word “succumb” 
suggests that the contractors were under considerable pressure; “demands” indicates the 
unions expected the contractors to comply; “peace” implies the contractors and unions 
were at war; and the combination of “financial” and “buy” leaves no doubt that money 
was involved. This strongly worded statement by Commissioner Cole accuses the unions 
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of extortion, which is an illegal activity. If money was involved this raises the question: 
how was it transferred from the contractors to the unions? Commissioner Cole found 
that the money trail occurred this way: 
• contractors agreeing to substantial increases in wages and salaries for employees (the 
unions’ members) 
• paying strike pay  
• paying donations to the union 
• numerous other financial contributions that were demanded (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 
206). 
The RC found many examples of such payments. The following is a sample.  
a. In New South Wales union officials sought a substantial ‘donation’ from an 
employer to help fund a union organiser’s salary to regulate a sector of the 
industry. A union required an employer to pay moneys to both union related 
and unrelated organisations in the form of ‘donations’ in return for the 
agreement to settle an industrial dispute, when in reality these so-called 
‘donations’ were in fact penalties or fines imposed by the union. 
b. In Victoria head contractors and subcontractors made inappropriate payments 
to unions and union-nominated funds because of demands by union officials. 
Union officials demanded that employers make contributions to union funds, 
linking a positive response to industrial peace. 
c. In Queensland head contractors paid union membership fees for 
subcontractors’ employees to avert the risk of industrial action. 
d. In Western Australia payments for casual tickets, ‘specialised training’ and 
strike pay were all made to unions with the expectation of buying industrial 
peace. 
e. In the Northern Territory a subcontractor made payment for union 
membership for its employees in order to gain union support for the award of 
a contract (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 207). 
One of the main mechanisms for implementing increased wages and salaries for 
employees as a result of union pressure was over award payments. Over award payment 
is defined as “any payment and/or benefit above that is set out in the relevant award, 
registered agreement and/or legislation” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 60). This includes 
payments provided for in workplace arrangements (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 60). “Decisions 
on over award payments, including superannuation, redundancy, and workers’ 
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compensation insurance, shall be made by the individual employer to suit the needs of 
the enterprise” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 60). The problem with over award payments in the 
construction industry is that the unions often tried to exert industrial pressure forcing 
contractors to pay above award. Commission Cole stated that “no employer may be 
compelled to pay benefits above that prescribed in the relevant workers compensation 
legislation, … redundancy or superannuation fund” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 60). His 
concern was that the unions coerced contractors to pay more than they were legally 
required to. 
Commissioner Cole found that some unions tried to force contractors to pay members 
while on strike. This practice, known as strike pay, was considered unlawful. 
Commissioner Cole recommended that “no payments shall be made to employees for 
time spent in industrial action, unless payment is legally required or properly authorised 
by an Industrial Tribunal where this is permitted by relevant industrial legislation” (Cole 
2003, vol. 7, p. 61).  
Another way to pay employees more than they were entitled to is found in project 
agreements. These are workplace agreements, negotiated between the employer and 
employees, where the working conditions are available for the duration of that project 
only. However, Commissioner Cole found that these project agreements were being 
abused. Unions were negotiating increases in employee entitlements, such as redundancy 
pay and superannuation contributions, which should not have been included in project 
agreements because they have effect beyond duration of the project (Cole 2003, vol. 7, 
p. 61). Commissioner Cole recommended that the only way to avoid this overpayment of 
employee entitlements was to ensure the “integrity of individual enterprise agreements 
must be maintained” (Cole 2003, vol. 7, p. 61). This means project agreements cannot 
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override the normal workplace arrangements of individual contractors, and the EBA 
must be followed.  
The third relationship between owners/managers and staff was use of illegal workers. 
Illegal workers were exploited by owners/managers who paid them low wages. Field 
operations conducted by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and 
Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) found that “the majority of illegal workers are often paid 
less than legal entitlements; some were not paying tax, either at the correct rate or at all; 
and some were claiming social security benefits to which they were not entitled” (Cole 
2003, vol. 3, p. 208). Commissioner Cole was highly critical of employers responsible 
for exploiting migrant labour and avoiding tax because they were using these workers to 
lower costs and, therefore, compete unfairly with law abiding businesses (Cole 2003, 
vol. 3, p. 209), as well as avoiding the social contract for paying tax.  
Commissioner Cole “considered that the presence of illegal workers in the industry can 
constitute an instance of unlawful or inappropriate conduct” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 11). 
He made this claim based on two reasons: foreign nationals who wish to work in 
Australia must obtain a valid visa with work conditions as “it is an offence under the 
Migration Act 1958 (C’wth) for foreign nationals to work without permission, or to 
work in breach of their visa conditions”; and “employers who employ someone without 
a legal right to work close the position to an Australian citizen or permanent resident” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 11). Those who employ and underpay illegal workers have a 
competitive advantage, in the form of lower overheads, over those who employ legal 
workers (Cole 2003 vol. 8, p. 11).  
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6.2.4 Owners/Managers and Suppliers 
The construction industry’s complex contracting system created socio-political power 
inequities between companies at the various levels of the system, head contractors (large 
companies), contractors (medium sized companies), and sub-contractors (small 
companies). In general, whoever wins the construction project holds the economic 
power and can outsource work to other companies who then acted as suppliers of labour 
and other project requirements. Power inequities emerged from this complex work 
relationship between companies. As was discussed in the section on unions and 
owners/managers, industrial relations was a major source of power disputes in the 
industry. Fundamental to these disputes was EBA’s, which were workplace agreements 
designed to ensure adequate working conditions, including employee entitlements were 
paid.   
Owners/managers needed to be aware that some EBA’s made them liable for the 
employee entitlements of their subcontractors. The RC found that head contractors found 
project agreements a means of managing risk in respect of employment conditions for all 
workers on a site (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 107). In New South Wales, in some 
circumstances, “head contractors can be held legally responsible for payments to 
subcontractor employees that do not meet relevant award and agreement provisions” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 107). Similar provision existed in Victoria and Queensland. This 
led to the following advice from Commissioner Cole: “accordingly, it is an advantage 
for head contractors to be aware of and control the work arrangements on projects in 
relation to employees of subcontractors” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 107).  
Commissioner Cole argued that “head contractors had contractual mechanisms available 
to them to ensure, before progress payments are made, that a subcontractor has paid its 
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employees” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 107). This means that companies involved in the 
construction industry should be aware of whether other companies they are working 
with, such as subcontractors, are making payment to their employees. If a subcontractor 
is not able to pay its employees, it is technically insolvent, and the contractor should not 
be able to do business with it. Therefore, it is in the interests of both parties to share 
information about solvency, more specifically whether the company can pay its 
employees.  
The construction industry’s contracting system also caused problems in the security of 
payments. The RCR provides several detailed case studies which enable analysis of the 
role of contractors in security of payment activity. The following case studies show how 
noncompliance occurred, with a focus on the contracting system. The first case is an 
example of the contracting system involved in a large construction project, for a 
shopping mall.  
The RC investigated a large shopping centre development constructed by Multiplex 
Constructions Pty Ltd in Cairns in 1996 and 1997. The project was known as Cairns 
Central. The Cairns Central case study is particularly interesting for the investigation of 
security of payment because “a number of subcontractors that worked on the … project 
went into liquidation or administration, and others suffered severe financial hardship, as 
a result of payment disputes that arose during the course of that project” (Cole 2003, vol. 
8, p. 232). The head contractor on the project, Multiplex, was a very large construction 
company. It is important to note that the RC did not find that Multiplex in fact owed the 
amounts claimed by the subcontractors in the case and that Commissioner Cole stated 
that he did not want to investigate the truth of these claims as it was not an appropriate 
use of the RC’s resources (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 232). However, the case is useful for this 
analysis because it demonstrated the “type of payment disputes that arise on building 
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projects, the absence of suitable mechanisms to resolve those disputes and the 
consequences for subcontractors of being unable to resolve disputes quickly and 
cheaply” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 232). Therefore, it allows investigation of several of the 
problems associated with security of payment outlined above.  
The evidence presented to the RC about Cairns Central demonstrated that: 
• disputes existed between Multiplex and many subcontractors over whether very 
substantial sums of money were payable; 
• these disputes extended over a significant period of time 
• there were no suitable mechanisms available for resolving them satisfactorily (Cole 
2003, vol. 8, p. 232). 
As a result, several subcontractors either went out of business, or accepted amounts far 
less than they believed that they were owed in full settlement of their claims.  
The evidence provided by five subcontractors who worked on the Cairns Central project 
highlighted problems which the RC was told was common throughout the construction 
industry. These included disputes about: 
• non-payment for approved variations 
• whether particular variations had in fact been authorised 
• regular late payment or non-payment of progress claims (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 232). 
These disputes are activities involving accountants. As Multiplex is a very large 
company, it would have had internal accountants who would have been involved in 
decisions about payments. Specific evidence presented to the RC by these subcontractors 
included:  
• arbitrary deductions from the claimed amount that have not been discussed 
• subcontractors continuing to work despite the non-payment or underpayment of 
progress claims, in one case because the subcontractor feared liquidated damages of 
up to $46 000 per day if it refused to do so 
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• completed extra work that were not paid (for example one subcontractor completed 
work on over 100 variations, with a total value in excess of $900 000). Not being 
paid for this work led to severe limitations on subcontractors’ cash flow and 
operating ability. 
• non-payment of progress claims placed subcontractors under serious financial stress, 
and caused difficulties for them in paying suppliers further down the contractual 
chain, so there was a domino effect (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 232 & p. 236). 
One of these five subcontractors tried to explain Multiplex’s behaviour by giving 
evidence on the reasons for non-payment; 
Late payment varied, but: the pattern was that payments were always behind, and 
never reflected the true amount of work completed. It did not matter that we 
disagreed with Multiplex, because Multiplex had the money and would pay only 
what it decided to pay irrespective of the strength of the arguments against its 
decisions (Cole 2003, vol. 8, pp. 232-233). 
In this extract, the problems are about payments and withholding payments. It is relevant 
in this section on security of payment because it illustrates the complexity of the security 
of payment problem caused by the construction industry’s contracting system. The 
problem here is that Multiplex is a very large company which should not need to 
demonstrate its financial capability to pay when awarded a construction contract. 
Multiplex could pay. It chose not to. The complexity emerges when the domino effect is 
considered. The five subcontractors may have been required to demonstrate security of 
payment to win their respective contracts to work on the Cairns Central project. 
Therefore, they would have been able to demonstrate their ability to pay their staff and 
any subcontractors they used on the project. However, the analysis shows that they were 
not able to meet their financial commitments during the project. This case shows how 
the subcontractors’ security of payment situation changed over the life of the project due 
to the behaviour of the head contractor.  
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In its defence, Multiplex explained that it chose to engage in non-payment or late 
payment because of not being paid by the client (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 233). Another 
reason given by Multiplex was that the amounts deducted from the progress claims were 
justified by back-charges (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 233). The RC found that: 
In some cases the back-charges related to matters said to have occurred weeks or 
months earlier, and these matters had not been mentioned earlier, at the time they 
were said to have been incurred, making it impossible for the subcontractors to 
dispute the back-charges effectively (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 233). 
Evidence for the abuse of power within the contracting system is provided by this extract 
from the RCR: 
As subcontractors reached the end of their work on the Cairns Central project, 
many were told when they sought to collect their final progress payment either 
that none of it would be paid, or that only a small percentage of the amount 
claimed would be paid. If a small percentage was offered, that was sometimes 
done on a ‘take it or leave it basis’, with the offer open only for 24 hours, 
presumably in the knowledge that the subcontractors required cash flow to 
survive. One subcontractor gave evidence that Multiplex’s construction manager 
said, on offering $200 000 in final settlement of a claim by the subcontractor for 
$1, 183, 745; This is our final offer, that’s all you’re going to get. You can fight 
us for more if you want, but we have got a building full of lawyers and we can 
stretch this thing out for years. So even if by chance you were to win, the cost of 
winning will send you broke long before you get any money (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 
233, emphasis in the original). 
This extract suggests cruel behaviour by the head contractor. The language used is very 
aggressive and intimidating. The phrase ‘take it or leave’ it is an ultimatum. The 
pressure to accept the offer is emphasised with the 24 hour time limit. The language in 
the response from Multiplex, as quoted by the subcontractor, is defiant and inflexible. It 
indicates that Multiplex felt it had much more power than the subcontractor and that it 
would not hesitate to exercise this power. The threatening tone of the quote focuses on 
the emotional vulnerability in this relationship between head contractor and 
subcontractor caused by threats to financial security and livelihood.  
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The security of payment problems were highlighted by CCF, which is the peak industry 
body for all civil construction contractors, and represents more than one third of the civil 
construction industry, including companies ranging from small and medium to large 
civil construction, excavation and demolition companies (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 235). The 
CCF told the RC that security of payment problems: 
Are reported to the Federation almost daily where contractors or suppliers in the 
industry feel they are between a rock and a hard place, not knowing what to do in 
these circumstances where they have completed work or supplied goods or 
services in good faith, yet have not been paid (Cole 2003, vol. 14, p. 235). 
Several industry groups presented testimony to the RC of the powerlessness of small 
companies to deal with non-payment or payment delays caused by head contractors. 
This powerlessness was often described in terms of contractors lacking the financial 
strength to fight large companies in the courts for payment for work done. Mr Michael 
Chesterman, the Compliance Manager of the Queensland Building Services Authority 
(BSA), had supervised several thousand investigations into the financial viability of 
building contractors, and he gave evidence to the RC “that suggested that the experience 
of the Cairns Central subcontractors was ‘far from unique’ ” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 235). 
The National Electrical and Communications Association (NECA) made similar 
observations, stating that, “To proceed to legal action for a justifiable progress claim or 
variations would be met with spurious counter claims and endless delays and legal 
expenses” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 236).  
The industry groups explained that head contractors guilty of exploiting these security of 
payment issues, or what they called ‘rogue builders’, depended upon the financial 
vulnerability of smaller contractors and delaying tactics. In the latter case, the legal 
system did not help the victims. These rogue builders relied upon the fact that the 
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smaller contractors would most likely “run out of resources” before a legal judgment 
could be reached in the courts.  
In summary, the cost for a small contractor to pursue a head contractor for non-
payment/slow payment to them was so high that unless the payment dispute was of a 
very significant nature, in many instances the small contractor made a commercial 
decision not to take the matter further (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 235). 
6.2.5 Owners/Managers and General Public 
Profit reporting was one of the unlawful activities identified by the RC. This activity 
involved profit manipulation. This was done for several purposes and for different 
audiences. Owners/managers might seek to manipulate profit reporting to falsify the 
company’s financial position to persuade other companies of financial viability when 
tendering for work, or to mislead regulators and evade tax, or even to avoid the threshold 
for payroll tax. However, it has been included in this section on the relationship between 
owners/managers and the general public because profit manipulation has the potential to 
affect all members of society; particularly investors or shareholders.  
The RC provides several detailed case studies which shed light on how employers 
engaged in inappropriate behaviours associated with profit reporting. The first case is the 
Sunshine Coast Regional Group Apprentices Ltd. (SCRGAL). The RC found that 
SCRGAL failed in its corporate governance. The case provides insight about how some 
construction companies were managed and that this did not meet the social contract. The 
social contract, in this sense, was to manage the business according to the standards and 
procedures expected. These standards were specified by the Corporations Act and 
enforced by the ASIC. The RC citing the New South Wales Court of Appeal made the 
following statement about a director’s duty: 
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A director, whatever his or her background, has a duty greater than that of simply 
representing a particular field of experience. That duty involves becoming 
familiar with the business of the company and how it is run in ensuring that the 
board has available means to audit the management of the company so that it can 
satisfy itself that the company is being properly run (Cole 2003, vol. 10, pp. 183-
184). 
Commissioner Cole found that the Directors of SCRGAL, and in particular Ms. Alison 
Grosse, as Chairperson, and Mr Robert Purvis, as Managing Director, failed in the 
discharge of that duty (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p. 184). The board clearly did not ensure that 
it had “available means to audit the management of the company so that it can satisfy 
itself that the company is being properly run” (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p. 184). “By failing to 
hold any (or any regular) Board meetings, the Directors of SCRGAL breached their duty 
to the company” (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p. 184). In any company, board meetings should be 
held regularly and part of those meetings should involve discussing financial statements, 
which would include profit and loss statements. The failure of SCRGAL to conduct 
board meetings raises questions about when and how profit and loss statements were 
discussed by this company. The social contract breach in this case was the failure of the 
Directors to follow the standards expected by the Corporations Act 2001 in its financial 
statements. More specifically, the way that debt was disclosed in the profit and loss 
statements was compromised by loans to directors and employees of the company. This 
is an example of profit manipulation because the company did not fairly and accurately 
report its financial performance.  
The RC found that SCRGAL made a number of loans to directors or senior staff of the 
company (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p. 184). The loans were described in SCRGAL’s accounts 
as “short term investments” (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.184). All of the loans were unsecured. 
Commissioner Cole found that “none of the loans were documented when they were 
made, although some have since been documented” (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.184). “No 
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repayment schedules were put in place and no regular repayments” were made for the 
largest of the loans, (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.184). “There was no evidence that Fringe 
Benefits Tax had been paid in relation to any of the loans” (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.184). 
There was “no evidence that any of the loans made by SCRGAL to directors or 
employees were ever discussed or approved by the Board, or by the members of 
SCRGAL” (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.184). At the conclusion of the review it was found that 
“no interest had been paid on any of the loans” (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.184). Only the 
three largest loans made by SCRGAL to directors or employees were examined by the 
RC (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p. 184). Two of those loans were made to Purvis, and one was 
made to Mr Neil Wilkinson who was company secretary and solicitor (Cole 2003, vol. 
10, p.184). The loan to Purvis is discussed as an illustration of inappropriate behaviour. 
The aim is to identify whether any of the unlawful processes would have been involved. 
The following is an extract from the RCR.  
Purvis and Grosse jointly owned a property at 16 Church Street, Maroochydore. 
At some time late in 2000 or early in 2001 the decision was made that Purvis 
would purchase Grosse’s share of that property. The property at 16 Church Street 
had been valued at $300 000 in June 1999. There was a mortgage over the 
property with Suncorp Metway for $233 545, meaning that, accepting the $300 
000 valuation, Purvis and Grosse held equity in the property of $66 455. In order 
for Purvis to buy Grosse’s share of the property, he therefore had to pay to her 
$33 227.50 (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.184). 
On 18 January 2001 three SCRGAL cheques were drawn. They were written out 
by Wilkinson and signed by Wilkinson and Purvis. The first was a cheque made 
out to Purvis for $233 545. The second was a cheque made out to Wilkinson for 
$25 000. The third was a cheque made out to Grosse for $33 227.50.  Purvis’ 
account of the events on 18 January 2001 that led to the creation of those three 
cheques is as follows: 
On 18 January 2001, Neil Wilkinson came to my office. He said to me, ‘Alison 
(Grosse) has just got off the phone. She wants to know what you’re doing about 
buying her out?’ I said, ‘I can’t afford it.’ Wilkinson said, ‘Not a problem. Alison 
and I have discussed it. The company is eligible under its Articles to lend the 
money. There is enough there – we’ve checked. The company can handle it 
easily at the moment.’ I said, ‘It might be OK for you and Alison to say this to 
me, however what about the rest of the Board, have they approved this?’ 
Wilkinson replied, ‘yes, it’s been approved. As Company Secretary and solicitor 
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I have advised the Board and Alison that everything is in order and the company 
is able to do this.’ When Wilkinson left my office, I rang my son who is 
employed by Suncorp and through whom I was negotiating the loan and said to 
him that I now didn’t need Suncorp’s loan as the company was now going to 
lend the money to me. I then got out the joint cheque account which Grosse and I 
had for the property and wrote out three (3) cheques. One (1) to Grosse for her 
profit on the property, one (1) to Suncorp to pay out the loan and one (1) for 
stamp duty. By doing this I was under the belief that the money would be paid to 
me by way of loan and enter this account as one lump sum. I then went to 
Wilkinson’s office and told him what I’d done in relation to the cheques and how 
the money was to be paid. He said to me, ‘No, we’re not going to do it like that. 
This is the easy way we’ll do it. I have some cheques here for you to sign. This is 
the way that Alison wants it done.’ I relied on his advice. I went through to sign 
the cheques and there I noticed in those cheques in the middle of two (2) of the 
cheques, one (1) being made out to Grosse and one (1) being made out to 
Suncorp Metway, a third cheque in the name of Wilkinson for $25,000.00. I said, 
‘What’s this one for.’ He said, ‘When I was talking to Alison, I mentioned that I 
had some debts to pay and she said “Oh well, you may as well put them all in 
together” and I’ve drawn that cheque for that purpose.’ I said to Wilkinson, ‘Are 
you positive that this is correct’. He said, ‘Yes’ I said, ‘Why is it in the middle?’ 
He didn’t answer me. I then signed the cheques relying on his advice to me (Cole 
2003, vol. 10, p. 185). 
At face value, if Purvis’s account is believed, then this directly implicates an individual 
with a similar role to an accountant in the construction, Wilkinson who was the company 
secretary and the in-house lawyer, of inappropriate behaviour. The drawing of cheques 
to provide company directors with loans may involve problems associated with 
classifying items of expense and revenue; falsifying or altering documents, and 
concealing significant information. In any case, the claim by Purvis is an illustration of 
the behaviour of company directors in the construction industry; when faced with 
allegations of inappropriate financial behaviour they blame company secretaries. In the 
case outlined above Purvis suggests he only acted inappropriately because the secretary, 
Wilkinson, told him to.  
Commissioner Cole, however, argued that Purvis cannot be believed at face value. 
Commissioner Cole concluded that “a number of aspects of Purvis’ account are not 
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credible” (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p. 185). The following evidence to support Commissioner 
Cole’s statement: 
First, Purvis asserted that he asked Wilkinson whether the Board had approved 
the loan, and that Wilkinson told him that it had been approved and that 
everything was in order. Leaving aside the language that Purvis suggests 
Wilkinson used, which is extremely artificial, Purvis knew that Board meetings 
were almost never held. Purvis was one of just three directors, and he was in 
complete day to day control of SCRGAL. It is not credible for Purvis to assert 
that he believed the Board had approved the loan to him. He would necessarily 
have been aware of any meeting at which such approval may have occurred. He 
must, therefore, have known that the loan had not been approved by the Board 
(Cole 2003, vol. 10, p. 185). 
Second, it is not credible for Purvis to assert that he signed a cheque to loan 
Wilkinson $25 000 simply on the basis of Wilkinson’s advice that Grosse had 
approved it, asking only, ‘Are you positive that this is correct’. It is not at all 
clear what was supposed to be ‘correct’. Leaving that aside, on his account 
Purvis claimed that, even though he was the Managing Director of SCRGAL, he 
did not ask why SCRGAL should lend a substantial amount of money to 
Wilkinson, nor did he make any attempt to discuss repayment terms, security or 
interest in relation to the loan. That is despite Purvis’ evidence that he expected 
his own loan to be documented, and that he would need to provide security. If 
that was the case, Purvis would have been expected to require the same of 
Wilkinson. Yet on his own evidence, he did not do so. That casts doubt not just 
upon Purvis’ claims in relation to the terms of his own loan, but also upon his 
claims as to the circumstances in which he came to agree to loan Wilkinson $25 
000 of SCRGAL’s money (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.186).  
Wilkinson’s account of the events on 18 January 2001 was very different. 
Wilkinson stated that Purvis told him that all of the money advanced to Purvis by 
SCRGAL on that day was to be repaid the next week, after Purvis obtained a 
loan from Suncorp Metway. In other words, he said the loan to Purvis was 
simply a bridging loan. Wilkinson was not, however, able to give a satisfactory 
explanation of the need for SCRGAL to provide bridging finance to Purvis. He 
said Purvis wanted to buy Grosse out to take advantage of a rumoured rise in 
property prices in the area. A delay of one week, while waiting for finance from 
Suncorp Metway, would have been very unlikely to frustrate that objective, so 
that explanation does not explain the need for a loan from SCRGAL. 
Furthermore, if the loans to Purvis were intended to be for a duration of only one 
week, it is very unlikely that Purvis would have been prepared to sign a cheque 
advancing $25 000 to Wilkinson with no agreed repayment schedule, no interest 
and no security. He would have been treating Wilkinson more favourably than he 
was treating himself (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.186).  
Commissioner Cole rejected Wilkinson’s evidence that the loans to Purvis were intended 
to be of short duration (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.186).  Commissioner Cole argued that 
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“Wilkinson’s evidence that he signed cheques lending $266 772.50 to Purvis for the sole 
reason that Purvis told him to do so is similarly not credible, and is rejected” (Cole 2003, 
vol. 10, p. 186). Wilkinson must have been aware of his legal obligations in relation to 
the company as a practising solicitor. He is unlikely to have breached those obligations 
simply because Purvis instructed him to do so. His evidence that “he ‘didn’t believe it 
[the loan to Purvis] to be wrong’ is not credible. Nor is his evidence that ‘If I had my 
time over, I’d be a much wiser man’” (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p. 186). It must have been 
obvious to Wilkinson at the time that he signed the cheques that he should not sign them. 
They were cheques intended to pay a large amount of money for the personal benefit of 
a director, in circumstances where no board or member approval had been obtained and 
there was no possible benefit to SCRGAL. Commissioner Cole found that “Wilkinson’s 
statement that it was not his function to inform the Board about the transaction is 
unacceptable” (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p. 186). This was due to the fact that Wilkinson was 
employed by SCRGAL as an in-house solicitor and, in this role, he had a duty to refuse 
to sign the cheques, and to inform the board (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p. 186). Commissioner 
Cole concluded that “the probability is that Wilkinson agreed to sign the cheques 
loaning money to Purvis because Purvis had agreed to lend Wilkinson $25 000” (Cole 
2003, vol. 10, p.186). Commissioner Cole then cites a letter written by Purvis to 
Wilkinson copied to an internal accountant, Mr Des Robinson, which illustrates how 
accountants might have been involved in these types of activities. The following extract 
illustrates the exchange: 
An attempt was made by Purvis and Hoiberg to give the above letter to Robinson 
in or about October 2001. Robinson was told by Purvis or Hoiberg that the letter 
had just been prepared and back-dated to 23 January 2001. He refused to be 
involved in the deception. Hoiberg told Robinson ‘Don’t worry, you won’t be 
asked if the contents of the memo are correct, you will only be asked if you 
received a copy of the memo.’ Purvis asserted that the letter dated 23 January 
2001 was handed to Wilkinson on or about that date, and that he (Purvis) did not 
keep a copy. He then asserted that the letter that he tried to give to Robinson in or 
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about October 2001 ‘was not a direct copy of that letter but was prepared at a 
later date as a reproduction or facsimile of the original’. He stated that ‘the 
purpose of its reproduction was for Robinson to prepare a loan agreement’ (Cole 
2003, vol. 10, p.187). 
This is evidence of process 4b. falsifying or altering documents. It is also an important 
finding that Robinson, the accountant, refused to be involved in the deception. It is very 
difficult to find specific mention of accountants in the RCR or other publicly available 
information about the construction industry’s unlawful behaviour. This statement by 
Commissioner Cole provides support for the proposition that accountants would have 
been able to at least avoid step 4 in the profit reporting process (see appendix 1, figure 
A1.7). While accountants might have been involved in steps 1 to 3, they drew the line at 
fraud, at least from this evidence. This extract is also important for showing the pressure 
exerted on accountants to do the wrong thing. In this example, the accountant was 
actually told “don’t worry”, inferring that this was something to worry about, and 
advised how to behave to avoid detection, “you will only be asked…”. 
There was further evidence of the pressure exerted on the accountant, Robinson, by the 
management and how the accountant refused to cooperate with unlawful behaviour. In 
preparing a loan agreement, there were several exchanges: 
1. Purvis asked Robinson to agree that his signature on the Loan Agreement was 
conditional upon Wilkinson and Grosse signing similar agreements in relation to 
loans that SCRGAL had made to them. Robinson refused, saying that he 
believed Purvis had signed the agreement because it was the only way to do 
things properly (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.188).  
2. Robinson received a telephone call the next morning from Purvis’ solicitor in 
which he was told how important it was for Purvis to establish that the Loan 
Agreement was signed only to put pressure on Wilkinson and Grosse. Purvis’s 
solicitor also asked Robinson to sign a statutory declaration to that effect, but 
Robinson refused (Cole 2003, vol. 10, pp.188-189). 
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These incidents illustrate the pressure exerted on accountants to comply with 
inappropriate behaviour. It is particularly interesting that lawyers appeared willing to 
cooperate with management in inappropriate behaviour whereas accountants refused, 
however, this may reflect the different standards of the individuals involved in this case. 
A further incident occurred when management asked the accountants to write off the 
loan: 
On about 5 October 2001, following Wilkinson’s refusal to sign a loan 
agreement, Grosse asked Robinson and Hoiberg whether they could write the 
loan to Wilkinson off and transfer the amount to a ‘salary bonus’. Wilkinson 
denied that this was done at his instigation. Hoiberg apparently objected to 
writing the loan off, because of the fringe benefits tax implications for SCRGAL 
of doing so. The loan was, however, written off, although that decision was 
subsequently reversed (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.189). 
This provides further evidence about how the accountants refused to cooperate with 
management instructions which they felt was inappropriate. In this case, the accountant 
refused because of FBT implications. However, it is interesting to note that the loan was 
written off, despite the accountants objections. This suggests that while accountants have 
objected to inappropriate behaviour, they were not always successful in preventing this 
behaviour. Although in the above case, the decision was later reversed, which implies 
that someone, perhaps the accountants, were successful in adjusting the financial 
statements to reflect appropriate behaviour rather than inappropriate behaviour.  
The next situation was an illustration of how auditors were involved in this case. The 
following extract shows what happened when an auditor found the loan and how 
management responded:  
On 11 October 2001 Purvis sent a memo to Wilkinson which read, in part:  
Subject: Loan/Advance – N. Wilkinson 
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I refer to the above advance to you by SCRGAL. This was advanced to you by 
way of loan, but as no documentation exists on this, the auditor has asked how 
this amount should be shown. The accounting alternatives are as follows: 
1. Disclose this as a secured loan from SCRGAL to an employee. To do this, you 
must comply with Loan Documentation which is acceptable to the Directors of 
this company. This is in keeping with every other person who received this type 
of advance and have agreed to submit documentation and security adequate to 
the Directors. It is only reasonable that the company have the same expectation 
of you. 
2. However, you have stated that you do not have assets and you will not sign the 
appropriate Loan Documentation. Therefore the auditor question’s [sic] the 
recoverability of this debt and it will have to be treated as a non-recoverable 
amount. 
Consequently, SCRGAL will have to recognise that you will not repay the sum 
and they will never receive the money back. Therefore, we are advised that we 
must show this amount as a fringe payment to you and the company will be 
liable to pay fringe benefit tax of approximately $26,000 (Cole 2003, vol. 10, 
p.190). 
In this extract, management are following the instructions of the accountants, the 
auditors, to manage the loan appropriately. However, as was discussed above, 
management were as involved as Wilkinson in this loan agreement. These instructions, 
apparently drafted by the auditors, seem to be management pretending to be compliant. 
It was impression management. The evidence continues: 
As a result of this meeting with Alison Grosse, D Robinson and K Hoiberg it has 
become apparent that SCRGAL are exposed to certain Taxation complications 
because of your failure to sign Loan Documentation acceptable to this company. 
This is not acceptable and to protect this company’s interests I offer you the 
following options: 
1. Comply with an Agreement prepared by SCRGAL which acknowledges your 
debt, provides SCRGAL with an acceptable security against that debt and a 
planned repayment program. 
2. The money you received will be classified as an advance payment against your 
salary and no further salary will be paid to you until the advance is paid in full. 
SCRGAL will pay the additional PAYG Tax on your behalf (Cole 2003, vol. 10, 
p.190). 
Commissioner Cole concluded that:  
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Probably after the above memorandum was sent, a heated meeting took place 
between Wilkinson and Purvis. Robinson said that he could overhear part of that 
meeting, as he was in the next room. He said that Purvis was trying to get 
Wilkinson to agree that he would repay the money, but that he did not think 
Wilkinson had any intentions of doing that at all. Wilkinson did ultimately sign a 
loan agreement (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p.190). 
The RC found that this case constituted unlawful behaviour because it contravened s182 
of the Corporations Act 2001 (C’wth). Commissioner Cole asserted that the individuals 
outlined in this case had a responsibility to distinguish between appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviour. More specifically, Commissioner Cole highlighted the 
following from the Act: 
The section provided that: 
 (1) A director, secretary, other officer or employee of a corporation must not 
improperly use their position to: 
(a) gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or 
(b) cause detriment to the corporation. 
 (2) A person who is involved in a contravention of subsection (1) contravenes 
this subsection. 
By deciding to lend himself $266 772.50 of SCRGAL’s money, without 
providing any security, without agreeing to any repayment schedule, and on 
interest-free terms, Purvis improperly used his position as a director of SCRGAL 
to gain an advantage for himself (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p. 193).  
Commissioner Cole found Purvis engaged in unlawful conduct. He found Wilkinson, the 
internal lawyer, equally at fault, because he “improperly used his position as either an 
officer or employee of SCRGAL to gain an advantage for someone else” (Cole 2003, 
vol. 10, p.193).  
The next detailed case study provided by the RC involves Multiplex Constructions 
(NSW) Pty Ltd and payments to Comet Training Pty Ltd. In this case, an irregular 
payment classified as sponsorship was made to Comet. This analysis looks at how this 
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occurred, how it may have affected profit reporting, and the role of accountants. The 
following extract explains what happened: 
From July 1997 to July 2002 Multiplex Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd (Multiplex 
NSW) paid Comet Training a total of $1 245 484. An examination of the relevant 
accounts revealed that of that $1, 245, 484: 
(a) $381 652 was paid for training services actually provided by Comet 
Training on a fee for service basis; 
(b) $438 771 was paid through Comet Training to a safety consultancy 
company, HVG Enterprises Pty Ltd (HVG Enterprises); and 
(c) the balance of $425 061 was retained by Comet Training for what is 
now described as payments by Multiplex NSW in the form of 
sponsorship (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p.257). 
Commissioner Cole called for evidence “to examine the nature of the ‘sponsorship’ 
payments totalling $425 061 to Comet Training and examine why Multiplex NSW paid 
this amount and what it stood to gain from doing so” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p.257).  
The key players in this case were:  Mr Ian Gavin, Director, HVG Enterprises Pty Ltd and 
a former senior union official (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 257); Mr David Higgon, the 
Employee Relations Manager for Multiplex Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd (Cole 2003 
vol. 13, p. 257); Mr Raymond Harty, the General Manager of Comet Training Pty Ltd; 
and Multiplex senior manager Mr Stagg (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 258). The background is 
explained by these extracts from the RCR: 
In early 1997, Higgon approached Gavin to consider a long term occupational 
health and safety related role with Multiplex NSW. The primary role for Gavin 
as proposed by Higgon involved the auditing of safety on Multiplex NSW 
projects. Higgon asked Gavin to consider working as an independent contractor 
through Comet Training. Higgon said this arrangement would involve Gavin 
setting up his own company, entering into a subcontract arrangement with Comet 
Training, providing safety consultancy work for Multiplex NSW and being paid 
by Multiplex NSW through Comet Training (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 257). 
It appears that Higgon broached the topic of Multiplex NSW sponsoring Comet 
Training at a meeting with Gavin in late 1996 or early 1997. Higgon told Harty 
that Multiplex NSW would like to sponsor Comet Training as part of its support 
for the industry initiative in relation to health and safety training. At this meeting 
Higgon told Harty that Multiplex NSW would pay Comet Training $16 000 per 
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month and that it could contract its audit and advice work for Multiplex NSW to 
Gavin, and pay him $6700 per month with the balance to be retained by Comet 
Training. Harty said that Higgon told him that the balance of the money would 
be sponsorship by Multiplex NSW for Comet Training’s general work to ensure 
that there were sufficient properly trained skilled labourers in the building and 
construction industry (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 258). 
When questioned why the excess moneys paid to Comet Training would be 
retained by it, Higgon said he was aware that in all likelihood there would be 
moneys in excess of those paid to Gavin and was quite prepared to have those 
excess funds used by Comet ‘to promote their business’ and that the excess 
would ‘probably be something quite significant’. Harty said that it was always 
his understanding that the balance of the money paid by Multiplex NSW would 
constitute sponsorship of Comet Training. Stagg considered the balance of 
moneys paid to constitute a ‘profit component’ which could be described as 
‘sponsorship or whatever’. Ferguson said that he was aware that Multiplex NSW 
provided ‘financial support for Comet’ but that was the extent of his knowledge 
(Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 258). 
Stagg made the decision to pay Comet Training the total figure of $16 000 each 
month. He said he had arrived at this figure by considering the costs that would 
be involved in employing someone directly, even though in excess of 50 per cent 
of the payment did not relate to the services to be provided by Gavin. Higgon 
said that Multiplex NSW did not have anything in writing at the time the 
arrangement was entered into suggesting that part of the payment was related to 
sponsorship of Comet Training. Stagg had never asked Higgon to prepare any 
proposal to put to the Multiplex NSW Board of Directors in relation to the 
provision of sponsorship to Comet Training (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 258). 
At the RC hearings, a director of Comet Training, Mr Ferguson, indicated “he was aware 
that Multiplex NSW was making a substantial payment to Comet Training but did not 
know the exact amount of money being paid” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 259). He said he 
was aware that “Multiplex NSW was paying a surplus amount to Comet Training which 
he regarded as a form of sponsorship although he said he could not recall when he first 
attained that knowledge” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 259). He said he “did not recollect ever 
being advised that such sponsorship moneys were being paid in his position as a director 
of Comet Training” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 259). This is evidence that directors were 
ignorant or pretended to be ignorant about financial details associated with inappropriate 
behaviour in the construction industry. If Ferguson is to be believed, then who was 
aware?   
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The first step in this process was when the first invoice for services rendered by Comet 
Training was forwarded to Multiplex NSW on 4 July 1997 (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p .259), 
when an administration officer for Comet Training, in all likelihood an accountant, 
wrote to Higgon advising that “Multiplex NSW would be invoiced on the first business 
day of each month as has previously been raised by the CFMEU” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 
259). This reveals that the unions were involved in this deal between the former union 
member, Gavin, and Multiplex (construction company) and Comet (training provider).  
The second step in this process was payment of the invoice. To make this arrangement 
work, Comet invoiced Multiplex, and Gavin invoiced Comet, as a subcontractor via his 
own company HVG Enterprises. Comet Training paid HVG Enterprises from moneys 
received from Multiplex NSW upon receipt of HVG Enterprises’ invoice, (Cole 2003, 
vol. 13, p. 259). “The first payment of $16 000 from Multiplex NSW to Comet Training 
occurred on 4 July 1997” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p.259). The description on the first 
invoice was “‘Occupational Audit/Safety Program, 4 weeks commencing 1 July 1997’” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 13, p.259). The RC found that “this description accurately described the 
service provided by HVG Enterprises to Multiplex NSW” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 259). 
Therefore, the process of classifying items of expense and revenue, appears to be 
followed correctly. However, the RC found that the description of the invoice “did not 
distinguish between the component that was covering the cost of HVG Enterprises and 
that component representing sponsorship when invoicing Multiplex NSW” (Cole 2003, 
vol. 13, p. 259). Therefore, this is evidence that process 1d. was followed incorrectly. At 
worst, it could be claimed that the concealment of moneys as sponsorship is process 4e., 
concealing significant information,  or even 4d., recording forged transactions; both of 
which are fraud.  
CHAPTER 6: ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE - IMPACT AND EXPECTATIONS 388 
In relation to the “sponsorship” arrangement, when explaining why the invoices did not 
properly describe the arrangement between Comet Training and Multiplex NSW, “Harty 
said that even if the word sponsorship had never been mentioned, the excess could 
simply have been a ‘mark-up’ on the services provided by Gavin” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 
259). This would have been an example of creative accounting; more specifically 
process 3e., increase or decrease net income at will. Harty further defended the practice 
by saying “that Comet Training described the invoices in a way that Higgon had 
requested”, thereby placing blame with Multiplex (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 259). This 
exchange illustrates two interesting cultural norms within the construction industry 
regarding profit reporting. First, creative accounting appears acceptable, as Harty 
quickly used it as a defence against wrongdoing. Second, accountants appeared to follow 
instructions with a defence that it was the other parties’ fault if things emerged as 
inappropriate. This latter conclusion is based on Harty’s defence that the invoices were 
simply described as requested. Accountants simply followed instructions.  
As this practice continued over the next few years, some people questioned it. The ATO 
audited Comet Training in 2001, and found that “at no time was the ATO notified that 
the description on the invoices as ‘training’ did not properly reflect the nature of the 
service provided by HVG Enterprises to Multiplex NSW” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 260). 
When Harty was later questioned by Commissioner Cole, he stated that he “did not 
believe that the ATO was being misled as to whether GST should have been paid” (Cole 
2003, vol. 13, p. 260). Commissioner Cole found that Mr Brian Seidler, Executive 
Director of the MBA of New South Wales and Director of Comet Training Pty Ltd, first 
became aware of the sponsorship arrangement between Multiplex NSW and Comet 
Training in late 2001 (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 260). It is insightful that a director of one of 
the companies involved, Comet, did not know about this practice for four years. This 
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illustrates how inappropriate behaviour could be easily hidden. In response, Seidler 
worked with Mr Alex Stuart, President of the MBA of New South Wales, also a board 
member of Comet Training Pty Ltd to organise a letter from Comet to Multiplex 
formally thanking them for “continuing support of skill development and skill formation 
in the building and construction industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 260). Seidler and 
Stuart later told Commissioner Cole that they were concerned that “the arrangement 
between Comet Training and Multiplex NSW should be clearly articulated for what it 
was” (Cole 2003, vol. 10, p. 349). In other words, they wanted to be honest about the 
arrangement.  
The RC hearings surfaced some of the activities of staff involved in the arrangement 
between Gavin, Multiplex and Comet. The following extract from the RCR illustrates 
the role of Multiplex’s senior accountant: the company secretary:  
On 12 April 2002 Mr Darrin Smith, Company Secretary of Multiplex 
Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd, wrote to Comet Training seeking to have 
amended tax invoices issued by Comet Training properly describing the work 
performed, namely ‘safety audits’, and to include the 10 per cent GST 
component in the invoices. Harty refused to change the description as the 
invoices had been subjected to an ATO audit. It became apparent to Harty at a 
meeting with Smith to discuss the invoices that Smith was not aware of the 
arrangement between Multiplex NSW and Comet Training in respect of the 
sponsorship (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 261).  
This is a particularly important passage in the context of this thesis. It provides evidence 
supporting the proposition that accountants were not involved in unlawful behaviour in 
the construction industry. In this case at least, the accountant, Smith, appears unaware of 
the fraudulent activity involved in the sponsorship payments. There were also changes to 
the practice after the meeting between Smith and Harty. The invoices were described 
differently and there were now separate invoices for safety audits and sponsorship. The 
amount of the sponsorship was also decreased. It seems that in this case at least, 
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accountants sought to correct inappropriate behaviour when they became aware, and to 
take steps to introduce appropriate behaviour. However, the fact that Smith was a very 
senior accountant, company secretary of a large construction company such as 
Multiplex, meant he would have authority and power to impose his will. Accountants 
working in smaller companies or external accountants depending upon their clients for 
income, may have had less ability to bring about appropriate behaviour.  
The RC found some unusual features in the relationship between the unions and Comet. 
First, “Comet Training was an initiative of the CFMEU aimed at spreading its influence 
in the industry by the provision of training services” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 261). 
Second, Comet Training was a tenant of the CFMEU, and “since October 1996, the 
CFMEU has received from Comet $1 196 146.53” in rent (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 261). 
Therefore, there were commercial and strategic interests from the unions in Comet’s 
business success. The RC suggested that this whole practice was a “donation or 
sponsorship by Multiplex NSW to foster training in the industry, except that Multiplex 
NSW went to considerable trouble to disguise the fact, if it be the fact, that it was 
sponsoring training in the industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 261). This raises questions 
about the practice of “sponsoring” unions and other stakeholders in the construction 
industry. The allocation of money to sponsor is usually associated with an expectation of 
receiving something in return. Multiplex were, in effect, paying money to the unions 
disguised as sponsorship.  
The RC found that this case study was indicative of falsifying invoices in the 
construction industry. Whether this was creative accounting or fraud, is a matter of 
opinion and might be considered a fine line. Commissioner Cole appeared to focus on 
the fact that “invoices rendered by Comet Training did not truly disclose the service for 
which the invoice was rendered” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 262). This was misleading. 
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Whether it was falsifying documents or concealing significant information is a matter of 
debate. There is, however, good news for accounting practice in this case study. 
Commissioner Cole found that the parties involved only began to manage this matter 
appropriately when a senior accountant became aware there was a problem. 
Commissioner Cole commented “there was never any reference to sponsorship before 
the Secretary of Multiplex NSW became aware of the arrangement” (Cole 2003, vol. 13, 
p. 261). When Smith discovered what was happening, he addressed the situation. This 
provides support for the argument that accountants could play a role in addressing 
unlawful behaviour and address the societal contract breach.  
The RC contained numerous other similar case studies highlighted inappropriate 
behaviour associated with profit reporting. 
6.2.6 Owners/Managers and Project Managers 
Project managers play an important role in construction companies. They manage all 
aspects of a building project often as a turnkey task, that is, from design to hand over to 
the customer. This includes managing operations and costs, as well as subcontractors. 
The following case described in the RCR illustrates the role of project managers 
working for a large construction company.  
Mr Adrian Powell is a Project Manager employed by Westfield Design & 
Construction Pty Ltd (a large construction company).  As Project Manager, he 
has overall responsibility for the day to day running of the project he is employed 
to manage. A number of site-based personnel report to him and, in turn, he 
reports to a General Manager at Westfield Design & Construction Pty Ltd in 
Sydney. Powell was responsible for project management at Westfield shopping 
centres at both Airport West and Fountain Gate. Westfield Design & 
Construction Pty Ltd and Powell considered $20 000 to be a figure which 
represented a real and reasonable contribution to a worthy cause, such as the 
establishment of an occupational health and safety unit. Powell subsequently 
received approval to make the donation to the CFMEU FEDFA Division 
occupational health and safety unit by two instalments of $10 000 each plus 
GST. Powell told Hallet (his boss) about the contribution and indicated that the 
payment of the second instalment was conditional on the CFMEU FEDFA 
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Division continuing its good relationship with Westfield Design & Construction 
Pty Ltd by not adopting an unreasonable stance in relation to future forklift 
operations at the site. On 1 December 2000 Westfield Design & Construction Pty 
Ltd received a tax invoice from the CFMEU FEDFA Division for $11 000 in 
relation to its ‘Health and Safety Campaign’, for ‘Services relating to education, 
plus preparation, production and distribution of literature for improved health 
and safety in the building construction industry.’ The payment of this invoice 
was approved by Powell. The invoice was paid on 19 December 2000 (Cole 
2003, vol. 16, p. 273 & p. 279). 
This type of transaction was an example of how union officials demanded money from 
large companies, as well as small companies, in return for industrial peace. While a 
project manager approved the payment of the invoice, it raises questions about whether 
accounting staff have queried an invoice from a union about educational services.  
6.2.7 Summary Comments 
This section looks at whether members of the social network listened to accountants and, 
if so, whether they adjusted their behaviour accordingly. A fundamental cause of the 
problems that led to the RC was that the industry’s management were influenced by the 
demands of different stakeholders, the unions in particular. The RC also found non-
industrial relations issues such as tax evasion and unlawful acceptance and reporting of 
commissions/cash payments. This section examines which stakeholder groups 
influenced these behaviours and why. A fundamental structural problem within the 
construction industry was short-term focus. Those stakeholders with long-term interests, 
that is the unions, were aware that those with a short term focus were vulnerable to 
project delay and cost. Those stakeholders with a short-term focus such as 
owners/managers, knew that to cooperate with the unions was a better economic 
alternative to conflict with the unions. This created an inequality of bargaining power. 
The following analysis summarises how these socio-political inequities influenced the 
social relationships between stakeholders. 
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The main battle for power between stakeholders was between owner/managers and 
unions. The RC contains considerable evidence that the unions tried to exert power over 
owners/managers. The first impact of this behaviour was unions threatening to expose 
employers to regulators. The most common threat was to expose tax evasion. Case 
studies involving Hackett Laboratory Services, The Civil Management Group Pty Ltd, 
and Cables at Cammeray site were used to illustrate the aggressive behaviour of unions 
to achieve their aims. Commissioner Cole found that the unions behaved this way to 
ensure better working conditions for their members, defined by EBA’s. While this is a 
legitimate activity, the unions often went about achieving this aim illegitimately. 
The unions used various methods to coerce owners/employers to comply with their 
demands and numerous case study examples are scattered throughout the RCR. A 
principal tactic of union officials was to use tax evasion as a threat. This involved 
threatening owners/managers that union officials would contact the ATO with 
accusations of tax evasion. This implicates construction companies in two of the seven 
unlawful activities – tax evasion and payroll tax – for two reasons: union officials must 
have been aware of unlawful activity and the fact that owners/managers complied in 
response to the threat suggests they did not want the accusation to be made. This 
suggests there was unlawful behaviour and the owners/managers did not want the 
authorities to know.  
A third of the seven unlawful activities - inappropriate payments – was also found in this 
section. An example of unions demanding financial contributions was a practice called 
dual ticketing. This practice begins with coercion to ensure employees are union 
members. A response from some employers was to purchase casual tickets (that is, 
memberships) as a means of avoiding industrial disruption is a problem. Westfield 
Design and Construction Pty Ltd (Westfield) in Victoria provided an interesting case 
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study to illustrate the practice, because it reveals evidence about accounting practice 
associated with making and receiving payments. Associated with buying industrial 
peace, some unions negotiated workplace agreements with contractors which included 
inappropriate payments in the agreements. 
The relationship between owners/managers and staff was different. In this case, 
owners/managers held power over staff and exploited them for financial gain. 
Owners/managers had three types of relationships with staff. First, full-time employees 
were exploited by owners/managers by withholding or refusing to pay employee 
entitlements. This was the fourth of the seven unlawful activities. Some unscrupulous 
contractors delayed paying employees wage increases as a way of improving their cash 
flow. The section showed evidence of underpayment or miscalculation of workers’ 
wages and entitlements. The second type of relationship was with sub-contractors. Sub-
contractors were also exploited by owners/managers by withholding or refusing to make 
payments. Commissioner Cole found that some unions tried to force contractors to pay 
members while on strike. This practice, known as strike pay, was considered unlawful. 
The third relationship between owners/managers and staff was use of illegal workers. 
Illegal workers were exploited by owners/managers who paid them low wages. Illegal 
workers are often paid less than legal entitlements; some were not paying tax, either at 
the correct rate or at all; and some were claiming social security benefits to which they 
were not entitled. 
The construction industry’s complex contracting system created socio-political power 
inequities between companies at the various levels of the system, head contractors (large 
companies), contractors (medium sized companies), and sub-contractors (small 
companies). Power inequities emerged from this complex work relationship between 
companies and revealed problems in the fifth of the seven unlawful activities: security of 
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payments. Head contractors called rogue builders, depended upon the financial 
vulnerability of smaller contractors and delaying tactics.  
The sixth of the seven unlawful activities - profit manipulation was done for several 
purposes and for different audiences. Owners/managers might seek to manipulate profit 
reporting to falsify the company’s financial position to persuade other companies of 
financial viability when tendering for work, or to mislead regulators and evade tax, or 
even to avoid the threshold for payroll tax. It was included in this section on the 
relationship between owners/managers and the general public because profit 
manipulation has the potential to affect all members of society; particularly investors or 
shareholders.  
The seventh of the seven unlawful activities – phoenix company activity – was purely 
self-interest by owners/managers and was not included in this section on social 




The third ST construct was expectations. In order to understand the social reality of 
accounting from a critical theory perspective, PET is used. This theory elucidates that 
the strategic outcomes of accounting practices favour specific interests in society and 
disadvantage others (Cooper & Sherer 1984, p. 208). The differing interests of the social 
actors may explain the social praxis underlying the behaviour leading to the construction 
industry’s legitimacy gap.   In this section, the construction industry’s multiple social 
contracts are examined. These explain what society expected of the industry. The 
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analysis highlights stakeholder expectations of one another as well as the construction 
industry’s legitimacy gap, that is, the difference between society’s desired behaviour and 
actual behaviour. The analysis will explore whether accounting played a role in this 
legitimacy gap either by contributing to the undesired behaviours or by improving the 
behaviours.  
The main societal expectations of the construction industry were: 
1. Contribute to public funds. This was an expectation that construction companies 
would meet their corporate citizenship responsibilities and pay taxes. In this way, 
they would contribute to the funds gathered by government to be shared with all of 
society through government services. Tax evasion was the main problem in this area.  
2. Pay employees their entitlements. This was an expectation that individuals employed 
by construction companies would receive their salary and non-salary reward for their 
work. Underpaying employees or avoiding payment altogether through insolvency 
were the main problems in this area. 
3. Pay suppliers their entitlements. This was an expectation that companies and 
individuals who provide materials and services to construction companies, including 
sub-contractors, be paid appropriately in return. Delaying or withholding payments 
was the main problem in this area. 
4. Accurate performance reporting. This was an expectation that construction 
companies would honestly and accurately report on their business activities, 
including profit reporting. Society includes public and private investors; as well as 
other stakeholders interested in the financial position of construction companies such 
as customers, creditors (for example banks), suppliers, and regulators. These 
stakeholders want to know if they will get a return on their investment, have their 
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building project completed, and whether they will be paid. Profit manipulation was 
the main problem in this area.  
These expectations emerged from the analysis. Based on the findings about the nature of 
the social contract breach surrounding the seven unlawful activities, these four 
expectations summarized what society expected the construction industry to do to repair 
its legitimacy and bridge the social contract gap.  
Commissioner Cole was scathing in his criticism of the construction industry’s unlawful 
behaviour. While he is often highly critical of unions and sympathetic towards 
employers, he concludes that “every participant bears some responsibility” (Cole 2003, 
vol. 3, p. 211). His most aggressive criticism of the industry emerges when he describes 
participants as uncivilised: “civilised standards of the kind which would be expected by 
ordinary Australians have too often evaded workplace relations in the building and 
construction industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 211). The use of words such as civilised 
standards by Commissioner Cole, illustrates the industry’s inability to satisfy societal 
expectations.  
6.3.2 Contribute to Public Funds 
6.3.2.1 Societal Expectation 
The first expectation of society regarding the construction industry was that it should 
contribute to public funds. Companies must pay tax on income earned. There are 
particular accounting rules and conventions related to the recognition of expenses and 
income which lead to the determination of accounting profit.  
Society expects two outcomes from companies in terms of the issues outlined above. 
First, society expects companies to make a profit. This would reflect that the company is 
using the resources allocated to it by society wisely. This is reflected in accounting 
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profit. Investors and other stakeholders are happy if there is accounting profit and it 
reflects good performance from the company. Second, society also expects the company 
to pay taxes. Taxes on income are paid by all citizens of society. These taxes help pay 
for essential government services such as education, health, defence, and infrastructure. 
It is expected that all members of society, including companies, contribute towards these 
services by paying taxes. Individuals and organisations who try to avoid making their 
contribution to these essential government services, by not paying their taxes, are 
considered outlaws, in the sense that they are not meeting society’s expectations of 
them. This is reflected in profit gained from tax evasion.   
The Federal and State Governments in Australia have also seen payroll tax as a problem 
area for many years. This perception was created by two factors. First, companies have 
tried to avoid paying payroll tax. Second, the governments have varied in their treatment 
of payroll tax. As a result, considerable government revenue has been lost due to non-
payment, and governments have found it difficult to respond. Part of the problem was 
inconsistency in the treatment of payroll tax which created confusion for companies and 
the regulators. In response the governments have moved towards a consistent approach 
to payroll tax, called harmonisation. This is described in the following extract: 
A Protocol for Payroll Tax Harmonisation between Jurisdictions (Signed 28 July 
2010): 
On 29 March 2007 State and Territory Treasurers announced a decision to 
overhaul payroll tax arrangements to achieve greater legislative and 
administrative harmonisation. Payroll tax harmonisation was endorsed and 
continued by the Council of Australian Governments as one of 27 projects 
designed to achieve a National Seamless Economy. Under the National 
Partnership Agreement to Deliver a National Seamless Economy, the States and 
Territories were responsible to work together to produce a nationally coordinated 
approach in relation to payroll tax, and complete the reforms by 1 July 2012. All 
jurisdictions have taken steps to enact legislation aligning provisions in eight 
areas agreed to by State and Territory Treasurers. Further, New South Wales, 
Victoria, Tasmania, Northern Territory and South Australia have enacted 
identical payroll tax legislation, apart from minor differences identified in 
schedules to the legislation. Queensland has also passed legislation to establish 
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harmonisation with those jurisdictions. On 11 July 2008 the Commissioners of 
all State and Territory Revenue Offices signified their commitment to 
establishing and maintaining consistency in the administration of payroll tax. In 
order to implement arrangements for harmonised administration, the 
Commissioners established the Payroll Tax Harmonisation Committee in 
December 2008. The role of the Committee is to oversee the design, 
implementation and maintenance of an administrative framework to support the 
goal of harmonisation of payroll tax administration, and it has already undertaken 
significant work to advance harmonised administration. (2012 - The work of this 
committee is now undertaken by the Tax Law Committee.) By signing this 
Protocol the Commissioners agree to continue their high level of cooperation and 
consultation in order to further payroll tax harmonisation (Payroll Tax Australia 
2010, paras. 1-6). 
Payroll tax is a self-assessed, general purpose state and territory tax assessed on wages 
paid or payable by an employer to its employees, when the total wage bill of an 
employer (or group of employers) exceeds a threshold amount (Payroll Tax Australia 
2010). The payroll tax rate and threshold amount vary between states and territories. 
Payroll tax returns are lodged and payment of liability is made at an agreed frequency 
(monthly, quarterly, or annually) to the respective revenue office in the Australian state 
and/or territory in which the wage payment is deemed liable (Payroll Tax Australia 
2010). The Australian states and territories agreed to harmonise a number of key areas of 
payroll tax provisions in order to address inconsistencies across the country (Payroll Tax 
Australia 2010). However, payroll tax administration differs between the states and 
territories in other areas (Payroll Tax Australia 2010). 
6.3.2.2 Societal Contract Breach 
The RC found “avoidance and evasion of taxation obligations” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 6). 
It was clear that the regulator, the Australian Federal Government, was very concerned 
about taxation misconduct within the construction industry before, during and after the 
period of the RC. The RC recommendations included the need for the industry to 
achieve compliance with taxation laws (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 90). An investigation 
CHAPTER 6: ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE - IMPACT AND EXPECTATIONS 400 
conducted during the same period by the DEWR Report in 2003 announced that the 
industry reform program included steps to combat tax evasion. The second BIT Report 
in 2005 also recommended that there was need to combat tax evasion. This trail of 
regulator intervention reveals that tax misconduct continued after the RC. It seems that 
the behaviour was embedded within the industry’s culture and was accepted as a normal 
part of doing business.  
Tax evasion within the construction industry occurred as follows:  
1. Income tax evasion by persons and entities 
2. Payroll tax evasion 
3. Phoenix company activity 
Commissioner Cole stated that:  
The avoidance and evasion of taxation obligations is relevant to the Royal 
Commission Terms of Reference because it affects the building and construction 
industry at a number of levels.  It affects the public taxation revenue raised from 
the industry, it puts law abiding contractors in a non-competitive situation, and it 
can turn legitimate employees into contractors (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 51). 
The significance of the problem of inappropriate income tax activity within the 
construction industry at the time of the RC is illustrated in three ways. First, estimates by 
the ATO. The ATO Submission to the RC (exhibit 0714), questioned “the utility of 
estimating ‘revenue leakage’, and states only that, with respect to the building and 
construction industry, this ‘leakage’ is ‘significant’” (Cole 2003, vol. 12, p. 234). It was 
suggested that “$354 million worth of income tax is evaded or avoided in the industry 
each year” (Mr Wallace Trohear in Cole 2003, vol. 12, p. 234), but Commissioner Cole 
qualified this by emphasising this was an estimate, and “there is no empirical data in 
evidence which might support this figure” (Cole 2003, vol. 12, p. 234). Second, efforts 
to recoup tax avoided. Since 1998, the “ATO has recovered over $370 million in tax in 
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the industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 122). Third, the unions used tax evasion as a way to 
threaten employers (Cole 2003, vol. 12, p. 484; Cole 2003, vol. 13, p. 34). There are 
specific cases in New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory where union 
officials threatened to call the ATO and tell them to conduct audits of contractors and 
their employees if industrial demands were not met. The fact that unions could make this 
threat, and contractors backed down in the face of the threat, suggests the reality and 
widespread practice of tax evasion within the construction industry at that time.  
Income tax evasion occurred within the construction industry in several ways. In his 
submission to the RC, Mr Ian Read, Assistant Commissioner of Taxation in the Small 
Business Line of the ATO, stated that “the level of non-compliance in this industry is 
significant, and if left unaddressed would pose a risk to ongoing revenue collections” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 56). He gave evidence describing the ATO’s interpretation of tax 
evasion activities conducted by the construction industry: 
• untaxed cash payments including salary and wages, overtime, rostered days off 
(RDOs) and bonuses 
• ‘bodgie’ or bogus labour hire companies 
• phoenix activity 
• fraudulent claims for GST Input Tax Credits;  
• false claims for Tax Instalment Deduction by directors of phoenix companies 
(Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 56). 
A major cause of tax evasion behaviour was the industry’s complex contracting system. 
Much of the evidence presented to the RC regarding tax evasion involved smaller 
companies, even sole traders. While larger contractors were implicitly involved because 
they would have cooperated in activities such as cash payments, they may appear to 
have engaged less in tax evasion compared with smaller companies. However, the 
Australian Taxation (ATO) submission to the RC provides a different picture. The ATO 
stated that it “undertakes a structured process in relation to ‘large clients’” and “of the 
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top 200 such large clients, 17 were from the property and construction industry”, that is 
8.5% (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 62).  
The ATO providing evidence that large construction companies also engaged in tax 
evasion. In 2015 the problem still existed. Ryan (2015) reported a senate enquiry of 
Australia’s top 40 companies to examine why these companies pay so little tax. Tax 
evasion appears to be common practice for large companies as well as small companies 
across all industry sectors. The ATO has identified that large companies engaged in tax 
evasion in the following ways: 
• tax planning as a strategy used to minimise the tax liabilities of these entities. In 
this group of taxpayers the ATO uses as a major tool a Client Risk Review, 
which examines the economic performance of the corporate group as a whole 
and includes financial analysis and qualitative profiling. The ATO has conducted 
such reviews on the top 200 large clients. The ATO submission states that recent 
projects covering large clients have involved examination of major construction 
and infrastructure projects and loss utilisation (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 62). 
• The ATO states that the particular risk issues involving large clients relate to: 
o Division 10D write back 
o Capital and revenue losses  
o Financing arrangements (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 62). 
The ATO concluded that “the tax planning and other behaviours of the 17 entities in the 
property and construction industry are consistent with those entities in other industries” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 62). In other words, large companies in the construction industry 
may have engaged in tax evasion in ways similar to large companies in other industries.  
One of the peculiarities of the contracting system with particular relevance to tax 
evasion was the widespread use of subcontractors. In the construction industry, skilled 
workers often “do not want to work as employees and want to run their own businesses, 
seeing subcontracting as rewarding effort and providing better financial incentive” (Cole 
2003, vol. 3, p. 207). Employers (large contractors) argue that subcontracting is a benefit 
to all parties: “it rewards productivity, innovation and quality [and] … makes individuals 
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responsible for their own well-being” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 207). Unions, on the other 
hand, argue that “many workers become subcontractors to avoid paying tax or because 
they are required to by employers trying to avoid paying them their proper entitlements” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 207). In either case, the use of subcontractors encourages activity 
such as tax evasion.  
Evidence provided to the RC argued that there were two types of “illegitimate 
contractors”:  
1. those that want to operate that way and flaunt, in general terms, the tax and 
industrial systems for greater in hand returns  
2. those that are told to be subcontractors to minimise the labour-related overheads 
of their employers (Cole 2003, vol. 12, p. 445). 
The PC recommended banning pyramid subcontracting on commercial building sites 
following concerns about “artificial labour only contractor arrangements which were 
designed to avoid legal responsibility for employee entitlements and tax payments, and 
the poor occupational health and safety practices associated with some of these 
contractors” (Cole 2003, vol. 4, p. 104). The PC proposed “that the extent of pyramid 
subcontracting should be at the discretion of the head contractor” because sometimes it 
was economically beneficial, so long as unlawful behaviour was not involved (Cole 
2003, vol. 4, p. 105).  
The RC provided case studies of pyramid contracting; including: 
o The No.1 The Esplanade, Glenelg case study involving Rapid Building 
Services (SA) Pty Ltd 
o SJ Weir Pty Ltd and the CFMEU (Cole 2003, vol. 12, p. 253). 
There was also evidence in the RCR that some major contractors (large companies) 
enforced the pyramid subcontracting prohibition (Cole 2003, vol. 12, p. 253), which 
essentially demanded subcontractors and their workers to become employees against 
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their will (Cole 2003, vol. 12, p. 253). This was illustrated by a case study on 
Timbercraft Pty Ltd. 
The unions were particularly concerned about a practice they called “sham contracting”. 
They argued this had a significant effect on taxation revenue and the proliferation of 
incorporation and the use of ABN’s. Senior union official John Sutton’s evidence to the 
RC included the following: “by far the biggest problem in the building industry [is] the 
misclassification of workers as so-called independent contractors and there’s massive 
amount[s] [of] tax being lost to the Australian Government” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 63). 
On behalf of his union, the CFMEU, Sutton argued “unless we can do something about 
the massive tax fraud epidemic, we can’t seriously address the question of wages and 
conditions … because about half of all blue collar workers are … being classified as 
non-employees” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 63). This statement explains why the unions were 
so interested in exposing tax evasion in the construction industry. Sutton’s testimony 
indicates the union’s view of the illegality of tax evasion behaviour, and the use of the 
word “massive” illustrates the extent of this unlawful behaviour, it was widespread.  
Mr Richard Williams, Secretary of the Electrical Trades Union of Australia, Queensland 
Branch and Secretary of the Queensland Branch Electrical Division of the 
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and 
Allied Services Union of Australia, gave evidence to the RC indicating widespread use 
of working arrangements to evade or avoid taxation (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 63). He 
exposed that “on some sites, contractors from the housing industry may pay cash in hand 
and the workers be treated as contractors while they were working alongside workers 
being paid under enterprise bargaining agreements as employees” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 
63). This statement illustrates again how the unions’ interest in tax evasion was because 
CHAPTER 6: ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE - IMPACT AND EXPECTATIONS 405 
it effected their members who they felt were treated unfairly because they were not 
engaging in tax evasion.  
Bill Shorten of the Australian Workers Union (AWU), the Federal Opposition Leader at 
the time of writing, highlighted the use of bogus subcontracting as a major contributor to 
the avoidance of taxation within the industry (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 64). He referred to 
the 1999 Review of Business Taxation (the Ralph Report 1999) which recommended 
“that many subcontractors who were in fact really employees should be taxed as such as 
the economic reality of earning their income is unchanged, their income should be taxed 
on the same basis as other PAYE income” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 64). Shorten is 
explaining that employees, for example union members, were being exploited by 
employers in order to gain tax evasion benefits and this was unfair. 
The RC cited a report by Dr John Buchanan, Deputy Director (Research), Australian 
Centre for Industrial Relations Research and Training, University of Sydney and 
Cameron Allan entitled ‘The Growth of Contractors in the Construction Industry: 
Implications for Tax Revenue’ (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 67). This study cited research that, 
“on average, contractors in construction paid $6 217 a year less tax than their PAYE 
equivalent” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 67). The study looked at those workers who were sole 
traders, own account workers without incorporated status and without employees (Cole 
2003, vol. 9, p. 67). In evidence to the RC, Buchanan pointed out the significance of lost 
revenue, noting “that if their conclusions were only 25 per cent right, the amount of 
revenue lost was still about $500 million” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 67). The main building 
unions told the RC “that there is an ‘epidemic’ of tax fraud within the industry” (Cole 
2003, vol. 9, p. 53). A senior union official, Ferguson, alleged that “there’s $1 billion 
worth of tax evasion taking place in the building industry; and about 30 per cent of the 
companies don’t pay workers’ compensation and I would say a very substantial 
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percentage, 30 per cent perhaps, don’t pay payroll tax” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 53). 
Commissioner Cole stated that when interrogated by the RC hearings, union officials 
and others making these claims, provided little actual evidence, in terms of documents or 
other facts. However, the willingness of many companies to “succumb” to union 
pressure in response to threats to tell the ATO about their tax evasion; is sufficient 
implicit evidence.  
In its submission to the RC, the ATO explained that it had completed investigations into 
“209 cases involving bogus labour hire schemes, or ‘bodgies’, including a number of 
cases which have resulted in successful prosecutions, resulting in $26 million in tax and 
penalties being raised in New South Wales” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 57). Scheme 
promoters retained a commission and returned the balance in cash of fake invoices paid 
by cheque by employers (Cole 2003. vol. 9, p. 57). “A further $94 million in revenue 
was raised as a result of the indirect compliance effect of ATO audit activities” (Cole 
2003, vol. 9, p. 57). Four identified scheme promoters have been jailed (Cole 2003, vol. 
9, p. 57), which highlights the illegal nature of this activity.  
The RC identified non-compliance with payroll tax as one of the construction industry’s 
unlawful behaviours. Commissioner Cole stated “there is substantial evidence of evasion 
of payroll tax obligations in the building and construction industry, particularly by 
persons engaged in phoenix company activity” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 106). 
The significance of the problem of inappropriate payroll tax activity within the 
construction industry at the time of the RC was limited by the proportion of companies 
involved in payroll tax evasion. This occurred because most construction companies are 
small employers (see chapter 3) and are below the payroll tax threshold. As 
Commissioner Cole pointed out “the high threshold means that the number of registered 
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employers is considerably less than the number of employers who hold a workers 
compensation policy” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 95). For example, the RC reported that “in 
New South Wales as at 30 June 2001, there were a total of 25 873 registered employers 
liable for payroll tax and approximately 357 000 holders of workers compensation 
policies” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 95). However, while the proportion of companies 
involved in payroll tax evasion was relatively smaller than those engaged in other 
unlawful behaviour, for example income tax evasion, Commissioner Cole stated that 
“evasion of obligations is still prevalent” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 93).  
The RC provided specific evidence of the prevalence of payroll tax evasion. In New 
South Wales, for example, audit work in the construction industry indicated a high risk 
of non-compliance regarding payroll tax. The RC found that “this has been an ongoing 
focus for the New South Wales Office of State Revenue (NSW OSR), which is charged 
with the administration of payroll tax” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 97). “In 2000–01, a total of 
1947 full payroll tax audits were completed [by the NSW OSR], including 180 audits 
associated with the construction industry (9.2 per cent)” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 97). 
“Underpaid payroll tax liabilities were identified in approximately 80 per cent of 
construction audited cases” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 97). However, this does not mean that 
80% of construction companies are non-compliant with payroll tax. “The majority of 
audit cases were either specifically targeted or selected according to likely revenue risk” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 97).  
In 2002 the WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (WorkCover NSW) and the 
NSW OSR commissioned a report entitled “Review of employer compliance with 
workers compensation premiums and payroll tax in New South Wales” (Le Couteur & 
Warren 2002). The final report of the Review was delivered in September 2002 and 
stated in its Executive Summary: 
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Australia has a long history of reviews and recommendations for improvement in 
employers’ compliance with workers compensation premiums and pay-roll tax. It 
is a common belief that significant premium and tax revenues are being lost, 
although it is impossible to quantify the extent of the problem (cited in Cole 
2003, vol. 8, p. 97, is a citation by Cole of the NSW Workcover Review). 
However, there is some data available. A NSW OSR Building and Construction Audit 
Task Force raised “additional assessments totalling $16.5 million during the period 
November 1999 till December 2000” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 101). An audit project, 
targeting known phoenix operators, “issued assessments totalling $4.8 million” at the 
time of the RC; and a second project, “based on data matching with other agencies, had 
issued assessments totalling $7 million” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 101). These figures 
illustrate that despite the relatively small proportion of construction companies required 
to pay payroll tax, a significant amount of money are recoveries from construction 
companies avoiding payroll tax, which provides evidence of the scale of payroll tax 
evasion in the industry.  
The 2002 WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (WorkCover NSW) of employer 
compliance with workers compensation premiums and the NSW OSR Review of payroll 
tax found challenges in addressing non-compliance. The challenges for the OSR in 
respect of pay-roll tax were: 
1. complex legislation in relation to ‘relevant contracts’; 
2. the ability of employers to avoid reaching the threshold by splitting activities 
(despite grouping rules); and 
3. non-registration (which may be undetected as a result of the self-assessment 
system used to administer the tax) (cited in Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 98, is a 
citation by Cole of the NSW Workcover Review). 
In Victoria, Mr Grant Dunlop, Project Leader, Pay-roll Tax Investigations, State 
Revenue Office Victoria (SRO), informed the RC that: 
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The principal pay-roll tax compliance issues dealt with by the SRO are failure to 
lodge returns, late lodgement of returns, failure to be registered as an employer, 
incorrect application of the grouping provisions and failure correctly to declare 
taxable wages (in particular by incorrect application of exemptions and failure 
correctly to declare taxable components) (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 101). 
Using employees as sub-contractors to avoid paying tax and other financial 
commitments, such as employee entitlements was a widespread practice in the 
construction industry. The widespread nature of this practice was shown by data 
provided by WorkCover where the NSW OSR was “able to identify many employers 
who had not registered for pay-roll tax but had been paying a workers compensation 
premium” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 98). Consequently the Review found that “employers 
are more likely to take out workers compensation insurance because any worker who is 
injured will then be covered by the benefits of the insurance” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 98). 
The main building unions generally expressed to the RC the view “that there was an 
‘epidemic’ of tax fraud within the industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 53). The unions were 
very vocal about the use of employees as sub-contractors to avoid paying tax. This 
practice, which the unions called ‘sham contracting’, was widespread. In his testimony 
to the RC, Mr Wallace Trohear, State Secretary of the Construction, Forestry, Mining & 
Energy, Industrial Union of Employees, Queensland and Branch Secretary of the 
Construction and General Division of the CFMEU “estimated that up to 65% of the 
building and construction industry is on sham subcontracting arrangements and is only 
paying tax on the amount received as award or Enterprise Bargaining Agreement (EBA) 
rates” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 53). In New South Wales, Mr Andrew Ferguson, the Branch 
Secretary of the CFMEU, Construction and General Division, New South Wales 
Divisional Branch (CFMEU New South Wales Divisional Branch) alleged that “there 
had been the misuse of tens of thousands of Australian Business Numbers (ABNs), 
which had been issued to individuals who were really employees, and the incorrect 
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receipt of and misuse of goods and services tax refunds” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 53). 
While it is difficult to agree on quantified data on payroll tax noncompliance, it is clear 
that the unions felt the problem was significant, widespread, and a serious breach of the 
construction industry’s societal contract.  
The 2002 WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (WorkCover NSW) and the NSW 
OSR Review of payroll tax stated: 
Changes to the labour market brought about by growing use of contractors have 
fundamentally changed the nature of the employer/employee relationship. They 
have impacted on union membership, workplace relations, personal income tax, 
pay-roll tax, workers compensation premiums and OH&S (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 
99, is a citation by Cole of the NSW Workcover Review). 
Unscrupulous individuals exploited these industry structures to disguise the 
employer/employee relationship to avoid paying payroll tax. The Review recommended 
that “the principal contractor be liable for amounts of payroll tax and workers 
compensation premiums evaded by contractors unless the principal has a written 
statement from the contractor advising that appropriate payroll tax and workers 
compensation premiums have been paid” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 99). This 
recommendation aimed to address the problem by placing responsibility with the 
contractor. In this way, the contractor was responsible for payroll tax of those employed 
on their projects, whether they were employed as staff or as sub-contractors. However, 
this measure still did not address the problem of avoiding the payroll tax threshold by 
using employees as sub-contractors. If the contractor could split up his/her staff into 
smaller companies each of which did not reach the threshold figure, a practice known as 
grouping, then he/she would avoid payroll tax and also avoid any responsibility for these 
subcontractors paying payroll tax. The RC concluded that “in effect, there is currently no 
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real disincentive for a principal to engage a contractor who is non-compliant with the 
pay-roll tax legislation” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 99). 
The unions’ main concern in terms of payroll tax evasion was what some witnesses at 
the RC called “illegitimate use of contracting” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 103). Mr John 
Sutton, National Secretary of the CFMEU, Construction and General Division, gave the 
following evidence: 
MR GINNANE: Can I ask you about payroll tax. Do you agree that payroll tax is 
not a major feature of most building enterprises because of the payroll threshold 
that exists in various states? We were told this morning in Victoria it’s about 
$500,000 payroll before you have got to pay any payroll tax. There [are] 
thresholds around the states. Most building businesses, we are told, employ five 
or less people. Do you agree that payroll tax is not really much of a compliance 
issue in the building industry?  
MR SUTTON: It’s still an important issue because… There’s many legitimate 
contracting firms that do employ significant numbers of men in this industry. 
When we say 95 per cent of firms employ less than five, there’s a certain fiction 
in that, because that includes all these workers. On my figures, that includes 
about 150,000 workers who are called businesses, when they are in fact 
employees. You put them under the microscope, they are really employees. So 
it’s not really 95 per cent, if you discounted for all that. But in any event, I do 
accept that there is a large number of small contractors.  
MR GINNANE: The overwhelming majority of businesses in the building 
industry are small businesses?  
MR SUTTON: Yes, indeed. But there is a substantial number of medium sized 
contractors on all the commercial building sites around the country that do 
employ anywhere from 10 workers to 200 workers and many of those, of course, 
don’t pay their payroll tax or again understate it. So compliance with payroll tax 
laws is another – or non-compliance, I should say – is another very serious 
problem in the building industry (Cole 2003, vol. 8, pp. 103-104). 
This extract presents two opposing views. Mr Ginnane is trying to establish that payroll 
tax evasion is not a significant problem due to the complex nature of contracting in the 
construction industry. Most companies are so small that they do not meet the threshold 
figures, in terms of total wages bill, and therefore do not have to pay payroll tax. Mr 
John Sutton, on the other hand, is arguing that payroll tax noncompliance is a significant 
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issue. He is blaming the problem on mid-sized companies, with 10 to 200 employees, 
who would certainly reach the threshold and have to pay payroll tax. In this testimony, 
Mr Sutton is suggesting that these mid-sized companies are creating the problem of 
noncompliance because they are trying to avoid paying payroll tax by declaring their 
employees as sub-contractors. It seems that Mr Sutton is basing his argument on an 
assertion that the employee figures of 10-200 are the “real figures” but that these 
companies try to report much lower figures in the hope of avoiding their payroll tax 
obligations. They do this by “pretending” staff are subcontractors. The RC accepted 
evidence submitted by the CFMEU that it had notified the New South Wales OSR of its 
concerns regarding payroll tax, “but it was not apparent what response had been 
received” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 104). This provides support for the point that the unions 
were not creating payroll tax noncompliance as an issue for its own political means, 
thereby confirming that the unions felt they had legitimate concerns about the matter and 
had raised it with relevant authorities prior to the RC.  
This raises questions about where this practice of “hiding” employee numbers to avoid 
payroll tax fits within the payroll tax process and whether accountants would be 
involved. This activity would probably not involve accountants. Decisions about 
employment status would be made by management, perhaps with the advice of human 
resource management.  
A strategy which construction companies used to avoid reaching the payroll tax 
thresholds was to split activities to avoid having employees included in a “group” of 
companies that would aggregate the wages bill. The 2002 WorkCover Authority of New 
South Wales (WorkCover NSW) and the NSW OSR Review of payroll tax found that 
data matching with Workcover was encouraging but limited due to a number of 
conceptual differences. The Review found:  
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differences in the definition of wages, the concept of ‘employee’ for pay-roll tax 
and ‘worker’ for workers compensation and the differing rules regarding 
grouping, currently relevant for pay-roll tax purposes only, versus the concept of 
‘related activities’ for workers compensation purposes (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 98, 
is a citation by Cole of the NSW Workcover Review). 
Opportunities for payroll tax recovery, particularly in the case of phoenix company 
activity, were improved with legislative amendments in New South Wales. “Section 31C 
of the Pay-Roll Tax Act 1971 (NSW) enabled the service of a notice of liability to 
payroll tax on a director, or former director, once an assessment of their company 
becomes overdue” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 101). In its submission to the RC, the NSW 
OSR stated: 
Whilst section 31C was partially successful, phoenix company operators tended 
to ensure that none of their companies that paid wages held any worthwhile 
assets, which protected those assets from any legal action by OSR. To overcome 
this problem section 16LA was introduced. This section makes all members of a 
group jointly and severally liable for the debts of other group members, 
regardless of whether or not the group member pays wages. This provision had a 
commencement date of 1 January 2001. The current OSR compliance project 
regarding the building and construction industry has used s16LA to settle the 
debts of twenty-four (24) companies (controlled by known phoenix operators) 
which had a total liability of $2.8 million were prior to the introduction of this 
legislation, responsible for debts totalling $2.4 million considered to be 
irrecoverable (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 101).  
A further strategy used by construction companies to avoid tax was not registering as 
being eligible for payroll tax. The NSW OSR, using data provided by WorkCover, was 
able to identify many employers who had not registered for pay-roll tax but had been 
paying a workers compensation premium (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 98). The 2002 
WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (WorkCover NSW) and the NSW OSR 
Review of payroll tax found that “employers were more likely to take out workers 
compensation insurance because any worker who is injured will then be covered by the 
benefits of the insurance” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 98). Therefore, the number of employers 
paying workers compensation premiums was a more accurate measure of employers 
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with employees, rather than sub-contractors, because employers could see consequences 
in not paying workers compensation insurance, like being sued for workers 
compensation, as opposed to avoiding payroll tax where they felt they could avoid 
detection.  
The State Revenue Office Victoria (SROV) identified the construction industry as “the 
single largest industry group in which non-compliance to register for payroll tax 
occurred, representing 18% of failures to register” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 102). The SRO 
reported to the RC that the “main cause of that non-compliance was found to be 
ignorance of the legislation” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 102). This suggests that these non-
compliant companies were failing in process 1a. recognise the payroll tax liability, 
which is a process involving accountants. Accountants should have been aware of 
payroll tax legislation. Revenue South Australia (RSA) told the RC that: 
During the period 1 July 1995 to 30 November 1997, 39 audits and 
investigations (7.3%) had been conducted on the construction industry from a 
total of 534 assignments across 15 industry sectors. Pay-roll tax revenue of 
$685,778 (9.8%) was identified within the construction industry by these 
programs from the total revenue of $7M. The largest pay-roll tax revenue 
($523,934 or 74.6%) in the construction industry has been as a result of non-
registration. 25.4% of the noncompliance revenue has resulted from errors and 
omissions from returning incorrect taxable wages (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 102). 
More recent data (2001/02) showed that RSA had identified 24 employers not registered; 
which led to recovery of “$2,163,310 in pay-roll tax including penalty tax, additional tax 
and interest” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 103). The Queensland OSR’s investigation program 
reported to the RC that “in 2000–01, $8.1 million was collected following 521 
investigations” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 102). However, the revenue obtained from the 
construction industry could not be separated from this total. “Queensland identified 
labour hire as a high risk area” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 102). Given labourers represent 
part of the construction industry’s workforce, this could represent a problem. However, 
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the data from Queensland was broader than for the other Australian states and not 
helpful in identifying the precise nature of payroll tax evasion in the Queensland 
construction industry. Similarly, “Tasmania does not collect data to allow it to compare 
non-compliance in payroll tax in the construction industry with other industries” (Cole 
2003, vol. 8, p. 103). Australia’s two territory governments found limited payroll tax 
noncompliance. The Department of Treasury Australian Capital Territory informed the 
RC that: 
The significant cause of non-compliance with payroll tax obligations is due to a 
failure to declare a liability or the full extent of the payroll tax liability. In 
addition, payroll tax legislation requires the employer to determine which 
contractors and payments are included in the salary base for payroll tax purposes. 
Determining the payroll tax liability of employers in the building and 
construction industry is often difficult because of the widespread use of 
contractors and cash payments in the industry (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 103). 
This statement defends employers by suggesting that the construction industry is 
complex due to its contracting structure and it is difficult for companies to monitor their 
obligations because the threshold may rely upon information from others. The 
Department provided this further information to the RC: 
The ACT’s data indicate that the level of compliance in the building and 
construction industry improved in the period 1998-99 to 2000-01: 
From July 1998 to June 2001, 17 inspections on companies in the building and 
construction industry were undertaken. This represents 6% of the overall number 
of inspections undertaken and is in line with industry representation… In 1998-
99, a significant amount of unpaid payroll tax was detected in the building and 
construction industry. This was mainly due to three companies who were 
identified because of a failure to lodge a return or register for payroll tax. Over 
80% of the unpaid revenue detected had been incorrectly paid to another 
jurisdiction. Similar investigations undertaken in subsequent years did not 
uncover the same level of unpaid payroll tax (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 103). 
This indicates that payroll tax is not a significant problem in the Australian Capital 
Territory. The fact that non-compliant companies appeared to pay monies elsewhere 
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suggests that non-compliance was an honest mistake rather than deliberate action to 
avoid paying tax. The Department’s testimony is forgiving of construction companies in 
terms of payroll tax evasion. However, it does highlight failure to declare payroll tax 
liability as a problem. This suggests that these non-compliant companies were failing to 
recognise the payroll tax liability, which is a process involving accountants.  
The Northern Territory, payroll tax noncompliance was much more prevalent, as shown 
by this extract from the RC: 
…in 2001-02, 32 investigations were conducted on businesses in the construction 
industry of which 18 (or 56%) resulted in the issue of a pay-roll tax assessment. 
In comparison, 208 pay-roll tax investigations were conducted on businesses in 
other industries of which 102 (or 49%) resulted in the issue of a pay-roll tax 
assessment in the same period. Of note is that this reflects only 25% of the 
taxable employers in the construction industry and 17% of taxable employers in 
all other industries (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 103). 
This indicates that while payroll tax noncompliance within the construction industry was 
high, it was high in other industries within the Northern Territory as well; perhaps 
suggesting a culture on unlawful behaviour common across the territory’s industry. 
Despite this widespread culture, construction industry was still worse than other 
industries in the Northern Territory, suggest payroll tax non-compliance was a 
significant problem. 
Construction companies were also guilty of failing to lodge returns, late lodgement of 
returns, and incorrect lodgement of returns. The submission by Mr Dunlop of the SROV 
provides insight into the type of activities associated with payroll tax evasion. The 
SROV engaged in audit activities of companies investigated for payroll tax evasion. The 
audit activities undertaken by the SROV indicate how companies may have been 
avoiding payroll tax. This is helpful in determining whether accountants were involved 
in these activities. The audit activities conducted by the SROV included: 
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• evaluations based on employer profiles 
• measures directed at coverage of the tax base and identified risk areas  
• Audit activities are undertaken via a mixture of desk and field audits of particular 
taxpayers (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 102). 
Incorrect lodgement of returns involves failure to correctly declare taxable wages; in 
particular by incorrect application of exemptions and failure to correctly declare taxable 
components. “The main areas of non-compliance were non inclusions of superannuation, 
understatement of remuneration and non-inclusion of directors’ superannuation and 
directors’ fees” (Cole 2003, vol. 12, p. 257). 
The RC found “significant incidence of fraudulent phoenix company activity in the 
construction industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 108). It is important to highlight the word 
‘fraudulent’ used here by Commissioner Cole. Phoenix companies were created by the 
construction industry to avoid paying tax and this activity was considered illegal. A 
2009 Australian Government Treasury report estimated cost of phoenix activity to the 
ATO to be $600 million per year (Treasury 2009). This is the direct cost to the regulator. 
Indirect costs to other creditors were also considered significant. The RC found that a 
major reason for establishing phoenix companies was to evade payroll tax obligations 
(Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 106). Commissioner Cole described this as fraudulent conduct.  He 
also found that businesses and individuals who engage in phoenix company activity are 
often trying to evade other revenue obligations, including the proper payment of 
employee entitlements (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 106). This suggests that phoenix companies 
were often established for fraudulent purposes and were associated with other unlawful 
activity. A major reason for this activity was the lack of accountability and information 
sharing between regulators. Some people knew that the activity was poorly policed and 
so they took the risk of getting away with it. Commissioner Cole stated “since 1998 the 
Australian Taxation Office has raised at least $110 million in taxes and penalties from 
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the detection of fraudulent phoenix company activity in the construction industry” (Cole 
2003, vol. 1, p. 108). That means that more than $20 million in taxes per year were being 
avoided by companies engaging in phoenix activity. Commissioner Cole added “for 
every $1 spent by the Australian Taxation Office on the detection of phoenix company 
activity in the period 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 $8 in revenue was raised” (Cole 2003, 
vol. 1, p. 108).   
While Cowan described phoenix company activity as “mischief” (Cowan 2012, p. 19), it 
is clear that Australian society viewed it much more seriously, and saw it as unlawful 
and a significant breach of the societal contract. In 2009, a report from the Federal 
Government Treasury Department showed that losses caused by phoenix activity had 
been mounting in Australia (Treasury 2009). The regulator’s attention on phoenix 
activity heightened when it realised that losses to taxation authorities were estimated to 
run into the hundreds of millions of dollars (Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, 
cited in Anderson 2012, p. 412). A press release in 2011, accompanying draft legislation 
to penalise the non-remittance of superannuation contributions, estimated that there were 
6000 phoenix companies in Australia (Shorten 2011). This highlighted the widespread 
nature of the activity.  
The significance of the breach of societal contract by phoenix company activity is not 
limited to avoiding taxation. What makes phoenix activity so objectionable to the public 
is its widespread impact on so many parts of society. Those who suffered from phoenix 
activity included “unsecured trade creditors, employees and revenue authorities” 
(Anderson 2012, p. 412). The impact on employees included losing their “accrued 
annual and long service leave entitlements, in addition to wages, redundancy and pay in 
lieu of notice” (Anderson 2012, p. 412). There is also impact on state and federal 
taxation authorities because they “lose payroll tax revenue, and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
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instalments and superannuation amounts, deducted from employees’ wages, are not 
remitted” (Anderson 2012, p. 412). In each case, there are negative flow-on effects. For 
example, trade creditors may experience their own financial difficulties as a result 
(Anderson 2012). This is particularly true in the construction industry where so many 
small companies struggle to survive. Overall, the greatest burden is borne by the Federal 
Government who suffers “loss from tax avoidance, and indirectly the taxpayer, who 
represents all of the rest of society, and who is further burdened where properly levied 
taxation liabilities are unable to be recovered” (Anderson 2012, p. 412). 
The significance of the problem of phoenix company activity was further highlighted in 
a recent article in The Australian newspaper which cited a study that found that 
“dishonest and debt-laden directors who set up phoenix companies to avoid tax, 
superannuation and other creditors are costing the country up to $3 billion a year” 
(Owen 2012, p1). A regulator, the FWO, released a report it commissioned by 
consultants PricewaterhouseCoopers, to reveal the scope of phoenixing. The report 
estimated the cost of phoenixing at between $1.78bn and $3.19bn (Owen 2012). 
Analysis of the cost breakdown showed company directors engaging in phoenix activity 
were avoiding paying up to $655m in unpaid wages and other worker entitlements 
(Owen 2012). They also avoided up to $1.93bn in unpaid debts, and goods and services 
paid for but not provided (Owen 2012). The federal government was estimated to lose 
up to $610m in revenue, mainly in unpaid taxes, but also from the avoidance of 
payments to employees under the GEERS (Owen 2012). 
The RC found evidence that “persons associated with fraudulent phoenix company 
activity in the building and construction industry [were] being appointed as directors of 
other construction companies” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 109). As these people were 
declared bankrupt they were disqualified to act as directors. Commissioner Cole was 
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critical of regulatory authorities for allowing these individuals to avoid detection. 
Commissioner Cole’s recommendation to change the law to allow the disqualification of 
directors after being associated with one failed company was not adopted, but “the 
period of potential disqualification for directors was doubled in 2004” (Anderson 2012, 
p. 414).  
The RC found evidence that tax evasion occurred by directors setting up a group of 
companies within the same industry offering the same services, that is construction. 
While not unlawful, it provided opportunity for individuals to avoid liabilities, such as 
paying tax, by transferring assets to one company and liquidating one of the companies. 
By declaring insolvency in one of the group’s companies, the directors could avoid 
paying its debts, such as tax, but carried on doing the same business as directors in one 
of the other group’s companies.  
The RC found that some “offenders deliberately structure their operations to engage in 
phoenix activity and to avoid detection” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 208). Commissioner Cole 
was clear that this behaviour was intentional. These individuals “fail to pay their debts, 
act in a manner that intentionally denies unsecured creditors equal access to the entity’s 
assets to later re-emerge as a similar business controlled by parties related to either the 
management or directors” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 208). While a primary aim of phoenix 
company activity was to avoid paying tax, Commissioner Cole reveals that the activity 
had a spill-over effect on other businesses. Failing to pay debts to other companies can 
cause recurrent losses to other businesses. The RC found that company directors 
intentionally “designed and planned their businesses to profit at the expense of their 
creditors” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 208, p. 18). Phoenix company activity also involved 
deliberate intent to avoid paying other companies, for example subcontractors, wages 
and other entitlements legally deserving.  
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Commissioner Cole recommended that the way to stop this practice was that directors 
“should be jointly and severally liable for the taxation debts of the other group 
members” (Cole 2003, vol. 19, p. 92). This would deter declaring insolvency and also 
make directors accountable for taxation debt.  
Commissioner Cole’s recommendation to include “corporate group liability in relation to 
certain tax debts of other group members” was not adopted (Anderson 2012, p. 414). 
Therefore, there is no specific evidence that accountants involved with the construction 
industry changed their practices associated with phoenix company activity as a result of 
the RC finding a societal contract breach in this area. It may be inferred, however, that if 
there were any changes to accounting practice, it had little impact on phoenix company 
activity. The evidence is that phoenix company activity continued after the RC and that 
it remained a significant societal contract breach almost 10 years afterwards. Therefore, 
it may be concluded, that if it is accepted that accountants must have played some role in 
phoenix activity (see above), that they did not succeed in bringing a sense of order to 
some individuals in the construction industry. Indeed, this analysis provides support that 
accounting has a subjective role and that some accountants would have bent the rules, 
that is, the accounting standards, in their work with company directors involved in 
phoenix activity.  
A further clue on how difficult it may have been for accountants to change phoenix 
company activity is provided by how difficult the regulators found it to police unlawful 
behaviour. Anderson (2012) explains how frustrated the Federal Government was with 
continued phoenix activity six years after the RC: 
The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit in 2008 noted an increase in 
the numbers of individuals promoting the benefits of fraudulent phoenix activity, 
and at its hearings, ATO Deputy Commissioner Mark Konza expressed his 
frustration that the fight against phoenix activity was being thwarted by light 
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penalties and a lack of prosecutions. The 2009 Phoenix Proposals Paper 
acknowledged that ‘[i]t is clear that ... existing mechanisms do not provide a 
sufficient disincentive to prevent fraudulent phoenix activity.’ This is 
undoubtedly true (Anderson 2012, pp. 422-423). 
Commissioner Cole states that phoenix company activity was associated with tax 
evasion and Anderson (2012) calls it fraudulent. Therefore, phoenix company activity 
for the purposes of tax evasion represents non-compliance with accounting standards. If 
the ATO felt powerless to enforce the law regarding phoenix activity, how could 
accountants employed by the construction industry have felt any differently? This 
evidence suggests that accounting practice regarding phoenix activity had not changed 
based on two assumptions. First, phoenix activity was actually increasing in the period 
after the RC. Second, accountants were unlikely to have the authority or disincentives to 
prevent fraudulent phoenix activity. Therefore, it may be concluded that there were no 
observable changes to accounting practice regarding phoenix activity in the period after 
the RC. Accounting may be considered a subjective practice in regards to phoenix 
company activity. It was unable to stand above this activity and to enforce accounting 
standards to prevent fraudulent phoenix activity. Accountants employed by the 
construction industry were most likely applying subjective judgements in their work 
associated with phoenix activity depending upon the amount of pressure exerted on them 
by others, for example company directors.  
6.3.3 Pay Employees Their Entitlements 
6.3.3.1 Societal Expectation 
The second expectation of society regarding the construction industry was that it would 
pay employees their entitlements. Employee entitlements includes: wages, 
superannuation, workers compensation, annual leave and long service leave, and 
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redundancy payments (s596AA(2) Part 5.8A of the Corporations Act 2001(C’wth)). 
However, researchers tend to exclude wages, and classify employee entitlements as non-
salary items that employers provide for employees (Symes 2003). These items are 
expenses which should be recorded in the entity’s IS. As an expense, they have an 
impact on the entity’s profitability. Manipulation of employee entitlements, that is 
underpayment, would decrease expenses and increase profitability.  
Australian insolvency law has protected employee wages since at least 1825, that is 
colonial times (Symes 2003, p. 134). From the 1930s, “the various States Companies 
Acts gave employees' wages a statutory priority upon insolvency” (Symes 2003, p. 134). 
Originally, this involved “only wages but was extended to other entitlements”, as part of 
employment awards (Symes 2003, p. 134). In 1984, the Termination, Change and 
Redundancy case changed industrial laws and “employees enjoyed rights to accumulate 
entitlements, not just wages” (Symes 2003, p. 134). These changes had an important 
impact on employee entitlements and industrial relations. The 1984 case provided legal 
precedent for employees and their unions to demand non-wages benefits, such as sick 
leave and superannuation. It also provided a change in the socio-political relationships in 
industries such as construction, where unions felt they had legal support for arguing for 
employee entitlements.  
From a theoretical perspective, employee entitlements is grounded in organisational 
science; more specifically the disciplines of human resource management and industrial 
relations.  From an organisational science perspective, employee entitlements is based 
on social reciprocity theory (Blau 1964), and psychological contract (for example, see 
Massingham & Diment 2009). Strong psychological contract means the employee is 
happy with their employer and this will generate positive work attitudes and behaviours 
such as increased motivation and productivity (Massingham & Diment 2009). Employee 
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entitlement is fundamental to understanding employees' expectations and, in particular, 
the nature of exchange between each individual and the employing organisation 
(Naumann, Minsky & Sturman  2002). From an industrial relations perspective, research 
has generally focused on the philosophical debate regarding the specification of what is 
entitled (for example, Nozick 1974). Related disciplines have different assumptions 
about entitlement. Law, for example, treats entitlement as a measure of one's right, 
which cannot be taken away without due process (Black 1990). Industrial relations 
grounds employee entitlements within debate over the merits of socialism versus 
capitalism. This debate contrasts human resource management’s focus on distributive 
justice with industrial relation’s focus on procedural justice. Distributive justice aims to 
distribute pay equitably within the organisation (Phillips & O’Connell 2003). If 
employees feel that the organisation has a fair distribution of pay, the employees’ 
psychological contract will be higher than those who feel pay is unfairly distributed 
(Phillips & O’Connell 2003). Industrial relations focus is on procedural justice and 
employees need to understand the process through which pay is administered. 
Employees need to be able to address organisational procedures if problems occur with 
the administration and delivery of pay (Phillips & O’Connell 2003). This debate 
explains employees’ perception about pay inequality and the extent to which employees 
understand how performance affects salary (Phillips & O’Connell 2003). Procedural 
justice occurs when employees have the right to appeal unfair pay practices and is the 
focus of the unions’ attention in the construction industry. 
The various disciplines involved in employee entitlements research agree that entitlement 
is related to what a person perceives he/she deserves from their employer in return for 
their services. Where the disciplines tend to disagree is why entitlement is deserved. 
Research influenced by socialism and trade unionism, for example industrial relations, 
CHAPTER 6: ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE - IMPACT AND EXPECTATIONS 425 
suggests that an employee's level of entitlement is predetermined. This research argues 
that employees are not required to reciprocate in return for a certain entitlement, for 
example food, legal rights, democracy, and that employers are obliged to provide these 
societal benefits for members of society (for example, see Naumann, Minsky & Sturman  
2002). More recently, Fisk (2010) proposed a concept called “excessive entitlement”, 
which she defined as a trait reflecting unjustified beliefs of deservingness. Fisk (2010) 
proposed a model to predict counterproductive work behaviours by examining where this 
trait interacts with specific HRM practices related to staffing and performance. While 
this research suggests a personality defect at the individual level, meaning the person has 
unrealistic expectations of their entitlement from their employer, this may be projected 
onto groups of individuals (for example, union members) or organised groups (for 
example, unions) who may exhibit these types of attitudinal traits, that is, unrealistic 
expectations. This is particularly interesting for the construction industry where profit 
margins are so small and employers could reasonably argue that union expectations of 
entitlements are unrealistic. In contrast, research influenced by business strategy, for 
example human resource management, implies that the individual is only entitled to as 
much as his/her benefit to the overall good. If the individual can demonstrate how their 
work benefits society, they are then entitled to receive the full amount of that benefit 
(Naumann, Minsky & Sturman  2002). In other words, the individual must earn their 
level of entitlement.  
The second difference amongst the employee entitlements research disciplines, concerns 
the level of reciprocity inherent in the employee-organisation exchange relationship 
(Naumann, Minsky & Sturman  2002). The difference is about whether employees 
should be rewarded for loyalty or their performance. This discussion is grounded in 
psychological contract theory, which argues that if the organisation rewards individuals 
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with high employee entitlements, the individual’s emotional relationship with their 
employer will be strengthened resulting in positive work attitudes and behaviours (for 
example, see Massingham & Massingham 2014). Researchers have identified two types 
of employee-organisation relationships: job focused and organisation focused (Tsui, 
Pearce, Porter & Hite 1995). This framework offers a spectrum of psychological contract 
and a way to measure levels of reciprocity. At the lowest level, job focused  relationships 
are more transactional in that  the employer is primarily interested in obtaining high 
levels of task performance from employees, without expecting organisational 
commitment in return (Tsui et al. 1995). At the highest level, employees working in 
organisation focused relationships have broadly defined jobs, a high degree of 
organisational involvement, and a willingness to perform tasks outside of their job 
descriptions (Tsui et al. 1995). In return for this loyalty, employers are expected to offer 
a wide range of benefits including: investing in the employees' careers, providing job 
security, and offering extended benefits (Tsui et al. 1995). 
The solution to the differences in levels of employee entitlements and reciprocity is to 
align employee expectations with employee entitlements. Some employees will have low 
reciprocity which means they will have low expectations of their employer in terms of 
employee entitlements. These individuals will have a job focused relationship with their 
organisation. They are likely to accept lower levels of entitlements than individuals with 
high reciprocity. These latter employees will have high expectations of their employer in 
terms of employee entitlements. These individuals will have an organisational focus 
relationship with their employer; are not likely to accept low levels of entitlements and 
would expect to be rewarded for their loyalty. Naumann, Minsky and Sturman  (2002) 
suggest that employee alignment with employee entitlements expectations is contextual 
in the sense that some industries tend to have strong political ideologies supporting 
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workers’ rights. These industries are characterised by strong trade unionism which 
encourage employees to see employee entitlements as a right rather than something to be 
earned. The construction industry had these characteristics. The aim of employers should 
be to align employee entitlements with employee expectations which in the case of the 
construction industry the employers did not do. The levels of reciprocity help us 
understand why this happened. Construction industry employees would have a job focus 
rather than an organisation focus. There was high employee turnover and employees 
moved from project to project. According to this previous research, these employees 
should have low reciprocity and expect lower employee entitlements, however, the 
unions wanted high employee entitlements which created tension within the stakeholder 
system, and misalignment in employee entitlements expectations.  
6.3.3.2 Societal Contract Breach 
The RC found unlawful behaviour in the way the construction industry paid employee 
entitlements. In an industry with intense competition and small profit margins (see 
chapter 3), owners or investors and management would have been under pressure to 
reduce expenses and improve profitability. Given entitlements are an expense in the IS, 
it is easy to see how underpayment of employee entitlements would have occurred in 
these operating conditions.  
The consequences of non-compliance and underpayment of employee entitlements is 
that society suffers, through the financial impact for employees who do not receive their 
full entitlements. The significance of this problem is highlighted when the financial 
amount of employee entitlements is considered. Employers’ liabilities for employees’ 
accrued annual and long service leave entitlements alone probably exceed $50 billion 
(Davis & Burrows 2003). To illustrate how much this figure actually means, it is an 
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amount approximately equal to total lending by all finance companies (Davis & Burrows 
2003). Considering employees are, in essence, providing these funds to their employers 
until they seek them, that is take the leave or exit the company, the situation takes a 
different context. Employee entitlements represent a very significant amount of funds in 
Australia, equal to all of the funds made available as debt by the country’s financial 
sector, and these are in essence loaned by employees to their employers. It is a 
remarkable measure of the reciprocity involved in employee entitlements. Employees 
allow their employers to use funds, which employees essentially own, for other 
purposes. It seems only fair that employers provide these entitlements when employees 
want them.  
Underpayment of employee entitlements was allowed to evolve as a widespread practice 
in the construction industry because of a loophole created by industry structure. As 
shown in chapter 3, the construction industry was characterised by its fragmented 
structure and by the very high proportion of small firms known as subcontractors. This 
changed the employee relationship in ways that encouraged and even allowed 
underpayment of employee entitlements.  
The first change in the employee relationship was employees who pretend to be 
contractors. During the RC hearings, Mr Dean Mighell and Mr Bill Shorten highlighted 
the problem of workers, who had all the fundamental characteristics of an employee, but 
who operated as contractors. These were workers who essentially supply labour only 
services. Mighell stated that this was done to “avoid taxation and payment of correct 
employee entitlements” (Cole 2003, vol. 12, p. 141). The Construction and General 
Division of the CFMEU Queensland gave evidence to the RC that employers avoided 
payment of Workcover premiums by classifying workers as subcontractors. The 
Queensland State Government also acknowledged that the “attraction of not having to 
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pay workers’ compensation premiums was one significant inducement for employers to 
engage their workers through subcontracting arrangements” (Cole 2003, vol. 12, p. 208). 
A second change in the employee relationship was through the use of cash payments. 
While the primary objective here was to avoid paying income tax it was also used as an 
incentive to persuade employees to work as subcontractors and avoid paying them 
entitlements. 
A third change in the employee relationship was through the use of pyramid 
subcontracting. This was the practice of sub-contractors employing other sub-
contractors. The RC found that pyramid contracting was “an artificial labour only 
contractor arrangement which was designed to avoid legal responsibility for employee 
entitlements and tax payments” (Cole 2003, vol. 4, pp. 104-105). 
Insolvency can occur lawfully and unlawfully. The analysis of phoenix company activity 
above provides further details. Some company directors used insolvency as a way to 
avoid paying employee entitlements.  
6.3.4 Pay Suppliers Their Entitlements 
6.3.4.1 Societal Expectation 
The third expectation of society regarding the construction industry was that it would 
pay suppliers their entitlements. This involved two activities: inappropriate payments 
and security of payments. The payable and receivable of payments involves the accounts 
payable and receivable functions. These are considered the most labour intensive of all 
accounting functions (Bragg 2007, p. 18). The basic accounts payable process in most 
companies is to receive three types of information from three sources: an invoice from 
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the supplier, a purchase order from the purchasing department, and a proof of receipt 
from the receiving department. This information ensures that the payment is appropriate.  
The RC identified inadequate security of payment for subcontractors as one of the 
construction industry’s unlawful behaviours. Indeed, Commissioner Cole stated that 
“security of payment in the construction industry throughout Australia remains one of 
the most significant and controversial issues impacting the success or failure of any 
party working in the construction industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 227). Commissioner 
Cole concluded that “in general, security of payment practices in this industry 
throughout Australia remain barbaric and definitely unfair” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 229). 
This strong language suggests the problem of inadequate security of payment is cruel to 
its victims, which are small business owners who suffer enormously as a result. 
Commissioner Cole felt passionately about this problem and argued that it was one the 
most important unlawful behaviours in the construction industry. He described it as a 
topic of national concern (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 229).  
6.3.4.2 Societal Contract Breach 
There appears to be two types of payment issues associated with the unlawful behaviour 
within the construction industry identified by the RC. First, delaying or withholding 
payments in the normal course of completing a construction project (see Tran & 
Carmichael 2012). Second, delaying or withholding payments as the result of business 
failure, that is, liquidation (see Ramachandra & Rotimi 2012). However, there are also 
unlawful payments disguised by incorrectly recording the expense, but this is a 
recording issue rather than a payment issue. Commissioner Cole focused mainly on the 
third behaviour, incorrect recording of expenses, because it allowed the opportunity for 
illegal payments such as bribes.  
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In terms of the first and second unlawful behaviours , delaying or withholding payments, 
Tran and Carmichael (2012) identify four scenarios employed by the construction 
industry: 
• Scenario 1 (best scenario): the contractor always pays its subcontractor punctually 
and in full regardless of payment from the owner.  
• Scenario 2: the contractor delays and/or withholds part of the owner payment, 
responding to every subcontractor claim with exactly the same treatment, in terms of 
delay and partial payment, that it gets from the owner (a "pay when paid" situation 
applies). For example, if the owner pays a claim one week late then the contractor 
would also pay its subcontractor one week late. When the owner pays the contractor, 
the contractor also pays its subcontractor. In this case, payment from the contractor 
to subcontractor reflects exactly the owner payment characteristics in both timing 
and quantum. If the owner pays the contractor, then the subcontractor also gets paid.  
• Scenario 3 (worst scenario): The contractor tries to delay and withhold payments to 
the subcontractor even if the owner has made its payment on time and in full, in 
order to improve its own cash flow to the detriment of the subcontractor. Payment to 
the subcontractor is completely independent of the payment from the owner to the 
contractor. In this case, the two issues are independent since they reflect the owner's 
and the contractor's separate payment behaviour. The issue is created by the 
contractor payment behaviour.  
• Scenario 4: A contractor's response to each subcontractor claim may not be 
consistent. The contractor may not always act as in any of the scenarios above, but 
rather may exhibit behaviour which is a combination of the above scenarios. For 
some claims, the contractor pays its subcontractor when the owner pays; for other 
claims, the contractor does not pay even if the owner has paid.  
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In terms of the unlawful behaviour, incorrect recording of expenses, examples include 
cash bribes, purchasing goods and services at inflated prices, or where the payment is for 
a service that cannot be recorded, for example a financial incentive to win a contract or 
deter industrial action.  
Small companies are sometimes not paid due to legitimate business failure, as opposed 
to the other inappropriate behaviours listed above. In this case, problems can arise 
because the company is in financial difficulty and does not have the cash flow to pay 
subcontractors; or the company has become insolvent and cannot pay the full amounts 
owing to their creditors, including subcontractors (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 231). In these 
circumstances, the small company suffers as it would if the contractor was behaving 
inappropriately. The difference is this behaviour is legitimate, the contractor cannot pay 
even though they would like to do the right thing, while the others are illegitimate, 
unscrupulous individuals deliberately intend not to pay. This raises the question whether 
security of payment may be improved to anticipate contractors likely to get into financial 
difficulty. This could signal the risks for subcontractors even though the company might 
be in satisfactory financial health at the time of signing the contract.  
The RC found unlawful behaviour in the way the construction industry treated security 
of payments. Security of payments was raised at the RC during the public hearings, in 
meetings Commissioner Cole held with interested parties, in interviews conducted by 
Commission investigators, and in submissions to the RC (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 115). 
Commissioner Cole stated that it “became apparent that it is an issue that critically 
affects the ability of participants in the industry to make a living, and to be rewarded for 
work that they have performed” (Cole 2003, vol. 1: p. 115). Commission investigators 
were “repeatedly told of the suffering and hardship caused to subcontractors by builders 
who are unable or unwilling to pay for work from which they have benefited” (Cole 
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2003, vol. 1, p. 115). Commissioner Cole was very sympathetic towards those 
companies who suffered from inadequate security of payment arrangements in the 
construction industry. He stated “the subcontractors who experience payment problems 
are often small companies or partnerships”, and “frequently they do not have the 
expertise or resources to enforce their legal rights, because enforcement would require 
protracted litigation against much better resourced and more sophisticated companies” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 115). The language used by Commissioner Cole portrays these 
small companies as powerless victims. He presents the problem of security of payments 
as a significant societal contract breach by the construction industry. Commissioner Cole 
concluded that “subcontractors that have operated profitably and well for many years 
can be forced into liquidation through no fault of their own, often with devastating 
consequences for the owners of these businesses, their families, their employees and 
their creditors”  (Cole 2003, vol. 1 p. 115). The use of the phrase “devastating 
consequences”, creates sympathy for the victims of inadequate security of payments. 
Commissioner Cole clearly feels strongly about this problem. He is arguing that society 
has a responsibility to fix this problem due to the serious negative impact it has on 
members of society, that is, small business owners who are suffering through no fault of 
their own.  
The unions also felt very strongly about the problem of security of payment. The RC 
reported that “on 27 July 2001 the CFMEU New South Wales Divisional Branch 
organised a march on the Sydney office of the PM to protest that ‘100 building workers 
became the latest victims of the Government’s paltry security of payment laws’” (Cole 
2003, vol. 8, p. 180).  The CFMEU claimed that “‘the men were abandoned by their 
employer – Emerson Formwork – without warning and [that they had] not been paid for 
two weeks and [were] owed some $500 000 in wages, redundancy, holiday pay and 
CHAPTER 6: ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE - IMPACT AND EXPECTATIONS 434 
super’” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 180). The union is arguing here that if the regulator, the 
government, had better security of payment legislation and methods to police 
compliance then companies like Emerson would not have been awarded this contract 
and the workers would not have suffered from its business failure.  
6.3.5 Accurate Performance Reporting 
6.3.5.1 Societal Expectation 
The fourth expectation of society regarding the construction industry was that it 
accurately report on performance. Profit or loss is calculated by subtracting the expenses 
of an organisation from its income (Deegan 2012, p. 560). The aim of profit reporting is 
to explain the organisation’s profitability. Profitability is defined as the organisation’s 
ability to generate profits from the available resources (Birt et al. 2010, p. 304). 
Profitability is an effective measure of past performance that may be used by 
shareholders to predict future performance. Financial statements depict historical 
information and profit reporting will influence perceptions of future profitability. Profit 
or losses generated by an entity will also have a direct impact on the equity of an 
organisation; with a consequential impact on assets and/or liabilities (Deegan 2012, p. 
560).  
6.3.5.2 Societal Contract Breach 
The RC identified profit manipulation as one of the construction industry’s unlawful 
behaviours. Profit manipulation involves the alteration of accounting information 
associated with profit and loss to convey a particular image; normally aimed at creating 
a more favourable view of a company’s performance than is warranted (Beattie & Jones 
2002). The small profit margins in the construction industry created opportunities for 
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creative accounting. This was particularly true in the case of managing costs. The RC 
found two types of contracts used in the construction industry: “payment based on a 
fixed price, and payment of the costs incurred by the contractor plus a fee for services” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 4, p. 72). Commissioner Cole noted that “while cost–plus contracts 
placed the risk on the principal, they offered greater flexibility for the project manager” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 4, p. 72). However, fixed price contracts had become more common in 
the industry (Cole 2003, vol. 4, p. 72). The RC identified a number of problems with 
fixed price contracts (Cole 2003, vol. 4, p. 72). First, tenderers commonly built “risk into 
the cost of their tender” (Cole 2003, vol. 4, p. 72). Second, “the costs of terminating a 
deficient fixed price contract” might be more than the costs of continuing with it (Cole 
2003, vol. 4, p. 72). Third, a contractor may “seek to enhance his profit by cutting costs, 
either through lower quality building or litigious behaviour” (Cole 2003, vol. 4, p. 72). 
In contrast, those in favour of fixed price contracts proposed that “the risks were 
assigned to the person in the best position to manage it, that is, the project manager” 
(Cole 2003, vol. 4, p. 72). This type of contract had a direct impact on management of 
costs. Fixed term contracts placed more pressure on cost management because any cost 
increases had to be absorbed by the contractor, who was often already under 
considerable pressure to make a profit. This led to creative accounting solutions, 
involving the use of accrual accounting, which when abused or illegal, could mislead 
users of the profit statements about the real financial performance of the company.  
The RC found evidence of profit manipulation in the construction industry. However, 
Commissioner Cole places the blame onto unions for exerting industrial pressure on 
struggling companies. He frequently refers to small profit margins in the construction 
industry and how union pressure eroded these small margins for many companies. He 
also refers to intense competition and tax evasion as reasons for engaging in profit 
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manipulation. Altogether, Commissioner Cole is almost forgiving of construction 
companies for engaging in profit manipulation. This raises the important question of 
whether profit manipulation was inappropriate behaviour or unlawful behaviour. Given 
the nature of activities involved in profit reporting, accountants must have been involved 
in profit manipulation. It is an excellent opportunity to explore the level of subjectivity, 
or creative accounting, within the construction industry. This section will explore just 
how creative accountants were, and whether some may have stepped over the boundary 
into fraudulent activity or inappropriate application of the accounting standards.  
The consequence of profit manipulation is that the financial position and the results of 
operations do not fall into fair presentation of financial results. This means that the profit 
reported will not represent the long-term capacity of the firm to generate earnings. 
However, profit manipulation may be a matter of different interpretation rather than 
fraud. Accountants engaged in profit manipulation might be making honest mistakes, or 
behaving inappropriately if it is intentional, or illegally if fraudulent activities. Profit 
manipulation, therefore, offers possibilities of a range of accounting behaviour. It is 
certainly evidence that accounting is a subjective rather than an objective process.  
The measurement of corporate profits is a critical method used by society to evaluate an 
industry or firm’s legitimacy. PIT explains that society confers resources, such as capital 
and labour, in expectation that these resources will be used wisely and for the benefit of 
society (Deegan 2013). Profit reporting is central to the process of capital allocation 
within an economy (Desai 2005, p. 172). The relationship between capital allocation and 
profit reporting is as follows. Investors infer a firm’s prospects and value from reported 
profits (Desai 2005, p.172). Suppliers and banks assess profits reported in terms of the 
firm’s financial health and ability to repay debt. Economists and policy analysts “employ 
corporate profits to assess the nature of economic fluctuations, to project tax revenues, 
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and to assess the desirability of a variety of policies aimed at fostering capital formation” 
(Desai 2005, p. 173). This discussion illustrates the importance of accurate profit 
reporting, and how it represents how society measures the social contract. Society 
allocates capital to the construction industry and in return expects that companies will 
report honestly and accurately on how they used this capital to benefit society. Profit 
manipulation, this context, is a breach of the social contract because the construction 
companies are misleading society about how they used the capital allocated to them.  
 
6.4 Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to complete the reconstruction the social reality of how 
accountants work within the construction industry which began in chapter 5. The chapter 
examined the second and third of three constructs adopted from ST, impact and 
expectations to explore the social practice of accounting in the construction industry.  
The chapter provides three groups of findings: first, understanding the use of power and 
level of influence of each stakeholder group; second, discussing further whether social 
practice in the construction industry was ethical or managerial; and third, drawing 
conclusions about accountants’ differing social contracts which leads to chapter 7 and 
further exploration of how to address social contract breach.  
The first findings relate to use of power by stakeholders within the construction industry. 
Power may be defined at several levels. ST looks at it in terms of influence and 
management’s willingness to listen to various stakeholder groups and adjust their 
behaviour accordingly. For example, whether people making decisions about tax evasion 
were willing to listen to accountants and adjust their behaviour accordingly. Power may 
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be defined in terms of self-interest. This was measured in terms of short-term versus 
long-term interests. Short-term interest was a sense of survival, for organisations and 
individuals. Construction companies operated under tight profit margins and were often 
under financial pressure to be profitable and solvent. Individuals, including 
owners/managers and accountants would also have felt job insecurity in an industry 
where companies regularly went out of business. On the other hand, trade unions had 
long-term interests to improve the working conditions for their members. Long-term 
suggests less immediacy and pressure compared with short-term. The trade unions’ 
survival did not depend upon the success or failure of an individual construction 
company or individual. Therefore, they were willing to place their long term interests 
before the short term interests of other stakeholders. They were also able to use political 
behaviour to exploit the short term interests of others.   
Power was also defined in terms of the cause of power. The study makes a further 
important contribution to SNA theory by using causes of power to explain political 
behaviour contributing to our understanding of the construct, impact. The analysis 
produced these findings. The first battle for power between stakeholders was 
owner/managers and unions. In this battle, the trade unions used coercive power by 
threatening to expose employers to regulators. The most common threat was to expose 
tax evasion. There was evidence of the level of threat posed by the trade unions by the 
use of language such “go down the tube”. The trade unions leveraged the short-term 
focus of owners/managers by reminding them of the consequences if they did not 
comply with union demands, that is, business closure, which re-enforced the threat. The 
results showed that union officials used threatening language and intimidating behaviour 
to achieve their goals. Commissioner Cole’s description that people “instinctively 
succumb to the exercise of industrial muscle in the interests of commercial expediency 
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and survival” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 211) illustrates the success of the trade unions’ 
political behaviour. The unions did not use this power to direct owners/managers to 
conduct unlawful financial activities. The construction companies did engage in 
unlawful behaviours in response to union pressure. However, these activities were 
decisions taken by the companies themselves. The unions would argue they were only 
exerting pressure to ensure their members, employees of the construction companies and 
sub-contractors, were paid what they were entitled to. 
The trade unions also used a form of reward power. They would reward 
owners/managers for compliance with industrial peace. This was important to 
construction companies because industrial action, such as strikes, would delay projects 
having negative impact on project management, schedules, and cost. In an industry with 
tight profit margins, these delays could influence profitability and also business survival. 
The trade unions knew the impact of these delays. Associated with buying industrial 
peace, some unions negotiated workplace agreements with contractors which included 
inappropriate payments in the agreements. In this way, the unions used reward power, in 
the guise of industrial peace, to negotiate improved working conditions for members and 
inappropriate payments, sometimes called union sponsorship.  
The next battle was between owners/managers and staff. Owners/managers had three 
types of relationships with staff. First, full-time employees were exploited by 
owners/managers by withholding or refusing to pay employee entitlements. In this 
relationship, owners/managers used reward power. They had power to pay staff and also 
to determine what they paid staff. This made full-time employees vulnerable because 
they depended upon owners/managers for their income and also their level of income. 
Some unscrupulous individuals abused thus power. The RC also found “substantial” 
evidence of underpayment or miscalculation of workers’ wages and entitlements. This 
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occurred for two reasons: to improve their cash flow and to lower costs and improve 
profitability. The second relationship was with sub-contractors. Owners/managers would 
exploit the construction industry’s contracting system to pretend full-time staff were 
sub-contractors to avoid paying employee entitlements and payroll tax.  
The trade unions became involved in this relationship and used their coercive power to 
address inequities in the owners/managers reward power over staff. The RC found three 
examples of the outcomes of this coercive power: first, increased wages and salaries for 
employees as a result of union pressure was over award payments; second, some unions 
tried to force contractors to pay members while on strike, a practice, known as strike 
pay, which was considered unlawful; and third, demands by the unions related to 
inappropriate payments or enforced donations either to unions funds or charities. This 
raises questions about how these payments were classified and recorded. How would an 
accountant respond if asked by their boss, the owners/managers, to treat a cash donation 
to a union official as something else? 
The third relationship between owners/managers and staff was use of illegal workers. 
Illegal workers were people who lived in Australia illegally, that is, they did not have a 
valid visa, and therefore, they may work for low wages on the basis of receiving cash, 
which enables to avoid paying income tax (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 11). Illegal workers 
were exploited by owners/managers who paid them low wages. This was another 
example of reward power. Unscrupulous individuals did this to lower costs and, 
therefore, compete unfairly with law abiding businesses, as well as avoiding paying tax.  
The third battle was between owners/managers and suppliers. This complex relationship 
was shaped by the construction industry’s contracting system. Owners/managers had 
reward power over sub-contractors. Smaller companies depended upon larger 
CHAPTER 6: ACCOUNTING AS SOCIAL PRACTICE - IMPACT AND EXPECTATIONS 441 
companies, that is head contractors, for work. The head contractors were aware of this 
and some exploited the situation and, therefore abused their reward power. They did this 
in several ways. First, they ignored or did not monitor EBA’s, which were workplace 
agreements designed to ensure adequate working conditions, including employee 
entitlements were paid. Commissioner Cole argued that head contractors had a 
responsibility to ensure sub-contractors had appropriate EBA’s. Second, they did not 
monitor the financial health of sub-contractors. This meant that head contractors might 
be doing business with companies which were technically insolvent which is illegal. 
Third, they delayed or withheld progress payments to sub-contractors, including project 
variations, for example additional work from the original contract. These latter two 
activities affected security of payments and illustrates the domino affect caused by the 
contracting system.  
The issues were illustrated by the case of Multiplex, a very large company, who could 
afford to pay its sub-contractors but it chose not to. Five subcontractors may have been 
required to demonstrate security of payment to win respective contracts to work with 
Multiplex. They would, therefore, have been able to demonstrate their ability to pay their 
staff and any subcontractors they used on the project. However, they were not able to 
meet their financial commitments during the project. This case shows how the 
subcontractors’ security of payment situation changed over the life of the project due to 
the behaviour of the head contractor. Multiplex explained that it chose to engage in non-
payment or late payment because it was not being paid by the client. The nature of the 
reward power abused by head contractors is realised when the options available to sub-
contractors is considered. The cost for a small contractor to pursue a head contractor for 
non-payment/slow payment to them was so high that unless the payment dispute was of 
a very significant nature, in many instances the small contractor made a commercial 
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decision not to take the matter further. This explains sub-contractors’ lack of power and 
perhaps why this abuse of reward power was tolerated by the industry; people felt they 
had to comply.  
The next battle was between owners/managers and general public. The construction 
industry’s unlawful behaviours affected the broader community, particularly in terms of 
profit manipulation and tax evasion. The public expects companies to provide honest 
and accurate financial reports. Investors make decisions on these reports and they expect 
the truth. The public also expects companies to pay tax in order to meet their corporate 
social responsibilities. Owners/managers have information power over the general 
public. They have the power to share information about their company, manipulate this 
information, and disguise the truth. They also have the power to choose what 
information to disclose to taxation authorities. The public does not have access to this 
information and would find it difficult to discover the truth; particularly with smaller 
companies who do not have to issue annual reports.  
What was the role of accountants in this political behaviour? Accountants had expert 
power based on their financial management capability. This provided them with 
opportunities to be advisors and even decision makers within construction companies 
regarding the seven activities listed as unlawful by the RC. However, this expert power 
had differing influence on other stakeholders. Chapter 5 showed that accountants were 
often shown respect and tolerance (homogeneity), as well as being allowed to participate 
in decisions (democracy). However, they were also excluded as outsiders or enemies 
(heterogeneity) and their opinions were challenged or ignored. Therefore, while they had 
expert power, this was not always enough to over-ride the reward power of 
owners/managers who had the fundamental short term power of hiring and firing.  
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The findings indicate that two types of power dominated relationships between 
stakeholders in the construction industry: reward power and coercive power. The main 
problem was the need for reward. In an industry with tight profit margins and the 
constant threat of business closure, owners/managers and employees were always 
focusing on the short-term and survival. The trade unions, on the other hand, were aware 
of the vulnerability of owners/managers and used coercive power to try to address their 
long-term goal to improve working conditions in the industry. A way forward would be 
to decrease the reward power of owners/managers. This would reduce employees’ the 
need for reward and the need for trade unions to exercise coercive power. This might be 
achieved by getting all stakeholders to adopt a long term perspective which embraces the 
viability of the industry as a whole rather than competing at the expense of one another. 
While this is aspirational, it enables the framing of a set of societal expectations which 
would help repair the construction industry’s legitimacy and restore the social contract.  
The main societal expectations of the construction industry were: 
First, contribute to public funds. This was an expectation that construction 
companies would meet their corporate citizenship responsibilities and pay taxes. 
In this way, they would contribute to the funds gathered by government to be 
shared with all of society through government services. Tax evasion was the 
main problem in this area.  
A major cause of tax evasion behaviour was the industry’s complex contracting 
system. It is reasonable to assume that smaller companies were the main problem 
due to the widespread use of sub-contractors, use of cash payments, and the lack 
of financial reporting required of these companies. Given smaller companies 
usually did not employ an internal accountant; it tends to excuse accountants 
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from their social contract in terms of tax evasion. Yet these companies still had 
to use an external accountant, that is a tax agent, to do their annual tax returns. 
These external accountants were breaching their social contract. Further, the 
findings showed that larger companies also engaged in tax evasion. The ATO 
concluded that “the tax planning and other behaviours of the 17 entities in the 
property and construction industry are consistent with those entities in other 
industries” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 62). In other words, the large companies in the 
construction industry engaged in tax planning in ways similar to large companies 
in other industries. This means that some internal accountants in large companies 
would have breached their social contract in terms of tax evasion.  
The RC also found significant incidence of fraudulent phoenix company activity 
in the construction industry (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 122). It is important to 
highlight the word ‘fraudulent’ used here by Commissioner Cole. Phoenix 
companies were created by the construction industry to avoid paying tax and this 
activity was considered illegal. The significance of the societal contract breach 
by phoenix company activity is not limited to avoiding taxation. What makes 
phoenix activity so objectionable to the public is its widespread impact on so 
many parts of society. Those hurt by phoenix activity include unsecured trade 
creditors, employees and revenue authorities (Anderson 2012, p. 412). In 
addition to losing their wages, redundancy and pay in lieu of notice,  employees 
may also lose their accrued annual and long service leave entitlements in the case 
of phoenix activity (Anderson 2012, p. 412). 
Accountants must have played some role in phoenix activity (see chapter 5),and 
breached their social contract whilst bending the rules, that is, accounting 
standards, in their work with company directors involved in phoenix activity. 
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However, accountants’ social contract may have been unreasonable in this case. 
Evidence on how difficult it may have been for accountants to change phoenix 
company activity is provided by how difficult the regulators found it to police 
unlawful behaviour. Anderson (2012) explains how frustrated the Federal 
Government was with continued phoenix activity six years after the RC. If the 
ATO felt powerless to enforce the law regarding phoenix activity, how could 
accountants employed by the construction industry have felt any differently? 
This evidence suggests that accounting practice regarding phoenix activity had 
not changed. First, phoenix activity was actually increasing in the period after the 
RC. Second, accountants were unlikely to have the authority or disincentives to 
prevent fraudulent phoenix activity. Therefore, it is conclude that there were no 
observable changes to accounting practice regarding phoenix activity in the 
period after the RC. Accounting may be considered a subjective practice in 
regards to phoenix company activity. Accountants employed by the construction 
industry were applying subjective judgements in their work associated with 
phoenix activity depending upon the amount of pressure exerted on them by 
others, such as company directors.  
Second, pay employees their entitlements. This was an expectation that 
individuals employed by construction companies would receive their salary and 
non-salary reward for their work. Underpaying employees or avoiding payment 
altogether through insolvency were the main problems in this area. In an industry 
with intense competition and small profit margins (see chapter 3), owners or 
investors and management would have been under pressure to reduce expenses 
and improve profitability. It is easy to see how underpayment of employee 
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entitlements would have occurred in these operating conditions, given 
entitlements are an expense in the IS.  
The social contract breach affected relationship between owners/managers and 
staff in three ways. First, employees pretended to be contractors. Second, was the 
use of cash payments. Third, was the use of pyramid subcontracting. These 
issues illustrated the systemic structural and cultural problems in the construction 
industry. This is a significant social contract breach. Society expects 
organisations to pay staff what they are entitled to. Australian culture has a 
legacy of ‘getting a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work’, which was discussed in 
chapter in the history of the trade union movement. The consequences of non-
compliance and underpayment of employee entitlements, is that society suffers, 
through the financial impact for employees who do not receive their full 
entitlements. Yet, it was not just about underpaying staff. The industry developed 
systemic ways of avoiding its social contract with a deliberate intent to breach 
this contract and avoid its moral and ethical obligations to pay people what they 
are entitled to. Given the high involvement of accountants in employee 
entitlements (see chapter 5), they must accept responsibility for participating in 
this systemic breach of social contract.  
Third, pay suppliers their entitlements. This was an expectation that companies 
and individuals who provide materials and services to construction companies, 
including sub-contractors, be paid appropriately in return. There were two types 
of payment issues associated with the unlawful behaviour within the construction 
industry identified by the RC. First, delaying or withholding payments in the 
normal course of completing a construction project. Second, delaying or 
withholding payments as the result of business failure, that is, liquidation. There 
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was also incorrectly recording the expense to disguise unlawful behaviour. While 
all three behaviours are serious, Commissioner Cole focused mainly on the third 
behaviour, incorrect recording of expenses, because it allowed the opportunity 
for illegal and corrupt behaviour such as bribes. It also had a significant impact 
on security of payments. Given the involvement of accountants in inappropriate 
payments (see chapter 5), they must accept some responsibility for participating 
in this breach of social contract. 
Fourth, provide accurate performance reporting. This was an expectation that 
construction companies would honestly and accurately report on their business 
activities, including profit reporting. Society includes public and private 
investors; as well as other stakeholders interested in the financial position of 
construction companies such as customers, creditors (for example banks), 
suppliers, and regulators. These stakeholders want to know if they will get a 
return on their investment, have their building project completed, and whether 
they will be paid. Profit manipulation was the main problem in this area.  
The consequence of profit manipulation is significant because the financial 
position and the results of operations do not fall into fair presentation of financial 
results. This means that the profit reported will not represent the long-term 
capacity of the firm to generate earnings. It is misleading the public. However, 
profit manipulation is not considered to be fraud. It is a matter of interpretation. 
This indicates that accountants engaged in profit manipulation are perhaps 
behaving inappropriately, particularly if their interpretation does not involve 
honest mistakes, that is, it is intentional; but it is not illegal, unless they engage 
in fraudulent activities. There is a grey area between creative accounting and 
deliberately misleading the public by providing false information. Accountants 
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involved in profit manipulation in the construction industry would argue they 
were simply trying to serve the best interests of their company with creative 
accounting. Chapter 5 also found that this activity typically excluded accountants 
wherever possible, that is the relationship with stakeholders was hostile because 
they were seen as the enemy. Therefore, profit manipulation is the area where 
accountants would be seen as having the least contribution to the social contract 
breach. It would also be argued it was an area where they were placed under the 
most pressure by owners/managers using reward power to coerce them. It is 
certainly evidence that accounting is a subjective rather than an objective 
process.  
Commissioner Cole was scathing in his criticism of the construction industry’s unlawful 
behaviour. While he is often highly critical of unions and sympathetic towards 
employers, he concludes that “every participant bears some responsibility” (Cole 2003, 
vol. 3, p. 211). Accountants played a role in the social contract breaches found in this 
chapter. Chapter 7 will discuss the research findings and suggest ways that accounting 
may be used to address these social contract breaches and legitimise the construction 
industry. 
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CHAPTER 7: ACCOUNTING AS A 
LEGIMIZATION PROCESS - A 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a preliminary conceptual model on the role of accounting as a 
legitimisation process, based on the findings presented in this study. As discussed in 
chapter 2, LT asserts that “organisations continually seek to ensure that they are 
perceived as operating within the bounds and norms of their respective societies, that is, 
they attempt to ensure that their activities are perceived by outside parties as being 
‘legitimate’” (Deegan 2009, p. 323). LT is part of the broader PET (Gray, Owens & 
Adams 1996). PET explains how capitalism, as a social system, is shaped by economic 
and political interests (Gaffikin 2008, p. 82). In a capitalist society, such as Australia, 
there are many social inequalities amongst social classes brought about by their 
inequitable access to the use of resources. Economic forces serve to protect the interests 
of those with access to resources. Regulation is the political forces used to find more 
balance in the allocation of these resources.  
LT fits within PET because it explains how organisations obtain access to resources in 
return for acting within the broader public interests. In essence, responsible corporate 
citizenship is rewarded with approval by society and wealth. The measure of legitimacy 
expectations is the social contract. Historically, social contracts were measured by profit. 
Traditionally, accounting theory has been situated within the goal of profit maximization 
as the optimal measure of corporate performance (Patten 1991). Under this notion, a 
firm’s profits were viewed as an all-inclusive measure of organisational legitimacy 
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(Ramanathan 1976) because this increased societal wealth. However, an increase in 
corporate disasters, for example Enron, and unethical behaviour has led to a shift in 
focus. Social contracts now expect organisations to react and “attend to the human, 
environmental, and other social consequences” of their activities (Heard & Bolce 1981, 
p. 247).   
Legitimacy, therefore, is the measure of societal perceptions of the adequacy of 
corporate behaviour (Suchman 1995). Legitimacy is a theoretical concept in the sense 
that there is usually no clear statement from society about what it expects of an 
organisation. It is unlikely that an organisation can find a copy of their social contract 
and ‘negotiate’ that with society (Deegan 2009, p. 326). However, this study has 
identified that the construction industry had a very clear social contract. The RCR 
defined societal expectations of the industry and its social contract breach. The 
legitimacy gap, as defined by this study, was the seven unlawful activities identified by 
the RC, for example tax evasion. If the industry wanted to regain legitimacy and restore 
public confidence, it needed to address the unlawful behaviours associated with these 
seven activities.  
The main societal expectations of the construction industry were listed at the conclusion 
to chapter 6, for example contribute to public funds. Construction companies and other 
industry stakeholders were able, therefore, to find a copy of their social contract. The RC 
findings told the industry stakeholders what society expected of them (see section 6.3.1 
for explanation).  
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7.2 The Role of Accounting 
7.2.1 Critical Accounting  
Critical accounting can identify theories for changing the way accounting is practiced in 
industry and ultimately lead to reforms in how business and society operate (Deegan 
2009, p.530). CAT aims to identify the prevailing social arrangements within a 
community, such as an industry, within the broader context of the society in which it 
exists (Roslender 2006, p. 250). CAT aims to promote self-awareness of both “what is” 
and “what might be”, and how the former might be transformed to install the latter 
(Roslender 2006, p. 250). It is concerned with the promotion of a better society, and 
understanding the change processes necessary to achieve this goal. Therefore, it lends 
itself to examining the role of accounting in legitimising the construction industry. 
Chapter 6 showed that the accounting process was manipulated by stakeholders within 
the construction industry. This manipulation occurred in the seven unlawful activities 
identified by the RC. Chapter 5 used SNA theory to extend critical accounting’s ST. 
This allowed development of analytical frameworks to examine the interaction between 
construction industry stakeholders (relationships), how stakeholders influenced each 
other (impact), and how this produced different social contracts for each stakeholder 
(expectations). The analysis showed that accountants would have been involved in each 
of the seven unlawful activities. Further, accountants were involved because many of the 
processes associated with the unlawful activities were the work of accountants. Finally, 
accountants would have been under considerable pressure to engage in creative 
accounting in conducting work associated with these unlawful processes. Accountants 
were either internal or external to the firm, in the case of small firms. 
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From a CAT perspective, chapters 5 and 6 established the social practice of accounting, 
that is, the ‘what is’. Chapter 7 proposes a way to learn from the events surrounding the 
construction industry at the time of the RC and to develop a role for accounting that 
might address the unlawful activities. In this sense, chapter 7 will propose a ‘what might 
be’ with the aim of using accounting to change the processes associated with this 
unlawful behaviour and help the construction industry address its legitimacy gap.  
7.2.2 Legitimation of the Construction Industry 
Legitimation is the process that leads to legitimacy (Deegan 2005; Lindblom 1994). 
Legitimation tactics might differ depending upon whether the entity is trying to gain, 
maintain, or repair legitimacy (Deegan 2009, p. 331). Deegan (2009) argues that 
theoretical development in this area remains weak. Given the historical context of the 
study, this represents an area where a significant theoretical contribution can be made. 
Chapter 7 proposes strategies to repair legitimacy. The only real difference between 
gaining and repairing legitimacy is that gaining is a proactive approach and repairing is a 
reactive approach. Repairing involves responding to a crisis. The RC definitely created a 
crisis.  
In Lindblom’s (1994) recommendations for repairing legitimacy, the first two are 
possible in the case of the construction industry, while the latter two are not possible: 
1. Communicate to the public the organisation’s performance and activities 
which align with society’s expectations 
2. Change perception of the public via disclosure of positive or desirable 
activities, without falsifying  
3. Manipulate perception by deflecting attention from problem areas onto 
positive or desirable activities 
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4. Change social expectations, perhaps by arguing they are unreasonable. 
The first two strategies involve correcting undesirable behaviour and communicating 
this to the public. The latter two strategies involve manipulation and changing society’s 
expectations, neither of which would be accepted by the public. There are, therefore, two 
steps to repairing the construction industry’s legitimacy: fix the unlawful behaviours and 
communicate this to the public. Deegan suggests that the actual conduct of the 
organisation is somewhat irrelevant and rather it is what society collectively knows or 
perceives that shapes legitimacy (Deegan 2009, p. 324). However, given the 
construction industry’s history of unlawfulness and the high level of public scrutiny, it is 
unlikely that the public would be satisfied in just being told that the industry was 
behaving. This creates an opportunity for accounting to help fix the unlawful behaviour 
and then to communicate that information.  
LT emphasizes that the organisation must appear to consider the rights of the public at 
large, not just shareholders or investors (Deegan 2009, p. 325). It explores questions 
about the type of information that needs to be disclosed, and how organisations can 
persuade society that they are behaving legitimately. The construction industry has many 
challenges if it is to repair its legitimacy and address the social contract breach.  
The first challenge is to persuade the public that the construction industry is willing to 
contribute to public funds. Australia is under fiscal pressure. The Federal Government is 
spending more than it earns which has resulted in a large budget deficit. The public 
expects organisations and individuals to help address this problem by paying taxes. The 
construction industry’s reputation for tax evasion has created a very negative perception 
amongst the Australian public. The industry needs to restore public confidence by 
showing it is willing to meet its corporate responsibility to pay tax.   
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The second challenge is to persuade the public that the construction industry is willing to 
pay employees their entitlements. Australian culture is based on values of fairness, 
equity, and comradery, that is, mateship. In a work context, these values translate to the 
idea of a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work. Australia’s history of trade unionism has 
been built upon these values (see chapter 5). The public expects construction companies 
to uphold these values in their treatment of employees, particularly ensuring employees 
receive expected salary and non-salary reward for their work. The industry needs to 
restore public confidence by showing it is willing to pay employees what is expected, 
and to also stop illegitimate insolvency aimed at avoiding payment altogether. 
The third challenge is to persuade the public that the construction industry is willing to 
pay suppliers their entitlements. This was an expectation that companies and individuals 
who provide materials and services to construction companies, including sub-
contractors, be paid appropriately in return. This problem is similar to employee 
entitlements, except this often involves small business owners, usually companies 
employing one-to-five staff. The public expects that these small business owners and 
their staff also be treated with fairness and equity. The industry needs to restore public 
confidence by showing it is willing to pay suppliers what is expected, and to also stop 
delaying or withholding payments. 
The fourth challenge is to persuade the public that the construction industry is willing to 
accurately report on its performance, particularly its financial reporting. This was an 
expectation that construction companies would honestly and accurately report on their 
business activities, including profit reporting. Society includes public and private 
investors, as well as other stakeholders interested in the financial position of 
construction companies such as customers, creditors such as banks, suppliers, and 
regulators. These stakeholders want to know if they will get a return on their investment, 
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have their building project completed, and whether they will be paid. The industry needs 
to restore public confidence by showing it is willing to stop profit manipulation. 
In summary, the construction industry can repair its legitimacy by addressing the 
business processes associated with these broad activities and communicate that to the 
public: 
1. Meet its corporate responsibility to pay tax 
2. Pay employees what is expected 
3. Stop illegitimate insolvency 
4. Pay suppliers what is expected 
5. Stop making and receipting inappropriate payments 
6. Stop profit manipulation 
7.2.3 What Can Accountants Do? 
Chapters 5 and 6 found that accountants would have been involved in all seven unlawful 
activities identified by the RC. Therefore, accountants could help repair legitimacy in the 
construction industry by changing their behaviour to improve the way these activities are 
performed in the construction industry and help eliminate unlawful behaviour.  
To understand what accountants can do to help the construction industry repair 
legitimacy, it is necessary to examine three issues: 
1. Why do accountants act subjectively rather than objectively when doing their work? 
By subjectively, it is meant that accountants have scope to act independently of the 
accounting standards; that is, to use their own judgment, intuition, experience, or 
organisational context to adapt the standards. By objectively, it is meant that 
accountants always follow the standards. This study has shown that accountants in 
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the construction industry acted subjectively. They did this because accounting allows 
scope for what is called creative accounting.  
2. Why did accountants in the construction industry become involved in activities they 
should have known were unlawful? This was explained in chapter 6 by the pressure 
placed on accountants by other stakeholders (see the section on Impact). Despite this, 
accountants still have free will and choice about how they behave. To understand 
this behaviour, accountants’ motivation will be explored. 
3.  Did accountants have different social contracts? Society’s expectation of 
accountants varies depending upon the stakeholder. The public expects accountants 
to be guardians of good financial management within organisations. Accounting 
bodies expect accountants to uphold good accounting practice and follow the 
standards. Industry stakeholders, particularly owners/managers, expect accountants 
to help them achieve their business goals. There are conflicting goals amongst these 
three groups. If accountants are to change their behaviour to satisfy the public, and 
help restore confidence in the construction industry, this may make their employer 
unhappy. At a fundamental level, the accountant needs to be employed to satisfy the 
need for income for them and their family. Employers, that is, owners/managers, 
have the power to hire and fire. Employers, not the public, provide accountants with 
the income they need. These conflicting demands on accountants can be explored 
through the six legitimation behaviours expected of the industry outlined at the 
conclusion of section 7.2.2.  
In exploring the first issue, why do accountants act subjectively rather than objectively 
when doing their work, creative accounting is used. Creative accounting is “the 
transformation of accounting figures from what they actually are to what perpetrators 
desire by taking advantage of the existing rules and/or ignoring some or all of them” 
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(Ghosh 2010, p. 1). The difference between creative accounting and fraud is that creative 
accounting is working within the regulatory environment but fraud involves breaking the 
law or violating the regulatory framework (Jones 2011). In Australia, the regulatory 
environment for accountants has two dimensions: ASIC enforces compliance with the 
accounting standards and the accounting bodies have the power to sanction or discipline 
members only for errant behaviour, and the social contract enforced by the government 
on behalf of society.  
Generally, fraud involves “deliberate distortion of accounting records, falsification of 
transactions, or misapplication of accounting principles” (Salem 2012, p. 1). Irrespective 
of how the fraud is manifested, it is “typically difficult for auditors to discover since the 
perpetrators take steps to deliberately conceal the resulting irregularities” (Salem 2012, 
p. 1). Furthermore, most accounting practitioners realize that “auditors are often not 
positioned to detect the occurrence of fraud” (Salem 2012, p. 3). Auditors are deprived 
of the “continuous presence necessary for the establishment and implementation of fraud 
prevention and deterrence programs” (Salem 2012, p. 3). This means that auditors are 
not present all of the time and, therefore, inappropriate practices, which might even be 
routinely done at an organisation, may be hidden from auditors during the short period 
when they are physically present at the organisation doing their audit.  
Creative accounting is allowed by law in some countries, such as Greece (Baralexis 
2004), while in some other countries it is considered illegal (Healy & Wahlen 1999). 
Similarly, some researchers argue that creative accounting is legitimate and ethical, 
while others consider it illegitimate and unethical (Healy & Wahlen 1999). Creative 
accounting is very important to the discussion of the role of accounting as a legitimising 
process. Creative accounting suggests accounting is a subjective process, where 
individuals have scope to make judgments regarding whether they follow the rules, that 
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is accounting standards, or not, and the type of information included in accounting 
disclosures. On the other hand, if accounting is an objective process, accountants would 
not engage in creative accounting. The social reconstruction of accounting in the 
construction industry, therefore, aims to establish the degree of creative accounting.  
One of the main forms of creative accounting is “creative disclosure” (Matis, Vladu, & 
Cuzdriorean 2012, p. 73). Creative disclosure is located in step three in the accounting 
process (Deegan 2013, p. 630), and evidence is found in annual reports under forms of 
distortion of financial information, often found in numerical and graph manipulation 
(Matis, Vladu & Cuzdriorean 2012, p. 73). “Creative accounting presented under all its 
forms of manifestation can directly affect the profit and loss account and also the 
balance sheet and it is also related to measurement or disclosure, the latter referring to 
the extent of to the method of presentation” (Matis, Vladu & Cuzdriorean 2012, p. 73).  
Matis, Vladu and Cuzdriorean  (2012, p. 75) states that “creative presentation must be 
regarded as a complex mechanism that comprises: motives for engaging in manipulation 
of accounts, types of information disclosed, and types of manipulations strictly 
connected to presentation of information”. The types of information presented comprise 
of two categories: verbal information and numerical information (Matis, Vladu & 
Cuzdriorean 2012, p. 75). The following strategies are summarized in regards to the 
types of manipulations connected to presentation of financial information: 
• Using a creative manner to make the text difficult to read; 
• Using persuasive language that comprises only positive words and emphasizes 
positive financial performance; 
• Using creative visual manipulation in the way information is presented with the 
scope of attracting the attention from others items that are important but in the 
same time are not flattering for the financial performance presented; 
• Using performance comparisons that involve choosing the benchmarks that 
portray current financial performance in the best possible light (Matis, Vladu & 
Cuzdriorean 2012, p. 75). 
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Each one of these strategies is not part of an objective disclosure choice. Furthermore, 
these strategies are based on subjectivity and bias (Matis, Vladu & Cuzdriorean 2012, p. 
75), which provides evidence for how accounting as a subjective process occurs. 
Creative accounting, such as creative disclosure, is apparently widespread. Firms have 
been manipulating accounts for a long time, and this practice has been given various 
names in the literature including: earnings management, income smoothing, big bath 
accounting, creative accounting, and window dressing (Stlowy & Breton  2004). Stlowy 
and Breton (2004) provide a comprehensive literature of the topic, which they 
summarise as accounts manipulation. While creative accounting is a theme throughout 
the accounting practices presented in this chapter, accounts manipulation is particularly 
relevant in section 7.3.1.3 inappropriate payments and section 7.3.1.6 profit 
manipulation. The motivation for accounts manipulation stems from the desire to 
influence wealth transfer between the various stakeholders (Stlowy & Breton 2004). The 
use of the word manipulation suggests that accounts are prepared in a way that differs 
from normal accounting practice; and here Stlowy and Breton (2004) are suggesting this 
happens because a stakeholder wants to profit at the expense of others. Stlowy and 
Breton (2004) identify the potential targets of manipulation in the financial statements as 
earnings per share (EPS) and the debt-equity ratio. “Earnings per share can be modified 
in two ways: firstly, by adding or removing some revenues or expenses (modification of 
net income), and secondly, by presenting an item before or after the profit used to 
calculate the earnings per share (classificatory manipulations)” (Stlowy & Breton 2004, 
p. 7). In certain countries where full dilution is not mandatory, the denominator can also 
be manipulated by applying unrealistic assumptions that are very difficult to challenge 
(Stlowy & Breton 2004).  
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Who then is involved in creative accounting? In their analysis of several corporate 
accounting scandals Yallapragada, Roe & Toma (2012) found that corporate fraud, 
white-collar crime, and identity theft were costing the United States hundreds of billions 
of dollars every year. Accounting fraud is defined as “knowingly falsifying accounting 
records in order to boost sales revenue and net income and is perpetrated by corporations 
by means of presenting false information, using funds for illegal purposes, overstating 
revenues, understating expenses, overstating the value of corporate assets, and 
understating liabilities” (Yallapragada, Roe & Toma 2012, p. 1). Yallapragada, Roe & 
Toma  (2012, p. 4) were scathing in their criticism of Enron and WorldCom, describing 
their accounting fraud as “the result of unbridled greed of corporate executives, utter 
lack of ethical standards, unscrupulous and cooperating auditors, lawyers, and bankers, 
lack of regulations, political favours, and useless and ineffective board of directors”.  
A final word on creative accounting is provided by Dickinson (1913) who described the 
role of accountants in these terms. The accountant’s responsibility is “largely moral, and 
only to a small extent legal” (Dickinson 1913, p. 240). This suggests that accountants 
have an ethical responsibility, but are not necessarily legally obligated to do so. The 
reason for this point is found in Dickinson’s discussion of the facts, where he argues that 
ascertaining facts is the “simplest and frequently the smallest and least important part of 
the work” of an accountant (Dickinson 1913, p. 240). At this point, Dickinson shows 
that he sees accounting as a subjective process, although he does not use those words. 
He argues that accountants use their judgment, or their “trained mind”, to “approximate 
the facts as is practicable” (Dickinson 1913, p. 240). This description of accounting 
practice as an approximation, based on the accountant’s interpretation, provides 
evidence from this work that accounting is subjective. In reconstructing the reality of 
accounting in the construction industry, this study aims to suggest what was 
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“practicable” for accountants employed by the industry in the period under review. 
Dickinson suggests that the only legal responsibility for accountants is limited to “gross 
errors of omission or commission” (Dickinson 1913, p. 240), which suggests major 
mistakes which would be obvious to any other accountant. However, he provides an 
escape clause by suggesting this legal responsibility “would not extend to errors of 
judgment” (Dickinson 1913, p. 240), in other words accountants are allowed to make 
mistakes if their interpretation is within a tolerable range. From a creative accounting 
perspective, this discussion appears to allow accountants scope to use their professional 
judgment to find their approximate view of the facts, so long as it does not vary too far 
from what others would also find, that is, it is not a “gross error”. While accounting is 
far more complex today than it was in 1913 when Dickinson wrote these comments, it is 
useful historical context and enables consideration of accounting values in a simpler 
time. The issues of judgment and honesty still apply today.  
In exploring the second issue, why did accountants in the construction industry become 
involved in activities they should have known were unlawful, accountants’ motivation is 
used. As was discussed in chapters 5 and 6, when accountants became involved in 
business processes associated with unlawful activities they were either acting alone or on 
the direction of another stakeholder, often owners/managers. In examining the motives 
of accountants in the construction industry, it is necessary to distinguish between self-
motivation, that is acting alone, and motivation created by others, that is pressure exerted 
by other stakeholders. In following the theme consistent throughout this study, the 
analysis does not seek to find the truth about accountants’ motives, as only they could 
tell us what was inside their heads at the time which would be very difficult to discover. 
Rather, the aim is to reconstruct the social practice of the industry at that time by 
inferring motive.  
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Behavioural finance (Shefrin 2000) has identified three principal themes that cover 
many types of inappropriate behaviour, such as accounting manipulation; including 
heuristic-driven bias, frame dependency and inefficient markets. These themes involved 
cognitive constraints , bias and frame dependency, and imperfect access to information, 
inefficient markets. In the case of accountants employed by the construction industry at 
the time of the RC, this translates in terms of whether they made mistakes or errors in 
judgment or whether they operated in an imperfect world. Dechow and Skinner’s (2000) 
research on accounts manipulation is based on motivations linked to market 
expectations. This defines what information stakeholders not only expect from financial 
reports but also whether they should expect perfect information.  
Stlowy and Breton (2004) define accounts manipulation as “the use of management’s  
discretion to make accounting choices or to design transactions so as to affect the 
possibilities  of wealth transfer between the company  and society (political costs), funds 
providers (cost of capital) or managers (compensation plans)” (Stlowy & Breton 2004, p. 
6) . In the first two cases, the firm benefits from the wealth transfer. In the third, 
managers are acting against the firm. The firm benefits from the wealth transfer. Figure 
7.1 summarizes the principles of accounts manipulation. The distinction between 
political costs, cost of capital and compensation plans is taken from Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978). 
Figure 8 - 7.1: Principles of Accounts Manipulation 
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Firms in the construction industry are economic entities in the sense that their main 
purpose is to create wealth. Wealth is created for owners and investors, but also for 
management and staff, including accountants, in terms of employment. Wealth is 
provided for material and service providers to construction firms; which includes banks, 
suppliers, and professional firms such as external auditors and accountants, in the form 
of payment from the firm to the supplier. The role of external auditors and accountants is 
particularly important for this study because the majority of construction firms are small 
and would not employ internal audit, tax or accounting staff. Wealth is important to the 
unions in terms of the welfare of members, that is, construction industry employees, and 
the union leaders. Wealth is also created for society in terms of the direct and indirect 
economic benefit of the construction industry (see chapter 3).  
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The fundamental driver in the motivation of accounting manipulation is wealth creation. 
In the development of a conceptual model explaining why accounting manipulation 
occurred in the construction industry, this chapter examines the tensions amongst 
stakeholders in the distribution of wealth. This conceptualization is supported by earlier 
research. Stlowy and Bretton (2004) found that accounts manipulation mainly emanates 
from the desire to influence the likelihood of wealth transfer between the various 
stakeholders. This chapter will show that the main stakeholder in the battle for wealth 
distribution in the construction industry was owners/managers, who worked both for and 
against the firm in negotiating stakeholder share of wealth.  
Wealth is, therefore, the key driver of the unlawful behaviour within the construction 
industry. Owner/managers were under significant pressure to cut costs to ensure 
profitability and survival in an industry characterised by fierce competition and small 
profit margins. Accountants may have been influenced by self-interest to protect and 
sustain their job. If their company survives, they get to keep their job. That must have 
been a powerful motivator in an industry where companies regularly declared insolvency 
and went out of business. This establishes justification for creative accounting. However, 
accountants would still be faced with a choice about how creative they were willing to 
be. Is there a line which may be drawn, where accountants say they cannot cross?  
To answer this question, the difference between manipulation and fraud must be 
established. Manipulation that is outside the law and standards constitutes fraud (Stlowy 
& Bretton 2004, p. 9). The activities covered by the terms “earnings management” 
(income smoothing, big bath accounting) or generally “creative accounting” normally 
remain within the law (Stlowy & Bretton 2004, p. 9). In this study’s examination of 
accounting manipulation in the construction industry, it is necessary to classify the types 
of activities discussed in chapters 5 and 6 in terms of whether they were creative 
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accounting or fraud. The difference appears to involve intent, that is, did the accountant 
intend to provide misleading information, or was it an error either due to incompetence, 
resulting in a mistake, or an error in judgment due to misinterpretation.  
Fraud occurs when somebody commits an illegal act (Stlowy & Bretton 2004, p. 11). In 
the case of financial statements, fabricating false invoices to boost sales figures is fraud, 
while interpreting consignment sales as ordinary sales is an error (Stlowy & Bretton 
2004, p. 11). The difference, however, does not appear clear to everyone. The American 
commission created to investigate fraudulent financial reporting defines fraud as “any 
act resulting in ‘materially misleading financial statements’” (National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting [NCFFR] 1987, cited by Belkaoui 1989b, p. 62). In his 
classification of fraudulent behaviour, Merchant (1987, cited by Belkaoui 1989a, p. 67), 
defines what is considered to be real fraud, that is, falsifying or altering documents, 
deleting transactions from records, recording forged transactions or concealing 
significant information. Brown (1999) analyses the difference between earnings 
management and reporting fraud and points out that the distinction between the two is 
often very narrow.  
At this point it is important to examine the motives behind fraud and creative 
accounting. Fraud seems to involve a deliberate intent to falsify financial reports and 
provide misleading information, whereas creative accounting appears to involve 
interpretation of accounting standards in a way that benefits the firm. This is where the 
lines between fraud and creative accounting become blurred. If an accountant deletes a 
transaction from the firm’s accounting records or fails to include significant information, 
can they defend themselves against allegations of fraud by arguing they made a mistake 
or that they did it based on their interpretation of the accounting standards? If so, the 
accountant can say that they were doing creative accounting and not engaging in 
CHAPTER 7: ACCOUNTING AS A LEGIMIZATION PROCESS - A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 466 
criminal activity. In this chapter, the conclusion is drawn that the distinction between 
fraud and creative accounting may be found in terms of the level of stakeholder 
involvement. If management, or another stakeholder, tells the accountant to deliberately 
falsify financial reports, for example, then this is fraud, as defined by Merchant (1987), 
and the accountant is involved in illegal activity, even if it is under duress. If the 
accountant engages in this activity without being told to do so by management or 
another stakeholder, then it  may be concluded that it is based on their interpretation of 
accounting standards, and it is creative accounting and not illegal. The issue then comes 
down to intent and whether the accountant performs account manipulation under the 
direction by others, against their own judgment, or on their own, based on their 
judgment. The latter absolves them from fraud so long as they are attempting to follow 
accounting standards.  
Support for this argument is found in Merchant’s (1987) discussion that accounts 
manipulation is related mainly to interpreting accounting standards. In most countries, 
GAAP allow for a certain degree of interpretation (Stlowy & Bretton 2004, p. 11). “To 
be legal, interpretations may be in keeping with the spirit of the standard or, at the other 
extreme, clearly stretch that spirit while remaining within the letter of the law” (Stlowy 
& Bretton 2004, p. 11). They may be erroneous, but never fraudulent (Dechow & 
Skinner 2000). Therefore, accountants are allowed to make mistakes or errors in 
judgment. This tolerance is even quantified by researchers as a “fair presentation zone” 
(Stlowy & Bretton 2004, p. 11), which is the degree of error tolerated in financial 
reporting before moving into the area of fraud. In this way, Stlowy and Bretton (2004, p. 
11) conclude that accounting manipulation is not fraud; it is just a matter of 
interpretation.  
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In summary, if accountants in the construction industry were engaging in accounting 
manipulation rather than fraud, it may be argued that they were simply being creative 
and were not actually doing anything illegal. While this behaviour supports this study’s 
central theme that accounting is a subjective rather than an objective process, it does not 
help find a way forward. If accountants can avoid punishment or responsibility for their 
behaviour in the construction industry, they will most likely continue to behave in the 
same way. Accountants will continue to be creative in the processes identified in chapter 
six because they are motivated by self-interest to do so, that is, to maintain employment.   
It seems the only way forward, if accountants are to help repair the construction 
industry’s legitimacy, is to make them accountable for the unlawful processes identified 
in chapter 6. This may be done by exploring the third issue outlined at the start of this 
section.  
In exploring the third issue, did accountants have different social contracts with industry 
stakeholders, the results from chapters 5 and 6 are used to reconcile stakeholder 
conflicting demands and make accountants accountable. In simple terms, if accountants 
had worked alone then these unlawful processes might be described as mistakes, errors 
in judgment or creative accounting.  However, if accountants worked under the direction 
of other stakeholders, it may be described as fraud. For example, the conceptual 
framework presented in figure 5.3 (see chapter 5), showed that the role of accountants in 
inappropriate payments was isolation. This proposes that accountants might have 
processed an invoice marked as “sponsorship” for a trade union social event as a 
legitimate activity, whereas the funds might have been a cash payment to a union official 
for industrial peace. The accountant was involved in the activity but might be excused 
because they did not know the truth and this could be described as an honest mistake. On 
the other hand, tax evasion was an area where accountants must have been actively 
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involved with unscrupulous individuals. While accountants might argue their role is to 
help minimise tax, that is, use creative accounting, some of the tax evasion activities 
were illegal. If accountants participated in this type of activity they cannot defend 
themselves by saying the boss put pressure on them. It is still an illegal activity 
irrespective of the pressure exerted.   
Figure 5.3 explained how the seven unlawful activities identified by the RC involved 
different social practice, defined by the three stakeholder constructs used in chapter 5: 
relationships (interaction) and chapter 6 impact (harmony), and expectation (cohesion). 
The summary map plots the location of the seven activities in terms of their dominating 
characteristics. The percentage under each label indicates the proportion of processes 
associated with this activity which have these characteristics (see table 6.2 in chapter 6).  
The figure illustrates how accountants are heavily involved with the broad range of 
stakeholders in making decisions in the seven areas outlined. However, at this point 
there is a need to differentiate between social interaction and information usage. ST 
explains that varying social contracts will be negotiated with different stakeholder 
groups. In reconstructing the social reality of accounting within the construction 
industry, this study seeks to infer the nature of the various social contracts accountants 
had with the other stakeholder groups. This will provide an understanding of society’s 
expectation of accountants through the lens of those they interacted with.  
Accountants’ interaction with construction industry stakeholders was personal and 
impersonal. It was personal in the sense that accountants interacted socially with others 
in doing their work and in helping others find meaning and interpretation in their work 
outputs, that is, their reports. Accountants employed by the construction industry would 
interact closely with internal users of their reports in meetings and other work 
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interaction. Interaction was impersonal in the sense that the work produced by 
accountants have been read and interpreted by others without any personal contact with 
the accounting staff that produced the report. For example, an investor might read the 
financial statements of an entity produced by an accountant whom the investor has never 
met nor ever interacted with. Similarly, an official from the ATO might review taxation 
returns prepared by an accountant whom they have never had personal contact with. The 
distinction between personal and impersonal interaction highlights that accountants had 
different interaction with the construction industry’s various stakeholders. This different 
interaction is explained by the type of work output, internal versus external, and the type 
of decision.  Accountants were much more likely to have personal interaction with 
internal users, and impersonal interaction with external users. This then raises the 
question of what was accountants’ social contract with internal versus external users.  
The social contract with external users was most likely objective in the sense that 
accountants were expected to follow standards and behaviours expected from 
accountants in any industry. Owners/investors, for example, would expect to see 
common accounting treatment of expenses and income, so that they could compare one 
entity against another and make appropriate investment decisions. Similarly, regulators 
including the ATO, accounting bodies, and auditors, would also expect accountants to 
follow accounting standards and taxation legislation. Banks and suppliers would expect 
not to be misled and that accountants would provide them with honest and accurate 
information on the entity’s financial position, particularly its capacity to repay debt. 
Society would expect accountants to represent it in accurately portraying how well the 
entity is managing its resources. This discussion highlights that accountants probably 
played an objective role in interaction with external users of work outputs, that is, 
financial reports. Owners/investors or regulators, for example, would have been unlikely 
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to interact personally with accountants and to try to influence them to behave in any way 
other than what society would expect of an accountant in any industry. This situation 
may, of course, have been different in the case of small firms or privately owned 
businesses, such as subcontractors, where the owner or investor was often the manager. 
The only other exception was the unions.  
The social interaction with internal users, including the unions, was more likely to be 
personal and to result in accountants playing a subjective role. By a subjective role, it is 
meant that accountants had different social contracts with the various internal users. The 
different contract resulted from internal stakeholders having different expectations of 
accountants.  
In understanding the nature of accountants’ different social contracts with industry 
stakeholders, it is necessary to consider the four steps in the accounting process (Deegan 
2013). While external users are most interested in the work outputs of accountants, that 
is, step four financial reports; internal users interact with accountants at all four steps.  
Step one is identifying business transactions. As outlined above, this step involves 
accountants identifying events that will have an impact on the financial performance of 
the entity. Figure 7.2 identified these as cash withdrawals, payment of wages and 
salaries, earning of fees revenue, and payment of tax. In reconstructing accountants’ 
social contract with stakeholders here, there is a need to identify who was involved and 
what they expected.  
Cash withdrawals would involve owners/investors and management. Accountants would 
not necessarily be informed of cash withdrawals. Cash outflows are movements of cash 
out of the entity resulting from transactions with an external party. However, it is often 
not practical to record every transaction separately in the cash flow statement (CFS). 
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Therefore, to ensure the CFS is not too lengthy, cash inflows and outflows are grouped 
into activities: operating activities, investing activities, and financing activities. It is 
reasonable to assume that owners/investors or management could have withdrawn funds 
from a firm’s bank account, used those funds to hand over to union officials for the 
various activities identified by the RC, itemised it as a business expense, and not told the 
firm’s accountant(s). This cash withdrawal might then be lost in the system as an 
operating activity and recorded anonymously in the cash outflows. Accountants are 
supposed to be able to track events which would impact the entity’s cash position. It 
might be argued that good accountants would find the cash withdrawal and require an 
explanation. The owners/investors or managers involved would probably then expect the 
accountant(s) to cooperate and ignore the transaction. The social contract for accountants 
in the cash withdrawal process is that accountants are expected not to find irregular cash 
withdrawals or, if they do, to cooperate and not to query the reasons for the cash 
withdrawal. This suggests accounting as a subjective process.  
Payment of wages and salaries would involve managers, human resources, and the 
unions. Accountants would not usually be involved in negotiating employee 
compensation and benefits. This activity would be led by human resources staff. Wages 
are typically grouped as an expense in the IS. Other employee benefit matters such as 
superannuation, workers compensation, annual leave, and redundancy payments would 
typically be handled by human resources. In the case of the construction industry, 
employee compensation and benefits was a major area of inappropriate behaviour. 
However, the negotiations would have involved management and human resources. It is 
unlikely that accountants would have been involved. The only involvement would have 
been recording the outcomes of negotiations as an increase or decrease on the IS, under 
the broad expense category of wages. The social contract for accountants in the wages 
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and salaries process is that accountants are expected to be excluded from negotiations 
with unions or staff and to record the outcomes on the IS without query. Given 
accountants would not normally be part of this process, other than recording business 
transactions on the IS, this suggests accounting as an objective process. Accountants 
would have been involved in considering FBT implications of certain benefits to 
employees especially managers.  
Earning of fees revenue involves management, project managers, and accountants. 
Earning of fees revenues describes the way the entity reports its revenues. This falls 
under the accounting activity called earnings management. Earnings management is the 
managers’ use of accounting discretion via accounting policy choices, that is which 
standard to follow and how this is interpreted, and/or estimated to report a desired level 
of earnings (Birt et al. 2010, p. 206). Earnings management is an area where accounting 
can become very subjective. Revenues are a critical part of profitability. Managers may 
be motivated to report the entity’s profitability in terms of economic reality, that is, the 
truth. However, they may also be motivated by self-interest, perhaps to help persuade the 
banks to provide additional loans, or to maintain share price, or to maximise 
performance bonuses (Birt et al. 2010, p. 206).  
As outlined in chapter 3, the construction industry is characterised by intense 
competition and small profit margins. As a result, managers are often under pressure to 
report good news in financial statements, rather than bad news. This satisfies 
owners/investors, as well as the banks, and suppliers. The nature of construction projects 
means that revenues are usually split over many months, and sometimes years. Revenues 
fluctuate on each project, based on the percentage of completion, and this presents an 
opportunity to manipulate revenues to help management report good news. For example, 
if the entity has less than expected revenue next month, management might hold some of 
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this month’s revenue and carry it over to the next month. This is an example of earnings 
management. It improves the quality of earnings (Birt et al. 2010, p. 206) by spreading 
the earnings over a period of time. In the construction industry, if the project is 
completed within one financial year, the monthly fluctuations do not really matter, but if 
the project runs over more than one year, it can affect the results in each financial year. 
In this activity, management can manipulate the revenue, and therefore the profit result, 
presented in the IS. The social contract for accountants in the earnings management 
process is that accountants are expected to cooperate and not to query the reasons for 
revenue manipulation. This suggests accounting as a subjective process. 
Furthermore, costs can be deferred to the BS as work in progress (WIP) to later match 
with like revenue for work completed. WIP is also open to manipulation by transferring 
costs to the BS rather than expensing them is another way to manage earnings. Expenses 
are lowered, profits increased and assets increased on the BS. 
Payment of tax involves owners/investors, management and accountants. Taxation is an 
expense of a company, because it has an obligation to pay tax on business activities. The 
process of paying tax involves taxation rules and accounting rules. The tax that should 
be paid is based on the company’s taxable income as calculated by applying taxation 
rules. As an expense, tax can be a significant expense for a company and subsequently 
has a strong influence on profitability. Profit performance measures can be referred to as 
pre and post-tax basis. In contrast to taxation, where taxation rules must be applied, 
profit reported in the IS is measured by applying accounting rules, that is, accounting 
standards. The difference between taxation rules and accounting rules is explained by 
the fact that the tax expense of a company will not be simply the pre-tax accounting 
profit multiplied by the applicable tax rate. Accountants are placed under pressure by 
owners/investors and management to minimise the tax expense, so that the post-tax 
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profit increases. This is called tax avoidance. Taxation and accounting rules can diverge 
due to income not being assessable for taxation purpose, and expenses not being 
deductible for taxation purposes. The social contract for accountants in the taxation 
process is that accountants are expected to minimise the tax expense. This suggests 
accounting as a subjective process. 
Step two, of the accounting process, is measuring business transactions. As outlined 
above, this step involves accountants identifying how business transactions will affect 
the entity’s position, and groups together similar items, such as expenses and income. 
Figure 7.2 identified these as analysis, recording, and classifying. In reconstructing 
accountants’ social contract with stakeholders here, there is a need to identify who was 
involved and what they expected.  
The measurement of business transactions mainly involves accountants working on their 
own. In most cases, other stakeholders would probably defer to the accountants’ 
professional judgment in this area and leave them alone. For the purposes of this study, 
this step is somewhat “murky” in the sense that it is impossible to reconstruct the social 
reality of what accountants did on a day-to-day basis in analysing, recording and 
classifying business transactions. Perhaps the only way to discover this truth would be to 
examine audit reports, but these would be inaccessible. All that can be done is to infer 
that step two is where creative accounting would most likely have occurred. In this 
sense, accountants would have adopted creative ways of analysing, recording, and 
classifying business transactions under pressure from owners/investors or management 
to achieve other outcomes, tax evasion for example. The social reconstruction of step 
two is that accountants would probably have conducted these activities based on their 
own professional experience and judgment, but probably had the outcomes expected by 
owners/investors or management in the back of the mind while carrying out these tasks. 
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The social contract for accountants in the measurement of business transactions process 
is that accountants are expected to follow accounting rules but to employ creative 
accounting, wherever possible, to meet outcomes specified by owners/investors or 
management. This suggests accounting as a subjective process. 
Step three, of the accounting process, is communicating via reporting. As outlined 
above, this step involves accountants identifying events that will have an impact on the 
financial performance of the entity. Figure 7.2 identified these as IS’s, BS’s, and CFS’s. 
In reconstructing accountants’ social contract with stakeholders here, there is a need to 
identify who was involved and what they expected.  
IS’s, BS’s, and CFS’s all involve owners/investors, managers and accountants. They 
may also involve regulators and auditors. The IS reflects the accounting return for the 
entity for a specified time period, and includes income and expenses, to calculate profit. 
IS’s are important because they measure profitability and, in doing so, they allow 
evaluation of the entity’s performance; more specifically reviewing past decisions, 
future growth, and enable future decisions. Large companies are subject to statutory 
reporting requirements and are required to prepare an IS at least every 12 months. The 
BS details the entity’s assets, liabilities, and equity at a particular point in time. BS’s are 
important because they represent the financial position of an entity at a particular time. 
For this reason, suppliers and banks, as well as employees may be interested in the BS. 
CFS’s measure liquidity, which is important to paying bills or debts on time and 
maintaining business confidence. Cash flow explain whether the entity has enough cash 
to meet its financial obligations such as paying wages, taxes, and other bills as they are 
due. For this reason, suppliers and banks, as well as regulators such as the ATO, are also 
interested in CFS’s.  
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Accountants follow accounting rules, that is accounting standards, in preparing ISs, 
BS’s, and CFS’s. While the analysis above showed that a wide range of stakeholders are 
interested in these financial reports, in most cases they would not try to influence 
accountants in the preparation of these reports. The socio-political power inequities 
amongst stakeholders emerge in step one and step two of the accounting process and 
only affect step three in the sense of being inputs into the information portrayed in step 
three’s financial reports. The social contract for accountants in the communicating for 
reporting process, is that accountants are expected to follow accounting rules. Deviation 
from this expectation would be picked up by auditors. This suggests accounting as an 
objective process. 
Step four, of the accounting process, is decision making. As outlined above, this step 
involves accountants providing information that users can employ to make strategic 
decisions about the business. Figure 7.2 identified these as investment, product or 
service range, and pay debts. In reconstructing accountants’ social contract with 
stakeholders here, there is a need to identify who was involved and what they expected.  
Accountants play an important role here in anticipating the type of financial information 
that is relevant and useful for a wide range of users. Financial analysis helps users 
evaluate the entity’s performance and future financial health. It helps guide owners and 
investors, both current and prospective, regarding decisions about investing funds into 
the business or withdrawing funds. Regulators such as the ASIC protect the public 
interest by ensuring investors receive accurate information. Accountants would feel 
under pressure to produce truthful financial information for investors. Owners/investors 
and management may use financial information about which markets to compete in, and 
which products and services to offer. These decisions will have a significant impact on 
the entity’s competitiveness and, therefore, its profitability. Accountants would feel 
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under pressure to provide accurate information for owners or investors and management. 
Suppliers and banks will want to know if the entity can pay for their services before 
trading with the entity. However, here a conflict emerges in the construction industry’s 
socio-political power inequities. Owners or investors and managers may not wish to 
fully disclose financial information to suppliers or banks, particularly if it faces a 
difficult financial period, cash flow problems for example, and needs material and 
capital to continue operating. Under these circumstances, accountants would have been 
under pressure to adjust financial information for certain external users. The social 
contract for accountants in the decision making process is that accountants are expected 
to follow accounting rules. Deviation from this expectation would be picked up by 
auditors and regulators. This suggests accounting as an objective process. However, this 
may have been different in providing information regarding debt repayment.  
The following figure updates the accounting process with social contracts summarised.  
 
 
Figure 9 - 7.2: The Accounting Process 
CHAPTER 7: ACCOUNTING AS A LEGIMIZATION PROCESS - A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 478 
Figure 8 - 7.2: The Accounting Process 
The figure highlights areas where accountants employed in the construction industry 
may have been under pressure to act in ways that did not always follow accounting rules, 
that is, accounting standards.  
 
7.3 Regulatory Outcomes 
7.3.1  The Regulators 
This study’s findings present an opportunity for regulators of the construction industry 
to take action to address the industry’s unlawful behaviour. While the seven unlawful 
activities were identified by the RC more than a decade ago, there is evidence that the 
construction industry continues to misbehave. The Royal Commission into Trade Union 
Governance and Corruption (Heydon 2015b), completed by The Honourable John 
Dyson Heydon AC QC, confirmed lawlessness in the construction industry as an 
ongoing problem more than a decade after the RC. Heydon found evidence of unlawful 
or unprofessional conduct by the trade union movement (2015b p. 49).  
This study provides regulators with information about the social practice of accounting 
which might be used to improve regulation of the industry. This could be done by 
empowering accountants to act as internal regulators. Given that much of the industry’s 
unlawful behaviour occurs due to poor or inappropriate financial management, improved 
accounting practice in the industry could help restore public confidence and repair 
legitimation.  
Policy improvements could be led by the lead regulator within each unlawful activity. 
For tax evasion, this is the ATO. The ATO could work with accounting bodies and 
accountants to empower them to regulate tax evasion and payroll tax activities. The aim 
is to identify who is the lead regulator, and then look at their website, and research their 
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TOR and role, and perhaps identify how they could give accountants the authority and 
protection to be internal regulators. One of the areas needs to be the FWO to provide 
accountants income protection and ensure unfair dismissal laws are very rigid in the 
construction industry, otherwise there will be no whistle blowers. Perhaps, also 
anonymity or confidentiality in giving testimony, for example, hidden screens in court 
rooms.  
The lead regulator for each of the seven unlawful activities identified by the RC is as 
follows: 
• For payroll tax, the lead regulator is the Australian State and Territory Revenue 
Offices .  
• For employee entitlements, the lead regulator is the Fair Work Commission 
(FWC) and the FWO  
• For inappropriate payments, the lead regulator is Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (AIRC)  
• For security of payments, the lead regulator is the Building and Construction 
Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (BCISP Act 1999) in all States and 
Territories, apart from Western Australia and the Northern Territory, where 
regulation is by the Construction Contracts Act 2004 (CC Act 2004) and is 
administered by various bodies in each State and Territory, for example, the 
Office of Fair Trading in NSW. 
• For phoenix company activities, the lead regulator is the ASIC 
• For profit manipulation, the lead regulator is ASIC 
• For tax evasion, the lead regulator is the ATO. 
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Each of the seven activities identified by the RC is now examined in terms of the current 
regulation of the construction industry, areas for improvement, and the role accountants 
could play. 
7.3.1.1 Payroll tax  
Payroll Tax Australia permits employers to self-register and self-assess payroll tax. In 
Australia, payroll taxes are paid to the State or Territory governments via the revenue 
collection offices. Each State or Territory has different payroll tax rates and general 
deduction thresholds. Payroll tax is a percentage of a business’s wages and salaries that 
exceed the threshold amount annually. Consequently, payroll tax is an employment on-
cost associated with large employers. “Most building and construction businesses are 
small employers and are below the payroll tax threshold” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, para. 8, p. 
95). 
In 2003 the RC found “that there is significant non-registration and underpayment of 
payroll tax in the building and construction industry, particularly in New South Wales” 
(Cole 2003, vol.8, p. 105). Apart from the reduction in revenue collection by the states, 
the findings had implications for the financial performance of a business. “Evasion of 
payroll tax disadvantages businesses which comply with their statutory obligations. 
Some contractors avoid the payment of their statutory obligations so that they can quote 
for work at lower rates” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 93). 
Payroll tax is predominantly avoided in one of two ways. The first method to avoid 
payroll tax is via sham contracting arrangements whereby employees are treated as 
“contractors” and “some union witnesses stated that there is significant avoidance of 
payroll tax flowing from the illegitimate use of contracting” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 103). 
The second method of avoiding payroll tax was through the use of phoenix companies; 
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and “significant numbers of companies in the building and construction industry, 
particularly phoenix operations, do not pay or underpay payroll tax” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, 
p. 105). These two mechanisms are covered in other unlawful activities that follow. In 
light of this, the RC made three recommendations in relation to non-compliance with 
payroll tax obligations in the building and construction industry. These 
recommendations were Recommendation 101, Recommendation 102 and 
Recommendation 103. It appears that only the last two recommendations have been 
adopted and considerable time after the RC. 
Recommendation 101 proposed that the “Commonwealth encourage the States and 
Territories to consider the adoption of the provisions contained in s. 16LA of the Pay-
Roll Tax Act 1971 (NSW) (PRT Act 1971) to address phoenix company activities in the 
building and construction industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 106). Adoption of the 
provisions would have made “all members of a group jointly liable for the payroll tax 
debts of other group members” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 106).  However, at the time the 
Government did not consider the changes as necessary because  “it in effect imposes 
liability on related parties and therefore implies a significant change to current corporate 
law and insolvency law policy” (Australian Government 2003, p. 89). According to 
Anderson (2012, p. 3), “this recommendation was not adopted”. 
Recommendation 102 advocated that the “Commonwealth discuss with the States and 
Territories appropriate methods of permitting their revenue authorities to share 
information relevant to the detection of payroll tax evasion in the building and 
construction industry where this does not already occur” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 106). 
This recommendation was adopted. The OSR in NSW stated:  
We regularly exchange information with the ATO in accordance with the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed by the ATO and all state revenue offices. 
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Our shared use of information and data includes using Business Activity 
Statement (BAS) data to identify those businesses which should be registered for 
payroll tax and matching business wages, salaries data, and fringe benefits tax 
data from the ATO to identify variances for payroll tax…(2015a, p.2) 
Recommendation 103 suggested the “Commonwealth encourage the States and 
Territories to continue efforts to harmonise between jurisdictions the key definitions of 
the payroll tax system, particularly the definition of wages” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 107). 
This last recommendation has been adopted: “although each jurisdiction continues to 
have different payroll tax rates and general deduction thresholds, the payroll tax 
legislation is virtually identical due to the harmonisation of payroll tax legislation in July 
2010” (OSR NSW 2015b). 
Non-compliance with payroll tax obligations continues to be an ongoing issue in the 
building and construction industry in many states of Australia. In June 2013, the 
Queensland OSR examined payroll tax compliance in the construction industry, by 
focussing on employers in the industry who were attempting to avoid paying payroll tax 
(FWBC 2013). The OSR NSW (2015a, p. 6) payroll tax compliance program in 2015-
2016 is targeting non-complying employers in various industries, including construction. 
During 2015-16, the Western Australia revenue collection office payroll tax compliance 
program will be concentrating on a number of industries, particularly the construction 
industry (Department of Finance WA 2015). 
7.3.1.2 Employee Entitlements 
The minimum employee entitlements are defined in the National Employee Standards, 
which are set out in the FW Act 2009 (FWO 2015). The practical application of the FW 
Act 2009 in workplaces is overseen by the FWC and the FWO. The Fair Work System is 
a national system that provides a safety net of minimum employee entitlements. 
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The payment of employee entitlements is dependent upon a company having adequate 
cash reserves (Deegan 2012, p. 429). Employees in the building and construction 
industry are particularly vulnerable to non-payment of employee entitlements (Cole 
2003, vol. 9, p. 290).  The non-payment of employee entitlements is often the result 
either insolvency or phoenix activity. “There are high levels of business insolvency in 
the building and construction industry particularly among small employers, whose 
businesses collapse financially and whose workers remain unpaid” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 
290). Some insolvency is deliberate and is the planned outcome of phoenix activity 
whereby “operators are serial offenders who use deliberate and fraudulent methods to 
avoid obligations” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 119). According to the FWO’s commissioned 
report on phoenix activity, prepared by PwC in 2012 (p. iii, Table 1) the cost to 
employees, in lost employee entitlements, due to phoenixing activity was estimated to be 
between $191,253,476 and $655,202,019 in 2009/10. 
The RC made several recommendations regarding employee entitlements (Cole 2003, 
vol. 9, pp. 338-342). Recommendations 154 to 165 were primarily centred on the 
Commonwealth and states providing a service for the recovery of unpaid entitlements, 
adopting a greater role in the enforcement of employee entitlements, and provide advice 
and where appropriate representation for all employees for claims of unpaid entitlements 
in the building and construction industry (Cole 2003, vol. 9, pp. 338-342). At the time, 
most of these recommendations were considered or accepted by the Government 
(Australian Government 2003, pp. 97-98). 
However, the Government focused on the recovery of unpaid entitlements rather than on 
the enforcement of employee entitlements. Consequently taxpayer government funded 
schemes, such as the EESS and the GEERS arose to compensate employees who had not 
been paid their employee entitlements. “However, much of the employee entitlements 
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paid by GEERS are not subsequently recovered from the insolvent employer” (Anderson 
2011, p. 150). 
Whilst GEERS provided a recovery mechanism for employees who had not been paid 
their entitlements due to insolvency by their employer, not all losses were recoverable 
due to the annual maximum wage limit cap, and certain “workers” were not covered by 
the scheme (Anderson 2011, p. 150). The major limitation of GEERS was that there was 
no legislative basis for the scheme; “the scheme is also not established by statute, but is 
rather a decision of executive government, which can be withdrawn at any time” 
(Anderson 2011, p. 150). 
The Fair Entitlements Guarantee scheme that commenced on 5 December 2012 replaced 
the GEERS. It establishes a legislative basis, through enactment of the Fair Entitlements 
Guarantee Act 2012 (C’wth), for the recovery of certain unpaid entitlements owed to 
employees due to the insolvency of their employer (Department of Employment 2015). 
If employees have lost their job and believe they are owed outstanding employee 
entitlements, but their employer is not in liquidation or bankrupt, then they can seek 
further information from the FWO, ASIC, or from the insolvency practitioner looking 
after the business affairs of their former employer (Department of Employment 2015). If 
the employer is still operating a business, the FWO may be able to provide information 
about the employer’s obligations to meet unpaid employee entitlements (Department of 
Employment 2015). Employees who are owed employee entitlements by abandoned 
companies can submit a request to ASIC to wind up the company (Department of 
Employment 2015). 
The role of accountants and other professional advisors must be examined in relation to 
the non-payment of employee entitlements. Anderson and Haller (2014) question:  
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whether the FWO ought to be seeking monetary penalties from the company’s 
other accessory — in other words, the advisor who recommended to the director, 
acting as the directing mind and will of the company, that they liquidate the 
company and move the business elsewhere as a means of avoiding payment of 
liabilities (p. 473). 
In considering the role and responsibility of advisors, Anderson and Haller (2014) state: 
Where a legal or insolvency practitioner advises a company director to phoenix 
their company as a means of the company avoiding payment of employee 
entitlements, the advisor is linked in purpose and thus an accessory to that 
company’s breach of the Act in the same way ……(p. 489). 
Anderson and Haller (2014) conclude: 
In relation to employee entitlements lost as a result of phoenix activity, the FWO 
can play a significant role in the deterrence of this behaviour. While the FWO 
should be given credit for routinely bringing actions against directors as 
accessories to their company’s breaches of the Fair Work Act, they have not gone 
further to seek a penalty against the advisors who might be behind the decision to 
phoenix the offending company (p. 497). 
7.3.1.3 Inappropriate payments  
Inappropriate payments, typically in the form of “donations”, are regulated by the 
Industrial Registrar, which is part of the AIRC, and the ABCC. The BCII Act 2005 
requires registered organisations to lodge a statement with the Industrial Registrar of 
donations exceeding $500 received by the organisation and clients, head contractors and 
subcontractors to notify  the ABCC of any request or demand for a donation exceeding 
$500 be made to a registered organisation. Subsequently, the BCII Act 2005 was 
superseded by the Fair Work (Building Industry) Act 2012 (FWBI Act 2012). 
Consequently, the ABCC was replaced with FWBC. The Wilcox Report 2009 
recommended the structure and power of FWBC, which were considerable less under 
the FWBI Act 2012.  
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The RC made a number of recommendations in response to inappropriate payments 
identified in the building and construction industry. These were specifically stated in 
recommendation 145, recommendation 147 and recommendation 149 of the RC, 
Volume 1, Summary of Findings and Recommendations.  In recommendation 145 (Cole 
2003, vol. 1): 
The Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act require registered 
organisations, as soon as practicable after the end of each financial year, to lodge 
with the Industrial Registrar a statement  showing the following particulars in 
relation to each donation exceeding $500 received by the organisation during that 
financial year: 
(a) the amount of the donation; 
(b) the purpose for which the donation was made; and 
(c) the name and address of the person who made the donation (p. 132). 
In recommendation 147 (Cole 2003, vol. 1):  
The Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act require clients, head 
contractors and subcontractors to notify promptly the Australian Building and 
Construction Commission of any request or demand that a donation exceeding 
$500 be made to, or at the direction of, a registered organisation or an official, 
employee, delegate or member of a registered organization (p. 133).. 
In recommendation 149 (Cole 2003, vol. 1):  
The maximum penalty for non-compliance with the following obligations in the 
Building and Construction Industry Improvement Act be set at $100 000 for a 
body corporate and $20 000 in other cases: 
(a) failure by an employer to notify the Australian Building and Construction 
Commission of any demand or claim for payment to an employee in relation to a 
period during which the employee engaged or engages in industrial action, within 
24 hours of receiving that demand or claim; 
(b) failure by a registered organisation to include all donations exceeding $500 
received by the organisation in a statement lodged with the Industrial Registrar 
and the Australian Building and Construction Commission as soon as practicable 
after the end of each financial year; and 
(c) failure by a client, head contractor or subcontractor to notify the Australian 
Building and Construction Commission of any request or demand that a donation 
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exceeding $500 be made to, or at the direction of, a registered organisation or an 
official, employee, delegate or member of a registered organization (p. 133). 
However, inappropriate payments continue to be an issue in the building and 
construction industry. There is evidence of this in the report by Heydon (2015b). 
Heydon (2015b)  had “uncovered and examined a wide range of corrupt or inappropriate 
conduct on the part of some union officials across a range of unions…(including for 
example): a former lead organiser for the (union name) conceded during hearings in 
Canberra that he had personally received $100,000 in secret payments from employers” 
(p. 25). 
A recent example of inappropriate payments is in a submission prepared by the CFMEU 
in 2014, whereby it was revealed that: 
In October 2013, reports emerged of an Australian Federal Police investigation 
into allegations of multi-million dollar ‘consultancy fees’ paid by Leighton 
Holdings to a UAE businessman in return for securing lucrative Iraqi 
government construction projects (CFMEU 2014, p2, para 1.7). 
This story was further corroborated by a number of newspaper articles, one of which, for 
example claimed: 
Damning evidence has emerged in a court case linking construction firm 
Leighton Holdings to allegedly corrupt payments of ‘not less than $25 million in 
marketing fees’ to a Monaco firm to help win Iraq government projects, even 
though the projects required no marketing (McKenzie & Baker 2013, para. 1). 
The problem of inappropriate payments in the building and construction industry 
remains an issue over a decade after the RC. The Royal Commission into Trade Unions, 
which commenced in 2014, acknowledges that the “giving and taking of such benefits is 
not a new phenomenon” (p. 94, clause 315). However, this raises the question as to why 
inappropriate payments are an ongoing issue in the building and construction industry. 
Reasons as to why inappropriate payments are an ongoing issue in the building and 
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construction industry are that existing laws and regulatory bodies have been ineffective 
at curbing inappropriate payments. Inappropriate payments are symptomatic of the 
lawless culture of the building and construction industry by being “antithetical to the 
rule of law” (Heydon 2015a, p. 94).  
Heydon (2015a, p. 98) believes, in addition to disclosure requirements, the introduction 
of specific legislation, prohibiting the making or receiving of inappropriate payments, 
with significant penalties may address the issue of corrupting benefits. If found to be in 
breach of the law, an individual could be imprisoned for ten years or fined up to $1.7 
million and a corporation could be fined up to $17 million (Heydon 2015a, p. 98). 
However, it is questionable whether additional laws and significant penalties would 
eliminate corrupting benefits, given that inappropriate payments have continued for well 
over a decade since the RC. The root cause of such behaviour appears to be cultural. 
Clearly, the cultural change recommended by the RC has not yet occurred in the industry 
to induce compliance with the law regarding inappropriate payments. After all, the 
building and construction industry lacks a “culture of legality” (Zimmermann 2007, p. 
11). Unless there is cultural change, the law alone will not be able to change this 
behaviour.  
7.3.1.4 Security of Payments 
The entitlement of subcontractors to receive payment due for work performed is 
regulated by the Building and Construction Security of Payment Acts in all states and 
territories, apart from Western Australia and the Northern Territory, where regulation is 
by the CC Acts 2004. Consequently there are two security of payment legislative models 
operating in Australia, referred to as the ‘East Coast’ and ‘West Coast’ Models 
(Coggins, Fenwick & Bell 2010). The two security of payment legislative models that 
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operate in Australia indicate an inconsistent approach to the regulation of security of 
payments in Australia. Security of payments legislation varies between the states and 
territories with the earliest enactment in New South Wales in 1999 and the latest in 
South Australia, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory in 2009. The Acts are 
administered by various bodies in each of these states and territories, ranging from the 
Office of Fair Trading in NSW, the building commissions in Queensland, Victoria and 
Western Australia, to Land and Planning Authorities in the Northern and Australian 
Capital Territories.  
Proposals for reforms to security of payments, considered by the RC in Discussion Paper 
12 titled Security of Payments in the Building and Construction Industry, released in 
2002, were bipartisan in approach (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 230). The first approach 
considered the root causes that lead to the problems of security of payments. The second 
approach considered how to overcome the effects of the problems associated with 
security of payments. The RC also recommended that there should be “Federal 
legislation to regulate security of payment” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 230). The RC set out 
the “model for Commonwealth security of payment legislation” in the draft Building and 
Construction Industry Security of Payment Bill 2003 (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 230). 
Reforms, considered by the RC, to the payment of subcontractors in the building and 
construction industry were on opposite ends of the continuum. The first approach 
concentrated on “the financial performance of businesses in the industry, in order to 
reduce the risk of financial problems that lead to the failure to pay subcontractors” (Cole 
2003, vol. 8, p. 245) and considered strategies such as prequalification guidelines and 
licensing conditions. The second approach focused on “schemes to improve the 
mechanisms that assist subcontractors in recovering payments that are owed to them, or 
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to provide some protection against the insolvency of parties higher up the contractual 
chain” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 245).  
The draft Building and Construction Industry Security of Payments Bill 2003, to reform 
security payments, recommended national legislation focused on rapid adjudication in 
line with the second approach focusing on mechanisms to recover payments due to 
subcontractors. Other mechanisms to improve payment, in particular trust funds, which 
were strongly opposed by industry, were not the focus of the Bill. “The Commission has 
therefore chosen to focus upon reform recommendations to improve security of payment 
that have better prospects of being accepted and implemented” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 
250). The draft Building and Construction Industry Security of Payments Bill 2003 has 
not become Commonwealth law. 
In the years following the RC, ‘Nothing has changed’ (Collins 2012, p. 12), in relation to 
security of payment, particularly in New South Wales.  Whilst security of payment 
problems can be the result of many factors, “security of payment problems can result 
from builders… that become insolvent” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 231). In 2011/12, the 
construction industry accounted for 22.1 percent of insolvencies in all industries while 
“one in every two insolvency events occurs in NSW’ (Collins 2012, p. 50). Due to this 
increase in the number of insolvencies in NSW, the NSW Government commissioned an 
investigation which produced the following report:  The New South Wales 
Government’s Independent Inquiry into Construction Industry Insolvency in 2012 found 
that: 
The Inquiry has absolutely no reason to think that the detailed examination of the 
problem conducted by the Cole Royal Commission does not continue to 
accurately describe the situation at present. The Inquiry has every reason for 
thinking, on the basis of credible evidence given to it that the position revealed 
by the Royal Commission investigators and summarised by the Royal 
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Commissioner in the above quoted passage [on security of payment] is an 
accurate representation of the present position (p. 13). 
Subsequent to the Collins Inquiry into Insolvency in the NSW Construction Industry, 
which considered payment practices affecting subcontractors, the Building and 
Construction Industry Security of Payment Amendment Bill 2013 was introduced in 
New South Wales, and commenced from 21 April 2014. The Amendment Bill 2013 was 
introduced to amend the BCISP Act 1999 for changes to improve payment claims 
procedures as well as to shorten periods for progress payments. The purpose of the bill, 
as explained by the second reading of the Bill in Parliament, “is to introduce reforms that 
will provide greater protection for subcontractors and promote cash flow and 
transparency in the contracting chain” (Building and Construction Industry Security of 
Payment Amendment Bill 2013, p. 1). 
The application of the East Coast model is further fragmented with these and other 
recent changes to security of payment legislation by individual states. This creates 
discrepancies in terms of how security of payment is regulated and administered 
between states and territories within Australia. Given that all states and territories have 
the common objective of facilitating cash flow within the construction contractual chain, 
there have been calls for harmonisation of the security of payment legislation (Coggins, 
Fenwick, & Bell, 2010).  As stated by Coggins et al. (2010): 
Few in the industry would seriously advocate that the present, disjointed 
situation ought to continue; rather, there have been increasing calls – echoing 
those of the Cole Royal Commission (Cole 2003) nearly a decade ago – to forge 
a uniform national approach to security of payment regulation (p. 20). 
In recent years, during 2014-2015, many of the states (NSW, Qld, SA and WA) have 
announced or commenced reviews of their security of payments legislation with some of 
the states adopting strategies or schemes previously recommended in the RC in 2003. 
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For example, NSW Fair Trading announced in December 2014 and made effective from 
May 2015, a retention trust scheme established for projects valued at $20 million or 
more to protect subcontractors’ retention money if a head contractor becomes insolvent 
(Fair Trading 2015). The Queensland Building and Construction Commission (QBCC) 
has implemented, effective from October 2015, a Minimum Financial Requirements 
Policy as a condition of licensing to “minimise the incidence of financial failure in the 
building industry” (2015, p. 4). 
The Queensland [licensing] model presents the only solution to the problem of 
preventing insolvency in the first place. The construction trust is important 
because it operates in a remedial manner after insolvency has begun to cause its 
problems, yet the best defence to the ills, ailments and undesirable consequences 
which gave rise to the establishment of this Inquiry [on insolvency], must be the 
Queensland model. (Collins, 2012, p. 4). 
The inclusion of financial criteria as a condition of licensing is a preventive measure and 
reduces the risk of financial problems arising that are associated with cashflow and 
insolvency, whereas, the adoption of trust funds is a remedial measure and offers 
mechanisms to recover money owed to a subcontractor when a head contractor becomes 
insolvent. Both measures rely on the involvement of accounting to succeed. The role of 
accounting in these strategies and schemes comes into play with reporting and auditing 
requirements. The NSW retention trust scheme imposes, on head contractors, record 
keeping, reporting requirements and annual auditing of trust accounts (Fair Trading 
2015). The Minimum Financial Requirements Policy in Queensland requires reports to 
“be prepared by an Accepted Independent Accountant” (QBCC 2015, p. 16) with the 
statements “prepared with all of the recognition and measurement standards of the 
Australian Accounting and Auditing Standards applied (irrespective of the Company’s 
adopted Accounting Standards)” (QBCC 2015, p. 33). It is important to note that the 
financial statements must be prepared in accordance with Accounting Standards 
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irrespective of the Accounting standards adopted by the company. The QBCC has issued 
a stern warning to accountants to ensure the information provided to the Commission is 
not false or misleading or face a maximum penalty of  two years imprisonment ( 2015, 
pp. 16-17). 
7.3.1.5 Phoenix Companies 
The Federal Treasury issued a report in 2009 (sect 1.1, p.1) which defines phoenix 
activity as “the evasion of tax and other liabilities such as employee entitlements through 
the deliberate, systematic and sometimes cyclic liquidation of related corporate trading 
entities”. Anderson and Haller (2014) explain fraudulent phoenix activity can take two 
forms: 
The first is through successor companies. One company, Oldco, becomes 
insolvent and a new company, Newco, is incorporated to take over the business 
of its failed predecessor. Second, phoenixing can occur within corporate groups, 
where Newco is an existing company within the group, and it takes over the 
business of Oldco, which is an insolvent related company. Treasury’s 2009 
Phoenix Proposals Paper called these ‘basic’ and ‘sophisticated’ phoenix activity 
respectively. In both cases, the aim is to quarantine Oldco’s debts or legal 
obligations, which are unenforceable against Newco or its owners. Both Oldco 
and Newco will have directors, and both companies can employ lawyers and 
accountants who advise on and carry out the necessary transactions (p.474). 
In the case of phoenix companies the primary regulator is ASIC. However, since 
“phoenix activity involves the avoidance of taxes, employee entitlements and other 
debts, there are three primary agencies that can detect and act on suspected phoenix 
activity, the ATO, ASIC and FWO” (PwC 2012, p. 34). Although, it is ASIC who can 
order the wind up a company if it believes the order is in the public interest under Part 
5.4C of the Corporations Act 2001, this was introduced by the Phoenixing Act 2012, 
which was an act to amend the Corporations Act 2001. 
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The RC made a number of recommendations in relation to phoenix companies. The 
“recommendations in this area seek to strengthen government actions to detect and 
eliminate fraudulent phoenix company activity” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 162). These 
recommendations range from recommendation 104 to recommendation 109 (Cole 2003, 
vol. 8, pp. 164-166).  Four out of six recommendations were implemented. The  
recommendations that were implemented  formalised the relationship between agencies, 
amended relevant legislation to permit the exchange of information between relevant 
agencies, commenced a program to identify persons disqualified from managing a 
company, and amended the Corporations Act 2001 for maximum disqualification 
periods of persons from managing corporations for insolvency and non-payment of 
debts. (PwC 2012, pp. 31-32). 
Almost a decade after the RC in 2003, the Phoenix Activity Report requested by the 
FWO found “Feedback from stakeholders indicated that phoenix activity remains a 
significant problem in the building and construction industry” (2012, p. 17). According 
to FWO’s commissioned report on phoenix activity, prepared by PwC in 2012 (p. iii) the 
total impact of phoenixing activity, on employees, businesses and government revenue, 
was estimated to be between $1,784,338,743 to $3,191,142,300 for 2009/10. 
Consequently, a Senate inquiry into insolvency in the construction industry commenced 
on 4 December 2014. The report prepared by the Economics References Committee was 
titled ‘I just Want to Be Paid: Insolvency in the Australian construction industry’, and 
was issued in December 2015 (Australian Parliament House 2015). The TOR of the 
inquiry were to examine the scale, incidences, causes and effects, and impacts of 
insolvency in the construction industry. The TOR were also examining whether the 
current law and regulatory framework is adequate to reduce the level of insolvency in 
the construction industry. The TOR of the Senate also examined the incidence of 
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phoenix companies in the construction industry, aimed at curbing the practice of 
phoenixing (Australian Parliament House 2015). 
Given that most insolvency practitioners have an accountancy background and 
insolvency is the result of poor financial record keeping, it is startling that there are no 
submissions to the Senate inquiry from either the Insolvency Practitioners Association, 
now known as Australian Restructuring Insolvency and Turnaround Association 
(ARITA), or any of the three professional accounting bodies; the Institute of Public 
Accountants (IPA), CPA Australia (CPA) and the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
Australia (ICAA). There may be a range of reasons for no submissions from ARITA, 
IPA, CPA, ICAA, and it would be too simplistic to assume they were not interested in 
phoenixing activity. 
Phoenixing predominantly occurs in the small and medium-sized enterprises sector. Mr 
Greg Tanzer, Commissioner, ASIC stated at the Council of Small Business Australia 
Conference Sydney, 17 July 2015. 
It’s important to note that almost all cases of illegal phoenix activity occur in the 
SME sector. Perpetrators who engage in this activity have a distinct commercial 
advantage over competitors that operate lawfully. With less or no debt, they’re 
then in a position to ‘undercut’ their competitors by offering goods or services at 
lower prices (ASIC 2015, p. 7) 
Anderson and Haller (2014, p. 474) claim accountants “advise on and carry out the 
necessary transactions” in phoenixing companies. Anderson and Haller (2014) argue in 
relation to phoenixing companies: 
Could the directors devise and implement these illicit transactions without the 
help of their legal, insolvency or accounting advisors? This is not to suggest that 
all, or even most, corporate rescues are fraudulent or that the advice behind them 
is improper. But it must be conceded that undoubtedly some are (p.472). 
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It appears the role of accounting in phoenix activity is one of an accessory or 
accomplice. In order to deter phoenix activity, advisors needs to be held responsible for 
their involvement. Anderson and Haller (2014) contemplate: 
whether the more frequent imposition of liability on the advisor as an accessory 
to the directors' breach of duty is needed to educate and deter other advisors from 
becoming involved in the creation of these arrangements that cause such harm to 
the economy (p.472). 
7.3.1.6 Profit Manipulation 
Profit manipulation is regulated by the ASIC under the Corporations Act 2001. The 
Corporations Act 2001 governs reporting and other corporate governance matters under 
Chapter 2M--Financial reports and audit. Section 286 states:  
1)  A company, registered scheme or disclosing entity must keep written 
financial records that: 
(a)  correctly record and explain its transactions and financial 
position and performance; and  
(b)  would enable true and fair financial statements to be prepared 
and audited. 
In particular, section 296 states that the financial report “must comply with the 
accounting standards” and “any further requirements in the regulations” (Corporation 
Act 2001). Furthermore, section 297(a) states “the financial statements and notes for a 
financial year must give a true and fair view of the financial position and performance of 
the company, registered scheme or disclosing entity”. However, under section 292 (1) 
only disclosing entities,  public companies, large proprietary companies and registered 
schemes are required to prepare a financial report and a directors’ report  (Corporation 
Act 2001). Under section 292 (2) of the Corporations Act 2001, small proprietary 
companies are only required to prepare the reports if directed to do so by shareholders/ 
members or ASIC, as stated below:  
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             A small proprietary company has to prepare the financial report and 
directors' report only if: 
                     (a)  it is directed to do so under section 293 or 294; or  
                     (b)  it was controlled by a foreign company for all or part of the year 
and it is not consolidated for that period in financial statements for that year 
lodged with ASIC by:  
                                 (i)  a registered foreign company; or  
                     (ii)  a company, registered scheme or disclosing entity.  
The rest of this Part does not apply to any other small proprietary company.  
Small companies limited by guarantee  
              (3)  Despite subsection (1), a small company limited by guarantee 
has to prepare the financial report and directors' report only if it is directed to do 
so under section 294A or 294B. 
Profit manipulation still exists in the construction industry. A recent example of profit 
manipulation is in a submission prepared by the CFMEU in 2014. The CFMEU 
submission was part of a union campaign against the need for a specialist regulator for 
the construction industry. The CFMEU explained that “the principle that the industry 
required industry specific regulation was first promoted by Justice Cole in his report of 
the Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry” (CFMEU 2014, p. 
52, para. 5.5). The CFMEU blamed the RCR for what they felt was unfair government 
intervention in the construction industry. They disagreed with the RCR’s view that the 
industry was different to others and, therefore, deserved special attention from the 
government. The CFMEU stated that there were “insufficient grounds for treating the 
industry as unique” (CFMEU 2014, p. 56, para. 5.6). The main reason for the CFMEU’s 
objection to industry regulation was concern about the “suggestion by the Prime 
Minister and other ministers, that the ABCC can address criminality in the construction 
industry…the ABCC does not have any powers to deal with criminal activity” (CFMEU 
2014, p. 58, para. 5.12). The CFMEU, therefore, was worried about the focus on 
criminal activity. It tried to show that its concern was for construction companies by 
revealing the impact of investigations on share prices: 
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In late 2012 there was extensive media coverage of a significant misreporting of 
profits and losses on two major AbiGroup Ltd projects, the D2G project in 
Queensland and the Peninsula Link Project in Melbourne. This misreporting 
came to light shortly after an audit of the company’s operations and resulted in 
intervention and ‘internal review’ by the parent company Lend Lease. Several 
Abigroup executives were stood aside. There was an immediate drop in the 
company’s share price and a number of other reports suggested that there might 
be broader compliance and corporate governance issues within the corporate 
group. (CFMEU 2014, p. 2, para. 1.8) 
This story was further corroborated by a newspaper article which claimed: 
Lend Lease management has seized control of Abigroup and has been forced to 
launch an internal investigation and call in its auditors to examine irregularities 
in the financial reporting relating to more than $1.5 billion of projects (Carter 
2012,  para. 1).   
In the article, two of four executives suspended during the internal investigation, were 
identified as holding the senior financial accounting role of chief financial officer (Carter 
2012):  
The company did not name the executives, but they are…the managing director 
of Lend Lease's Australian construction business, … the chief financial officer of 
Lend Lease's infrastructure business, …, Abigroup's managing director, and …, 
Abigroup's chief financial officer (p.1) 
The empirical findings of a recent US study suggest “that CFO’s are likely to become 
involved in material accounting manipulations because they succumb to CEO pressure, 
rather than because they seek immediate financial benefit” (Feng, Ge, Luo & Shevlin 
2011, p. 35). 
However, large construction companies, such as the Abigroup, only account for a very 
small proportion of construction companies. In 2011-2012, “large construction 
businesses (employment range of 200 or more) accounted for 0.1% (or 186) of all 
construction businesses and generated just over a quarter of total construction income 
(27.3% or $83.5b)’’ (ABS 2013). Whereas, “small construction businesses (employment 
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range 0-19) accounted for 97.7% (or 204,949) of all construction businesses and the 
largest share of total income with 49.0% (or $149.8b)” (ABS 2013). Accordingly, efforts 
to regulate the industry should be focussed on small construction businesses. Currently, 
many of these small businesses are able to escape the reporting requirements under the 
Corporations Act 2001. For example, under section 45A, a proprietary company is 
considered small if it can satisfy at least two of the following criteria; if the company has 
less than $25 million in consolidated revenue, less than $12.5 million in consolidated 
gross assets and less than 50 employees (Corporations Act 2001). Many proprietary 
companies in the construction industry are able to satisfy these criteria by holding very 
little in assets and employing less than 50 people whilst still being able to earn 
significant revenue. This is possible through the industry’s ability to subcontract work. 
7.3.1.7 Tax Evasion 
The ATO is the regulator of compliance with tax legislation. The ATO also has the 
“responsibility to implement the Australian Business Number and Australian Business 
Reporting initiatives” (ANAO 2002, para. 4, p. 12). The ATO operates under the Public 
Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 to ensure the use and 
management of public resources. 
The RC made several recommendations in relation to tax evasion. These 
recommendations include: increased funding for compliance activities in the building 
and construction industry (recommendation 124); additional resources to audit, monitor 
and review compliance with the Alienation of Personal Services Income legislation 
(recommendation 125 and 126) The alienation of personal services income rules are 
located in Part 2-42 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997(C’wth) and in Division 13 
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in Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953(C’wth) (TA Act 1953), and took 
effect from 1 July 2000 (Board of Taxation 2009 p.11). 
Further recommendations were: implement an auditing process of ABN’s issued to 
persons participating in the building and construction industry (recommendation 127); 
consider amendment to the ITA Act 1936 in the form of s16LA of the PRT Act 1971 
making all the members of a group jointly and severally liable for the taxation debts of 
other group members (recommendation 130); consider amendment to s222AOB of the 
ITA Act 1936 to remove the right of a director of a phoenix company involved in 
fraudulent activity to avoid the consequences of a Director’s Penalty Notice by placing 
the company into voluntary administration or into liquidation (recommendation 131) 
(Cole 2003, vol. 9, pp. 90-92). 
The tax evasion identified by the RC was sham contracting, untaxed cash payments to 
workers, and non-remitting PAYG withholding tax, and all of these activities “affects 
the public taxation revenue raised from the industry” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 51); 
furthermore, “evasion has a direct impact upon public revenue and therefore the 
community as a whole” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 67).  
Personal Services Income “is most typically earned by contractors, consultants and sole 
practitioners and in 2010–11 the majority (59 per cent) of these worked in administrative 
and support services; professional, scientific and technical services; and the construction 
industries” (ANAO 2013, p. 13, para. 2).  
The Board of Taxation conducted a post-implementation review into the alienation of 
personal services income rules to determine compliance. The Board’s findings (2009) 
were: 
CHAPTER 7: ACCOUNTING AS A LEGIMIZATION PROCESS - A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 501 
There is evidence of a low level of compliance. An unintended consequence of 
the ATO not being seen to be widely monitoring and auditing compliance with 
the alienation of personal services income rules is that it may have contributed to 
complacency among some taxpayers and advisors. 
The Board accepts that monitoring of compliance activity on personal services 
income is made difficult by the absence of information from other sources on the 
taxpayers who should be reporting that they have personal services income (p.7).  
Consequently, the taxable payments reporting system was introduced in 2012 to 
“improve compliance with tax obligations by … contractors” (ATO 2013, p. 15). 
Mandatory annual reporting requirements for certain businesses that make taxable 
payments to contractors in the building and construction industry took effect on 1 July 
2012 (ANAO 2013, para. 10, p. 13). The new taxable payments reporting is aimed at:  
improving compliance with tax obligations by contractors in the building and 
construction industry,  creating a level playing field for businesses and 
improving tax fairness within the industry. Specifically, the system is aimed at 
addressing identified compliance problems in this industry that include: non-
lodgement of tax returns, omission of contract income by contractors in their tax 
returns, non-compliance with GST obligations. The system is expected to 
promote voluntary compliance. Contractors who know their income is being 
reported are more likely to include the income in their tax returns (ATO 2013, p. 
15). 
However, the “ATO has … yet to determine whether its compliance activities are 
effectively mitigating the ongoing alienation of PSI risk” (ANAO 2013, para. 16, p. 18). 
Based on recommendation 127 of the RC, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) 
conducted an audit of the performance of the ATO in relation to the administration of 
ABN registrations in 2002 and a follow up audit into the administration of ABN 
registrations in 2007. Although these audits have examined the ATO’s efficiency in 
administering ABN’s, the audits have not specifically looked at the building and 
construction industry. 
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The “issue of sham contracting was claimed to be exacerbated by the ease with which 
such workers are able to obtain ABNs” (ABCC 2011a, p. 19). Sham contracting is 
defined as an arrangement “where an employer attempts to disguise an employment 
relationship as an independent contracting arrangement” (FWO 2015, p. 2). In relation to 
the government and regulators, sham contracting affects the collection of payroll tax 
from the employer and income tax from the employee. In relation to employers, sham 
contracting is usually undertaken with the aim of avoiding responsibility for employee 
entitlements. In relation to competitors within the economy, sham contracting is 
undertaken to gain a competitive business advantage (ABCC 2011b, p. 12). The 
ABCC’s Inquiry into Sham Contracting Report 2011, revealed sham contracting still 
exists in the construction industry: 
However, the issue of labour hire arrangements was canvassed by the Cole Royal 
Commission.  While Royal Commissioner Cole made a recommendation in this 
regard (to develop a ‘code of conduct’ for labour hire in the building and 
construction industry), the issues that gave rise to his concerns continue to exist 
today (p. 20, para. 1.58) 
Recommendation 130, regarding making all the members of a group jointly and 
severally liable for the taxation debts of other group members, was not implemented. 
The recommendation, to insert section 16LA type provisions into the ITA Act 1936, was 
considered to create “insurmountable difficulties in the administration of the taxation 
system” and consequently not warranted (Australian Government 2003, pp. 93-94).   
Non-remittance of PAYG withholding tax is often the outcome of phoenix activity. In 
2009, in its proposal paper entitled ‘Action against Fraudulent Phoenix Activity’, 
Federal Treasury recommended the director penalty regime “be amended to overcome 
its limitations with respect to the avoidance of PAYG(W) obligations by fraudulent 
phoenix operators” (S4.2.1, p. 12). The Tax Laws Amendment (2012 Measures No. 2) 
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Act 2012 (C’wth) amended the TA  Act 1953 by extending “the director penalty regime 
so that directors are personally responsible for their company’s unpaid superannuation 
guarantee amounts”; making “directors and their associates liable to pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) withholding non-compliance tax in certain circumstances”; and ensuring that 
“directors cannot discharge their director penalties by placing their company into 
administration or liquidation when PAYG withholding or superannuation guarantee 
remains unpaid and unreported three months after the due date” (Treasury 2010-12, p. 7) 
Tax compliance activities in the construction industry as at June 2015 revealed;  
•23% of businesses within the industry are rated as higher risk of not correctly 
meeting their tax obligations, which may be subjecting honest businesses to 
unacceptable levels of unfair competition 
•on average, 23.75% of businesses within the industry fail to lodge their activity 
statements on-time 
•based on community referrals, this industry has the highest level of community 
concern reports about potential tax evasion (ATO 2015, para. 2). 
The role of accountants is conflicting in relation to tax. Clients expect advice from 
accountants on how to avoid or evade tax, yet the role of accountant’s is primarily that 
of “tax enforcer/compliance” (Marshall, Smith & Armstrong 2010, p. 197). “An industry 
exists amongst accountants, tax agents and lawyers dedicated to the promotion of this 
[sham contracting] activity” (Cole 2003, vol. 9, p. 68).  
Although a decade later, the same problem is evident with calls for advisors, such as 
accountants to be targeted for their complicity. Anderson and Haller (2014) state: 
More must be done to target advisors, both from the legal and accounting 
professions…As Jooine demonstrates, the decision in Somerville certainly did 
not discourage the employment lawyers who concocted the sham contracting 
arrangements for their clients. Fraudulent phoenix activity costs the Australian 
economy hundreds of millions of dollars annually and it is fair to say that 
professional advice facilitates a portion of this. How sizeable this is cannot be 
ascertained. Yet any deliberate efforts to circumvent the proper distribution of 
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assets to creditors when a company becomes insolvent must be deterred, and it is 
particularly of concern when those deliberate efforts come from professionals 
who are subject to codes of practice that stress honesty, duty and propriety (p. 
500).  
7.3.2  An Action Plan 
As discussed in section 7.2.2, there are two steps to repairing the construction industry’s 
legitimacy: fix the unlawful behaviours and communicate this to the public. This study 
recommends that the construction industry’s regulators should develop policy to enable 
accountants to help address the unlawful behaviours and communicate this to the public. 
This would help restore public confidence in the industry as well as improve the social 
practice of accounting in the industry. Given much of the unlawful behaviours involved 
financial management, this would help address the industry’s social contract breach.  
At the conclusion of section 7.2.2, it was argued that the construction industry can repair 
its legitimacy by communicating to the pubic six behaviours, for example willingness to 
meet its corporate responsibility to pay tax. 
Section 7.3.1 examined how the lead regulators in each of the seven unlawful behaviours 
could enable accountants to act as internal regulators. The study recommends that the 
key to successful implementation of new policy is authority for the regulators to 
empower accountants in the specific unlawful processes involving accountants. In 
chapter 5, table 5.2 listed these unlawful processes. An action plan for regulators in 
developing new policy should target these specific processes. In terms of priorities, the 
study recommends that new policy be developed in this order of urgency: 
1. Tax evasion 
2. Employee entitlements 
3. Phoenix company activity 
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4. Security of payments 
5. Profit reporting 
6. Inappropriate payments 
7. Payroll tax 
Priorities 1 and 2 fall into quadrant 1 (top right hand corner) of figure 5.3. These two 
activities, tax evasion and employee entitlements, are of highest concern because they 
fall into the social practice most considered normal in the role of accountants. This is 
where the accounting role may be described as objective in the sense that accountants 
are supposed to follow the rules, that is the standards, without adjustment. This is of 
highest concern because unlawful behaviour may, therefore, be hidden. Individuals 
participating in unlawful behaviour associated with tax evasion and failing to pay 
employees their entitlements can feel protected by their accountant. In other words, they 
can blame their accountant if their unlawful behaviour is discovered. This provides a 
natural defence for unlawful behaviour. This is further emphasised by the legislation 
surrounding company directors where directors can avoid punishment by arguing they 
accepted advice or information from a third party qualified to give such advice or 
information. In other words, they can feign ignorance. In this case, the third party is the 
accountant. It is also concerning that the processes associated with unlawful behaviour 
in these two activities are core accounting work. This presents an opportunity to review 
the practice of accounting which is covered next in section 7.4.  
Priority 3 falls into quadrant 2 (bottom right hand corner) of figure 5.3. This activity, 
phoenix company activity, is where the accountant is trying to follow accounting 
standards but is being excluded from the social practice of the activity. In other words, 
the accountant will try to stop the unlawful behaviour if they become aware or involved. 
If this happens, the individuals involved will usually follow the accountant’s advice. The 
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problem with phoenix company activity is that unscrupulous individuals are aware what 
they are doing is wrong and they try to hide it from accountants. There is an opportunity 
to introduce policy which would ensure accountants are involved in this activity. It is the 
next priority because it would deter a major source of illegitimate behaviour within the 
industry.  
Priorities 4 and 5 fall into quadrant 3 (bottom left hand corner) of figure 5.3. These two 
activities, security of payments and profit manipulation, is where the accountant is seen 
as the enemy. In security of payments, the accountant may be seeking or hiding financial 
information from others to establish the company’s financial position. Policy which 
provides accountants with power to obtain this information and penalties for falsifying 
or not providing information is necessary. Profit manipulation involves a range of 
fraudulent activities aimed at misleading others. One of an accountant’s main roles is 
profit reporting. Fraudulent reporting of financial statements must be prosecuted if the 
public is to regain confidence in the construction industry. Accountants need to be given 
the authority to report unlawful behaviour to regulators along with appropriate income 
and witness protection. This is a lower priority because it will be difficult to introduce 
and implement necessary policy changes, so this is seen as a longer term set of actions.  
Priorities 6 and 7 fall into quadrant 4 (top left hand corner) of figure 5.3. These two 
activities, inappropriate payments and payroll tax, is where the accountant is isolated 
from the social practice associated with unlawful behaviour. In these activities, unlawful 
activities may be hidden from the accountant or the accountant is not consulted. Much of 
the processes involved are the core work of accountants. Unscrupulous individuals 
would know that accountants must be involved at some point in the unlawful activity, 
however, the unlawful behaviour is disguised so the accountant is not aware. For 
example, giving a financial gift to a union official in return for industrial peace but 
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disguised as a donation or a purchase of goods and services which were not actually 
delivered. Policy may be introduced to give accountants the authority to question 
disguised payments and other unlawful processes and to enforce appropriate payment 
and payroll tax payments under law. While the word ‘disguised’ suggests such a policy 
may be ineffective because the behaviour is hidden from accountants, the point is that 
enabling accountants to look for hidden inappropriate behaviour would be effective.   
7.3.3  Implementation 
If these policy outcomes are to be successfully implemented, there are three necessary 
steps: 
1. Regulators must be persuaded of the need for change. This must come from the 
Federal Government. Relevant Ministers must be convinced that these policy 
changes will help repair legitimation of the construction industry and that the effort 
is worthwhile.  
2. Income protection. Accountants will need protection. Given their primary motivation 
in engaging in unlawful behaviour was self-interest, more specifically to protect their 
employment and income, the regulators need to ensure there are no negative 
consequences for accountants in changing their role. If they are to be internal 
industry regulators, their employment and career development must be protected. 
Legislation must be introduced, along with appropriate penalties for non-compliance, 
to ensure that accountants are protected. This could emerge in employment 
legislation associated with unfair dismissal and Fair Work Practice.  
3. Stakeholder involvement. The accounting industry, including accounting bodies, 
auditors, and accountants practicing in the construction industry must work together 
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and give full commitment if these policy changes are to be successfully introduced. 
This is discussed in the next section.  
 
7.4 Practical Outcomes 
7.4.1  The Accounting Bodies 
This study’s findings present an opportunity for accounting bodies to take action to 
improve accounting practice within the construction industry. Consideration needs to be 
given to the role the professional accounting bodies can play in helping accountants as 
internal regulators of the construction industry.  
In Australia, there is no single body responsible for regulating the accounting profession. 
The bodies that are involved in the regulation of the profession and the activities in 
which accountants may be engaged, are outlined below: 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC): auditors and 
liquidators – through the Companies Auditors and Liquidators Disciplinary 
Board, Financial planners, Company directors. 
Tax Practitioners Board: Tax practitioners  
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority: Auditors/trustees of superannuation 
funds, Directors and senior managers of insurance companies  
Australian Financial Security Authority: trustees in bankruptcy  
(Institute of Chartered Accountants, Australia and New Zealand 2013). 
In Australia, there is a co-regulatory environment, which is comprised of government 
regulators, government standard-setting bodies, the Accounting Professional and Ethical 
Standards Board and the professional accounting bodies. “Ethics is fundamental to the 
accountability of the profession and its mandate to self-regulate within the broader co-
regulatory regime in Australia” (Institute of Chartered Accountants, Australia and New 
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Zealand 2013). Under the APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants 
Clause 100.1 (Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board Limited 2013),, 
accountants are bound to act in the public interest as outlined below: 
 A distinguishing mark of the accountancy profession is its acceptance of the 
responsibility to act in the public interest. Therefore, a Member’s responsibility 
is not exclusively to satisfy the needs of an individual client or employer. In 
acting in the public interest, a Member shall observe and comply with this Code 
(APES 110, Section 100.1). 
In order to act in the public interest, the principle of objectivity, in particular, must be 
maintained.  The Code of Ethics requires the principle of objectivity to be upheld and 
members to avoid situations where objectivity may be compromised such as the 
following:  
A Member shall not knowingly be associated with reports, returns, 
communications or other information where the Member believes that the 
information: 
(a) Contains a materially false or misleading statement; 
(b) Contains statements or information furnished recklessly; or 
(c) Omits or obscures information required to be included where such omission 
or obscurity would be misleading. (APES 110, Section 110.2) 
The principle of objectivity imposes an obligation on all Members not to 
compromise their professional or business judgement because of bias, conflict of 
interest or the undue influence of others. (APES 110, Section 120.1) 
Threats to the objectivity of the accounting profession would be the greatest in a lawless 
industry, such as the building and construction industry. Generally, an accountant’s 
ability to act objectively and professionally may be threatened as follows;  
Threats may be created by a broad range of relationships and circumstances. 
When a relationship or circumstance creates a threat, such a threat could 
compromise, or could be perceived to compromise, a Member’s compliance with 
the fundamental principles. A circumstance or relationship may create more than 
one threat, and a threat may affect compliance with more than one fundamental 
principle. Threats fall into one or more of the following categories: 
CHAPTER 7: ACCOUNTING AS A LEGIMIZATION PROCESS - A CONCEPTUAL MODEL 510 
(a) Self-interest threat ─ the threat that a financial or other interest will 
inappropriately influence the Member’s judgement or behaviour; 
(b) Self-review threat ─ the threat that a Member will not appropriately evaluate 
the results of a previous judgement made or service performed by the Member, 
or by another individual within the Member’s Firm or employing organisation, 
on which the Member will rely when forming a judgement as part of providing a 
current service; 
(c) Advocacy threat ─ the threat that a Member will promote a client’s or 
employer’s position to the point that the Member’s objectivity is compromised; 
(d) Familiarity threat ─ the threat that due to a long or close relationship with a 
client or employer, a Member will be too sympathetic to their interests or too 
accepting of their work; and 
(e) Intimidation threat ─ the threat that a Member will be deterred from acting 
objectively because of actual or perceived pressures, including attempts to 
exercise undue influence over the Member (APES 110, Section 100.12). 
Given the economic and financial pressures faced by the building and construction 
industry, there were cases exposed by the RC, previously mentioned, where accountants 
were placed under pressure to process certain transactions. Whilst these accountants 
were able to withstand the pressure, there are likely to be those who are unable to do so. 
In these cases, there needs to be a form of recourse. However, the principle of 
confidentiality requires members of the accounting profession to refrain from disclosing 
confidential information unless required to by law or there is a professional duty or right 
to disclose confidential information as outlined below: 
The principle of confidentiality imposes an obligation on all Members to refrain 
from: 
(a) Disclosing outside the Firm or employing organisation confidential 
information acquired as a result of professional and business relationships 
without proper and specific authority or unless there is a legal or professional 
right or duty to disclose; (APES 110, Section 140.1) 
The following are circumstances where Members are or may be required to 
disclose confidential information or when such disclosure may be appropriate: 
(a) Disclosure is permitted by law and is authorised by the client or the employer; 
(b) Disclosure is required by law, for example: 
(i) Production of documents or other provision of evidence in the course of legal 
proceedings; or 
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(ii) Disclosure to the appropriate public authorities of infringements of the law 
that come to light; and 
c) There is a professional duty or right to disclose, when not prohibited by law: 
(i) To comply with the quality review of a member body or professional body; 
(ii) To respond to an inquiry or investigation by a member body or regulatory 
body; 
(iii) To protect the professional interests of a Member in legal proceedings; or 
(iv) To comply with technical standards and ethics requirements. (APES 110, 
Section 140.7) 
In the late 1990s the procedures known as the Corporate Law Economic Reform 
Program (CLERP) placed accounting standards as a major agenda item (Treasury 1998). 
Whilst Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 9 (CLERP 9) and section 1317AA of 
the Corporations Act 2001 provide protection to the ‘discloser’, the Code of Ethics 
cautions members. Apparently, the “circumstances described in paragraph 140.7 do not 
take into account Australian legal and regulatory requirements”. “A Member considering 
disclosing confidential information about a client or employer without their consent is 
strongly advised to first obtain legal advice” (APES 110, Section AUST140.7.1). Apart 
from any possible legal implications, an accountant needs to consider the social 
ramifications of being a “whistle-blower” or “dobber”. 
7.4.2  The Accounting Standards 
This study’s findings present an opportunity for the accounting standards associated with 
the construction industry’s unlawful activities to be reviewed and perhaps changed. 
There may even be an opportunity to introduce a set of industry-specific standards for 
the construction industry.  
A major finding of this study has been the identification of unlawful processes involving 
accountants (see table 5.2 in chapter 5). This creates a roadmap for revision of 
accounting standards. It lists the accounting practice which might be reviewed with new 
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standards. The study found that accounting is a subjective rather than an objective 
process. This means that accountants use their judgment, intuition, and experience, as 
well as their organisational context, to interpret and apply the accounting standards when 
doing their work. This means accountants have a degree of flexibility in doing their 
work. The study has found that accountants do not, and perhaps cannot, always follow 
the standards objectively. However, the study also found that accountants were involved 
in unlawful activities in the construction industry. This suggests that accountants had too 
much flexibility in the way they did their work in the construction industry. There was 
too much creative accounting. The result was a loss of control and adherence to the 
principles of good financial management which is the role of accountants. Rather than 
make accounting completely objective, the study argues that it be made ‘less subjective’ 
if accounting is to help the construction industry repair legitimation. This may be done 
by reviewing and revising relevant accounting standards.  
Accounting standards such as reduced accounting disclosure requirements should not 
apply to construction companies, given its fragmented industry structure. The 
construction industry needs to repair its legitimacy and disclosures complying with 
accounting standards would contribute towards legitimation. Given the lawlessness of 
the construction industry, construction entities have public accountability and should not 
have the option to elect to comply with some or all of the excluded reporting 
requirements of AASB 111, Construction Contracts, paragraph Aus. 1.8 under the 
reduced disclosure requirements relating to Tier 2 of AASB 1053, Application of Tiers 
of Australian Accounting Standards, paragraph 13(a). However, this would put an 
intolerable cost burden on all of the 200,000 plus small businesses in this industry. 
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The definition of public accountability in AASB 1053 is different but perhaps should 
include the construction industry because of its unlawful behaviour. The standard 
defines public accountability as;   
Public accountability means accountability to those existing and potential 
resource providers and others external to the entity who make economic 
decisions but are not in a position to demand reports tailored to meet their 
particular information needs. 
A for-profit private sector entity has public accountability if: 
(a) its debt or equity instruments are traded in a public market or it is in the 
process of issuing such instruments for trading in a public market (a domestic or 
foreign stock exchange or an over-the-counter market, including local and 
regional markets); or 
(b) it holds assets in a fiduciary capacity for a broad group of outsiders as one of 
its primary businesses. This is typically the case for banks, credit unions, 
insurance companies, securities brokers/dealers, mutual funds and investment 
banks (2010, p.12) 
The option for this exists in AASB 1053 whereby it is stated: 
Whilst Tier 2 requirements would be available to all not-for-profit private sector 
entities and most public sector entities, regulators might exercise a power to 
require the application of Tier 1 requirements by the entities they regulate (2010, 
p. 5 and para. 15, p. 9 – slightly more detailed) 
Except for the presentation of a third statement of financial position under Tier 1, the 
presentation requirements under Tier 1 and Tier 2 are the same (2010, para. 9).  
The Corporations Act 2001’s definition of a Disclosing Entity would exclude most of 
the small participant in the construction industry. However, this allows small business to 
avoid the accountability of disclosure in their financial reporting. This means that the 
majority of firms in the construction industry (that is, small businesses) can avoid public 
accountability typically provided by accounting disclosures. This is the subject of recent 
debates on the definition of a reporting entity being considered by AASB Exposure 
Draft ED 264 Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting 2015.  The construction 
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industry provides an accounting in practice example to support some of the proposed 
changes to the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) Conceptual Framework 
for Financial Reporting 2010. The construction industry example particularly supports 
the comments made by the University of Melbourne Comments letter November 2015 
on the definition of a reporting entity. 
There have been considerable debates in Australia as to which entities should 
report. This question has come to the fore in the area of differential reporting and 
in the extension of accounting standards into the public and not-for-profit sectors. 
The IASB has so far only considered the borders of the reporting entity and not 
when one should exist. This is left to local jurisdictions to consider, except that 
the dividing line drawn between IFRS and SME accounting has effectively 
deemed publicly listed entities to be reporting entities. However, there is no 
exploration of whether very small entities should account on the same basis as 
SMEs. Conceptually, the IASB must have some implicit idea when an entity 
should be a reporting entity. We would have expected that when there is a range 
of users dependent upon general purpose financial reports to make decisions 
about allocating scarce resources that the entity should be, prima facie, a 
reporting entity (Pinnuck 2015, para. 11). 
Accounting disclosure requirements for the construction industry should be increased 
considering much of the industry’s unlawful behaviour occurred due to poor or 
inappropriate financial management. The construction industry had the second highest 
number of insolvency reports lodged with ASIC, with financial record keeping identified 
as the highest cause. In 2013–14, of the three industries with the highest number of 
reports lodged, construction came second with “2,153 reports or 22.8% of reports: see 
Table 9” (ASIC 2014, p. 17, para. 34). One of the top three causes of failure were 
inadequate cash flow or high cash use with construction amounting to “46.4% of 
reports” (ASIC 2014, p. 19, para. 38a). Further evidence of inappropriate behaviour was 
indicated by these ASIC findings: the construction industry scored the highest (78 out of 
247) for possible pre-appointment criminal misconduct for Sections 286 and 344(2), and 
also obligation to keep financial records of the Corporations Act  2001(1 July 2013 to 30 
June 2014): see table 20 (ASIC 2014, p. 17, para. 34). 
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7.4.3 A Conceptual Framework Approach to Legitimation or Regulation 
The regulation effected by the RC was fundamentally focused on unlawful industrial 
action and workplace rights. Commissioner Cole was appointed to conduct the RC, 
excluding the domestic housing sector, by Letter Patent on 29th August 2001 to 
investigate: 
a. the nature, extent and effect of any unlawful or otherwise inappropriate 
industrial or workplace practice or conduct, including, but not limited to: 
(emphasis added) i. any practice or conduct relating to the Workplace Relations 
Act 1996, occupational health and safety laws, or other laws relating to 
workplace relations; and  
ii. fraud, corruption, collusion or anti-competitive behaviour, coercion, 
violence, or inappropriate payments, receipts or benefits; and  
iii. dictating, limiting or interfering with decisions whether or not to employ or 
engage persons, or relating to the terms on which they be employed or 
engaged;  
b. the nature, extent and effect of any unlawful or otherwise inappropriate 
practice or conduct relating to:  
i. failure to disclose or properly account for financial transactions undertaken 
by employee or employer organisations or their representatives or associates; 
or  
ii. inappropriate management, use or operation of industry funds for training, 
long service leave, redundancy or superannuation;  
c. taking into account your findings in relation to the matters referred to in the 
preceding paragraphs and other relevant matters, any measures, including 
legislative and administrative changes, to improve practices or conduct in the 
building and construction industry or to deter unlawful or inappropriate practices 
or conduct in relation to that industry (Commonwealth of Australia 2001) 
No specific regulation was put in place to overcome, the TOR Part b. i., failure to 
disclose or properly account for financial transactions (Commonwealth of Australia 
2001). 
Most regulation to date has been externally driven and reactive. Consequently, cultural 
change has not been effected and regulation has been haphazard with the involvement of 
a number of regulators. Whilst there is clearly a need for regulation, an alternative, more 
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proactive approach, would be internal regulation. Both forms of regulation need to be 
considered, particularly in light of effecting cultural change. Internal regulation may be a 
way of transforming the culture of the construction industry, from one of lawlessness to 
one of more law abiding.  
7.4.3.1 External regulation 
External regulation is predominately conducted by ASIC through the Corporations Act 
2001 by classifying companies as public companies or proprietary companies. 
Proprietary companies are further classified as large proprietary company or small 
proprietary company on the basis of satisfying two of the following three criteria; 
consolidated revenue for the financial year of $12.5M or less, gross assets of $12.5 
million or less, and 50 employees or less at the end of the financial year (S45A).  
However, the compliance requirements for proprietary companies are less stringent than 
for public companies yet proprietary companies account for 98.87% of all registered 
companies (Governance Institute of Australia 2012). Breaches of regulation are typically 
uncovered when a company collapses and external administrators are appointed. This is 
illustrated by the following example; 
During the life of a small, private, unaudited Australian company, breaches of 
company law by its directors usually go unnoticed by the regulator because 
nobody other than the offenders (the directors) and perhaps one or two 
employees are aware that offences have occurred. Moreover, there are often no 
immediate victims, so there is not likely to be a complaint as long as the 
company continues to pay its suppliers, employees and taxes. 
However, when a company collapses and an external administrator is appointed, 
a supplementary branch of law enforcement comes into existence. The external 
administrator is required by the Act to make a formal report to ASIC about any 
alleged offences by a past or present director or other officer of the company that 
they detect. This requirement to report is not confined to offences under 
company law but relates to suspected violations under a law of the 
Commonwealth or a state or territory in relation to the company (ASIC 2008b). 
Where the suspected crime is not within ASIC’s province—for example, 
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restrictive trade practices or recklessly polluting the environment—the matter is 
referred to the appropriate regulatory authority. 
External administrators, especially liquidators, are ideally positioned to uncover 
offences. They have the right to examine all the company’s records, the right to 
question directors and employees, and the right to examine the directors and 
others under oath in court. They may also apply to a court for arrest warrants and 
for search and seizure warrants (Keenan 2013, pp. 2-3). 
Alternatively, financial reporting and accounting should be made a requirement for all of 
the construction industry, including small proprietary companies which account for a 
large proportion of the industry. In 2011-12, small construction businesses (employment 
range 0-19) accounted for 97.7% (204,949) of all construction businesses and the largest 
share of total income with 49.0% (or $149.8b) (ABS, 2013). While there is a need to  
recommended that section 292 of the Corporations Act 2001 be expanded to include 
financial reporting by all proprietary companies in the construction industry, the cost 
burden of such a recommendation on all the small businesses would need to be 
considered. 
The construction industry, an industry renowned for lawlessness, has been permitted to 
self-regulate in terms of accounting. There is a need to eliminate self-regulation in a 
lawless industry. As Gaffikin (2005a, p.17) said there needs to be regulation to act as a 
deterrent. There clearly needs to be regulation of the building and construction industry. 
Enforcement is often a criticism of self-regulation (Gaffikin 2005a, p. 17). Although, 
professional accounting bodies have disciplinary committees designed to enforce the 
relevant regulations, their effectiveness is questionable. This is due to the fact the 
effectiveness of the process is undermined by power and politics. Gaffikin (2005a, p. 17) 
proffers the following example, “would the accounting bodies have taken action against 
a major accounting firm if there was evidence of some of its member acting 
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inappropriately? Some suggest had they done so there may have been fewer corporate 
scandals”. 
7.4.3.2. Internal regulation 
Self-regulation is a defence against the Federal government enforcing regulation on 
accounting practitioners (Gaffikin 2008, p. 97). Self-regulation is seen as necessary to 
maintain the integrity of the profession of accounting, “as the capacity to effectively 
self-regulate is viewed as one of the hallmarks of a profession” (Gaffikin 2008, p. 97). In 
other words, if accounting is to command respect it needs to self-regulate.  
Regulation of a profession, such as accounting, needs a significant event to trigger 
societal interest and develop pressure on the profession. Gaffikin (2008) describes how 
the Great Economic Depression of the 1930s created the impetus for reform of the 
accounting profession. It was felt that accountants tended to try to satisfy management 
rather than portray economic reality. The Depression led to calls for accountants to 
produce financial information people rely on, and for uniformity of practice by 
practitioners (Gaffikin 2008, p. 96). The focus shifted from satisfying internal users of 
financial reports, that is management, towards external users, for example, investors. 
The desire for uniformity came from the need for investors to compare financial 
performance of different companies. Gaffikin (2008) explains the evolution of the 
regulation of accounting from that time, including the establishment of various 
accounting bodies and attempts to reconcile differences globally.  
Gaffikin (2008, p. 101) explains how the very early approach to accounting standards 
began in Australia in 1946 with the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia 
(ICAA), however, they had “little impact on accounting practice and a high degree of 
non-compliance”. He discusses the evolution of accounting standards and the various 
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bodies responsible. The problem with accounting standards has always been their 
enforcement (Gaffikin 2008,  p. 103). Gaffikin (2008 p. 103) suggests that the 
introduction of legal enforcement ‘put an end to the accounting profession’s self-
regulation’. In its place, accounting became part of effective corporate governance. Self-
regulation has been replaced by statutory regulation. However, Gaffikin (2008) sees this 
as a positive move because it recognises that accounting is an important part of the 
nation’s economic framework. However, this has resulted in still further problems with 
the regulation of accounting, as now even regulations are subject to official 
interpretations (Gaffikin 2008).  
Clearly, there is a need for improved regulation in the construction industry, which is 
due to both the public interest and institutional practices of the construction industry 
(Gaffikin 2005). Regulatory practices since the RC (2003) have not been successful with 
continued unlawful behaviour. Gaffikin (2008, p. 113) describes accounting regulation 
as a “very unsatisfactory story”. Gaffikin’s (2008) solution is a theoretical framework. In 
an ideal world, argues Gaffikin (2008), theories would exist to explain and lead practice. 
Theories, in this sense, would represent shared mental models of best practice which 
accountants everywhere would embrace because it simply makes sense to do things this 
way. However, as Gaffikin (2008) concludes with some despair, “there is no acceptable 
theory of accounting”. Other forms of regulation need to be examined.  
This study also recommends internal regulation for the building and construction 
industry more broadly. The solution is to internally regulate via improved social 
practice. Accounting as a social discipline is the ideal regulator (Hopwood & Miller 
1994). This means that agreement on appropriate behaviours in social practice is a way 
forward. In practice, this means making accountants aware of their roles in social 
networks when practicing accounting; who they will be interacting with; the dangers of 
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high intensity, harmony and cohesion in unlawful activities; the use of power and 
politics to coerce them to engage in inappropriate behaviours; how stakeholders perceive 
their purpose, that is, their differing social contracts, and the expectations of society; and 
how to draw a line between creative accounting and inappropriate or unlawful activity. 
The identification of the unlawful activities and the social practice associated with 
accountants’ work in these activities would lead to an awareness campaign for 
accountants. External regulators would need to work with accountants to give them a 
mechanism to report inappropriate behaviours, as well as the power to address them and 
the protection of job security and no career damage. Internal regulation of the building 
and construction industry by the accounting profession must be led by practising 
accountants who develop a shared mental model of appropriate social practice and 
professional safety to operate within the social networks where they may be vulnerable 
to pressure by stakeholders.  
A problem for the construction industry is caused by the size of its companies. While 
large companies such as head contractors will have internal accountants, the majority of 
companies are small and would not employ an internal accountant. This presents several 
problems in terms of regulation. Small companies may defend themselves against poor 
financial management or even inappropriate or unlawful behaviour by way of ignorance, 
that is, honest mistakes or errors of judgment because they could not afford to pay an 
accountant. This study recommends reform of the construction industry by mandating 
the use of accountants for companies of every size. While small companies do not have 
sufficient revenues to be able to afford a full-time internal accountant, they must be 
required to engage the services of an external accountant and be required to produce 
regular financial reports that comply with the accounting standards. The economic 
consequences of this change to public accountability and financial disclosures would be 
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significant. This initiative would add a cost to companies already under financial 
pressure. It is likely that the increased cost would be passed onto customers in the form 
of increased process. However, it is possible that the benefits to society in addressing 
many of the issues found in the construction industry’s social contract breach would 
outweigh the costs. To offset the increased costs for small business, the study 
recommends that the cost of employing an accountant, whether internal or external, be 
rewarded with substantial tax offsets to encourage small companies to comply with this 
mandate and to follow the advice of the accountant. Only if all companies, large and 
small, use accountants can the industry successfully self-regulate and effect cultural 
change. It is acknowledge that this is an aspirational goal and would be very difficult to 
implement in practice. For example, the majority of small construction firms could not 
afford to employ a full-time accountant. However, they could be required to use an 
accountant to comply with public accountability requirements, which would require 
employing an accountant on a casual basis similar to doing tax returns. It is also 
important to recognise that using an accountant is only a step in the reform necessary to 
address the construction industry’s unlawful behaviour. Industry self-regulation requires 
a complex set of inter-related interventions. This is discussed further in the next section.  
7.4.3.3 A Framework  
There has not been the structural and cultural reform in the construction industry which 
Commissioner Cole indicated was an urgent need. Cultural reform is changing the way 
business is done. Social transformation is yet to occur in this industry. This is in part due 
to not only the fragmented structure of the industry but also the patchwork legislation in 
addressing the lawlessness of the construction industry. A new approach is needed.  
While the recommendations from Gyles and Cole did become legislation, 
perhaps the real underlying issue that should be addressed is why the building 
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and construction industry operates the way it does. Neither of those Royal 
Commissions produced a vision of a different industry, apart from a law abiding 
one, and made no recommendations on the direction that strategic development 
of the industry might take (de Valence 2014). 
As Zimmermann (2007, p. 31) concludes ‘the realization of the rule of law is as much a 
cultural achievement as it is a legal-institutional one’. 
There are multiple social systems within the construction industry (see chapters 5 and 6). 
Practical solutions to structural and cultural reform must embrace a systems thinking 
approach. This study recommends a construction industry community of action research 
be established to implement the policy and practical outcomes outlined in this chapter. 
“A community of action research embeds change-oriented projects within a larger 
community of practitioners, consultants and researchers, to produce knowledge that is 
useful to people in their everyday lives” (Senge & Scharmer, 2001, p. 238).  
 
7.5 Theoretical Outcomes 
The study contributes to CAT by explaining how accounting practice was influenced by 
stakeholder interests, that is, the construction industry’s political economy. CAT aims to 
develop a more self-reflexive and contextualized perspective on accounting which sees 
the connections between society, history, organisations, accounting theory, and 
accounting practice (Lodh & Gaffikin 2005, p. 156). The study examines the role of 
sectional interests, in this case construction industry stakeholders, in accounting practice. 
Figure 1.1 illustrated the study’s theoretical approach and how it contributes to CAT. 
PET (Gray, Owen & Adams 1996, p. 47) provides the social, political and economic 
framework for this thesis. This theory explicates that the strategic outcomes of 
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accounting practices favour specific interests in society and disadvantage others (Cooper 
& Sherer 1984, p. 208). The study explains how socio-political power inequities 
amongst construction industry stakeholders created conditions leading to unlawful 
behavior. PIT explains how regulation is introduced to protect the public and that 
regulators seek to maximize the overall welfare of the community. This study explores 
how regulation of the construction industry failed. PIT assumes that the regulator, which 
is usually the government, is a neutral arbiter of the public interest and does not let its 
self-interest impact on the regulatory process. The study’s contribution to PIT is to 
examine the reasons why regulation of the construction industry was so difficult and to 
suggest how this may be improved. A key finding is the need to empower stakeholders 
with the capacity to self-regulate, including accountants. More specifically, the study 
contributes to the PET of regulation. The study advances our understanding of 
accounting regulation by going beyond the purely economic perspective of the neo-
classical approaches, to reflect the broader cultural and societal values at the time of the 
RC (2001-2003). It also frames guidelines for industry reform (chapter 7) around 
regulatory strategies and, in doing so, advances the importance of the role of accounting 
in legitimising an industry with a long history of unlawfulness.  
The study contributed to LT by defining the nature of the social contract breach between 
the construction industry and Australian society, and strategies to repair legitimacy. 
Legitimation is the process that leads to legitimacy (Deegan 2005; Lindblom 1994). The 
only real difference between gaining and repairing legitimacy is that gaining is a 
proactive approach and repairing is a reactive approach. Repairing involves responding 
to a crisis. The RC definitely created a crisis for the construction industry. The study 
explains what happens if an industry is unwilling to accept the regulator’s demand to 
repair legitimacy. The analysis in the period following the RC, post 2003, shows that the 
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construction industry continued unlawful behaviour despite being told it had breached its 
social contract. This poses questions about the social reality of LT and whether it applies 
in all industry contexts.  
The contribution to LT was to identify factors creating a situation where some 
stakeholders’ socio-political power exceeds the public interest, that is, the power of the 
regulator, meaning the industry ignores the need to repair legitimacy. The tables in 
chapters 3 and 4 illustrate the factors which create this situation where legitimacy is 
ignored by industry stakeholders. More specifically, the socio-political themes in table 
4.2 highlight the power of the unions and a culture of intimidation and conflict 
characterised by self-interest, rivalry and jealousy. There is a sense of succeeding at the 
expense of others and a lack of empathy. This helps explain why the public interest was 
ignored. Table 4.5 provides insight into stakeholders’ motivations and behaviours. LT’s 
pragmatic construct explains that the politics in stakeholder relationships were defined 
by greed, exploitation, and stand-over tactics; while the moralistic construct was 
characterised by being irresponsible or powerless. 
The study contributed to ST from the managerial perspective by exploring how the 
constructs of relationships, impact and expectations help us understand the social 
practice of accounting within the context of a social contract breach. At a broad level, 
the study’s contribution to ST, therefore, is to explain why industry practices favour 
specific interests in society and disadvantage others (Cooper & Sherer 1984, p. 208). 
This helps understand the social praxis underlying the behaviour leading to the 
construction industry’s legitimacy gap explained by the differing interests of the social 
actors, that is, stakeholders. This broad contribution lies in the empirical evidence of the 
socio-political power inequities defining the social interaction between industry 
stakeholders which have breached their social contract. The ST constructs of 
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relationships, impact and expectations explain why unlawful behavior emerged in this 
industry.  
The study makes several specific contributions to ST. First, it uses the theory of SNA 
construct of density to explain the social network interaction of stakeholders, 
contributing to our understanding of relationships. Figure 5.1 summarises the roles 
identified for stakeholders from this analysis. Second, it uses the SNA construct of 
heterogeneity and homogeneity to examine behaviour between these stakeholder groups, 
with a particular focus on their harmony and cohesion, contributing to our understanding 
of ST’s ethical perspective. Whereas, previous research argues that cohesion is a positive 
social practice, this study’s findings show that it can be a negative factor, particularly if 
the rest of the network is behaving unlawfully. In these circumstances, traditional 
measures of cohesion such as democracy are actually unfavourable because it reveals 
that accountants, in this case, are agreeing with the unlawful behaviour of the others 
within their social network. Therefore, the finding that three quarters of the accountants’ 
social networks are democratic is actually a negative result. It suggests that accountants 
did agree with unlawful behaviour in the following activities: tax evasion, employee 
entitlements, payroll tax, and inappropriate payments. Unlawful behaviour in these 
activities could not have occurred without accountants’ participation and, the findings 
suggest, without their agreement. Table 5.2 explains accountants’ social behavior using 
the SNA constructs of interaction, harmony and cohesion leading to 15 scenarios. The 
study developed a conceptual framework explaining four types of roles for accountants: 
trust, police, isolated, and hostile (see figure 5.2). 
Third, the study makes a further important contribution to ST by using types and causes 
of power to explain political behaviour contributing to our understanding of the 
construct, impact. It identified coercive, reward and expert power. Fourth, the study 
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identified four societal expectations to explain the social contract breach contributing to 
our understanding of the construct, expectation. It identified accountants’ differing social 
contracts with industry stakeholders.  
In summary, the study’s theoretical contribution to the aims of critical accounting 
research is by advancing our understanding of the social practice of accounting. Figure 
1.1 shows that the bridge is PIT, which connects critical accounting to LT and ST. The 
societal contract breach, which is defined by LT, identifies the opportunity for 
accounting to improve society, and ST enables us to understand why the legitimacy gap 
exists and how accountants might help close the gap. More specifically the use of power 
and language by stakeholders to influence the role of accounting. An appreciation of 
language is vital to understanding the practice and theory of accounting (Gaffikin 2008, 
p. 234). The study has used CDA and CA to explore the use of language in the research 
data analysed by this thesis, for example the RCR and associated documents. This was 
applied explicitly in chapter 4 and implicitly in chapters 5 and 6. In chapter 4 it was used 
to illustrate how these methods could explain the socio-political inequities between 
stakeholders in the construction industry, and also the behaviours which had become 
cultural norms. In the later chapters, the methods were used implicitly to ensure the 
analysis flowed like an historical narrative and was not too mechanical.   
Figure 7.3 summarises the study’s theoretical outcomes: 
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Figure 10 - 7.3: Theoretical Outcomes 
Figure 7.3 presents three areas of outcome. First, the left hand side of the figure looks at 
the study’s contribution to PIT. It highlights the importance of establishing the 
significance of the industry in maintain legitimacy, the need to clarify and communicate 
the social contract, understanding the nature of the social contract breach and its causes, 
and how those breaching the contract perceive themselves and the need for significant 
consequences if legitimacy repair is to be achieved. Second, the middle part of the figure 
explains how to define social practice. It measures interaction also showing how some 
constructs can actually have a negative impact if there is an unlawful culture, it develops 
fifteen scenarios of social practice and evidence that accounting is subjective practice, 
and these are combined into four types of social practice. Impact is measured in terms of 
type of power and source of power. Expectations are measured in terms of three 
summary concepts. The right hand side of the figure presents suggestions on how to 
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address social contract breach focusing on the role of accountants. It looks at creative 
accounting and inappropriate behaviours and how to address these by looking at 
motives, social practice, and accountability. It proposes policy outcomes in terms of the 
role of lead regulators in the seven unlawful activities, motivation for these regulators 
and protection for those willing to fight the unlawful behaviours. Finally, it looks at 
practical outcomes in terms of the role of accounting bodies in regulating accounting 
behaviours and the possibility of using accountants to regulate the industry.  
Gaffikin quotes Aristotle who said “practice proceeds from theory” (Gaffikin 2008, p. 
239). “There are many significant societal problems in which accounting needs to play a 
role” (Gaffikin 2008, p. 239). The unlawful behaviours by the construction industry in 
this study provided an opportunity to address a criticism of ST by critical accounting 
researchers regarding lack of empirical evidence about its application. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
The chapter developed a preliminary conceptual model on the role of accounting as a 
legitimisation process, based on the findings presented in this study. There were four 
groups of findings: first, the role of accounting, second, policy outcomes, third, practical 
outcomes, and fourth, theoretical outcomes.  
In the first group of findings, several questions were explored. Why do accountants act 
subjectively rather than objectively when doing their work? By subjectively, it is meant 
that accountants have scope to act independently of the accounting standards; that is, to 
use their own judgment, intuition, experience, or organisational context to adapt the 
standards. By objectively, it is meant that accountants always follow the standards. This 
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study has shown that accountants in the construction industry acted subjectively. They 
did this because accounting allows scope for what is called creative accounting. Why did 
accountants in the construction industry become involved in activities they should have 
known were unlawful? This was explained in chapter 6 by the pressure placed on 
accountants by other stakeholders (see the section 6.2 on Impact). Despite this, 
accountants still have free will and choice about how they behave. To understand this 
behaviour, accountants’ motivation was explored. Accountants’ interaction with 
construction industry stakeholders was personal and impersonal. It was personal in the 
sense that accountants interacted socially with others in doing their work and in helping 
others find meaning and interpretation in their work outputs, that is, their reports. On the 
other hand, interaction was impersonal in the sense that the work produced by 
accountants would have been read and interpreted by others without any personal 
contact with the accounting staff who produced the report. This different interaction is 
explained by the type of work output, internal versus external, and the type of decision.  
In the second group of findings, the study provides regulators with information about the 
social practice of accounting which might be used to improve regulation of the industry. 
This could be done by empowering accountants to act as internal regulators. Given much 
of the industry’s unlawful behaviour occurs due to poor or inappropriate financial 
management, improved accounting practice in the industry could help restore public 
confidence and repair legitimation. Policy improvements could be led by the lead 
regulator within each unlawful activity (see section 7.3.1). The chapter examined 
financial management regulation, and the role accountants could play. 
The third group of findings suggest practical outcomes in terms of opportunity for 
accounting bodies to take action to improve accounting practice within the construction 
industry, addressing accounting standards, and a knowledge translation framework. 
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There are multiple social systems within the construction industry (see chapters 5 and 6). 
Practical solutions to structural and cultural reform must embrace a systems approach. 
This study recommends a community of action research be established for the 
construction industry to implement the policy and practical outcomes outlined in this 
chapter.  
Finally, the fourth group of findings presents the theoretical outcomes. The study 
contributes to CAT by advancing our understanding of organisational power and 
politics, and its impact on the role of accounting. Critical study of accounting aims to 
comprehend the social contexts within which accounting issues exist. This approach 
examines how accounting may serve a useful social purpose and how its practice may be 
continually improved. The study explores the role of accounting in legitimising an 
industry characterized by unlawful behaviour. The findings show that accountants were 
placed under considerable pressure by other industry stakeholders to become involved in 
seven unlawful behaviours. The study provides evidence that accounting is a subjective 
rather than objective practice. It concludes with recommendations about how accounting 
practice may be improved to repair legitimisation in an industry that appears to ignore 
public interest.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a conclusion to the thesis and proceeds as follows. Section 8.2 
presents a summary of the chapters, outlining the historical narrative of the construction 
industry focusing on the period of the RC (2001-2003), and the role of accountants in 
the unlawful activities identified by Commissioner Cole. Section 8.3 revisits the research 
questions (initially proposed in section 2.4) and summarises the response to those 
questions. Sections 8.4, 8.5, and 8.6 discuss potential contributions in terms of theory, 
methodology, and substantive practice. Section 8.7 identifies limitations to the study. 
Section 8.8 suggests areas for future research, and section 8.9 offers concluding 
comments.  
 
8.2 Summary of Chapters 
Chapter 1 presented the foundation for this study. The research background indicated 
that the current study is important and useful. The primary objective of this study was to 
examine the underlying conflict between a lawless culture and accounting practices 
within the context of the construction industry. It provided an opportunity to test 
accounting’s role as a legitimising process, within the context of the CAT debate of 
whether accounting practice is objective or subjective. At the beginning of the thesis, it 
was proposed that accounting may have stood above the unlawful behaviour that was 
associated with many aspects of this industry’s activities, or it may have succumbed to 
stakeholder pressures. It set the scene for the exploration of the role of accounting within 
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this complex industry at a period of time, the 2003 RC, where its lawlessness had 
become such that society recognised its social contract was breached, and told the 
industry it would no longer be tolerated.  
Chapter 2 explained that the research is an historical narrative of the construction 
industry in the period 2003-2011, with a primary focus on the period surrounding the RC 
into the industry and its immediate aftermath (2003-2005). The data collection, analysis, 
and reporting uses CA and CDA. The study focused mainly on the text contained in (a) 
the RC (Cole 2003) and (b) the BIT Reports (2004, 2005); along with other publicly 
available information on the industry and its behaviour. CDA was used to examine the 
societal and political themes emerging from the CA coding categories. The outcomes of 
the CDA were examined from a critical accounting perspective, with a particular 
emphasis on PIT, and ST and LT. The chapter discussed the ‘what’, ‘why’, and ‘how’ of 
the study. It defined the ‘what’ as the construction industry, with a particular emphasis 
on the industry’s private and public stakeholders. The ‘why’ explained that the industry 
is socially and economically important to Australia and its conduct is in the public 
interest. The ‘how’ outlined the methodology and the theoretical framework used to 
examine accounting’s role in legitimising this industry. The methodology is an historical 
narrative embedded case study which uses CA and CDA to find meaning in the RCR. 
The social reconstruction of the industry and its stakeholders mainly using ST, with 
some help from LT and PIT, as well as sociology’s SNA theory.  
Chapter 3 explained the phenomena under investigation, the ‘what’ in this case study, in 
more detail, and also its significance, the ‘why’ in this case study. The chapter showed 
that the construction industry has had a long history in Australia, it is important to 
society, its structure has created intense competition with small profit margins and a 
short-term profit focus, and its culture has created a propensity towards unlawful 
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behaviour. Given this thesis is a historical narrative of the construction industry, it is 
important to know what happened before the period under focus, 2001 to 2003, to 
understand some of the factors which led to the social contract breach. The behaviours 
which led the RC to conclude that the industry was unlawful did not suddenly emerge. 
These behaviours were embedded in organisational practices, systems, norms and 
values. By looking at the history of the industry from a sociological perspective, it can 
be seen why these unlawful behaviours became the norm. The turning point appears to 
be a change in political ideology, brought about by the emergence of communism and its 
adoption by union leaders, particularly from the 1950s onwards. The prosperity of the 
1960s boosted union membership and strength. The 1970s saw a fundamental shift in the 
industry’s socio-political landscape with unions taking control and dictating the rules of 
stakeholder interaction. This evolved in the 1980s and 1990s into a culture that felt those 
in power could ignore the law and do things their way.  
The construction industry has significant economic and social importance. The second 
paragraph in the RCR explained that the industry “is critical to welfare and prosperity in 
Australia” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 3). Furthermore, the industry has widespread indirect 
impact on other sectors of the economy. However, it is not just economically important. 
In terms of LT, it provides services that make it highly desirable to society. The industry 
structure which existed prior to the RC was characterised by competition between 
construction firms (macro-level) and between industry stakeholders (micro-level). These 
stakeholders were dominated by owners/managers and the trade unions. However, there 
was a range of internal and external stakeholders involved in the construction industry’s 
unlawful behaviour. The intensity of competition was so high that it caused 
dysfunctional behaviour.  
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Chapter 4 examined the history of the regulation of the construction industry. The 
purpose of this chapter was to examine society’s expectations of this industry, that is, its 
social contract, and its behaviour compared with expectations, using the RC’s findings 
and associated documents. The chapter includes a discussion of what happened after the 
RC in terms of legislative change and other regulation, including the activities and 
reports of a new body, the ABCC. The chapter explains the need for regulation of this 
industry, how this was done, and the industry response.  
Chapter 5 reconstructed the social reality of how accountants work within the 
construction industry from a stakeholder perspective. The aim was to examine the social 
system that accountants work within this industry. The first findings relate to the nature 
of social interaction. The construction industry’s social networks were dominated by 
interaction between a few stakeholders, owners/managers, trade unions, and regulators, 
who had high density within these networks. The remaining stakeholders, including 
accountants, had lower density. The research found that social interaction within the 
construction industry contradicted previous research on network density. High network 
density was not always a positive factor; rather it often had a negative impact on social 
relations. This finding is explained further by the different types of interaction between 
stakeholders identified by this research (see figure 5.1 in chapter 5). It describes the 
social roles played. Whereas unions play multiple roles as advocates (for members), 
adversaries (for owners/managers), and whistle blowers (for regulators); 
owners/managers are negotiators (for staff), and avoiders (for regulators), as well as 
adversaries (for trade unions); and accountants play the role of providing information 
and reporting. The study, therefore, contributes to understanding of explanatory 
mechanisms within SNA theory by explaining that high network density can create 
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negative social interaction and that this is conceptualised by different social roles which 
distinguish positional interaction rather than people interaction.  
Two measures were used to explain the social behaviour of accountants associated with 
the unlawful activities identified by the RC: harmony and cohesion. The first measure, 
harmony, was defined by levels of homogeneity and heterogeneity within the social 
network. The list of processes associated with the unlawful activities identified by the 
RC had more homogenous than heterogeneous social networks. Almost two thirds 
(62%) of the 37 processes listed in table 5.2 in chapter 5 were heterogenous, while about 
one third (38%) were homogeneous. This finding indicates that accountants’ social 
networks, defined as the social practice around each process outlined in table 5.2, were 
more likely to have harmony because they were respected or tolerated by other 
stakeholders. This was evident in certain unlawful activities including tax evasion, 
employee entitlements, payroll tax, and inappropriate payments. On the other hand, a 
significant proportion of accountants’ social networks had disharmony and lacked 
cohesion because they were seen as outsiders or the enemy. This was evident in phoenix 
company activities, security of payments, and profit manipulation.  
The study here makes an important contribution to SNA theory. Whereas, previous 
research argues that harmony is a positive social practice, this study’s findings show that 
it can be a negative factor, particularly if the rest of the network is behaving unlawfully. 
In these circumstances, traditional measures of harmony such as homogeneity are 
actually a bad thing because it reveals that accountants, in this case, are accepting of the 
unlawful behaviour of the others within their social network. Therefore, the finding that 
two thirds of the accountants’ social networks are homogenous is actually a bad result. It 
suggests that accountants did comply with unlawful behaviour in the following 
activities: tax evasion, employee entitlements, payroll tax, and inappropriate payments. 
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Unlawful behaviour in these activities could not have occurred without accountants’ 
knowledge and, the findings suggest, without their cooperation. On the other hand, there 
is some defence for accountants doing the right thing. More than one third of social 
networks were heterogeneous, which means that accountants were excluded, mainly 
because unscrupulous individuals knew accountants would not cooperate with their 
unlawful behaviour. This suggests that in the following activities: phoenix company 
activities, security of payments, and profit manipulation, was hidden from accountants or 
their advice was ignored.  
The second measure, cohesion, indicates efficient teamwork. It is defined by the 
democracy of accountants’ social networks in each process. This measures how much 
accountants’ opinions were listened to by other stakeholders. Almost three quarters 
(73%) of the 37 processes listed in table 5.2 in chapter 5 were democratic, while about 
one quarter (27%) were undemocratic. This finding indicates that accountants’ social 
networks, defined as the social practice around each process outlined in table 2, were 
more likely to have democracy because they were considered experts or advisors by 
other stakeholders. This was evident in certain unlawful activities including tax evasion, 
employee entitlements, payroll tax, and inappropriate payments. At the same time, a 
significant proportion of accountants’ social networks were undemocratic and lacked 
efficiency because their opinion was challenged or ignored. This was evident in phoenix 
company activities and security of payments. Profit manipulation had elements of both 
but was slightly more undemocratic. 
The study makes a further important contribution to SNA theory. Whereas, previous 
research argues that cohesion is a positive social practice, this study’s findings show that 
it can be a negative factor, particularly if the rest of the network is behaving unlawfully. 
In these circumstances, traditional measures of cohesion such as democracy are actually 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS  537 
a bad thing because it reveals that accountants, in this case, are agreeing with the 
unlawful behaviour of the others within their social network. Therefore, the finding that 
three quarters of the accountants’ social networks are democratic is actually a bad result. 
It suggests that accountants did agree with unlawful behaviour in the following 
activities: tax evasion, employee entitlements, payroll tax, and inappropriate payments. 
Unlawful behaviour in these activities could not have occurred without accountants’ 
participation and, the findings suggest, without their agreement.  
The findings then presented several social network scenarios which summarised the 
three measures of accountants’ social practice: interaction, harmony, and cohesion. 
Fifteen scenarios were presented in section 5.3 summarising accountants’ social 
behaviour, each illustrating different combinations of the three measures. Of these 
fifteen scenarios, nine provided evidence for subjective accounting, and six for objective 
accounting. Overall, the analysis provides support for the argument that accounting is a 
subjective practice.  
The analysis identified four types of social practice involving accountants and other 
stakeholders in the construction industry, which was conceptualised as four quadrants: 
trust, police, isolated, and hostile (see figure 5.2 in chapter 5).  The four quadrants are 
identified based on the three themes of interaction, harmony and cohesion used as the 
analytical framework for this section.  
In summary, the chapter provided understanding of the relationships within the 
construction industry. It provided evidence for the managerial perspective of ST which 
argues that management will be likely to respond to the expectations of particular 
(typically powerful) stakeholders. The results do not provide evidence for the ethical 
perspective argues that all stakeholders should be treated equally and that the (economic) 
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power of various groups should not allow them to have differential influence over the 
firm. The outcome of this analysis is the social contracts which are ‘negotiated’ with 
different stakeholder groups. The results argue that accounting is a subjective rather than 
objective process. Ideally, the seven unlawful activities mapped in figure 5.3 in chapter 5 
should be in the top right hand quadrant, trust, and accountants should be working 
closely with other stakeholders to ensure these activities are performed lawfully. 
Unfortunately that was not the case in the construction industry. In chapter 6 the two 
remaining stakeholder constructs, impact and expectations, were examined to understand 
why accountants behaved this way and the outcomes in terms of the different social 
contracts.  
Chapter 6 continued to reconstruct the social reality of how accountants work within the 
construction industry from a stakeholder perspective. The aim is to examine the social 
system that accountants work within this industry. The first findings relate to use of 
power by stakeholders within the construction industry. Construction companies 
operated under tight profit margins and were often under financial pressure to be 
profitable and solvent. Individuals, including owners/managers and accountants would 
also have felt job insecurity in an industry where companies regularly went out of 
business. On the other hand, trade unions had long-term interests to improve the working 
conditions for their members. They were able to use political behaviour to exploit the 
short term interests of others.   
The study makes a further important contribution to SNA theory by using causes of 
power to explain political behaviour contributing our understanding of the construct, 
impact. The analysis produced these findings. The first battle for power between 
stakeholders was owner/managers and unions. In this battle, the trade unions used 
coercive power by threatening to expose employers to regulators. The most common 
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threat was to expose tax evasion. There was evidence of the level of threat posed by the 
trade unions by the use of language such ‘go down the tube’. The trade unions leveraged 
the short-term focus of owners/managers by reminding them of the consequences if they 
did not comply with union demands, that is, business closure, which re-enforced the 
threat. 
What was the role of accountants in this political behaviour? Accountants had expert 
power based on their financial management capability. This provided them with 
opportunities to be advisors and even decision makers within construction companies 
regarding the seven activities listed as unlawful by the RC. However, this expert power 
had differing influence on other stakeholders. Chapter 5 showed that accountants were 
often shown respect and tolerance (heterogeneity), as well as being allowed to 
participate in decisions (democracy). However, they were also excluded as outsiders or 
enemies (homogeneity) and their opinions were challenged or ignored. Therefore, while 
they had expert power, this was not always enough to over-ride the reward power of 
owners’/managers who had the fundamental short term power of hiring and firing.  
The findings indicate that two types of power dominated relationships between 
stakeholders in the construction industry: reward power and coercive power. The main 
problem was the need for reward. In an industry with tight profit margins and the 
constant threat of business closure, owners/managers and employees were always 
focusing on the short-term and survival. The trade unions, on the other hand, were aware 
of the vulnerability of owners/managers and used coercive power to try to address their 
long-term goal to improve working conditions in the industry. A way forward would be 
to decrease the reward power of owners/managers. This would reduce employees’ need 
for reward and the need for trade unions to exercise coercive power. This might be 
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achieved by getting all stakeholders to adopt a long term perspective which embraces the 
viability of the industry as a whole rather than competing at the expense of one another.  
The main societal expectations of the construction industry were: first, contribute to 
public funds, second, pay employees their entitlements, third, pay suppliers their 
entitlements, and fourth, provide accurate performance reporting (see section 6.3.1 for 
explanation). Commissioner Cole was scathing in his criticism of the construction 
industry’s unlawful behaviour. While he is often highly critical of unions and 
sympathetic towards employers, he concludes that “every participant bears some 
responsibility” (Cole 2003, vol. 3, p. 211). Accountants played a role in the social 
contract breaches found in this chapter 6.  
Chapter 7 developed a preliminary conceptual model on the role of accounting as a 
legitimisation process, based on the findings presented in this study. There were four 
groups of findings: first, the role of accounting, second, policy outcomes, third, practical 
outcomes, and fourth, theoretical outcomes.  
In the first group of findings, several questions were explored. Why do accountants act 
subjectively rather than objectively when doing their work? By subjectively, it is meant 
that accountants have scope to act independently of the accounting standards; that is, to 
use their own judgment, intuition, experience, or organisational context to adapt the 
standards. By objectively, it is meant that accountants always follow the standards. This 
study has shown that accountants in the construction industry acted subjectively. They 
did this because accounting allows scope for what is called creative accounting. Why did 
accountants in the construction industry become involved in activities they should have 
known were unlawful? This was explained in chapter 6 by the pressure placed on 
accountants by other stakeholders (see the section on impact). Despite this, accountants 
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still have free will and choice about how they behave. To understand this behaviour, 
accountants’ motivation was explored. Accountants’ interaction with construction 
industry stakeholders was personal and impersonal. It was personal in the sense that 
accountants interacted socially with others in doing their work and in helping others find 
meaning and interpretation in their work outputs, that is, their reports. On the other hand, 
interaction was impersonal in the sense that the work produced by accountants would 
have been read and interpreted by others without any personal contact with the 
accounting staff that produced the report. This different interaction is explained by the 
type of work output, internal versus external, and the type of decision.  
In the second group of findings, the study provides regulators with information about the 
social practice of accounting which might be used to improve regulation of the industry. 
This could be done by empowering accountants to act as internal regulators. Given much 
of the industry’s unlawful behaviour occurs due to poor or inappropriate financial 
management, improved accounting practice in the industry could help restore public 
confidence and repair legitimation.  
Policy improvements could be led by the lead regulator within each unlawful activity:  
• For payroll tax, the lead regulator is the Australian State and Territory Revenue 
Offices.  
• For employee entitlements, the lead regulator is Fair Work Commission and the 
Fair Work Ombudsman.  
• For inappropriate payments, the lead regulator is Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission.  
• For security of payments, the lead regulator is the BCISP Act 1999 in all States 
and Territories, apart from Western Australia and the Northern Territory, where 
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regulation is by the CC Act 2004 and is administered by various bodies in each 
State and Territory, for example, the Office of Fair Trading in NSW. 
• For phoenix company activities, the lead regulator is the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (ASIC). 
• For profit manipulation, the lead regulator is Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC). 
• For tax evasion, the lead regulator is the ATO. 
The chapter examined the current regulation of the construction industry, areas for 
improvement, and the role accountants could play. 
The third group of findings provide practical outcomes in terms of opportunity for 
accounting bodies to take action to improve accounting practice within the construction 
industry, addressing accounting standards, and a knowledge translation framework. 
There are multiple social systems within the construction industry (see chapters 5 and 6). 
Practical solutions to structural and cultural reform must embrace a systems approach. 
This study recommends a construction industry community of action research be 
established to implement the policy and practical outcomes.  
Finally, the fourth group of findings presents the theoretical outcomes. The study 
contributes to CAT by advancing our understanding of organisational power and 
politics, and its impact on the role of accounting. Critical study of accounting aims to 
comprehend the social contexts within which accounting issues exist. This approach 
examines how accounting may serve a useful social purpose and how its practice may be 
continually improved. The study explores the role of accounting in legitimising an 
industry characterized by unlawful behaviour. The findings show that accountants were 
placed under considerable pressure by other industry stakeholders to become involved in 
seven unlawful behaviours. The study provides evidence that accounting is a subjective 
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rather than objective practice. It concludes with recommendations about how accounting 
practice may be improved to repair legitimisation in an industry that appears to ignore 
public interest.  
Whereas section 8.2 summarizes the research findings by chapter, section 8.3 
summarizes the research findings by research question. These 16 questions were posed 
in section 2.4 – research objectives. They were then discussed in the context of each 
chapter summary, thereby linking the findings by chapter and by research question. 
Section 8.3 organizes the discussion of the research questions in terms of the two broad 
themes, pre and post RC. Theme 1 – What Led to the RC (up to 2003), explained why 
and how society intervenes in business activity. In this study, it was used to explain why 
the regulator, the Federal Government, felt it needed to take action to improve behaviour 
in the construction industry. It is also used to explain the types of regulation used by the 
Government and accounting bodies. This theme includes research questions 1 to 9. 
Theme 2 – Post RC (after 2003), explained why and how non-compliance with the social 
contract occurs and the response of industry stakeholders. This theme includes research 
questions 10 to 16. 
 
8.3 Research Questions 
The research questions are outlined below followed by a brief discussion of the research 
findings for each question.  
Theme 1 – What Caused the Royal Commission (up to 2003) 
1. Why was the construction industry sufficiently important for the Australian 
Federal Government to launch a Royal Commission? (chapter 3) 
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The construction industry has significant economic and social importance. The second 
paragraph in the RCR explained that the industry “is critical to welfare and prosperity in 
Australia” (Cole 2003, vol. 1, p. 3). Furthermore, the industry has widespread indirect 
impact on other sectors of the economy. However, it is not just economically important. 
In terms of LT, it provides services that make it highly desirable to society (Suchman 
1995, p. 574). It provides essential residential and commercial accommodation, as well 
as infrastructure essential to society and it also improves the standard of living.  
2. Why did the Federal Government choose to conduct a Royal Commission into 
the construction industry? (chapter 4) 
The Australian Government’s main interest in the construction industry was concern that 
it was not operating productively. In other words, it was not using the resources 
allocated to it by society in an effective manner. The lack of productivity meant that 
there were market inefficiencies, capital and other resources, such as labour, not being 
used by society in a way that met its best interests.  
There was another serious concern for government. Many of its constituents were being 
directly affected by the industry’s behaviour. As the second Business Industry Taskforce 
Report (Hadgkiss 2005) stated, many Australians seeking an honest living,  both 
business owners (contractors) and workers,  suffered social inequities such as financial 
hardship, job loss, violence, and intimidation, as a result of behaviour in the construction 
industry. It was in the public interest that this behaviour, stop. 
The construction industry did not always misbehave. The industry began with a strong 
sense of social justice, and the friendly societies in the period 1790-1820 created a 
benevolent culture based on sharing and support for the less fortunate. The industry’s 
culture changed in the 1900s as the friendly societies became trade unions. The 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS  545 
relationship between employers and employees became more adversarial. The 1930s 
marked the most dramatic change in behaviour of the unions, as communism infiltrated 
the union movement, and people with communist ideology assumed leadership. From 
this period, the unions became increasingly militant and aggressive in negotiating 
demands from employers on behalf of their members. 
3. Did regulation of accounting practice in the construction industry act in the 
interests of the public or its constituents? (chapter 7) 
The RC findings and recommendations covered a range of cultural and structural reform. 
However, they focused mainly on owners/managers and trade unions. There was no 
specific mention of changes to accounting practice or improved regulation. Therefore, 
this question was not examined in the main historical narrative of the thesis, that is, 
chapters 5 and 6. However, chapter 7 provided guidelines emerging from this thesis 
which could improve the role of accounting in legitimising the construction industry.  
4. Why does the construction industry need to be perceived as legitimate? What 
resources are conferred as a result? (chapter 3) 
Legitimacy is “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
[organisation or industry] are desirable, proper, or appropriate, within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 574). It 
is considered essential because it means society agrees to allow the organisation or 
industry access to necessary resources for survival. These resources could be any factor 
of production such as raw materials, land, office, retail or manufacturing space, and 
employees. Legitimacy is a status conferred upon by society, in other words, it has to be 
earned. The construction industry has access to the input factors it needs for production 
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which includes staff, building materials, technology, and finance. Society might deny 
construction companies access to these resources if it engages in illegitimate activity.  
5. What criteria does society set in adjudging legitimate status? How can it be 
known if the industry is legitimate? (chapter 4) 
Two scenarios were presented to explain why the regulator, the Federal Government, 
increased its regulation of the industry and led to the RC in 2003. The first scenario, IIS, 
is where the regulator suddenly loses patience does not explain what happened, because 
the Government had a history of enquiries and action to discipline the industry, 
particularly the unions.  
The second scenario, DSS, more accurately explains what happened. The analysis of the 
government enquiries shows that the regulator was unsatisfied with the behaviour of the 
construction industry for at least a decade before the RC. Therefore, the social contract 
breach was not something that was hidden and suddenly emerged. The catalyst was 
probably the Four Corners media investigation, which gave wide public exposure to the 
behaviour of the trade union officials within the industry. While the information 
provided by the media investigation was not new, it highlighted for many people the 
seriousness of the cultural problems within the industry. The CDA of the Four Corners 
transcript shows a blatant disregard for others’ opinions, that is society, and suggests 
some of the union officials saw themselves a law unto themselves. The lack of respect 
for society opinion showed a disregard for the social contract. It suggested some union 
officials did not care what society expected. The self-interest of some individuals was 
further highlighted by the union in-fighting. The pursuit of power was not limited to 
conflict between stakeholders, it occurred within the unions themselves. The publicity 
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surrounding this media report suggested to the Government that they must act and that 
society would no longer tolerate the industry’s behaviour.  
In terms of LT, the construction industry’s behaviour was considered no longer proper or 
appropriate. While its services were still desirable, the benefits provided were 
outweighed by the costs of the inappropriate behaviour. Society, through Minister 
Abbott and the Australian Federal Government, indicated it was unhappy with the 
construction industry’s behaviour and launched the RC to investigate the size and true 
nature of the social contract breach. 
6. What processes does society expect of the industry to close the legitimacy gap? 
What information or disclosures are required to measure legitimacy?  (chapter 
4) 
The CDA shows that the PM’s Statement announcing the RC was conservative in its use 
of language (see significance) but critical of the range of activities involved in the social 
contract breach. It clearly identifies the unions as being at fault but also includes, 
implicitly, management and sub-contractors. The connections reveal illegality, inequity, 
and lack of accountability as the important themes in this document. The Government 
wanted to communicate to the industry that it would not tolerate this behaviour any 
further (see deter) and that it wanted to introduce fairness and accountability to the 
industry, particularly in terms of industrial relations and funds management and 
disclosure. Accounting is implicated in terms of the latter point.  
In terms of the individual CDA themes, the following conclusions were drawn. First, the 
analysis distinguishes between explicit and implicit social contract expectations. Explicit 
expectations are legal requirements, for example legislation or activity required by law 
(Deegan 2009). The analysis showed what the regulator expected of the construction 
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industry in terms of the law, and why these expectations were not being met. The main 
issues were industrial relations and employment practices, where the language used by 
the PM’s statement suggests connections of illegality and inequity. It allocates identities 
as union leaders being villains and workers and employers as victims. Implicit 
expectations are areas outside the law but still deemed desirable by society (Deegan 
2009). The main issue here was financial disclosure, where the language used by the 
PM’s statement suggests connections of unaccountability. It uses strong words to 
describe the significance of this behaviour, failure, and allocated identities in terms of 
management doing deals. It did not identify accountants specifically. However, financial 
disclosure is an activity that involves accountants, so they are implicated.  
Second, the analysis distinguished between pragmatic and moral motives. It showed the 
regulator’s perception about why the construction industry misbehaved. Pragmatic 
motives are self-interest, for example profit (Deegan 2009), which led to corruption. 
Moral motives involve responsibility, desire to do the right thing, for example good 
corporate citizenship (Deegan 2009), which involved appropriate use of funds. In both 
cases, the language used by the PM’s statement suggests connections of illegality. The 
identities were all those with self-interest, and while union leaders were implicated, the 
language is cautious, using the word ‘inappropriate’. Deegan (2009) identifies a third 
motive, cognition, which is shared mental models, for example peer group pressure, 
norms, or just the way things are done in the industry. This involves the cultural 
problems later identified by the RC report in 2003, however, at that stage the PM’s 
statement did not specifically use language regarding cognition, possibly because the 
cultural behaviours were unknown at that time.  
Third, the analysis explained the legitimacy gap, in terms of expectation change; how 
society expectations have changed over time, current requirements which were different 
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from the past; and organisational shadow, when previously unknown information about 
an industry or organisation becomes known (Deegan 2009). The analysis showed that 
the language in the PM’s statement identified expectation change as the main factor. As 
a result of the regulator perceiving the construction industry was not meeting its social 
contract, both explicitly and implicitly, and the nature of the industry’s pragmatic and 
moral motives, the government required changes to the way the industry was being 
regulated. The connections were about prevention and the regulator wanted identity as 
taking charge. However, the sign symbols showed that the regulator’s history of 
powerlessness showed it was dis-privileged in terms of the socio-economic power 
inequities amongst construction industry stakeholders. While the PM’s statement 
suggested the regulator wanted a relationship with the industry where it was a watchdog 
with a policing role, the social reconstruction of the reality of the industry at the time 
was that the regulator was often ignored. 
7. How did the construction industry perceive its role as a corporate citizen? 
(chapter 4) 
The RC lays the blame for the social contract breach mainly with the unions and for the 
reasons of self-interest and lack of fear of consequences. However, blame may be shared 
amongst all stakeholders. The ultimate cause of the industry’s behaviour is competition 
and profit. Industry structure meant intense competition, tight profit margins and a short 
term focus. Customers were demanding and wanted projects to finish on time and on 
budget. The unions were aware of these pressures and used them to their advantage. 
They set themselves up as the industry regulator, interested in the long term, due to their 
concerns for employment of their members. The sustainability of the industry was the 
unions’ goal because it meant safe and secure long term employment for members. They 
used tight profit margins and contractors’ need to meet time schedules demanded by 
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customers to negotiate a powerful industry position. They knew that industrial action 
would lead to delays, projects over-schedule, and unhappy customers. They used this to 
coerce contractors to cooperate with their self-interests in return for no industrial action. 
It was essentially industrial blackmail according to the RC. This assists our 
understanding regarding the nature of the social contract breach, that is, why and how 
the industry misbehaved. 
Evidence that the construction industry did not wish to repair its public image and seek 
to regain legitimacy status is provided in the previous sections. The evidence comes in 
two forms: the continued unlawful behaviour found by the BIT after the RC was 
completed and the creation of various regulatory measures (for example legislation) and 
authorities since the RC.  
There were clear signs that the union leaders actively sought to maintain unlawful 
behaviour. Indeed, rather than seek to regain legitimacy status, union leaders openly 
defied the Government and sought to challenge the laws imposed on them. The second 
BIT Report cites evidence that unionists “continue to break these laws” and other 
examples of civil disobedience (Hadgkiss 2005, p8). Rather than seek legitimacy, the 
tactic of the unions was to continue to challenge social expectations by often breaking 
the law.  
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence in the second BIT Report that some 
contractors tried to repair legitimacy by standing up to the unions (Hadgkiss 2005). The 
contractors employed the communication tactic, explain how you are doing what society 
expects, by reporting efforts to confront the unions to the BIT. These actions were then 
communicated to the broader public by the BIT Report. However, these actions did not 
work. The BIT Report lists several tragic stories of contractors facing bankruptcy or 
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substantial financial loss as a result of trying to stand up to the unions. Most accepted the 
unlawful behaviour as necessary if they were to survive, after trying to behave according 
to society’s expectations and it failed.  
8. How did society perceive the industry’s role as corporate citizens? (chapter 4) 
LT is used to interpret the RC’s main recommendations for cultural change in the 
construction industry. LT examines three aspects of the recommendations: social 
contract, breach, and legitimacy gap. Social contract explains the ‘what’, in terms of 
what society expected from this industry. Breach explains the ‘how’, in terms of the 
behaviour that the regulator found unsatisfactory. Legitimacy gap explains the ‘why’, in 
terms of the reasons for the gap occurring.  
The analysis showed that explicit expectations required industry stakeholders to follow 
appropriate legislation as law (statute), being aware of the consequences of illegal 
behaviour (law enforcement); while implicit expectations involved cultural change 
essentially related to fair work practice and employee empowerment and freedom. The 
breach explains why society felt the industry was not fulfilling its contract, that is, why it 
was misbehaving. The analysis shows that there was bullying, inadequate financial 
management, disempowerment, conflicting relationships, unfair workplace practices, 
industrial disputation, and unsatisfactory law enforcement. The legitimacy gap explains 
how this situation has occurred and how the industry behaviour came to differ from 
society’s expectations. The analysis shows that there was a culture of industrial pressure 
which led to organised financial mismanagement; failed moral responsibility to do the 
right thing by society and the owners of the resources conferred by society; and a shared 
cognitive denial of freedom of individuals to act without fear of consequences. 
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9. What was the nature of the social contract between the construction industry 
and Australian society? What did society expect from this industry? (chapter 4) 
Society’s expectations of the construction industry may be understood from two 
perspectives: 
1. Explicit: legal requirements, for example legislation or activity required by law 
2.. Implicit: areas outside the law but still deemed desirable by society 
Society’s legal requirement of the construction industry is what is explicitly stated by 
law, that is, legislation or other legal document, and endorsed by Government as the 
representative of the society in which the industry operates. This assists our 
understanding regarding what society expected of the industry, that is, what was social 
contract. 
Using the CDA to examine the RC’s view of the social contract, the language used is 
assertive and prescriptive. The significance of the RC’s recommendations is highlighted 
by the phrase requires significant cultural change. The desired activity is the rule of law. 
The politics are individual freedoms. The sign system is that the recommendations will 
privilege all sectors of the industry. The legal expectation, therefore, is that industry 
stakeholders need to change their cultural behaviours to abide by the law and give all 
individuals their freedom to act in accordance with the law without unfair workplace 
pressure. In order to achieve cultural change, the recommendations included establishing 
an authority to police the industry’s behaviour, with sufficient power to punish unlawful 
behaviour, and that the consequences of unlawful behaviour be clearly communicated to 
all stakeholders. Commissioner Cole’s frustration is evident throughout the RCR; with 
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industry participants but also with the lack of capacity for authorities to deal with 
unlawful behaviour.  
Implicit requirements in the social contract are those that are desirable but not 
enforceable by law. A cynical perspective might argue that the industry’s social contract 
prior to the RC was entirely implicit because it did not seem enforceable by law. 
However, the regulator had established a legal framework, as far back as 30 years before 
the RC, with the Workplace Relations Act 1974 and the Trade Practices Act 1974, which 
aimed to provide the legal tools to deliver industry reform. Therefore explicit 
requirements did exist. Implicit requirements are more related to moral motives, for 
example a sense of doing the right thing. Commissioner Cole’s recommendations 
include the implicit requirement of attitudinal change. Attitudes are difficult to monitor 
and perhaps impossible to police. However, attitudinal change was essential if cultural 
change was to be successful. 
The RC outlined the social contract in explicit terms by requiring industry stakeholders 
to follow appropriate legislation as law (statute), being aware of the consequences of 
illegal behaviour (law enforcement), and only dealing with union officials with proper 
accreditation and behaviours. Implicit expectations involved cultural change essentially 
related to fair work practice and employee empowerment and freedom. These themes 
would carry on throughout the next decade of regulation of the industry.  
10. How did the construction industry’s stakeholders interact with accountants? 
(chapter 5)  
The construction industry’s social networks were dominated by interaction between a 
few stakeholders, owners/managers, trade unions, and regulators, who had high density 
within these networks. The remaining stakeholders, including accountants, had lower 
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density. The research found that social interaction within the construction industry 
contradicted previous research on network density. High network density was not always 
a positive factor; rather it often had a negative impact on social relations. This 
contradiction with previous research is explained by differences in interacting with 
people and positions. When interacting with people, high network density will often lead 
to positive social interactions, as individuals get to know one another and build a sense 
of trust and reciprocity. However, when dealing with positions, the individual becomes 
somewhat obsolete, particularly in adversarial situations such as the construction 
industry. People see the person they are interacting with as being from management or 
from the trade unions and they immediately adopt an adversarial position irrespective of 
their frequency of interaction. Their positions means they are not allowed the 
opportunity to like each other on a personal level.   
This finding is explained further by the different types of interaction between 
stakeholders identified by this research. It describes the social roles played. Whereas 
unions play multiple roles as advocates (for members), adversaries (for 
owners/managers), and whistle blowers (for regulators); owners/managers are 
negotiators (for staff), and avoiders (for regulators), as well as adversaries (for trade 
unions); and accountants play the role of providing information and reporting. The 
study, therefore, contributes to understanding of explanatory mechanisms within SNA 
theory by explaining that high network density can create negative social interaction; 
and this is conceptualised by different social roles which distinguish positional 
interaction rather than people interaction.  
The findings then presented several social network scenarios which summarised the 
three measures of accountants’ social practice: interaction, harmony, and cohesion. 
Fifteen scenarios were presented, each illustrating different combinations of the three 
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measures. Of these fifteen scenarios, nine provided evidence for subjective accounting, 
and six for objective accounting. Overall, the analysis provides support for the argument 
that accounting is a subjective practice. A conceptual framework was designed 
incorporating the three SNA measures, interaction, harmony and cohesion, into a two 
dimensional matrix with four quadrants. These quadrants summarise the social practice 
of accounting in the construction industry in terms of trust, police, isolation, and 
hostility. The seven unlawful activities identified by the RC were mapped onto this 
matrix, with two, tax evasion and employee entitlements, being in the trust quadrant 
suggesting they are the most serious concerns for accounting practice because 
accountants were most likely to be cooperating with unlawful behaviours in these 
activities.   
11. What is the willingness of the construction industry’s management to listen to 
various stakeholder groups and adjust their behaviour accordingly? Who had 
the power in this industry? What power did accountants have? (chapter 6) 
Accountants had expert power based on their financial management capability. This 
provided them with opportunities to be advisors and even decision makers within 
construction companies regarding the seven activities listed as unlawful by the RC. 
However, this expert power had differing influence on other stakeholders. Chapter 5 
showed that accountants were often shown respect and tolerance (homogeneity), as well 
as being allowed to participate in decisions (democracy). However, they were also 
excluded as outsiders or enemies (heterogeneity) and their opinions were challenged or 
ignored. Therefore, while they had expert power, this was not always enough to over-
ride the reward power of owners’/managers who had the fundamental short term power 
of hiring and firing.  
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The findings indicate that two types of power dominated relationships between 
stakeholders in the construction industry: reward power and coercive power. The main 
problem was the need for reward. In an industry with tight profit margins and the 
constant threat of business closure, owners/managers and employees were always 
focusing on the short-term and survival. The trade unions, on the other hand, were aware 
of the vulnerability of owners/managers and used coercive power to try to address their 
long-term goal to improve working conditions in the industry. A way forward would be 
to decrease the reward power of owners/managers. This would reduce employees’ need 
for reward and the need for trade unions to exercise coercive power. This might be 
achieved by getting all stakeholders to adopt a long term perspective which embraces the 
viability of the industry as a whole rather than competing at the expense of one another. 
12. What is the social contract the construction industry’s stakeholders had with 
accountants? (chapter 6) 
The main societal expectations of the construction industry were: 
First, contribute to public funds. This was an expectation that construction companies 
would meet their corporate citizenship responsibilities and pay taxes. In this way, they 
would contribute to the funds gathered by government to be shared with all of society 
through government services. Tax evasion was the main problem in this area, but 
phoenix company activity was also a problem.  
If it is accepted that accountants must have played some role in these activities (see 
chapter 5), then it  may be concluded that accountants breached their social contract and 
may have bent the rules, that is the accounting standards, in their work with company 
directors involved in these activities. However, accountants’ social contract may have 
been unreasonable in this case. Evidence on how difficult it may have been for 
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accountants to change phoenix company activity, for example, is provided by how 
difficult the regulators found it to police unlawful behaviour. Anderson (2012) explains 
how frustrated the Federal Government was with continued phoenix activity six years 
after the RC. If the ATO felt powerless to enforce the law regarding phoenix activity, 
how could accountants employed by the construction industry have felt any differently? 
This evidence suggests that accounting practice regarding phoenix activity had not 
changed based on two assumptions. First, phoenix activity was actually increasing in the 
period after the RC. Second, accountants were unlikely to have the authority or 
disincentives to prevent fraudulent phoenix activity. Therefore, it is concluded that there 
were no observable changes to accounting practice regarding phoenix activity in the 
period after the RC. Accounting may be considered a subjective practice in regards to 
phoenix company activity. It was unable to stand above this activity and to enforce 
accounting standards to prevent fraudulent phoenix activity. Accountants employed by 
the construction industry were most likely applying subjective judgements in their work 
associated with phoenix activity depending upon the amount of pressure exerted on them 
by others, for example the company directors.  
Second, pay employees their entitlements. This was an expectation that individuals 
employed by construction companies would receive their salary and non-salary reward 
for their work. Underpaying employees or avoiding payment altogether through 
insolvency was the main problems in this area. In an industry with intense competition 
and small profit margins (see chapter 3), owners or investors and management would 
have been under pressure to reduce expenses and improve profitability. Given 
entitlements are an expense in the IS it is easy to see how underpayment of employee 
entitlements would have occurred in these operating conditions. The social contract 
breach affected relationship between owners/managers and staff in three ways. First, 
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employees pretended to be contractors. Second, was the use of cash payments. Third, 
was the use of pyramid subcontracting. These issues illustrated the systemic structural 
and cultural problems in the construction. This is a significant social contract breach. 
Society expects organisations to pay staff what they are entitled to. Australian culture 
has a legacy of ‘getting a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work’, which was discussed in 
chapter 3 in the history of the trade union movement. The consequences of non-
compliance and underpayment of employee entitlements, is that society suffers, through 
the financial impact for employees who do not receive their full entitlements. Yet, it was 
not just about underpaying staff. The industry developed systemic ways of avoiding its 
social contract with a deliberate intent to breach this contract and avoid its moral and 
ethical obligations to pay people what they are entitled to. Given the high involvement 
of accountants in employee entitlements (see chapter 5), they must accept responsibility 
for participating in this systemic breach of social contract.  
Third, pay suppliers their entitlements. This was an expectation that companies and 
individuals who provide materials and services to construction companies, including 
sub-contractors, be paid appropriately in return. There were two types of payment issues 
associated with the unlawful behaviour within the construction industry identified by the 
RC. First, delaying or withholding payments in the normal course of completing a 
construction project. Second, delaying or withholding payments as the result of business 
failure, that is, liquidation. These payment issues had a significant impact on security of 
payments. 
Fourth, provide accurate performance reporting. This was an expectation that 
construction companies would honestly and accurately report on their business activities, 
including profit reporting. Society includes public and private investors; as well as other 
stakeholders interested in the financial position of construction companies such as 
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customers, creditors (for example, banks), suppliers, and regulators. These stakeholders 
want to know if they will get a return on their investment, have their building project 
completed, and whether they will be paid. Profit manipulation was the main problem in 
this area. The consequence of profit manipulation is significant because the financial 
position and the results of operations do not fall into fair presentation of financial results. 
This means that the profit reported will not represent the long-term capacity of the firm 
to generate earnings. It is misleading the public. However, profit manipulation is not 
considered to be fraud. It is a matter of interpretation. This indicates that accountants 
engaged in profit manipulation are perhaps behaving inappropriately, particularly if their 
interpretation does not involve honest mistakes, that is, it is intentional; but it is not 
illegal, unless they engage in fraudulent activities. There is a grey area between creative 
accounting and deliberately misleading the public by providing false information. 
Accountants involved in profit manipulation in the construction industry might argue 
they were simply trying to serve the best interests of their company, for example creative 
accounting. Chapter 5 also found that this activity typically excluded accountants 
wherever possible, that is the relationship with stakeholders was hostile because they 
were seen as the enemy. Therefore, profit manipulation is the area where accountants 
would be seen as having the least contribution to the social contract breach. It may also 
be argued it was an area where they were placed under the most pressure by 
owners/managers using reward power to coerce them. It is certainly evidence that 
accounting is a subjective rather than an objective process.  
Commissioner Cole concluded that “every participant bears some responsibility” (Cole 
2003, vol. 3, p. 211). Accountants played a role in the social contract breaches found in 
this chapter.  
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13. What measures of legitimacy were imposed by the Royal Commission on the 
construction industry? (chapter 4) 
Chapter 4 showed that explicit expectations required industry stakeholders to follow 
appropriate legislation as law (statute), being aware of the consequences of illegal 
behaviour (law enforcement), while implicit expectations involved cultural change 
essentially related to fair work practice and employee empowerment and freedom. The 
measures of legitimacy were also defined by the social contract breach because 
Commissioner Cole specified the inappropriate behaviour society expected the 
construction industry to change: bullying, inadequate financial management, 
disempowerment, conflicting relationships, unfair workplace practices, industrial 
disputation, and unsatisfactory law enforcement. 
Further evidence to support these findings is provided by the RC Recommendations 
listed below.  
1. The building and construction industry in Australia requires significant 
cultural change. Such change is necessary if the rule of law is to be reintroduced 
to conduct and activities within the industry, if individuals’ freedoms are to be 
maintained, and if the industry is to achieve its economic potential. Change is 
required in the attitudes of all sectors of the industry, including governments, 
clients, head or subcontractors, industrial organisations and employees. 
2. In summary, I recommend that cultural change be achieved by: 
• The Commonwealth Parliament enacting a statute of special application 
to the industry. 
• Creating a new statutory norm which clearly delineates between unlawful 
and lawful industrial conduct. 
• Creating a Commission with responsibility for investigating unlawful 
conduct occurring in the industry. 
• Rendering those causing loss from unlawful industrial action liable for 
such loss and prosecuting such conduct. 
• Establishing a just, quick and cheap method of assessing and recovering 
loss caused by unlawful industrial action. 
• Imposing a statutory obligation to report actual or threatened industrial 
action to the Commission. 
• Providing that only fit and proper persons may hold office in, or exercise 
official functions on behalf of, industrial organisations. 
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3. The nature and extent of the unlawful and inappropriate conduct disclosed in 
the hearings before me and recorded in this report should not continue 
uncorrected. (Cole 2003, vol. 11, p. 3) 
Section 2.4 (chapter 2) in Theme 2 – Post Royal Commission (after 2003) provides the 
context for these findings. Section 2.4 explained how non-compliance with the social 
contract can also have a negative impact on the organisation or industry’s market 
reputation or image (Deegan et al. 2000). In other words, organisations need to see 
compliance with their social contract important enough to take action. This leads to 
questions about the RC’s findings and how the construction industry reacted. However, 
it also raises issues about the regulators’ response. Commissioner Cole was frustrated by 
the lack of authority allocated to regulators. This is illustrated by his specification about 
unsatisfactory law enforcement. The study recommended allocating responsibility for 
policy improvements to the lead regulator in each unlawful activity (see section 7.3.1 
and 7.6).  
Chapter 7 discusses the research findings and suggest ways that accounting may be used 
to address these social contract breaches and legitimise the construction industry.  
14. Did the construction industry’s non-compliance with the social contract have a 
negative impact on its market reputation/image? If so, how did this negative 
impact affect the industry? (chapter 7) 
The Federal Government continues to be frustrated with the construction industry and its 
ongoing social contract breaches. At the time of writing, twelve years after the RC, a 
Royal Commission into trade union behaviour is underway, including court proceedings 
against union officials. While these allegations are not proven, it is still reasonable to 
assume that the regulator has still not successfully reformed the construction industry. 
The social contract breach remains.  
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While the regulator is unhappy with the industry, it is difficult to say whether this has 
had a negative impact in terms of broader society, construction industry customers. 
People need homes to be built, roads and bridges to be constructed, and companies need 
offices and factories to be built. This raises questions about the consequences of social 
contract breach. The ultimate consequence would be that society would deny companies 
engaging in illegitimate behaviour access to resources. To fully enforce punishment of 
social contract breach, customers of construction companies could refuse to pay if the 
company is found guilty of unlawful behaviour. The Government, as a major purchaser 
of construction services, has the power to deny companies government tenders and 
building contracts. However, the construction provides a necessary service (see chapter 
3) which implies that some behavior may be overlooked. This suggests that social 
contract breach is able to be addressed only if there are significant consequences for 
non-compliance. The construction industry appears to carry on with unlawful behaviours 
because the consequences are not sufficiently serious. 
15. What role did accountants play in activities identified as unlawful by the Royal 
Commission? (chapters 5 and 6) 
Accountants were involved in seven unlawful activities identified by the RC. They were 
involved in 37 processes associated with these activities (see table 5.2 in chapter 5). 
Their main role was to provide information and reports. However, these processes 
involved the full range of accounting activities including identification, measuring, 
communicating, and decision making. For example, the tax evasion activities are mainly 
measuring, and the profit manipulation activities are mainly communicating. The 
measurement role mainly involved classification of assets with the aim of reducing the 
amount of tax payable. In the communication role, the accountant needs to consolidate 
financial information and produce regular reports (Birt 2010). Therefore, if the 
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accountant was involved in unlawful behaviour associated with these activities, it mainly 
involved financial reporting.  
When the processes characterised by this behaviour were examined, it is clear that only 
accountants are qualified to do this type of work, therefore, they took a leadership role in 
social networks involved in these unlawful activities. This has implications for this study 
in the examination of the role of accounting. Given the nature of the social behaviour in 
processes with these characteristics, accountants were heavily involved in these unlawful 
activities. Given the nature of these activities, the decision makers must have sought the 
involvement of accountants. The question then emerges: did accountants respond by 
telling decision makers that they must follow accounting standards at all times? If so, 
this would support the argument for accounting as objective practice. Or did accountants 
respond by doing creative accounting to help their employers’ goals? If so, this would 
support the argument for accounting as subjective practice. The results indicated that 
accounting was a subjective practice, which meant they responded to pressures exerted 
by their employers to engage in creative accounting and, at times, inappropriate or 
unlawful behaviours.  
16. Did accountants change their role in the activities identified as unlawful by the 
Royal Commission after 2003? (chapter 7) 
There is no evidence that accountants changed their behaviours as a result of the RC. 
Chapter 7 provides suggestions on how these behaviours might be changed.  
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8.4 Theoretical Contribution 
The study contributes to CAT by explaining how accounting practice was influenced by 
stakeholder interests, that is, the construction industry’s political economy. The study’s 
contribution to PIT is to examine the reasons why regulation of the construction industry 
was so difficult and to suggest how this may be improved. Furthermore, the study 
contributes to the PET of regulation reflecting broader cultural and societal values and, 
in doing so, advances the importance of the role of accounting in legitimising an 
industry with a long history of unlawfulness. The study contributed to LT by defining 
the nature of the social contract breach between the construction industry and Australian 
society, and strategies to repair legitimacy. The contribution to LT was to identify 
factors creating a situation where some stakeholders’ socio-political power exceeds the 
public interest, that is, the power of the regulator whereby the industry ignores the need 
to repair legitimacy. LT’s pragmatic construct explains that the politics in stakeholder 
relationships were defined by greed, exploitation, and stand-over tactics; while the 
moralistic construct was characterised by being irresponsible or powerless.  
The study contributed to ST from the managerial perspective by exploring how the 
constructs of relationships, impact and expectations help us understand the social 
practice of accounting within the context of a social contract breach. The contribution 
lies in the empirical evidence of the socio-political power inequities defining the social 
interaction between industry stakeholders which have breached their social contract. The 
ST constructs of relationships, impact and expectations explain why unlawful behavior 
emerged in this industry. The study makes several specific contributions to ST. First, it 
uses the theory of SNA construct of density to explain the social network interaction of 
stakeholders, contributing to our understanding of relationships. Second, it uses the SNA 
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construct of heterogeneity and homogeneity to examine behaviour between these 
stakeholder groups, with a particular focus on their harmony and cohesion, contributing 
to our understanding of ST’s ethical perspective. Third, it uses types and causes of 
power to explain political behaviour contributing to our understanding of the construct, 
impact. Fourth, the study identified four societal expectations to explain the social 
contract breach contributing to our understanding of the construct, expectation.  
 
8.5 Methodological Contribution 
The study contributes to the debate between traditional conceptions of accounting 
history and new historians. The debate centres around the importance of facts and the 
pursuit of truth by traditional historians (Funnell 2005, p. 138). Traditional historians 
aim to agree on the reality of the past and on the relevance of the facts (Himmelfarb 
1989). “It has been the traditional historian’s role to seek out the facts of history from 
hard evidence” (Funnell 2005, p. 135). It is the definition of evidence which might 
persuade traditional historians to criticise this study. The main source of evidence used 
by this study is the RCR, along with associated other reports and publicly available 
information about the construction industry at the period under investigation. However, 
these documents say little about accountants or accounting practice. The analysis 
presented in this study infers the role of accounting from this evidence. Traditional 
historians might argue that this is insufficient. The study should have gathered more 
evidence, perhaps by interviewing people who worked in the industry at the time. The 
study acknowledges this is a limitation. However, it defends this criticism on two points. 
First, it is highly unlikely accountants working in the industry would admit to 
participating in unlawful behaviour, therefore, the ‘truth’ would have been very difficult, 
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perhaps impossible, to discover. Second, this study is not about forensic accounting. It 
does not seek to find blame or to discover the truth of unlawful behaviour. It does not 
even seek to argue that accountants behaved unlawfully. The RC had already 
investigated the construction industry’s unlawfulness. Rather, the study sought to 
explore the role of accounting as social practice in an industry that placed pressure on 
accountants to be subjective.  
The study’s approach, therefore, was similar to post-modern historians which have used 
historical narrative as a form of “discursive engagement”, which is far from neutral 
(Funnell 2005, p. 135). This approach has used the text of the RCR, and the other 
associated documents, to allow the researcher to put herself into the minds of the 
historical actors, in this case accountants who worked in the construction industry at that 
time, and to construct a “readable invention” of the social practice of accounting 
(Funnell 2005, p. 135). This allowed the researcher, who has spent most of her career as 
a practicing accountant, to find interpretation and meaning in the text of the research 
sources, and to reconstruct the social reality of accounting practice in the construction 
industry. The researcher has also worked for the construction industry making it easier to 
engage with this discourse.   
While both the new and old history approaches aim to improve our understanding of the 
environment in which accounting operates, they differ in terms of their focus. 
Traditional accounting history tends to have a macro-economic perspective, which 
places accounting within the broader social context of society and its need for 
accounting (for example, see Littleton 1933). The new history of accounting explores the 
reflexive relationships between accounting and the socio-political system in which it is 
embedded (Funnell 2005, p. 144). New accounting history tends to have a sociological 
perspective, which explores accounting as social practice using social theory. 
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Accounting history has become less econometric and more socio-centric (Funnell 2005, 
p. 147).  
The study contributes to the current rivalry between new and old history in two ways. 
First, it examines the existence of multiple stakeholders within an industry and not just 
the political or social elites, in this case owners/managers within the construction 
industry. Whereas traditional accounting history might have written this thesis from the 
perspective of those with economic power, that is, owners/managers; the new history 
approach adopted allows for exploration of stakeholders with little power, such as 
employees and also accountants, and how this has influenced accounting as social 
practice in this industry. Second, it questions the role of facts and truth in accounting 
history. Whereas traditional accounting history has had a pursuit of truth, evidence, and 
objective knowledge; new accounting history questions the need for such a rigorous 
approach. New accounting history has a more subjective perspective about events, 
allowing for multiple truths and even facts, depending upon the lens from which the 
events are written. This study has illustrated how unlawful activities might be justified 
from the perspective of one stakeholder, deemed necessary for survival, but criticised by 
others as unfair or unjust, such as trade unions or employees. History depends upon 
perspective. The contribution is to advance our understanding of socio-political 
behaviour from multiple stakeholder perspectives, and to demonstrate that subjective 
truth and evidence still allows for a realistic portrayal of the truth of social practice. It 
does this by addressing Funnell’s (2005) guidelines on writing accounting history for 
new history researchers: 
It requires researchers whose primary focus is on the “what” and “how” of 
history which verifies dates and the specifics of historical chronology, the 
province of the traditional accounting historians, and those whose overwhelming 
concerns are to interrogate the historical record and ask “why” or “how did we 
get into this state?” (p. 147) 
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This study has embraced Funnell’s challenge. It has asked how did the construction 
industry breach its social contract and why did accounting allow this to happen.  
Social science researchers have been described as taking a ‘hermeneutic turn’, which is a 
realisation that the knowledge of an event can only be determined through interpretation, 
and that meaning comes through the interpretation of the researcher (Gaffikin 2008, p. 
235). All meaning comes from the interpretation of text, and interpretation is always 
contextual (Gaffikin 2008, p. 236). When reviewing documents, such as in this study, 
the context comes from the explanatory power of the knowledge, which varies 
depending upon the reader. This meaning is created in the relationship, the internal 
discourse, between the reader and the words written by the writer. The study is an 
example of how to use the context dependent method to better understand accounting as 
social practice. It allows us to understand the power of language to interpret the power 
between stakeholders within the social practice of accounting in the construction 
industry.  
 
8.6 Substantive Contribution 
The study makes a substantive contribution by advancing our knowledge of accounting 
practice. In his discussion of understanding accounting theory, Gaffikin (2008) explains 
that research may be undertaken to improve practice. This type of research tends to 
focus on understanding behaviour. As Gaffikin explains: 
This is done to better explain elements of practice or to understand phenomena 
such that predictions can be made as to their behaviour (Gaffikin 2008, p.5). 
From this perspective, the study contributes to the debate over whether accounting is an 
objective or subjective practice. The results argue that accounting is a subjective 
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practice. More specifically, it explains how accounting is subjective. Accountants use 
their judgment and experience to respond to their operating context. In response, they 
adopt creative accounting to provide solutions to their context. They might also step 
outside the boundaries of creative accounting and into inappropriate or even unlawful 
behaviour.  
The study also provides findings to predict behaviour by explaining why accounting is 
subjective. More specifically, chapter 5 explains the relationships involving accountants 
and other stakeholders. It makes substantive contributions by developing a new theory of 
social practice, based on the SNA constructs of interaction, cohesion, and harmony (see 
figure 5.2 in chapter 5). This produced four types of accounting social practice: trust, 
police, isolation, and hostility. Chapter 6 examined the use of power and politics by 
other stakeholders to coerce accountants to engage in creative accounting, and 
sometimes inappropriate or unlawful behaviour. Chapter 6 also mapped the different 
social contracts between stakeholders as an outcome of this social practice, and how this 
influences their expectation of accounting practice, that is the social contract for 
accountants. It finds that accountants will not always behave in ways that society 
expects, rather they may behave inappropriately if their social contract with their 
employer requires other behaviours. These findings allow us to predict accounting 
practice based on the social interaction (roles), use of power and politics (impact), and 
social contract (expectations).  
Gaffikin (2008) also explains that research may be undertaken to understand the role of 
accounting in inappropriate behaviour. He uses the example of business failure: 
This century has already witnessed some of the largest ever business failures. 
Such failures are not new and not purely the result of poor or inadequate 
accounting. However, the fact that they exist and seem to be getting bigger is 
reason to examine what possible role accounting played in these corporate 
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demises and whether improvements in accounting practices could have assisted 
in preventing them. In addition, where accountants have been accused of 
negligent or inappropriate behaviour, what accounting practices could have been 
developed to prevent such undesirable actions? (Gaffikin 2008, p. 5).  
From this perspective, accounting research may make a substantive contribution by 
examining the role of accounting in corporate disasters. Gaffikin is highlighting breach 
of social contract in terms of business failure, but the same objectives apply with other 
inappropriate corporate behaviours such as tax evasion, profit manipulation and the other 
unlawful activities covered by this thesis. The study provides guidelines for improving 
the social practice of accounting. It identifies the unlawful activities and whether 
accountants would be involved in these activities. It defines the accounting processes 
where unlawful behaviour may exist. Accountants would be aware of these processes 
and the pressures that may be placed on them when conducting them. Regulators may 
then focus their attention on these unlawful processes and work with accountants to 
develop industry self-regulation. The Code of Ethical Conduct expects that accountants 
do what is referred to as 'the right thing', and this is an expectation of ethical in any 
profession but perhaps impossible to guarantee in practice. The other difficulty is that in 
the construction industry, not all accountants are members of the professional bodies 
and, therefore, do not fall within the scope of the Code of Ethics. The recommendation 
about accountants self-regulating the industry are, therefore, aspirational and would 
represent an ideal outcome. 
The study makes sense of the complexity of social practice of accounting by developing 
theoretical frameworks designed to summarise the behaviour, for example see section 
5.3. It recognizes the multiple realities of the social practice of accounting; for example 
section 5.3 identifies fifteen scenarios of social interaction, and four roles for 
accountants, and chapter 6 identifies numerous socio-power situations (see section 6.2) 
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and social contracts (see section 6.3). The study reconstructed the social practice of 
accounting within the construction industry to examine the issue of whether accounting 
is objective or subjective, and then how to improve the social practice of accounting so 
that it may benefit society. These goals align with critical accounting research. 
 
8.7 Limitations of the Study 
The research is limited in several ways. First, there are methodological limitations. The 
study is a historical narrative. Critics of this method argue that, perhaps out of necessity, 
narratives are incomplete in the story which they tell and are therefore a weak form of 
history (Previts, Parker & Coffman 1990). These critics suggest historical narrative 
researchers should reconsider the way they reconstruct the socio-political context of 
accounting. This study has tried to address this criticism by embracing the new history 
accounting method, which explores the historical narrative of the role of accounting in 
the construction industry from a social practice perspective. However, Funnell (2005, p. 
145) raises concerns that if the new history moves too far into post-modernism then 
narrative “may no longer provide a source of common ground for all accounting 
historians”. Despite this, Funnell (2005) recognises the need for accounting historians to 
be open to alternative interpretations. Only then can the discipline ensure it does not 
digress into “dogmatism” and “intra-disciplinary intolerance” (Funnell 2005, p. 147). 
This study embraces Funnell’s philosophy and his love of accounting history and is 
evidence of this tolerance in action. In response, the analysis was spatially and 
temporally broad, in order to cover the complexity of an industry in breach of its social 
contract. The main source of data, the RC (Cole 2003), contained 23 volumes. Given this 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS  572 
breadth, it was impossible to incorporate every aspect, and such detail may have 
detracted from the overall account.  
Second, there are theoretical limitations. CAT may be seen as a controversial field. Over 
the past three decades, a “range of studies have been conducted using alternative 
theoretical stances and strategies to mainstream accounting research” (Lodh & Gaffikin 
2005, p. 155). CAT aims to “develop a more self-reflexive and contextualized 
perspective on accounting which sees the connections between society, history, 
organisations, accounting theory, and accounting practice” (Lodh & Gaffikin 2005, p. 
156). There are various views of critical accounting including: accounting significance 
as everyday practice, the role of sectional interests, for example stakeholders in 
accounting practice, and to apply fresh insights into the effects of accounting. This study 
is interested in all three perspectives but has the most focus on the second, particularly 
exploring the role of socio-political power inequities using ST.  
Critics of CAT may see limitations in this study from two perspectives. First, those with 
a socio-theoretical rationality perspective (for example, see Booth 1991) may argue that 
accounting as social practice is bounded by human rationality, and it may be explained 
by logical decision making. In the context of this study, this means that accountants 
should always be objective, that is rational, and that the subjectivity inherent in the 
study’s discussion of accounting practice in the construction industry, that is 
subjectivity, is incorrect. The study’s findings argue against this socio-theoretical 
rationality perspective because it finds that accounting is a subjective practice.  
The second limitation relates to Habermas’s distinction between “lifeworld” and the 
“systems” (Habermas 1988, p. 44). In their discussion of Habermas’s work, Lodh and 
Gaffikin (2005) propose that the above distinction represents two fundamentally 
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different ways of approaching the study of society. This is particularly relevant to this 
study as it is examining the breach of the social contract by the construction industry. 
These two views seem to be influenced by the researcher’s sense of self and society. The 
controversy in this debate is how the researcher’s sense of self is made conscious in the 
methodological approach (Habermas, 1988). Critics may argue that this study is too 
‘lifeworld’ and, therefore, too subjective as an interpretation by the researcher of social 
practice in the construction industry. These critics might suggest a more systems or 
objective approach would be better. The researcher’s defense is that the researcher has 
been a practicing accountant for many years, including in the construction industry, and 
the researcher’s view of the reality of social practice in the industry was influenced by 
the researcher’s own perceptions. However, this perception was based on a degree of 
experience which qualified the researcher to reconstruct this reality with some 
confidence. Despite this, it is acknowledge that it is the researcher’s reconstruction, and 
the researcher was influenced by the researcher’s own experiences as an accountant.  
 
8.8 Opportunities for Further Research 
The historical narrative in this thesis is broad, encompassing a complex industry, 
substantial data, from the RC volumes, activities, social networks, and social practice. 
Future research might focus on one or more of these areas to provide further insight. The 
analysis was based on publicly available information. Future research might involve 
interviews with individuals involved in the construction industry representing the 
various stakeholders, to gain further knowledge about motivation, behaviours, and 
culture. However, as pointed out in the section on limitations, it would be difficult to get 
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individuals to admit unlawful behaviour, so such research would need to recognise the 
challenges involved. 
There is a promising opportunity to investigate the future of the construction industry 
and the role of accounting in legitimising the industry. Chapter 7 provided suggestions 
for accounting emerging from this study. Future research could examine these ideas in 
more detail, perhaps working with regulators and other stakeholders to explore the 
implementation of some of the ideas. The construction industry continues to pose 
problems for Australian society and it has not yet repaired the legitimacy gap first 
established by the RC in 2003, now more than 13 years ago. It is in the public interest to 
legitimise this industry. The study has shown that accountants played a role in the 
unlawful behaviour, but also that accounting may help address the problems, particularly 
in the financial management of some of the processes associated with the seven unlawful 
activities identified by the RC. Rather than looking backwards, future research might 
learn from the lessons of the history presented in this thesis, and look forward, and 
consider how accounting might improve its role in this industry by implementing some 
of the ideas presented in chapter 7.   
Finally, the study began with an aim to explore the role of accounting, and whether it is 
an objective or subjective practice. The findings indicate that accounting is a subjective 
practice. However, the study also found that accounting in the construction industry was 
too subjective, allowing too much opportunity for creative accounting and even some 
inappropriate or unlawful behaviour. While this study concluded that subjective 
accounting is a realistic portrayal of the reality of accounting and indeed necessary due 
to the pressures placed on accountants by more powerful stakeholders, it also finds that 
too much subjectivity is undesirable. Future research might consider the following 
dilemma: how much subjective accounting is too much, and what is the appropriate 
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balance or tipping point? Chapter 7 argued that steps must be taken to reduce the amount 
of subjectivity in accounting in the construction industry, moving towards more 
objectivity. At what point may success be measured? When is the right amount of 
subjectivity reached? 
 
8.9 Concluding Comments 
The thesis has been an interpretative social reconstruction of the construction industry in 
the period 2001 to 2003, with some following narrative in the period up to 2011. As 
such, it may only be a partial coverage of this complex topic. The thesis has been shaped 
by the views of the researcher and the methodology employed. It has adopted a critical 
accounting approach based on using ‘new history’ narrative to examine the role of 
accounting from a socio-metric rather than econometric lens. Therefore, it has been 
interested in people, the industry’s stakeholders, and understanding their behaviours. 
The construction industry was characterised by a fierce battle for power between 
owners/managers and the trade unions. It seems that all other stakeholders, including 
accountants, were swept up in the momentum of this ongoing conflict. People made 
conscious decisions to engage in unlawful behaviour. It was so widespread that it had 
become normal, part of industry and organisational culture, and accepted as common 
practice. People broke the law routinely to survive. Commissioner Cole was highly 
critical of the trade unions, but also the owners/managers. However, he felt everyone in 
the industry shared responsibility for the unlawful behaviours, and that includes 
accountants.  
The thesis did not set out to identify unlawful behaviour or to lay blame. This is not a 
forensic accounting study. The RC has already investigated the unlawful behaviour. The 
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study does not attempt to prove that accountants were engaged in unlawful behaviour. 
Rather, it focused on the role of accountants who operated under extreme pressure by 
other stakeholders, their employers, in this complex industry. Evidence was presented 
that seven unlawful activities identified by the RC involved processes normally done by 
accountants. The study raised important questions about whether accountants were 
simply engaging in creative accounting in undertaking this work, if so it is evidence that 
accounting is a subjective practice, or whether sometimes they stepped over the 
boundaries of acceptable practice, into inappropriate or unlawful behaviour.  
In writing this thesis, it has been necessary for the researcher to engage in the story 
itself. As a practicing accountant for many years, the researcher has considerable 
experience in dealing with some of the pressures which would have been placed on 
accountants in the construction industry. Therefore, the researcher has written the thesis 
with a practical lens, reconstructing the social practice of accounting from a pragmatic 
perspective, rather than a theoretical perspective. As noted by Gaffikin (1998, p. 633), 
“it is not possible to separate the past from our perceptions of it. It is through our 
interpretation that we make the past coherent”. The researcher’s interpretation of 
accounting practice has influenced this thesis. For example, the identification of 
processes associated with the seven unlawful activities identified by the RC is an 
interpretation of how these activities occur and the involvement of accountants. It is 
based on the work of other researchers, but is also influenced by the researcher’s views 
of how accounting is practiced. Similarly, the analysis of the relationships between 
stakeholders and accountants (chapter 5), the use of power and politics and the outcomes 
of this (chapter 6), and the lessons learned from the role of accounting in this industry 
(chapter 7), are all influenced by the researcher’s experience as a practicing accountant. 
While this is a strength, as it provides a realistic, rather than purely theoretical, 
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perspective, it is also a weakness as it presents only one interpretation of this historical 
narrative. An owner/manager or trade union official might have a very different 
interpretation of events, and the role of accountants in this industry.  
The thesis concludes with optimism: optimism for the role of accountants, and for the 
future of the construction industry. It believes that accountants play an important role in 
legitimising industry and company behaviour and in repairing legitimisation, even in 
industries with such a significant and long standing breach of social contract as the 
construction industry. Accountants need to have the power and job security to self-
regulate this industry. Regulators might implement some of the ideas presented in 
chapter 7 and learn from the lessons of history presented in this study. The historical 
narrative constructed in this thesis is about fear. The construction industry operated, and 
still operates, with a fear culture. Commissioner Cole described this as conflicting 
stakeholder interests between the short-term and long term. It is really about fear for 
survival and employment. Only once this fear culture is addressed and individuals, 
including accountants, can feel safe in their workplace, can the construction industry 
achieve reform and be legitimised. Accountants deserve to feel safe in their workplace. 
Unfortunately, it seems that accountants in this industry did not feel safe, and some, 
perhaps many, engaged in behaviours they knew were wrong because they felt they had 
no choice. The future for accounting should be that accountants always have choice. 
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APPENDIX 1 THE ACCOUNTING 
PROCESS 
A1.1 Introduction 
This section provides a brief overview of the accounting process. The aim is to describe 
what accountants do, in simple terms, and who they interact with in doing their work. 
The overview is simple because this study does not seek to reconstruct the social reality 
of the accounting process in the construction industry. It would be difficult, and perhaps 
impossible, to reconstruct how accountants employed by the industry carried out their 
work during the period of the RC. To do so would probably require interviews with 
accountants who worked in the industry at that time and access to accounting 
documents, which would be very difficult when Commissioner Cole found it difficult to 
get industry stakeholders to cooperate with his investigations. Rather, the study seeks to 
reconstruct the social reality of the ‘role’ of accountants employed by the construction 
industry. This investigation of the role of accountants aims to examine whether 
accounting was an objective or subjective process within the overall social reality of 
what was happening in this industry.  
In exploring whether the accounting process was objective or subjective, chapter 6 
placed the activities identified by the RC as misbehaving, for example tax evasion, 
within the context of the accounting process. The purpose is to situate the unlawful 
activities within the day-to-day operations of accountants. As stated above, the truth of 
how accountants behaved on a daily basis cannot be known, but it is possible to infer 
their role in these misbehaving activities from two perspectives. First, by generalising 
about the processes that accountants normally do, this may be linked to the misbehaving 
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activities by concluding whether accountants would normally become involved in these 
activities, tax for example, as part of normal duties. This allows the study to draw 
conclusions about the possible level of accountants’ involvement in these misbehaving 
activities which will be explored in later sections in this appendix. Second, by 
generalising about the nature of accountants’ interaction with stakeholders, inferences 
may be made about the socio-power political inequities in accountants’ relationships 
within the construction industry. This allows the study to draw conclusions about 
whether accountants were playing an objective or subjective role in these misbehaving 
activities, which was also examined further in chapter 6. 
Accounting can be defined as a process of identifying, measuring, and communicating 
economic information about an entity to a variety of users for decision making purposes.   
Accounting information is designed to meet the needs of both internal and external 
users. As discussed in chapter 2, the construction industry has a range of internal and 
external stakeholders. All of these are potential users of accounting information. 
Accounting researchers typically examine the interaction of accountants with 
stakeholders in terms of decision making. Accountants’ interaction, therefore, may be 
socially reconstructed by looking at how stakeholders use accounting information and 
the role accountants play in helping them understand and use the information.  
Internal users need accounting information to:  
1. Make decisions concerning the operations of the business entity.  
2. Evaluating business performance.  
3. Resource allocation. This involves how best to allocate the entity’s resources. 
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External users need accounting information to: 
1. Assess the entity’s growth potential.  
2. Evaluate the entity’s capacity to repay debt and the level of risk involved with 
lending funds to it. 
3. Review the entity’s future prospects.  
4. Assess the entity’s profitability  
5. Appraise the tax paid. 
6. Evaluate whether management are using the entity’s resources effectively.  
Unions, managers, project managers, and accountants are involved in each of the three 
internal decisions; engineers and human resources are mainly involved in business 
performance and resource allocation; while other staff are involved in resource 
allocation and future prospects, external work. In terms of external use, owners/investors 
are involved in all six decisions; regulators and banks/suppliers mainly involved with 
debt payment, profitability and taxation; and society is mainly concerned with taxation.  
 
A1.2 Taxation Process 
Taxation is a complex activity. The first of the seven unlawful activities identified by the 
RC was tax evasion. It is the not the purpose of this section to provide a detailed analysis 
of how taxation is done. Rather it aims to explore accountants’ role in company taxation. 
If accountants are heavily involved, then they may have been also part of tax evasion.   
The process for accounting for company income tax involves the following steps: first, 
recognising the tax base of assets and liabilities, second, treatment of tax losses, and 
third, minimising tax payments.  
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In step one, the aim is to calculate a tax base. The BS approach to accounting for 
taxation focuses on comparing the carrying amount of an entity’s assets and liabilities 
(using accounting rules) with the tax base for those assets and liabilities (Deegan 2013, 
p. 630). This compares two BS’s: the one produced by following accounting rules and 
the one produced by following taxation legislation. The profit declared by following 
accounting rules can be very different from the profit declared following taxation 
legislation. Given tax is paid on profit; these differences create tensions in societal 
expectations. This tension may also spill-over into step two: the treatment of tax losses. 
The reason for these differences occur is differences in recognition rules. Some 
examples are provided by Deegan (2013) in the table below: 
Table 23 - A1.1: Some differences between Accounting and Tax Rules 
Table A1.1: Some Differences between Accounting and Tax Rules 
Item Generally Accepted 
Accounting Rule 
Tax Rule 
Many accrued expenses (for 
example long service leave, 
warranty costs) 
An expense when accrued Recognised as a Tax 
Deduction When Paid 
Many prepaid expenses (for 
example prepaid rent, 
prepaid insurance) 
Initially an asset – expensed 
when economic benefits 
used 
Typically a tax deduction 
when paid 
Revenue received in 
advance (for example rental 
revenue) 
Treated as a liability – 
recognized as revenue 
when earned 
Typically taxed when 
received 
Entertainment and goodwill 
impairment 
Treated as an expense Not a tax deduction in 
current or subsequent 
periods 
Doubtful debts Treated as an expense when 
recognised 
Treated as a tax deduction 
when debtor is actually 
written off in subsequent 
period 
Development expenditure Often capitalized and 
subsequently amortized 
Typically a tax deduction 
when paid for 
(Deegan  2013, p. 630) 
 
The use of words such as “often” and “typically” in this table; further illustrate the 
subjective nature of accounting. If the word “always” was used; this would support the 
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case for accounting as an objective process. It is interesting to note that these softer 
words are used more frequently in the interpretation of tax rules, suggesting more 
subjectivity in taxation compared with accounting. This perhaps helps explain why 
taxation was a major problem found by the RC; it creates more scope for creative 
accounting and unlawful behaviour.  
Step three aims to minimise tax payments. The first process is re-evaluation of non-
current assets (see process 3b. in figure A1.1). When non-current assets are revalued, the 
tax base is not affected because depreciation for accounting purposes will continue to be 
based on the original cost (Deegan 2013, p. 643). However, if there is an increase in the 
carrying value of a non-current asset as a result of re-evaluation, there is an implication 
that this should be recognised as an expected increase in the future flow of economic 
benefits (Deegan 2013, p. 643). Minimising tax payments is not illegal. However, it 
creates opportunity to push the boundaries too far and move into the area of tax evasion, 
which is illegal.  
The following figure A1.1 provides a summary of the processes involved in income tax 
activity. It defines the three steps outlined above, along with associated processes. The 
processes in bold are the main opportunities for unlawful behaviour associated with 
taxation activity. The other processes may be considered lawful. The legend on the right 
outlines the internal and external stakeholders involved in the construction industry. At 
this stage, it is helpful to highlight where accountants might be involved. It is reasonable 
to assume that accountants would have been involved in steps 2 and 3. They would 
probably have been involved in the unlawful activities 2a and 3a to 3e in particular.  
Figure 11 - A1.1: Taxation Process Map 
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A1.3 Employee Entitlements Process 
The second of the seven unlawful activities identified by the RC was underpayment of 
employee entitlements. It is the not the purpose of this section to provide a detailed 
analysis of how employee entitlements is done. Rather it aims to explore accountants’ 
role in employee entitlements. If accountants are heavily involved, then they may have 
been also part of underpayments.  
Employee entitlements are governed by law and are part of good corporate governance. 
For example, payment of superannuation by entities is regulated by the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission under the Superannuation Industry 
(Supervision) Act 1993(C’wth). Most companies typically follow the law with employee 
entitlements in order to demonstrate best practice and good business ethics. However, 
successful protection of employee entitlements is not straightforward. Anderson (2014, p. 
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118) found in her review of employee entitlements  across multiple Australian cases that 
it “is often a matter of timing, strategic choices, innovative approaches, regulator 
intervention, gritty determination by insolvency practitioners, union pressure, political 
expediency or a happy confluence of circumstances”. This suggests that best practice 
employee entitlements is the result of pressure from groups with vested interests, 
particularly regulators and unions, as well as chance.  
The management of employee entitlements involves the following steps: first, determine 
employee entitlements, second, distributive justice (fairness), and third, procedural 
justice (equity).  
In the first step, the company determines the level of employee entitlements it is willing 
to provide for its employees. This may be done lawfully or unlawfully. If done lawfully, 
the correct level of employee entitlements is recorded in the IS as an expense (see 
process 1b in figure A1.2), and the company seeks legal advice to ensure it is compliant 
(see process 1d. in figure A1.2). If unlawful, the company may seek to manipulate 
employee entitlements payments by under paying (see process 1c. in figure A1.2), and 
declare insolvency to avoid paying employee entitlements (see process 1f. in figure 
A1.2). The following case explains how insolvency works to avoid paying employee 
entitlements: 
As in McCluskey, the employees (at Steel Tank and Pipe) had been transferred, 
without their knowledge, to five different companies that had no assets, 
ostensibly for tax reasons. All of the companies within the Group were 
undercapitalized, and the family shareholders had placed charges over the assets 
of the company in the weeks prior to the Group’s collapse (Anderson 2014, p. 
123). 
Insolvency aims to avoid paying employee entitlements by declaring bankruptcy and 
claiming the company cannot afford to pay its employees what they are entitled to. The 
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regulators are well aware that some unscrupulous individuals will seek to avoid their 
legal obligations in terms of employee entitlements. As a result, the Federal Government 
has introduced various legislation aimed to deter unlawful behaviour and encourage 
company directors comply (see process 1d. in figure A1.2). For example, the 
Explanatory Memorandum which preceded the enactment of the Corporations Law 
Amendment (Employee Entitlements) Act 2000 (C’wth), the object of s 596AB explained 
that the introduction of a liquidator to try to save struggling companies was a way to 
protect employee entitlements (Anderson 2014).  
In the second step, the aim is to ensure that employees feel their employee entitlements 
is fair. This involves philosophical debate about the nature of work and social exchange 
theory. Perceptions of fairness about the level of employee entitlements is based on 
whether the employee sees entitlement as a right (see process 2b. in figure A1.2) or 
entitlement as something to be earned (see process 2c. in figure A1.2). For many 
employees, entitlements such as wages, superannuation and leave are seen as a right. In 
return for giving their services to their employer, individuals would expect to receive 
these entitlements. It gets more ambiguous when the level of entitlements is discussed. 
Employees covered by an industrial award or an enterprise agreement would expect to 
receive the level of employee entitlements relevant to their work. Under these 
circumstances, the agreement should ensure that employees’ expectations would be 
aligned with what the employer offered (see process 2f in figure A1.2) if both the 
employer and the employee meet their obligations under the agreement. However, 
employees not covered by an agreement may see differences in levels of employee 
entitlements, particularly wages, which could also translate into other employee 
entitlements areas if a percentage of wages is the denominator. In this latter group in 
particular, entitlement is probably more something to be earned in the sense that good 
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work performance is rewarded with higher wages and then higher employee 
entitlements.  
Perceptions of fairness about the level of employee entitlements are also based on the 
nature of the employees’ emotional relationship with their employer. Individuals with 
low levels of psychological contract with their employer (see process 2d. in figure A1.2), 
are probably more likely to accept lower employee entitlements. On the other hand, 
individuals with high levels of psychological contract with their employer (see process 
2e. in figure A1.2) will probably want higher levels of employee entitlements. They 
expect higher reward for their extra loyalty and commitment. This creates a tension in 
aligning employers and employees’ employee entitlements (see process 2f in figure 
A1.2). In industries such as construction, where employees expect low ambiguity due to 
their perception that employee entitlements is a right and governed by industrial 
agreements, individuals expect that employers should meet their employee entitlements 
expectations. For the employees, this is only fair. However, employers may see their 
employees having low psychological contract, that is committed to the job and not the 
organisation, and therefore deserving lower levels of employee entitlements. 
Unscrupulous company directors might extend this thinking to justify avoid paying 
employee entitlements. This creates misalignment in employee entitlements levels and 
perceptions of unfairness. At this point, this is where the construction industry’s trade 
unions become involved in employee entitlements. Anderson (2014) provides case study 
examples of union involvement in employee entitlements.  
In the third step, the aim is to ensure that employees feel their employee entitlements is 
equitable. This involves discussion of legitimacy and opportunity for both employers 
and employees to ensure that employee entitlements is provided equitably. Perceptions 
of equity in employee entitlements is examined by theories about equity sensitivity. One 
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of the ways that construction companies could engage in legitimate performance 
bonuses (process 3b in figure A1.2) was reward for early project completion. In its 
submission to the RC, the Australian Industry Group (AIG) argued that “some project 
agreements had also provided for performance-related payments to employers through 
gain-sharing systems to encourage early completion” (Cole 2003, vol. 5, p. 115). This 
was a performance incentive offered to companies for good work; which in the 
construction industry included completing the project before the expected due date. This 
provided employers with flexibility to offer performance bonuses (process 3b). A more 
effective method would be for the whole workforce to negotiate with their employer an 
early completion bonus to be shared amongst each employee. Another means for 
implementing legitimate performance bonuses (process 3b in figure A1.2) was penalty 
and overtime payments.  
The following figure A1.2 provides a summary of the processes involved in employee 
entitlements activity. It defines the three steps outlined above, along with associated 
processes. The processes in bold are the main opportunities for unlawful behaviour 
associated with employee entitlements. The other processes may be considered lawful. 
The legend on the right outlines the internal and external stakeholders involved in the 
construction industry. At this stage, it is helpful to highlight where accountants might be 
involved. It is reasonable to assume that accountants would have been involved only in 
step 1. They would probably have been heavily involved in the unlawful activities 1b, 
1c, and 1e in particular.  
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Figure 12 - A1.2: Employee Entitlements Process Map 
A1.4 Payroll Tax Process 
The third of the seven unlawful activities identified by the RC was non-compliance with 
payroll tax. It is the not the purpose of this section to provide a detailed analysis of how 
payroll tax is done. Rather it aims to explore accountants’ role in payroll tax. If 
accountants are heavily involved, then they may have been also part of non-compliance. 
PTA (2010) explain that payroll tax is state tax on wages paid by employers and it is a 
self-assessing tax. The process for accounting for payroll tax involves the following 
steps: first, recognising the payroll tax liability, second, seeking exemptions, and third, 
minimising tax payments.  
In the first step, the aim is to measure the company’s payroll tax obligations (see process 
1a in figure A1.3). Payroll tax is a self-assessing tax, which means that the onus is on the 
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company to do the right thing and calculate and pay the tax required. This is done by 
calculating the company’s tax debt using PTA tax guidelines on thresholds and rates.  
The threshold figures are the total wages paid by the company as wages to its 
employees. For example, once a company reaches the figure of $689,000 in wages in 
NSW, it must then pay payroll tax. If its wages are below $689,000, the company does 
not have to pay payroll tax. As payroll tax is an additional tax burden and an unwanted 
expense for companies, it is easy to see how small companies in the construction 
industry would want to avoid paying it. Given the high proportion of very small 
companies in the construction industry, that is with one to five employees (see chapter 
3), many would be so small in terms of their wages bill that they would be below the 
threshold and could avoid paying payroll tax legitimately. However, in this step the 
company must determine its legal obligations to pay payroll tax (see process 1b in figure 
A1.3) and accountants would have been involved in this activity, as it would involve 
measuring the wages bill which is a company expense and would need to be reported in 
IS’s. The list of items defined by the PTA as comprising the wages bill may have been 
an opportunity for creative accounting in the construction industry, that is, not disclosing 
certain payments or not disclosing their full amount with the aim of avoiding the payroll 
tax threshold or reducing the threshold.  
The next process in the first step is to calculate the amount owing using the tax rate (see 
process 1c in figure A1.3). For example, a NSW company with an annual wages bill of 
$1 million would need to pay 5.45% payroll tax on the wages above the threshold of 
$689,000 (that is, $321,000). Accountants would have been involved in this activity, as 
it would involve calculating the expense payroll tax posed for the company. However, 
companies may try to reduce the threshold figure (see process 1d in figure A1.3). 
Companies could do this by determining levels of part-year employment, interstate 
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wages (it is possible for a multi-state employer to be liable for payroll tax in some states 
and not others), and group membership (one threshold per group) (Payroll Tax Australia 
2010).  This activity could be an example of creative accounting where the company’s 
accountants are directed by management to find ways to reduce their payroll tax 
obligations.  
In the second step, the aim is to reduce the company’s payroll tax obligations by seeking 
exemptions (see process 2a in figure A1.3). A common way to try to avoid paying 
payroll tax was to classify employees as contractors. In this way, the company can 
reduce their wages bill and, therefore reduce their threshold. Similarly, the “employee” 
may avoid paying payroll tax because they do not reach their individual wages do not 
reach the threshold figure. The PTA recognised this problem and explained that “a 
worker can be an employee even if they have an ABN and that ‘many ‘contractors’ have 
been found by courts to be employees” (Payroll Tax Australia 2010).  The next activity 
in the second step is to determine employee versus contractor employment status (see 
process 2b in figure A1.3). This is likely to have involved HRM staff rather than 
accountants, as it was a personnel classification decision. Whereas management would 
have probably told HRM staff who to classify as an employee versus a contractor; 
accountants would most likely have only become involved when measuring the wages 
bills of employees versus contractors, not who was in each group.  
The use of subcontractors was widespread in the construction industry (see chapter 3). 
Construction companies had a legal responsibility to ensure their use of contractors to do 
work for them met payroll tax obligations. Companies were required to pay payroll tax 
for both employees and contractors. Companies were allowed to try to reduce their 
payroll tax threshold by seeking exemptions as outlined above. This was process 2c in 
figure A1.3. Accountants would have been involved when the company is receiving 
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invoices from contractors for payment. At that point, accountants may have wanted to 
know who the contractors were and the type of services provided. However, it is 
reasonable to conclude that accountants would probably not have been primarily 
responsible for seeking exemptions regarding contracts.  
The next activity was to seek exemptions for contractors who were part of corporate 
groups. As stated above, one way of reducing the threshold for payroll tax was group 
membership (one threshold per group). In this way, companies could employ contractors 
who were part of the same group, and only pay payroll tax for the group as a whole. As 
shown in chapter 3, the construction industry had a complex structure (see chapter 3). 
This created opportunity for unscrupulous individuals to manipulate company ownership 
to engage in unlawful behaviour (see the next section on phoenix company activity). The 
one threshold per group payroll tax exemption opened the door for unscrupulous 
behaviour. Groups are created when two businesses are controlled by the same person or 
group of people. Grouping had two primary effects in terms of payroll tax: first, only 
one threshold for the group and second, each is liable for the tax of the others (Payroll 
Tax Australia 2010). Companies may try to avoid paying payroll tax via grouping . This 
activity, process 2d. grouping,  in figure A1.3 is the responsibility of management. 
Directors of companies have a legal responsibility to know who they are doing business 
with under the Corporations Act 2001. It is unlikely that accountants or human resource 
management staff would have been involved, or even interested, in the grouping 
activities of contractors. However, they might have become aware of unscrupulous 
activity in the course of their work, particularly if the company was dealing with the 
contractor group regularly and over a considerable time period.  
The third step in payroll tax is appeals (see process 3a. in figure A1.3). The PTA 
explains that in administering payroll tax, companies have two appeal mechanisms: first, 
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objections and reviews, and, second, reassessments (Payroll Tax Australia 2010). It is 
likely that accountants would have been involved in process 3a. However, it is unlikely 
that this activity was unlawful or inappropriate as the appeal mechanisms involved the 
regulator and the courts. Under these circumstances, accountants would have had no 
choice but to follow the PTA’s requirements for payroll tax, including all exemptions 
and other opportunities for creative accounting, to the strict letter of the law.  
The following figure A1.3 provides a summary of the processes involved in payroll tax 
activity. It defines the three steps outlined above, along with associated processes. The 
processes in bold are the main opportunities for unlawful behaviour associated with 
payroll tax activity. The other processes may be considered lawful. The legend on the 
right outlines the internal and external stakeholders involved in the construction 
industry. At this stage, it is helpful to highlight where accountants might be involved. It 
is reasonable to assume that accountants would have been involved in all three steps. 
They would probably have been involved in the unlawful activities 1b in particular. The 
other unlawful activities (see bolded) would probably not have involved accountants.  
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Figure 13 - A1.3: Payroll Tax Process Map 
A1.5 Phoenix Company Process 
The fourth of the seven unlawful activities identified by the RC was creation of phoenix 
companies. It is the not the purpose of this section to provide a detailed analysis of 
phoenix company activity. Rather it aims to explore accountants’ role in phoenixing. If 
accountants are heavily involved, then they may have been also part of unlawful 
behaviour. 
The concept of phoenix activity broadly centres on the idea of “a new company arising 
from the ashes of its failed predecessor” (Anderson 2012, pp. 411-412). There can be 
lawful and justifiable reasons to start a similar business when an earlier company fails; 
but often the behaviour exploits the opportunity to harm creditors by not paying 
liabilities. A 2009 Proposals Paper entitled ‘Action against fraudulent phoenix activity’ 
issued by the Treasury describes a newly-incorporated company taking over the business 
of a previously liquidated entity, which had no intention of  repaying its debts, as the 
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“basic” form of phoenixing;
 
and phoenix activity within corporate groups as the 
“sophisticated” form (Treasury 2009, p. 2).
 
 
The creation of phoenix companies involves the following steps: first, create new 
company name, second, transfer assets of existing company to the new company at little 
or no value, third, avoid liabilities of existing company, and fourth, avoid punishment 
from the taxation office or other creditors.  
In the first step, the directors of a business which is struggling to remain solvent, identify 
an opportunity to establish a new company. While phoenix companies may exist in 
parallel with the existing business, it seems that directors who face insolvency tend to 
declare bankruptcy, and start again with the new company. There are two main 
processes in this first step: identify insolvency – this creates the need for a phoenix 
company, and apply for and register a new company - this creates the phoenix company. 
The same directors of the old company will operating the new company (Cowan 2012). 
The new company will trade under a similar name to the liquidated company in an effort 
to exploit the goodwill of the old company (Cowan  2012). Directors tend to establish 
the phoenix company in the same industry as the previous insolvent industry. This is 
important because it enables the directors to build on their business capabilities for 
example industry knowledge, customer relationships, as well as being able to utilise the 
assets of the insolvent company.  
In second step, the assets of the insolvent company are transferred to the new phoenix 
company. “In a typical ‘phoenix’ company scenario a limited company will have 
transferred its assets to a new company for little or no consideration” (Cowan 2012, p. 
17). In third step, the directors of the new phoenix company try to avoid paying the 
liabilities of the previous insolvent company, whilst attempting to trade under a similar 
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name to the old company. In fourth step, the directors of the new phoenix company may 
try to avoid punishment from the taxation office or other creditors if they tried to avoid 
paying the liabilities of the previously insolvent business or other fraudulent activity. 
Directors can choose to do this legally or illegally. In the United Kingdom, section 216 
of the Insolvency Act 1986 allows for the possibility for a director of a failed company to 
“buy out” the company’s name and business and to genuinely re-establish the business 
(Cowan 2012). However, to achieve this, the director will have to obtain the court’s 
approval (Cowan 2012). If this is not done the director will not only have committed a 
criminal offence but, in addition, will no longer have the benefit of limited liability 
(Cowan 2012).  
If the directors try to avoid punishment illegally, there are two main processes in this 
fourth step: declare bankruptcy of the insolvent company as this avoids payment of 
outstanding debts, and avoid detection through a different company name. In terms of 
the second process, Cowan (2012) found that some directors seem to try to avoid 
detection by creating a new name for the phoenix company which is so different from 
the previous insolvent business that others may not realise it involves the same directors. 
However, the High Court found this activity to be illegal (Cowan 2012, p. 19). 
The following figure A1.4 provides a summary of the processes involved in phoenix 
company activity. It defines the four steps outlined above, along with associated 
processes. The processes in bold are the main opportunities for unlawful behaviour 
associated with phoenix activity. The other processes may be considered lawful. The 
legend on the right outlines the internal and external stakeholders involved in the 
construction industry. At this stage, it is helpful to highlight where accountants might be 
involved. It is reasonable to assume that accountants would have been involved in steps 
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1 to 3. They would probably have been heavily involved in the unlawful activities 1c, 2a, 
and 3a in particular.  




A1.6 The Making of Payments Process 
The fifth of the seven unlawful activities identified by the RC was inappropriate 
payments. It is the not the purpose of this section to provide a detailed analysis of 
making payments. Rather it aims to explore accountants’ role in making payments. If 
accountants are heavily involved, then they may have been also part of inappropriate 
payments. 
The making of payments involves the accounts payable function. In the payable 
function, the accounts payable staff match all three documents: the invoice, purchasing 
order, and proof of receipt, to ensure that the underlying goods have been received and 
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the payment is authorised, prior to making the payment. When the accounts payable staff 
authorise payment, funds are transferred from the company to the supplier. It is recorded 
as an expense on the IS, and as a cash outflow in the CSF. 
The payments process involves the following steps: first, matching support documents 
and authorising payment, second, recording transaction, and third deciding when to pay. 
In the first step, the accounts payable staff ensure that appropriate goods and services are 
received and authorise payment. The accountants’ role in the accounts payable function 
is to ensure relevant documents match before authorising payment.  
In the second step, accounts payable staff record the transaction appropriately in the 
financial statements and transfer funds to the supplier. One of the problems in the 
accounts payable function is ensuring that goods and services purchased are appropriate. 
By appropriate, the goods and services are allowable under the company’s policies. It is 
the accountants’ role to ensure accounts payable are appropriate and company funds are 
only used to purchase goods and services relevant to the business and approved under its 
policies.  
In the third step, deciding when to pay, the company directors will determine the 
payment behaviour which, as outlined above is influenced by the owners (customers) 
payment behaviour, but might also be pre-determined by company policy or random. 
Delaying or withholding payment is common in many countries (Tran & Carmichael 
2012). It has become an entrenched culture in parts of the construction industry across 
the world (Tran & Carmichael 2012). Companies engage in this activity to improve their 
own financial position; and it is referred to as opportunistic behaviour (for example, see 
Wu, Kumaraswamy & Soo 2011, p. 16). This behaviour is clearly desirable for those 
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delaying payment, and undesirable for those waiting for payment. It is unscrupulous in 
the sense that one company attempts to profit at another’s expense.  
The contractual relationships in the construction industry make decisions on payment a 
complex issue. In general, the contractor is responsible for the satisfactory completion of 
the work by a subcontractor and for the payment of subcontractors' claims (Tran & 
Carmichael 2012). This means that the owner, customer, pays the contractor and not the 
sub-contractors. The contractor is expected to manage their subcontractors without any 
involvement from the owner. Under these conditions, the owner may never be aware of 
when or even if the contractor pays their sub-contractors. It is reasonable, therefore, to 
remove owners from blame in unlawful behaviour associated with the third step in the 
payments process. Owners are indirectly involved in the sense that if they delay payment 
to contractors, this will be passed onto subcontractors. However, the main focus of the 
RC’s findings in terms of payments was on contractors or construction companies rather 
than those purchasing buildings. The relationship between contractors and their 
subcontractors now becomes our focus. Typically the conditions of contract for a 
subcontractor involve the subcontractor doing the work, submitting or lodging a claim, 
and being paid at a nominated later time or times (Tran & Carmichael 2012).  
Waiting until the owner pays and then pay subcontractors, was much more common (see 
process 3b. figure A1.5). This could usually be built into contracts. For example, owners 
might be required to provide regular progress payments over the life of the project (for 
example, every month). If the contractor knows they will receive this regular payment, 
they could build this into their contracts with subcontractors. Money received in March, 
for example, would be used first to pay any bills due at that time, for example including 
invoices received from subcontractors. Companies could plan this payment behaviour 
based on their known payment schedules from owners. However, complexities emerge 
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when projects are delayed, which happens regularly in the construction industry. For 
example, a project might be delayed by four weeks due to problems with an electrical 
subcontractor. Subcontractors associated with other trades for example, bricklaying or 
plumbing, may have completed their work and submitted invoices. But the owner 
refuses to pay that instalment of the payment schedule until all work planned for that 
time period, including the electrical work, is completed. Therefore, the contractor has to 
wait until the electrical subcontractor finishes their work until the owner will pay and 
they can then pay the other subcontractors. Under these circumstances, this is a 
legitimate delay in payment.  
However, not all delays are legitimate. Some contractors delay payments to 
subcontractors in order to improve their cash flow (Tran & Carmichael 2012). As 
outlined above, the contracting arrangements in the construction industry are complex. 
They include power differentials, which some individuals tend to exploit. For example, 
unscrupulous contractors may take advantage of smaller subcontractors by delaying or 
deducting payment without good reason (Uher & Brand 2008). Contractors know that 
many subcontractors in the construction industry are very vulnerable and struggling to 
survive. They know that subcontractors may not wish to damage relationships with 
people who provide them with work by complaining about payment. They will also 
know that subcontractors will usually have limited financial resources to pursue legal or 
other action to recover delayed payments through formal dispute resolution mechanisms 
(Tran & Carmichael 2012). Therefore, contractors may use their power to delay or 
withhold payment to subcontractors. Research has found that subcontractors are often 
not aware of the retained amount withheld by the owner from the contractor (Hinze & 
Tracey, 1994). Unscrupulous contractors could essentially lie to subcontractors by 
falsely blaming owners.  
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Research has also found that contractors are well aware of their actions when delaying 
payment. It is not an honest mistake. Wu, Kumaraswamy & Soo (2011, p.16) claim that 
payment delays seem “to arise from a deliberate choice of opportunism; rather than 
ignorance of the potential from ‘partnering’ or a long-term collaboration”. This means 
that rather than failing to see the damage caused or the need to build better working 
relationships with their suppliers, that is subcontractors, unscrupulous contractors 
deliberately choose to delay payment at the expense of their subcontractors. Finally, 
research has found that there is a correlation in this bullying behaviour and power 
differentials within the construction industry’s complex contractual system. There are 
differences in the incidence and degree of late payment between contractors and 
subcontractors related to company size (Brand & Uher 2010). In New South Wales of 
Australia, “firms with less than five employees and turnover less than $500,000 receive 
late payments more often than firms with more employees and higher turnover” (Brand 
& Uher 2010, p. 15).  
The final process in the third step, is payment during insolvency, referred to as 
bankruptcy at personal and individual levels while at the corporate level it connotes a 
broader term covering liquidation, receivership and the administration of firms. 
Insolvency is covered elsewhere in this appendix,  
The following figure A1.5 provides a summary of the processes involved in making and 
receiving payments. It defines the three steps outlined above, along with associated 
processes. The processes in bold are the main opportunities for unlawful behaviour 
associated with making and receiving payments. The other processes may be considered 
lawful. The legend on the right outlines the internal and external stakeholders involved 
in the construction industry. At this stage, it is helpful to highlight where accountants 
might be involved. Accountants would have been involved in steps 1 and 2. They would 
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probably have been heavily involved in unlawful activities in all nine processes outlined 
in the figure for these steps.  
 
 
Figure 15 - A1.5: Payments Process Map 
A1.7 Security Payments Process 
The sixth of the seven unlawful activities identified by the RC was absence of adequate 
security of payments for sub-contractors. It is the not the purpose of this section to 
provide a detailed analysis of security of payments. Rather it aims to explore 
accountants’ role in security of payments. If accountants are heavily involved, then they 
may have been also part of absence of adequate security of payments for sub-
contractors. 
The RC defines “the term ‘security of payment’ as attempts to redress a consistent 
failure to ensure that participants in the building and construction industry are paid in 
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full and on time for the work they have done, even though they have a contractual right 
to be paid” (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 229). 
Legislation to address security of payment in the construction industry was initially 
introduced in New South Wales and Victoria (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 245). The legislation 
provides a best practice approach to security payments, as it helps identify what 
regulators wanted in terms of societal contract, that is, desired behaviour associated with 
security payments. Both of the state’s legislation establish a system of progress 
payments, rapid adjudication of payment disputes, and contract reform (Cole 2003, vol. 
8, p. 245). The Victorian legislation is modelled upon the New South Wales legislation. 
The other states later introduced legislation that built on the New South Wales model. 
Therefore, the focus is on the New South Wales legislation for illustration.  
In New South Wales, security of payment is regulated by two different sets of laws – the 
Contractors Debts Act 1997 (NSW) and the BCISP Act 1999. Commissioner Cole 
(2003, vol. 8, p. 239, para. 50) explains that:  
The Contractors Debts Act 1997 (NSW) enables a subcontractor who has not 
been paid by a building contractor to obtain payment directly from the principal. 
This may be achieved through two mechanisms – attachment of moneys and 
assignment of debt. Attachment means freezing moneys in the hands of the 
principal so that the principal cannot pay the building contractor until the 
subcontractor has obtained judgment in the Magistrates Court for the amount 
owed by the contractor to the subcontractor. Assignment occurs once such a 
judgment has been given by the court. In these circumstances, the court may 
issue a debt certificate for the amount of the judgment. The subcontractor can 
then serve this on the principal, with a formal notice of claim, thereby obligating 
the principal to pay the subcontractor directly out of the moneys otherwise owed 
to the contractor (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 239). 
The BCISP Act 1999 initiated a system of progress payments, adjudication of payment 
disputes and security over payments (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 240). The BCISP Act 1999 
safeguarded entitlement to receive payment for construction work performed under a 
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construction contract (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 240). Section 3(3) of the BCISP Act 1999 
provides that: 
The means by which this Act ensures that a person is able to recover a progress 
payment is by establishing a procedure that involves: (a) the making of a 
payment claim by the person claiming payment, and (b) the provision of a 
payment schedule by the person by whom the payment is payable, and (c) the 
referral of any disputed claim to an adjudicator for determination, and (d) the 
setting aside of money as security of payment of the progress payment so 
determined (Cole 2003, vol. 8, p. 240). 
Commissioner Cole (2003) found that:  
Under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 
(NSW), progress claims for payments may be made by subcontractors against 
contractors; subcontractors against other subcontractors; contractors against 
certain clients; and suppliers against purchasers. Where payments are not made, 
the claimant, for example a subcontractor, may seek to recover the moneys 
claimed. If the respondent, for example a contractor, does not either pay a 
progress claim in full, or provide a ‘payment schedule’ within a specified time of 
receiving a progress claim setting out the amount of the progress claim that is 
disputed, the claimant may seek summary judgment in relation to the unpaid 
moneys. If a payment schedule is provided, then both parties are required to 
prepare submissions concerning the validity of the claim within a short period, 
and the matter is submitted to an appointed adjudicator. The adjudicator’s 
decision can be enforced via the summary judgment procedure. Each party 
retains the right to litigate in the courts in the normal way, but until a court 
determines the matter, the adjudicator’s decision prevails. Hence, a builder is 
required to pay money found to be owing by the adjudicator, even if the builder 
is disputing a subcontractor’s entitlement to that money in the courts. Only if the 
court action is successful is the subcontractor required to return the money. This 
adjudication procedure greatly speeds up the process of resolving disputes 
concerning security of payments in the New South Wales building and 
construction industry. It substantially reduces the cost of having such disputes 
resolved (vol. 8, p. 240).   
The following figure A1.6 provides a summary of the processes involved in security 
payments. It defines two steps outlined above, along with associated processes. The 
processes in bold are the main opportunities for unlawful behaviour associated with 
security payments. The other processes may be considered lawful. The legend on the 
right outlines the internal and external stakeholders involved in the construction 
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industry. At this stage, it is helpful to highlight where accountants might be involved. It 
is reasonable to assume that accountants would have been involved in both steps. They 
would probably have been involved in unlawful activities in six of the process outlined 
in the figure for these steps.  
 
Figure 16 - A1.6: Security Payments Process Map 
A1.8 Profit Reporting Process 
The final of the seven unlawful activities identified by the RC was profit manipulation. 
It is the not the purpose of this section to provide a detailed analysis of profit reporting. 
Rather it aims to explore accountants’ role in profit reporting. If accountants are heavily 
involved, then they may have been also part of profit manipulation. 
Profit reporting involves communication of financial performance; more specifically 
profitability to users of financial statements. It is an important measure of past 
performance, and also a good indicator of future performance. Therefore investors and 
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other stakeholders interested in future financial performance will rely heavily upon 
profit reporting.   
Profit reporting involves the following steps: first, profit or loss disclosure, second, 
exceptions to accounting standards, third, creative accounting, and fourth, fraud.  
In the first step, profit and loss is disclosed via financial statements (see process 1a. in 
figure A1.7). In financial reports, profit is disclosed in a statement of comprehensive 
income. Profit manipulation involves two simultaneous activities: first profits are 
inflated in reports to capital markets, and second profits are understated in reporting to 
tax authorities (Desai 2005, p.171). This then poses the question of how a firm can 
inflate and understate profits at the same time. The answer to this question is “firms keep 
two sets of financial statements: a financial statement that reports ‘book profits’ to the 
capital markets, and a separate financial statement that reports on ‘tax profit’ to the 
government” (Desai 2005, p. 171) (see process 3b. in figure A1.7 in this appendix). The 
two types of reports bear little resemblance to one another and follow distinctly different 
rules (Desai 2005, p. 171). 
Desai (2005, p. 184) asks whether the “degradation of profit reports to capital markets 
and tax authorities”, illustrated by the cases of Enron and Xerox among others, was 
indicative of random behaviour or “representative of some broader trends in the reduced 
quality of profit reporting”. He then explains that “the quality of corporate profit 
reporting can be measured in several ways” (Desai 2005, p. 184). “First,  it  is useful  to  
identify  the  degree to  which  profits reported  to  capital markets and  tax authorities 
are related” (Desai 2005, p. 184). In a historical analysis, Desai (2005, p. 184) found that 
whereas “simulated book income tracked actual book income fairly well until the mid-
l990s, actual book income has diverged considerably from both tax income and 
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simulated book income since then”. Desai (2005, p. 184) concluded that “while book 
and tax profits were once closely related, they now appear to have distinct dynamics”. 
The second measure of the quality of profit reporting is the “accuracy of forecasts of 
corporate profits and the accuracy of initial estimates of corporate profits” (Desai 2005, 
p.184) (see process 2d. in figure A1.7). He found significant differences between 
forecasts and initial estimates “usually associated with unexpected moves in interest 
rates and sharp economic contractions” (Desai 2005, pp. 184-185). This suggests that 
profit manipulation had reached the levels of severe macroeconomic factors; a finding 
that Desai (2005) called striking.  
Creative accounting (see process 3c. in figure A.110) “can directly affect the profit and 
loss account and also the balance sheet and it is also related to measurement or 
disclosure, the latter referring to the extent of to the method of presentation” (Matis, 
Vladu & Cuzdriorean 2012, p. 73).  
This raises the question of whether profit manipulation is inappropriate behaviour and, if 
so, is it unlawful. The generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) allow for a 
certain degree of interpretation in most countries” (Stlowy & Breton 2004, p. 11). 
Stlowy and Breton (2004, p. 11) explain that “to be legal, interpretations may be in 
keeping with the spirit of the standard or, at the other extreme, clearly stretch that spirit 
while remaining within the letter of the law” Interpretations may be erroneous (see 
process 3f. in figure A1.7), but never fraudulent (Dechow and Skinner 2000). 
Fraud occurs when somebody commits an illegal act (see process 4a. in figure A1.7). 
Stlowy and Breton (2004, p. 11) state that “in terms of financial statements, for instance, 
“fabricating false invoices to boost sales figures is fraud, while interpreting consignment 
sales as ordinary sales is an error”. The difference, however, does not appear clear to 
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everyone. Stlowy and Breton (2004) list classification of fraudulent behaviour: falsifying 
or altering documents (see process 4b. in figure A1.7), deleting transactions from 
records (see process 4c. in figure A1.7), recording forged transactions (see process 4d. in 
figure A1.7) or concealing significant information (see process 4e. in figure A1.7). They 
also include elements that fall under the definition of accounts manipulation: those 
related mainly to interpreting accounting standards. 
The following figure A1.7 provides a summary of the processes involved in profit 
reporting. It defines the four steps outlined above, along with associated processes. The 
processes in bold are the main opportunities for unlawful behaviour associated with 
profit reporting. The other processes may be considered lawful. The legend on the right 
outlines the internal and external stakeholders involved in the construction industry. At 
this stage, it is helpful to highlight where accountants might be involved. It is reasonable 
to assume that accountants would have been involved in all four steps. They would 
probably have been involved in unlawful activities in the nine processes outlined in the 
figure for these steps.   
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Figure 17 - A1.7: Profit Reporting Process Map 
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